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Introduction 
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of one of the most remarkable and consequen­
tial pieces of congressional legislation ever enacted. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("the 
VRA") targeted massive disfranchisement of African-American citizens in numerous 
Southern states. It imposed measures drastic in scope and extraordinary in effect. The 
VRA eliminated the use of literacy tests and other "devices" that Southern jurisdictions 
had long employed to prevent black residents from registering and voting.1 The VRA 
imposed on these jurisdictions onerous obligations to prove to federal officials that pro­
posed changes to their electoral system would not discriminate against minority voters.2 
Resistance was immediate both in the streets and in the courts, but the VRA 
withstood the challenge.3 The result was staggering. The VRA ended the long-entrenched 
and virtually total exclusion of African Americans from political participation in the 
South. Black voter registration rose and black participation followed such that, by the 
early 1970s, courts routinely observed that black voters throughout the South were 
registering and voting without interference. Similar benefits accrued to non-English 
speaking voters, particularly to Latino voters in the Southwest, after Congress amended 
the VRA to protect specified language minorities in 1975. This increased participation 
exposed less blatant inequalities and problems-complex issues such as racial vote 
dilution, the contours of which courts are still tackling today. 
These persistent problems have led Congress to extend and expand the VRA 
each time its non-permanent provisions were due to expire. The ban on literacy tests, 
as well as the "predearance" provisions contained in Section 5 ,  initially were enacted 
to last for only five years. Nonetheless, Congress decided to extend these provisions in 
1970, again in 1975, and for twenty-five more years in 1982. During the last renewal, 
Congress also expanded the terms of the core permanent provision of the Voting Rights 
Act- Section 2. 
Four decades after their original enactment, the non-permanent provisions of 
the VRA are once again set to expire.4 Congress must soon determine whether it should 
renew these provisions, make substantive alterations to them, or simply let them lapse. 
To make this determination, Congress needs information about the p ast and present 
status of minority participation in the political process. 
The Voting Rights Initiative ("VRI" )  at the University of Michigan Law School 
was created during the winter of 2005 to help address this need and to help inform the 
nationwide discussion on voting rights now under way. A cooperative research venture 
involving 1 00 students working under faculty direction set out to produce a detailed 
portrait of litigation brought since 1982 under Section 2. This Report evaluates the 
results of that survey. The comprehensive data set may be found in an analytically 
structured as well as searchable form at http:/ /www.votingreport.org. The aim of this 
report, the accompanying website, and the project as a whole is to contribute to a criti­
cal understanding of current opportunities for effective political participation on the 
part of those minorities the Voting Rights Act seeks to protect. 
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The Project: Background, Goals, and Methods 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted in response to the continued, massive, and 
unconstitutional exclusion of African Americans from the franchise. Despite the ratifi­
cation in 1870 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits denying or abridging the 
right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, state voting 
officials continued to devise mechanisms to exclude African Americans from the fran­
chise. 5 Judicial invalidation of one such practice often prompted the creation of another 
to achieve the same result. Moving from outright violence to explicit race-based exclu­
sions to "grandfather clauses;' literacy tests, and redistricting practices, many former 
Confederate states (and several others) successfully prevented African Americans from 
participating in elections for nearly a century.6 
Prompted by several notorious attacks on civil rights activists and recognition of 
the scope of African-American disfranchisement, Congress and the President acted to 
remedy the ineffectiveness of existing anti-discrimination provisions in 1965. The statute 
they created would both reaffirm the basic constitutional prohibition against race­
based exclusions from the franchise and make those constitutional prohibitions effective. 
The central provision of the Voting Rights Act is Section 2, which, as originally 
enacted, closely tracked the wording of the Fifteenth Amendment.7 To this Congress 
added Section 4, which suspended the use of particular exclusionary practices, and 
Section 5 ,  which demanded that jurisdictions with extremely low levels of voter regis­
tration and turnout seek "predearance" from federal officials before implementing any 
changes to their voting laws and procedures.8 The non-permanent provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act, including Section 5 ,  were extended in 1970, 1975, and 1982, and are 
due for reauthorization in 2007. 
Congress enacted the current version of Section 2 when it amended the statute 
in the course of reauthorizing the nonpermanent provisions in 1982. The amendment 
was a response to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the VRA in a case brought by 
African-American residents in Mobile, Alabama. 
By the summer of 1975, black citizens in Mobile were registering and voting 
without hindrance, a feat that would have seemed impossible a decade earlier. And yet, 
ten years after passage of the Voting Rights Act, black residents in Mobile noticed that 
their participation seemed to be making little difference to the substance and structure 
of local governance. At the time, African Americans comprised approximately one third 
of the city's population, white and black voters consistently supported different candi­
dates, and no African-American candidate had ever won a seat on the three-person city 
commission. Housing remained segregated, black city employees were concentrated in 
the lowest city salary classification, and "a significant difference and sluggishness" char­
acterized the City's provision of city services to black residents when compared to that 
provided to whites.9 Since 191 1 ,  Mobile had chosen its commissioners in city-wide at­
large elections. 
In Jru1e of 1975, African-American residents in Mobile filed a class action law­
suit challenging the city's at-large electoral system. Two lower federal courts held that 
this system unconstitutionally diluted black voting strength. 10 
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In 1980, the Supreme Court reversed. In City of l'vlobile v. Bolden,11 the Court 
held that neither the Constitution nor Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibited 
electoral practices simply because they produced racially discriminatory results. The 
Court determined that these provisions proscribed only those rules or practices enacted 
with racially invidious intent. Mobile's at-large system remained permissible unless the 
plaintiffs could demonstrate that the city adopted the at-large system for the purpose 
of diluting black voting strength.12 
In 1982, Congress responded to Mobile by amending Section 2 to create an 
explicit "results"-based test for discrimination in voting. As a consequence, Section 2 
provides today: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or [on 
account of statutorily designated language minority status].13 
Determining whether a particular electoral rule results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right to vote is a complex inquiry. The statute indicates that to prevail under Section 2 ,  
plaintiffs must demonstrate that, "based on the totality of circumstances . . .  the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a [racial or language minority] ." Plaintiffs 
must show that members of these protected classes "have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa­
tives of their choice." Relevant to the inquiry is "the extent to which members of a pro­
tected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision;' although 
the statute is explicit that it creates no right to proportional representation.14 
The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report to accompany the 1982 amend­
ment to Section 2, now known as the Senate Report.15 The Supreme Court has since 
described this report as "the authoritative source" on the meaning of the amended 
statute.10 The Senate Report identified several factors, now known as "the Senate Factors:' 
for courts to use when assessing whether a particular practice or procedure results in 
prohibited discrimination in violation of Section 2. Derived from the Supreme Court's 
analysis in VVhite v. Regester,17 and the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decision in Zimmer v. 
McKeithen,13 these "typical" factors are: 
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to 
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivi­
sion is racially polarized; 
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually 
large election districts, majority vote requirements , anti-single shot provi­
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportu­
nity for discrimination against the minority group; 
4. If there is a candidate slating process, ·whether members of the minority 
group have been denied access to that process; 
Documenting Discrimination 3 
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or politi­
cal subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively 
in the political process; 
6. ·whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle 
racial appeals; 
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to 
public office in the jurisdiction.19 
The Senate Report also identified two additional factors that have "probative value" 
in establishing a plaintiff's claim under the amended statute, often considered Senate 
Factors 8 and 9, namely whether "there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the 
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group"; and whether the justification for the policy behind the practice or procedure 
is "tenuous."20 
The 1982 Amendment to Section 2 dramatically altered voting rights litigation 
nationwide. While prior to 1982 plaintiffs had rarely invoked Section 2 in its original 
form, most plaintiffs alleging racial vote dilution since 1982 have consistently brought 
their claims under Section 2.21 
In 1986, the Supreme Court issued its first major decision addressing the 1982 
amendments to Section 2. In Thornburg v. Gingles, African-American voters in North 
Carolina challenged a state-wide legislative districting plan, and sought to replace some 
of the plan's multi-member districts with single-member districts in which black voters 
would comprise a majority. The Court used the case as a vehicle to articulate a three­
part test for bringing a Section 2 claim: the minority group must demonstrate that, 
first, that it is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in 
a single-member district;" second, that it is "politically cohesive;" and, third, that "the 
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it- in the absence of special cir­
cumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed- usually to defeat the 
minority's preferred candidate."22 The Gingles case itself involved a challenge to multi­
member districts, but courts soon extended its framework to cases where plaintiffs 
challenged single member districts.20 
Eight years after Gingles, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. De Grandy, 
which made clear that the Gingles preconditions were precisely that, preconditions, and 
not a substitute for adjudication under the totality of circumstances test. Courts that 
find the preconditions met must proceed to evaluate whether under the totality of cir­
cumstances relief is warranted. De Grandy found such relief unwarranted in the case 
before it- a  challenge to a statewide districting plan brought by African-American and 
Latino plaintiffs. The Court concluded that the plan achieved "proportionality" because 
"both minority groups constitute effective voting majorities in a number of state Senate 
districts substantially proportional to their share in the population." 24 
Two years ago, the Supreme Court h anded down Georgia v. Ashcroft, in  which it 
evaluated whether Georgia could replace several of its majority-minority districts with 
districts where minority voters constituted only a plurality. In concluding that nothing 
in Section 5 of the Act prevented Georgia from doing so, the Court relied significantly 
on its own precedent construing Section 2 .25 Recent Section 2 decisions now discuss 
Georgia v. Ashcroft when assessing challenges to various districting practices.26 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
A detailed understanding of Section 2 litigation informs several issues Congress must 
confront as it evaluates the reauthorization of the expiring provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act. First, the record of judicial implementation of Section 2 will inform the 
question whether the auxiliary provisions, such as Section 5, are still helpful today. To 
be sure, Section 5 is distinct from Section 2 in that compliance with Section 2 is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to obtain preclearance from the federal government. Nonethe­
less, analyzing the judicial record of Section 2 decisions - including the structured 
nature of the judicial inquiry under the Senate Factors - helps illuminate the extent to 
which meaningful minority participation in elections has been a reality in recent times. 
Put another way, Section 5 was originally enacted because "Congress had found that 
case- by-case litigation was inadequate to combat wide-spread and persistent discrimi­
nation in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to over­
come the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits."27 Even though 
the Voting Rights Act successfully reduced the incidence of those tactics, the persistence 
of many such "obstructionist tactics;' as this study documents, suggests that Section 5 
remains a useful tool today to protect the basic right to political participation. 
Second, the record of judicial implementation of the core provision of the VRA 
provides helpful evidence in determining whether the constitutional predicate neces­
sary for Congress to exercise its legislative powers in this area exists. Recent Supreme 
Court decisions have demanded increased scrutiny of the connection between the 
p erception of a constitutional evil and the remedy enacted under Congress's power to 
enforce the Civil War amendments. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court 
announced a rule that Congress could only invoke its legislative powers under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment where the Congressional legislation was "congruent and 
proportional" to "remedy or prevent" an underlying constitutional violation.28 The 
same is true for the power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment pursuant to Section 2 
of that amendment.29 
To be sure, Section 2 prohibits more than the Fifteenth Amendment itself pro­
hibits. In particular, Section 2's "results-based" test goes beyond what the Fifteenth 
Amendment alone commands. As a consequence, the record of Section 2 violations 
does not necessarily indicate the existence of constitutional violations, and therefore 
does not necessarily provide the proper predicate for Congress's exercise of its enforce­
ment p owers under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
And yet, an examination of Section 2 cases can provide the requisite foundation 
for Congress's exercise of its enforcement powers. As an initial matter, some Section 2 
violations are constitutional violations.30 These may figure directly into the calculus of  
whether the predicate for Congress's exercise of its enforcement powers exists. Moreover, 
courts assessing the Senate Factors in the course of adjudicating Section 2 cases have 
documented evidence that reveals a wide range of unconstitutional conduct by state and 
local officials in specific regions across the Nation. While these judicial findings are not 
formal adjudications of unconstitutional conduct, they represent the considered judg­
ments of federal judges nationwide that the evidence they reviewed reveals conduct that 
runs afoul of the Constitution. These findings accordingly provide a basis on which 
Congress can rely in determining the scope of unconstitutional conduct and the need for 
a federal law that goes beyond the simple prohibition of the unconstitutional act itself. 
Documenting Discrimination 5 
Third, Section 2 decisions tell a powerful story about the health of minority 
political participation throughout the United States since 1 982.  And they do so in 
Congress's own terms-in the way Congress asked courts to assess political equality and 
to determine whether to issue a remedy. Any examination of Congressional policy in 
this area should therefore begin with how the courts have addressed minority political 
participation in the course of implementing the VRA. 
Fourth, an examination of these decisions illustrates how both claims and reme­
dies have changed over the years. Enacted by Congress in 1965 to address the specific 
problem of black disfranchisement in the South, the Voting Rights Act has been amend­
ed to protect language minorities and today is invoked by several different minority 
groups to challenge a host of electoral practices throughout the country. The findings 
in these cases offer a lens, provided by Congress itself, through which variations in 
political participation over time and region may be viewed and evaluated. 
FinaJly, the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act's non-permanent provi­
sions offers an opportunity for Congress to give further guidance on how it believes the 
law as a whole should operate. Documentation of the judicial record in Section 2 cases 
- in particular, courts' analysis of the various Senate Factors and the judicial choice 
of remedies -therefore may be useful to inform Congress on how federal judges have 
understood the instructions contained in the V RA and whether those instructions are 
in need of revision. 
RESEARCH PROJECT AND DESIGN 
The Voting Rights Initiative is a faculty-student research collaborative established in 
January, 2005 at the University of Michigan Law School. Working under the direction 
of Professor Ellen Katz, a group of more than 1 00 Michigan law students set out to 
document the nature and scope of litigation brought under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act since 1982. 
Researchers began by searching the federal court databases on Westlaw and 
LexisNexis to identify electronically published decisions addressing a Section 2 claim. 
To develop this list, researchers searched these databases for every federal court decision 
that cited 42 U.S.C. § 1973 since June 29, 1982, when Section 2 was amended. The 
resulting list was then narrowed by identifying cases in which plaintiffs had filed an 
actual claim under Section 2, and removing all decisions that merely reference Section 
2 without involving a claim brought under that provision.'1 
Researchers then located on these databases all related decisions and organized 
them by lawsuit with a single litigation title for quick reference.32 Within each lawsuit, 
researchers determined which opinion provided the final word53 for the purposes of 
this project, since many lawsuits included multiple appeals and remands. The final 
word case in each lawsuit is usually the last case in the lawsuit that assessed liability on 
the merits and determined whether Section 2 was violated. If there was no such case to 
analyze, researchers coded as the final word the last published case in the lawsuit mak­
ing some other determination for or against the plaintiff, including whether to issue a 
preliminary injunction, whether to approve a settlement, what remedy to order, and 
whether to grant fees.34 In these latter cases, the contours of the underlying Section 2 
claim and the court's analysis of it were often difficult to discern as the reported deci-
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sion was addressing a distinct question. Still, these cases, especially preliminary injunc­
tion cases, sometimes included reference to some Senate Factors or other substantive 
Section 2 criteria, and where possible researchers documented these findings. Even 
where nothing more than the fact of decision could be discerned from these opinions, 
researchers included the lawsuit in the overall list of lawsuits to attempt to give as broad 
a picture as possible of Section 2 litigation. 
Researchers reviewed each case within a litigation string and followed a standard 
checklist ( see Data Key located at W\.VW.votingreport.org) to catalogue the information 
discussed and determine the outcome in each lawsuit analyzed. Researchers recorded 
which of the nine Senate Factors, if any, the reviewing court fotmd to exist, and whether 
the court ultimately found a violation of Section 2. Researchers also tracked how courts 
have treated the so-called "Gingles" threshold test ( set forth by the Supreme Court in its 
1986 opinion Thornburg v. Gingles'5), the law or practice challenged in each lawsuit, the 
implicated governing body, the minority groups bringing the claim, the involvement of 
expert witnesses, and other basic case data such as the judges and lawyers involved with 
the case. 
Each case was read and catalogued by multiple researchers working independ­
ently - then by research directors and then checked for consistency by editors. Since 
the completion of the case reports, searches have been designed and the database used 
to document and analyze the particular findings in this report. 
All of the case reports and searches to access this data are available at 
http://www.votingreport.org. This site includes lists of cases, organized by lawsuit and 
by state, that: identify a violation of Section 2; identify such violations in covered juris­
dictions; find each of the Senate Factors; challenge specific types of electoral practices; 
challenge certain governing bodies; and involve particular minority groups. 
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The Findings: Documenting Discrimination 
OVERALL RESULTS 
The Numbers 
This study identified 322 lawsuits, encompassing 750 decisions that addressed Section 2 
claims since 1982.36 These lawsuits, of course, represent only a portion of the Section 2 
claims filed or decided since 1982. Of the total number of cases filed, some plaintiffs 
failed to pursue their claims, many obtained relief through settlement, and others saw 
their cases go to judgment, but the courts involved did not issue any published opinion 
or ancillary ruling published on the electronic databases surveyed ( i.e . ,  Westlaw, 
LexisNexis). The total number of claims filed under Section 2 since the statute was 
amended is accordingly not known. 
The ACLU has reported that approximately 1 out of 5 of their plaintiffs' Section 
2 cases filed in Georgia and in South Carolina ended with a published decision.37 In 
Texas, the Section 2 litigation record of attorney Rolando Rios shows that 8 of 2 1 1  or 
3.8% of his law firm's filed Section 2 lawsuits ending with a reported decision.38 Insofar 
as these ratios of filings to reported decisions are at all representative, this study's com­
pilation of 323 lawsuits suggests more than 1 600 Section 2 filings nationwide with 
filings in covered jurisdictions possibly exceeding 800 filings. 
Of the identified lawsuits, 209 produced at least one published liability decision 
under Section 2. The remaining 1 13 include lawsuits in which the only decisions pub­
lished on Westlaw or LexisNexis addressed preliminary matters ( 73 decisions) or fees, 
remedy, or settlement issues ( 40 decisions) .39 Of the 209 lawsuits that ended with a 
determination of liability, 98 ( 46.9%) originated in jurisdictions covered by Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act, and 1 1 1  (53 . 1  %) were filed in non-covered jurisdictions.40 
Of lawsuits identified, 88 documented a violation of Section 2 - either on the 
merits or in the course of another favorable determination for the plaintiff. Another 29 
lawsuits made a favorable determination for the plaintiff (such as issuing a preliminary 
injunction, granting a settlement, awarding fees, or crafting a remedy) without stating 
whether Section 2 was actually violated. Plaintiffs accordingly succeeded in 1 1 7  (36.3%) 
of the lawsuits identified in this study.41 
Plaintiffs won more Section 2 lawsuits in Section 5-covered jurisdictions than 
they did in non-covered jurisdictions even though less than one-quarter of the U.S. 
population resides in a jurisdiction covered by Section 5. 42 Of the 1 1 7  successful plain­
tiff outcomes documented, 67 originated in covered jurisdictions and 5 0  elsewhere.4:' 
Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions also won a higher percentage of the cases decided 
than did those in non-covered ones. Thirty percent of the 1 63 lawsuits published in 
non-covered jurisdictions ended favorably for plaintiffs, while 42.l % of the 1 59 law­
suits from covered jurisdictions produced a result favorable to the plaintiffs. 
Courts identified violations of Section 2 more frequently between 1982 and 1992 than 
in the years since. Of the 88 total violations identified, courts found 60.2% of them 
during the first period, 39.8% since then.44 
In all, 145 of the 322 total lawsuits challenged at-large districts, and of these, 55 
held the practice to violate Section 2.45 In addition, 10 lawsuits challenging at-large elec­
tion systems otherwise ended with a favorable outcome for the plaintiff ( indicated by a 
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25 
Plaintiff Section 2 Success Rate Over Time 
1982-1987 1988-1992 
Section 5 Covered• and Non-Covered Jurisdictions 
1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-present 
settlement, remedy or fees case if not a published finding of a violation). A total of 1 10 
lawsuits challenged redistricting plans. Of those, 43 ended with a favorable outcome for 
the plaintiffs, of which 30 found a violation of Section 2. Thirty-six lawsuits challenged 
election procedures ( e.g., registration, candidacy, or voting requirements, or polling 
place rules or practices by election officials), and 1 4  of these ended with a favorable 
outcome for the plaintiffs ( including 7 violations found). Eleven lawsuits challenged 
majority-vote requirements such as a run-off, anti-single shot provisions, or numbered­
place systems.46 Six of these held the practice to violate Section 2; with no other favorable 
outcomes reported.47 Thirty-six challenges addressed annexations, felon disfranchise­
ment provisions, and appointment practices and none of these ended with a favorable 
outcome for the plaintiff. In some lawsuits, plaintiffs challenged multiple electoral prac­
tices, or the practice challenged was not identified dearly in the only published opinion, 
so the numbers listed here do not add up to the total number of lawsuits. 
The nature of Section 2 litigation has changed during the past twenty-three years. 
Of the 1 42 lawsuits that ended during the first decade after the 1982 Amendments, 
most involved challenges to at-large elections (81  or 57%). Since 1993, 180 lawsuits 
have produced published opinions. Of these, 66 (36. 7%) challenged at-large elections, 
and 73 (40.5%) challenged reapportionment or redistricting plans. 
African-American plaintiffs have brought the vast number of published claims 
( 268) under Section 2 since 1982, with an increasing number of cases involving Latino 
( 96), Native American ( 1 2) and Asian American (7)  plaintiffs. African-American plain­
tiffs won the vast majority of claims, and were plaintiffs in 1 03 (88%) of the successful 
decisions ( and 77 of the violations) overall, and 54 (85.7%) of the 63 total successes for 
plaintiffs since 1 990. Of all successful lawsuits, 14  involved multiple minority group 
plaintiffs .48 In addition, Latino plaintiffs won 7 lawsuits independently. Native American 
plaintiffs won an additional 5 published lawsuits. 
Sbcty-six lawsuits identified the remedy granted for a Section 2 violation. Of 
these, 24 (36.3910) replaced an at-large system with a single district system;49 27 (40.9%) 
ordered new multi-district lines to be drawn;50 15 (22.7%) ordered something else, such 
as changes to election administration procedures ,5i changes to the actual outcome of an 
election,52 or affirmative steps ( such as targeted community voter registration and edu­
cation) to encourage minority p olitical participation.53 
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In several lawsuits, courts addressed the constitutionality of Section 2 and all 
upheld that statute.54 
Judicial findings on the Senate Factors are discussed in more detail below. 
Briefly stated, however, courts found Senate Factor 1 (a history of official discrimina­
tion touching the right to vote) in 107 lawsuits. Twenty-four lawsuits identified explicit 
official discrimination against a racial or language minority group since 1982, of which 
eleven originated in covered jurisdictions. 55 
Ninety-one lawsuits found racially polarized voting or racial bloc voting since 
1982, generally analyzing the question under either Senate Factor 2 or the second and 
third Gingles preconditions. 56 Where courts found racial bloc voting, plaintiffs prevailed 
74.7°Ai of the time ( or in 68 lawsuits overall). Courts found racially polarized voting in 
44 lawsuits in covered jurisdictions. 
Eighty-five lawsuits found that minority candidates had difficulty getting elect­
ed (Factor 7) . 5 7  In 84 lawsuits, courts found that past socioeconomic discrimination 
hindered effective political participation ( Factor 5).58 Courts documented the presence 
of enhancing practices (Factor 3 ) ,  such as at-large elections or majority vote require-
ments, in 53 lawsuits not directly chal­
Judicial Findings under Discriminatory Results Test 
lenging these practices. Courts identified 
overt or subtle racial appeals in 42 cam­
paigns held between 1982 and 2002 
( Factor 6 ) .5 9  Ten lawsuits found that 
minorities were denied access to a can­
didate slating process (Factor 4) ; 19 law­
suits documented a significant lack of 
responsiveness by current officials to the 
needs of the minority community 
( Factor 8) ;  and 22 found that only a ten­
uous policy existed for the challenged 
practice (Factor 9) .6° Factors 4, 8 and 9 
featured less prominently in analyzed 
lawsuits, but when these factors were 
present, courts typically found a statuto­
ry violation as well. 
Gingles 
Factor 1: 
History 
Factor2: 
Racially Polarized 
Voting 
Factor 3: 
Enhancing 
Practices 
Factor4: 
Candidate Slating 
Factor S: 
Ongoing Effecrs 
of Discrimination 
Factor6: 
Racial Appeals 
in Campaigns 
Factor 7: 
Low Candidate 
Success 
Factors: 
Low 
Responsiveness 
Factor 9: 
Tenuous Policy 
Since 1982, Number of Cases by Senate Factor 
Found Factor 
II Plaintiff Success 
0 00 
Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Gingles 
preconditions in 99 of the 1 63 lawsuits 
to consider Gingles.61 Plaintiffs who 
crossed the Gingles threshold were more 
likely to prevail in covered jurisdictions 
than in non-covered ones. Of the 64 
lawsuits that deemed the Gingles factors 
satisfied, plaintiffs in covered jurisdic­
tions prevailed in 92.6% of the cases, 
winning a favorable outcome in 25 of 
the 27 lawsuits. Plaintiffs in non-covered 
jurisdictions prevailed in 72.9% of the 
cases, winning relief in 2 7  of the 37 cases 
that satisfied the Gingles preconditions. 
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The Trends 
The Persistence of Discrimination 
Four decades after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, racial discrimination in vot­
ing is far from over. Federal judges adjudicating Section 2 cases over the last twenty­
three years have documented an extensive record of conduct by state and local officials 
that they have deemed racially discriminatory and intentionally so. Judicial findings 
under the various factors set forth in the Senate Report reveal determined, systematic, 
and recent efforts to minimize minority voting strength. 
Examples abound.62 Last year's decision in the Bone Shirt litigation documents 
how county officials in South Dakota have purposely blocked Native Americans from 
registering to vote and from casting ballots. The Charleston County, South Carolina lit­
igation reveals deliberate and systematic efforts by county officials to harass and intimi­
date African-American residents seeking to vote. The North Johns litigation in Alabama 
describes the town mayor's refusal to provide African-American candidates registration 
forms required by state law. The Harris litigation in Alabama tells of Jefferson County's 
refusal to hire black poll workers for white precincts - and the blind eye state govern­
ment turned to the voting discrimination perpetuated at local polls. A Philadelphia 
lawsuit describes a deliberate and collusive effort by party officials and city election 
commissioners to trick Latino voters into casting illegitimate absentee ballots that would 
never be counted. The Town of Cicero litigation categorizes an 1 8-month residency 
requirement deliberately designed to stymie Hispanic candidacies. Many more cases tell 
of state and local authorities drawing district lines for the express purpose of diminish­
ing the influence of minority voters, or to protect partisan interests knowing that doing 
so will hinder minority voting strength. 
Section 2 lawsuits also catalogue formal and informal slating procedures imple­
mented by party officials and private associations that function to deny minority candi­
dates meaningful access to the ballot- from the local Democratic party in Albany, NY 
and the Republican party in Hempstead, NY, to informal groups in Texas and Louisiana 
and the state-funded firefighters on the Eastern Shore of Maryland.63 Federal judges 
have identified a host of campaign tactics nationwide designed to appeal to base racial 
prejudice, tactics that include manipulating photographs to darken the skin of opposing 
candidates, allusions or threats of minority group "take over;' or imminent racial strife, 
and cynical attempts to increase turnout among voters perceived to be "anti-black." 64 
Courts have also documented some instances of suspicious or "tenuous" poli­
cies - as when the legislature in Alabama removed the only majority-minority district 
from its reapportionment plan after the governor threatened a veto.65 Courts also care­
fully considered the ways in which local and state governments responded to minority 
needs - noting, for exan1ple, a Colorado school board's refusal to provide requested 
bilingual and Native American educational programs in order to keep the curriculum 
"ethnically clean:'66 
The Power of Partisanship 
Courts adjudicating Section 2 claims must confront the significance of the tight linkage 
between race and party in many parts of this country. This issue has taken on greater 
importance with the emergence of the Republican Party as a vibrant and influential 
force in the Southern United States, a development that complicates claims of racial 
vote dilution, as traditionally alleged. Courts must now assess how partisan affiliation 
affects minority electoral success and the legal significance to accord to that relationship. 
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Courts adjudicating Section 2 lawsuits confront this issue at numerous junctures, 
but do so most prominently when assessing racial bloc voting. The LULAC v. Clements 
litigation famously declared that Section 2 is "implicated only where Democrats lose 
because they are black, not where blacks lose because they are Democrats."67 The major­
ity of courts today will examine the claim that party, rather than race, causes minority 
electoral defeats. Some Section 2 plaintiffs falter on this requirement, particularly as 
numerous Section 2 lawsuits document the increasing willingness of white D emocrats 
to support minority-preferred candidates in the general election. 
Concerned that party affiliation masks instances of racial discrimination among 
voters, some courts are looking more frequently to the primary elections as a gauge of 
minority political opportunity. A host of recent Section 2 lawsuits document that 
significant racial polarization in voting remains prevalent at this juncture of the elec­
toral process, notwithstanding the willingness of voters, minority and non-minority 
alike, to support the party nominee in the general election. With the proliferation of 
noncompetitive districts in the United States, the primary now forms the critical locus 
for political participation today such that the racial composition of the primary elec­
torate is often more critical to minority electoral opportunity than is the composition 
of the district as a whole. 
Emphasis on the centrality of party as an organizing principle in American poli­
tics may also obscure the ways in which partisan conduct itself may diminish opportu­
nities for minority political participation. State-mandated white primaries are long gone, 
but party officials, acting formally or ad hoc, continue to implement slating procedures 
that stymie minority candidacies. Some lawsuits document what might aptly be labeled 
backstabbing by party officials who omit minority candidates from party campaign lit­
erature or otherwise fail to support their party's minority candidates .  Numerous courts 
now classify the knowing sacrifice of minority interests to the quest for partisan gain a 
form of intentional race discrimination.68 
THE GINGLES THRESHOLD 
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision Thornburg v. Gingles distilled three "preconditions" 
from the totality of the circumstances test that Section 2 requires. Satisfaction of these 
conditions does not establish a Section 2 violation, but failure to meet them almost 
always brings a plaintiff's case to an end. 
Since tl1e Court decided Gingles, 163 lawsuits addressed its preconditions, and 
64 lawsuits found them to be satisfied.69 Most ( 52) of these suits proceeded to a favor­
able outcome for the plaintiff. In many of these cases, courts have engaged in only a 
perfunctory review of the Senate Factors. Since Johnson v. De Grandy, moreover, a num­
ber have restricted their inquiry to assessing whether the challenged practice achieved 
"proportionality," and finding a Section 2 violation only if it did not.70 
In 99 lawsuits, courts held that plaintiffs failed to establish one or more of the 
Gingles factors.71 A few of these courts nevertheless proceeded to evaluate plaintiffs' 
claims under the totality of the circumstances, typically finding that plaintiffs lose under 
this test as well. 72 In a few cases, courts have analyzed claims under the totality of cir­
cumstances without engaging in review under Gingles at all.73 
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Since Gingles, only 7 cases have identified a violation of Section 2 without 
addressing the Gingles factors.74 Some courts acknowledge that the Gingles factors may 
"foreclose a meritorious claim;' but find that they serve a useful gate-keeping function 
because "in general they will ensure that violations for which an effective remedy exists 
will be considered while appropriately closing the courthouse to marginal cases."75 
Plaintiffs crossing the Gingles threshold are more likely to prevail in covered 
jurisdictions than in non-covered ones. Twenty-seven lawsuits originating in covered 
jurisdictions found the Gingles factors, and of these, 25 (92.6%) also ended favorably 
for the plaintiffs.76 In non-covered jurisdictions, 37 lawsuits found all three Gingles fac­
tors, of which 27 (72.9%) ended with plaintiff success.77 
Gingles I: Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact 
Sufficiently Large 
The first component of the Gingles test requires a minority group to demonstrate that 
it is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single 
member district." Courts addressing Gingles I have generally engaged in two inquiries: 
( 1 )  assessing when the minority population is "sufficiently large;' and (2) determining 
whether a proposed district encompassing that population is "geographically compact:'78 
Discussion of the "sufficiently large" prong has focused primarily on the size of 
the population needed to establish a majority in a single member district. Most courts 
define the relevant majority to be the voting age population, reasoning that absent a 
majority among voters, the minority group will not be an effective majority.79 Where, 
however, the minority group contains a large proportion of non-citizens, some courts 
have required that plaintiffs demonstrate the feasibil ity of creating a district in which 
the group constitutes a majority of the citizen voting age population. 8° Finally, a few 
courts rely on the overall minority population when assessing Gingles I .'1 
Lower rates of voter registration and turnout in some minority communities 
have led some courts to require that minority voters (or the minority population over­
all) constitute more than simply a majority, but in fact a supermajority. Some courts 
have suggested that population percentages as high as 65% are needed to constitute an 
effective majority.82 Others, however, expressly reject an assessment of likely turnout 
among minority voters when assessing the size of an effective majority under Gingles.83 
Several lawsuits involved claims brought by more than one minority group. 
These plaintiffs argued that, if members of the two (or more) groups were placed 
together in a single district, they would constitute an effective majority within the 
meaning of Gingles I. The vast majority of courts view this type of claim as cognizable 
under the statute, so long as the groups can demonstrate political cohesiveness under 
the second Gingles factor,84 a requirement on which many aggregation claims falter. 85 
Influence or Coalition Districts: In an increasing number of lawsuits, plaintiffs are rais­
ing Section 2 claims on behalf of minority groups too small in number to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district. Typically, these plaintiffs take issue with district 
lines that divide the minority group members among several districts, and argue that 
the challenged districting plans hinder their ability either ( 1 )  to elect representatives of 
choice by forming coalitions with other voters ( "coalition districts" or "ability to elect 
districts"), or (2) more amorphously, to influence elections ("influence districts").86 
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Courts have generally resisted pure influence claims,67 expressing concern that 
allowing them would eviscerate the gate-keeping function performed by Gingles I and 
open federal courts to inundation by "marginal" Section 2 claims.88 As such, no plain­
tiffs identified in this study have succeeded on an influence claim absent an indication 
that they would have the ability to elect candidates of choice. So, too, some courts have 
raised concerns with coalition districts. For some, the crossover votes that define coali­
tion districts suggest that voting is not polarized, and thus present an obstacle for 
plaintiffs trying to establish white bloc voting under Gingles I I I .89 Other courts require 
assurance that minority-preferred candidates will prevail, something they maintain a 
coalition district cannot provide. These courts thus conclude that plaintiffs suffer no 
injury when a j urisdiction fails to include a sufficient number of minority voters to give 
rise to a coalition district.90 
Some courts, however, have been more receptive to coalition district claims.91 In 
the Armour litigation, for example, the district court suggested that African-American 
voters in a 36% black district might be able to elect their preferred candidate, given that 
Democratic primaries in the region typically determined the winner in the general elec­
tion, and at least some white voters were willing to support the black-preferred candi ­
date.92 In  this circumstance, the court held, the j urisdiction's decision to split the black 
community between t\vo districts might violate Section 2.93 
Employing similar reasoning, the Page litigation rejected a Section 2 challenge 
to New Jersey's decision to replace several majority-minority districts with districts in 
which African-American voters constituted a mere plurality.94 The court noted that 
support from Latino and white voters meant that black-preferred candidates could win 
elections in districts where the African-American population was less than fifty percent.95 
In this circumstance, the state's decision not to create majority-black districts, even 
though such districts were feasible, did not violate Section 2. 96 
In the Martinez v. Bush litigation,97 black plaintiffs challenged a redistricting 
plan that replaced majority-minority districts with districts in which the black voting 
age population was less than fifty percent. Plaintiffs argued that, as a result of the 
change, they were no longer assured that their preferred candidate would win in the 
affected districts. The court held, however, that because blacks were the majority of 
Democrats, and Democrats were the majority of the district, blacks were likely to elect 
their candidate of choice even when comprising only 41 .8% of the voting age popula­
tion. The district court deemed Gingles I satisfied, arguing that the Gingles I "majority" 
requirement should not be interpreted literally,98 but rather that it defines any situation 
where the district is likely to result in the election of minority candidates of choice in 
most elections.9 9  
The courts in Armour, Page, and lv1artinez all recognized that in safe Democratic 
districts, the Democratic primary dictates the outcome of the general election s uch that 
the racial composition of the primary electorate is a more probative gauge of minority 
voting strength than is the racial composition of the general electorate. Minority voters 
in safe Democratic districts often need not constitute a majority of the district's elec­
torate to elect candidates of choice, particularly when they represent a majority of vot­
ers eligible to participate in the primary. Such majority-minority primaries yield results 
much like majority-minority districts, but do so with fewer minority voters overall. The 
efficacy of the majority-minority primary in this regard suggests a Section 2 "packing" 
claim might lie where j urisdictions opt to create or maintain majority-minority dis­
tricts, notwithstanding the ability of minority voters to elect preferred candidates from 
plurality districts where the primary is majority-minority. 
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Black plaintiffs unsuccessfully pursued a related claim in the Perry litigation 
where they challenged a districting plan that reduced the black population in a district 
where black voters previously had comprised 2 1 .6% of the voting age population. 100 The 
plaintiffs argued that, prior to the redistricting,  they constituted an effective majority 
for purposes of Gingles I notwithstanding their minority status because they controlled 
the Democratic primary and Anglos and Latinos voted "either in the Republican pri­
mary or not at all, but return [ ed] home out of party loyalty in the general election."101 
The Perry court, however, viewed black influence exerted through the majority-minori­
ty primary simply as a facet of party politics rather than as the locus for meaningful 
black political participation that the courts in Armour, Page, and A1artinez viewed as 
worthy of cognizance under Section 2 .102 For the Perry court, the primary was relevant 
only insofar as it showed that black and Latino voters did not vote cohesively and hence 
could not combine their strength for the purposes of claiming entitlement to a majori­
ty-minority district.103 
The plaintiffs in Perry relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft that a coalition district may sometimes provide effective representation to 
minorities104 to argue that the requirements of Gingles I had been "effectively overruled" 
and that plurality districts are entitled to protection under Section 2. 105 The Peny court 
read Ashcroft differently, finding in it no obligation for states to preserve coalitions: 
" [ t] o so conclude would have profound consequences, freezing ephemeral political 
alliances, which are the bull's eyes of partisan redistricting."106 
In the Rodriguez litigation, plaintiffs were similarly unsuccessful in seeking to 
establish that New York violated Section 2 by "cracking" the minority population 
among several districts, in a context where a majority-minority district was not possi­
ble.w7 Unlike Perry, the claim here was not that an existing coalition district had been 
destroyed, but instead that district lines continued to divide rapidly growing minority 
communities.108 The court found no injury, holding that recognition of a pure influence 
claim would open a "Pandora's box" because " ' [ i] nfluence' cannot be clearly defined or 
statistically proved."109 Regarding a separate coalition claim, the court, as in Perry, con­
cluded that Georgia v. Ashcroft "does not broaden the power of federal courts under 
section 2 of the VRA to require state legislatures to protect or create such 'ability to 
elect' districts." 1 10 
Thus, Perry and Rodriguez read Ashcroft to provide authority for jurisdictions 
to choose between influence and coalition districts, on the one hand, and majority­
minority districts on the other. 1 1 1  Neither court interprets Ashcroft to require that juris­
dictions protect influence or coalition districts where they already exist.1 12 In dicta, 
however, the Perry court evinces a preference for the creation of influence or coalition 
districts where possible. m Some other courts have displayed a similar preference114 but 
doubts remain regarding when such districts should be created and whether they will 
better serve minority voters. 1 1 5  
Geographically Compact 
Courts have consistently used a few different criteria for assessing compactness under 
Gingles I ,  and have often used them in combination. Courts examine the proposed dis­
trict's shape,116 the extent to which it comports with the jurisdiction's traditional dis­
tricting principles,1 17 and how it compares to other proposed or existing districts.1 18 
Some courts view compactness as a "practical or functional" concept to be assessed in 
terms of whether the district captures a community. 1 19 
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Since 1994, courts have invoked Shaw v. Reno and its progeny120 when discussing 
compactness under Gingles I .  121 The Shaw cases require dose scrutiny of districting 
plans in which racial considerations predominate over traditional districting principles 
in the drawing of district lines. An oddly shaped district is not a prerequisite to a Shaw 
claim, but courts often look to shape to assess whether race was the primary considera­
tion when the district was drawn. Since Shaw, some courts have invoked bizarre shape 
to measure compactness under Gingles I ,122 and generally consider districts compact 
when they appear more compact than those struck down in the Shaw cases. 123 Some 
courts have, moreover, invoked Shaw and its progeny to voice concern that plans seek­
ing to increase minority voting strength do not pay adequate heed to traditional dis­
tricting principles. 124 
Gingles II and lII: Racial Bloc Voting 
Racial polarization in voting, also known as racial bloc voting, constitutes a critical 
component of a Section 2 daim. 125 The vast majority of Section 2 violations (87.5%) 
identified in this study found legally significant racial bloc voting. 126 
Racial bloc voting factors into the evaluation of Section 2 claims at two junc­
tures. The second and third of the Gingles "preconditions" to a Section 2 claim call for 
an inquiry into racial polarization in voting. They require courts to determine whether 
minority voters are politically cohesive, and whether white voters vote sufficiently as 
a bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate. 127 Courts who so find ( and also find 
the first Gingles factor128) must then evaluate whether the plaintiffs can sustain their 
claim under "the totality of circumstances."129 This inquiry includes analysis of the Senate 
Factors, one of which is the extent of racially polarized voting. 130 
In practice, however, courts that consider racial bloc voting generally engage in 
one inquiry, typically under the Gingles factors. 13 1 Of those that deem Gingles satisfied 
and proceed to the totality of circumstances review, some simply refer back to their 
previous analysis of racial bloc voting tmder Gingles, if in fact they return to racial bloc 
voting at all. Other courts engage in additional analysis, typically examining within the 
total ity of circumstances the question whether race is the cause of the polarized voting 
patterns identified under Gingles. 132 This approach notwithstanding, this Report confines 
its discussion of racial bloc voting to this section, as opposed to parsing it between the 
Gingles factors and the discussion of Senate Factor 2 below. 
Of the lawsuits analyzed, 1 86 considered the extent of racially polarized voting, 
9 1  found the factor to exist. Of those finding this factor, 65 also identified a violation 
of Section 2 and another 3 granted a preliminary injunction. In covered jurisdictions, 
44 lawsuits found racial bloc voting; 47 in non-covered. Twenty-three lawsuits found 
racially polarized voting but ultimately did not end in a favorable outcome for the plain­
tiffs. Nearly 70% of these were in non-covered jurisdictions. 133 Seven deemed Gingles I 
or I I  unsatisfied,134 eight identified "rough proportionality" as defined in Johnson v. 
DeGrandy,135 two remanded the case for further review,u0 six declined to find a violation 
under a more general totality of the circmnstances review. 137 
Several recurring issues pervade judicial analyses of racial bloc voting. The first 
concerns the identification of the minority-preferred candidate, the second, the role of 
causation, and the third, the existence of "special circumstances" that might warrant 
disregarding particular elections. These are discussed below. 
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Identifying the Minority-Preferred Candidate 
Courts assessing racial bloc voting must identify the minority-preferred candidate in 
order to determine whether "the white bloc usually votes to defeat" this candidate. In 
making this determination, courts overwhelmingly agree that the race of the candidates 
must inform the analysis at least to some degree. Courts have thus not followed Justice 
Brennan's position in Thornburg v. Gingles that a candidate's race should be irrelevant 
when assessing racial bloc voting. 138 
Most courts, for example, more easily identify a minority candidate as minority­
preferred than a non-minority candidate, while some implicitly or explicitly assume 
the minority candidate is the minority-preferred candidate . 139 Others demand some 
evidence on point, although typically far less than what they require to demonstrate 
a white candidate is minority-preferred. 140 No court today holds that white candidates 
cannot be minority-preferred.111 
Decisions in the Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that courts 
should engage in a searching inquiry before identifying a white candidate as minority­
preferred. This approach, typically associated with the Jenkins v. Red Clay School District 
litigation that articulated it, deems election results only a preliminary component of 
the inquiry. 14' Courts must determine not only who gets minority votes, but also the 
depth and vigor of minority support for that candidate, the scope of that candidate's 
interest in the minority community, whether and why a viable minority candidate did 
not run, and whether minority candidates had run previously. 143 This approach implic­
itly imports into the racial bloc voting inquiry some of the Senate Factors such as can­
didate slating typically reviewed only after the Gingles threshold is crossed.144 
Courts in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits expressly reject this approach, 
maintaining that this "subjective" inquiry into minority preferences is inappropriate 
and impractical. 145 These courts posit that the inquiry should be limited almost exclu­
sively to election results to identify the minority-preferred candidate. With a few caveats, 
these courts define the preferred candidate as the one who receives the most votes from 
minority voters.146 While the Fourth Circuit has not explicitly followed this approach, 
recent decisions suggest it may be using an analogous one.117 
In practice, however, many courts do not strictly adhere to one or the other 
of these tests.148 For instance, after adopting the Jenkins v. Red Clay School District 
approach,149 the Eighth Circuit, in the St. Louis Board of Education litigation, noted "it is 
a near tautological principle that the minority-preferred candidate "should generally be 
one able to receive [minority] votes."150 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit facially relies on 
the totality of the circumstances to demonstrate that a white candidate is minority-pre­
ferred, but its most recent decisions treat the candidate who receives the majority of the 
minority vote as minority-preferred.151 In the context of multi-seat elections, moreover, 
where voters are permitted to cast as many votes as there are seats, both the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits have combined the quantitative and subjective approaches to assess 
the status of candidates that do not place first among black voters, but do receive a sub­
stantial percentage of the black vote. 152 
Probative Elections: Courts in most circuits generally place more weight on elections 
involving a minority candidate than on those involving only white candidates.15' Some 
courts discount white-on-white elections based on concern that the candidate receiving 
minority votes is not truly minority-preferred. 154 Others do so because of concern that 
these elections mask polarized voting patterns that should be deemed legally significant.155 
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Not infrequently, candidates preferred by minority voters in elections between white 
candidates prevail. These victories suggest that white voters are not voting sufficiently 
as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates. And yet, minority candidates in the 
same jurisdictions are often defeated even though they receive overwhelming support 
from minority voters. 1 56 These elections suggest white voters are voting as a bloc within 
the meaning of the third Gingles factor. Discounting elections between white candidates 
consequently helps courts discern polarization of a sort that might othenvise be obscured. 
For similar reasons, courts have increasingly looked to primary elections to 
determine which candidate is minority-preferred. Because primary elections remove 
party as a causal explanation for voting patterns, some courts view these elections as 
allowing better focus on the role of race in voter decisionmaking. 1 57 Primaries, more­
over, are increasingly the only election of consequence as noncompetitive districts have 
proliferated nationwide. 158 
Many courts, consequently, discount minority support for a particular candi­
date in the general election where minority voters supported another candidate in the 
primary. 1 59 A few courts have also held that white support for a minority-preferred can­
didate in the general election does not bar finding the third Gingles factor, so long as 
white voters supported a different candidate in the Democratic primary. 1 60 Highlighting 
this point, the district court in the Black Political Task Force litigation observed that 
"black and white voters in Boston preferred the [black] Democratic candidate at a gen­
eral election is hardly news . . . .  [and] says less about race than partisan politics." 161 
Courts have also relied on primary election results to examine whether two 
minority groups seeking to aggregate their voting strength in a Section 2 claim prefer 
the same candidate. \.Vhile most courts have held that multi-minority coalition claims 
are cognizable under Section 2, several decisions find that party affiliation masks a lack 
of cohesiveness between, for example, black and Hispanic voters. 162 In this context, evi­
dence that members of the minority groups supported different candidates in the pri­
mary weighs against finding political cohesion, even if voters from both groups sup­
ported the same candidate in the general election. As such, voting patterns in primary 
elections are probative on the issue of cohesion because such elections remove partisan­
ship as an explanation for voting behavior. 163 
Although no court has expressly rejected consideration of primary elections, 
some courts have identified reasons that suggest caution in weighing primary elections 
too heavily. For example, some courts have expressed concern that the preferences of 
politically active members of the minority community should not define the candidate 
preferred by the minority community as a whole.164 To the extent that primary voters 
are fewer in number and more extreme in political persuasion than those participating 
in the general election, the candidate who garners minority group support in the pri­
mary may not be the preferred candidate of most minority voters. 
Some courts have also questioned whether general election results should 
be discounted simply because minority voters supported a different candidate in the 
primary. These courts suggest that doing so privileges minority voters to an improper 
extent, effectively relieving them of the obligation to "pull, haul, and trade" that all 
voters confront.165 
Causation 
The justices in Thornburg v. Gingles disagreed about the role causation should play in 
the racial bloc voting inquiry. Justice Brennan rejected causation in his plurality opin-
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ion, arguing that " it is the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites -
not the reasons for that difference" that is important.166 Justice O'Connor, however, 
thought the inquiry should address "evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns 
may be explained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying divergence in 
the interests of minority and white voters."167 Justice White was the critical fifth vote on 
the issue and his separate opinion did not definitively resolve the question. 
Lower courts ever since have disputed the role causation should play in the racial 
bloc voting analysis. Courts in nine judicial circuits now expressly incorporate causa­
tion when they assess racial bloc voting, either under the second and third Gingles fac­
tors or as part of the totality of circumstances. 1<>8 Two circuits have not expressly adopt­
ed an approach to causation,169 while the Ninth Circuit appears to reject causation, 
though not explicitly.170 
\\Then courts consider causation, they all ask the same underlying question: 
namely, whether race, as opposed to partisanship or some other factor, best explains 
why white voters failed to support the minority-preferred candidate. And yet, courts 
suggest that the juncture at which they ask this question matters. A finding that politi­
cal party best explains divergent voting patterns under Gingles means that the court will 
not find legally significant racial bloc voting and necessarily that plaintiffs' claims fail. 171 
Consideration of causation within the totality of the circumstances review means that 
the plaintif s have already satisfied the Gingles preconditions and, as a result, an infer­
ence may come into play that "racial bias is at work." 172 In the Jvlount Holyoke litigation, 
the appellate court posited that "cases will be rare in which plaintiffs establish the 
Gingles preconditions yet fail on a Section 2 claim because other facts undermine the 
original inference."173 
In practice, however, the juncture at which courts consider causation may mat­
ter less than these courts suggest. Regardless of where they consider causation, courts 
do not typically require that plaintiffS disprove that factors other than race caused 
divergent voting patterns,174 but most require that plaintiffs demonstrate that race is the 
causal linkage when defendants proffer evidence supporting an alternative explana­
tion.175 Proving the linkage is difficult regardless of the juncture, and numerous lawsuits 
have held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden on this point,176 finding that success­
fully rebutting defendants' evidence is often quite difficult. 177 
Special Circumstances 
Courts have identified a variety of "special circumstances" that influence the racial bloc 
voting inquiry and have excluded or discounted elections involving such special cir­
cumstances as distinct from the "usual predictability" of voting patterns.  178 Some circuits 
have identified numerous special circumstances, others few or none. Typically, the recog­
nition of special circumstances makes an ultimate finding of racial bloc voting more 
likely. A few cases, however, have discounted elections where the minority-preferred 
candidate was defeated due to special circumstances, thus having the opposite effect.179 
Some recent decisions voice resistance to discounting elections b ecause of special cir­
cumstances, preferring instead to consider all the evidence presented. 180 
Incumbency: Numerous courts have held that legally significant white bloc voting may 
exist, notwithstanding white support for a black candidate, if the black candidate is an 
incumbent.181 Others disagree, finding that "incumbency plays a significant role in the 
vast majority of American elections:' such that its use as a special circumstance "would 
confuse the ordinary with the special." 182 
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The Majority-minority District: Several courts have identified the majority-minority 
district as a "special circumstance" that alters the conventional racial bloc inquiry. In 
such districts, white voters are by definition a minority of the population, and thus, 
courts have reasoned that the inability of white voters to defeat the minority-preferred 
candidate is less probative evidence of a decline in racial bloc voting than it would be 
elsewhere. The Ninth Circuit said that " [t ]o  do otherwise would permit white bloc vot­
ing in a majority-white district to be washed clean by electoral success in neighboring 
majority-Indian districts."183 
Post-lawsuit Elections: Some courts discount the results of elections occurring after the 
lawsuit at issue had been filed. This approach is premised on the view that the very 
filing of a Section 2 lawsuit makes white voters more likely to support the minority­
preferred candidate and that this support is somehow not genuine. The concern is that 
post-lawsuit elections might "work a one-time advantage for [minority] candidates in 
the form of unusually organized political support by white leaders concerned to fore­
stall single-member districting."18" Other courts will consider such elections, either out­
right,185 or with the caveat that plaintiffs are unable to show unusual white support for 
the minority-preferred candidate. 186 
Unusual Elections: Courts have held that the success of minority-preferred candidates 
may be discounted when reason exists to view voting behavior as unusual . Courts have 
excluded elections based on a plurality victory,187 an atypical primary,188 an unopposed 
candidacy,is9 and a candidacy against only a third-party candidate. 19° Courts have also 
excluded elections where a minority candidate was seen as "anti-busing" at a time when 
a local school desegregation lawsuit was pending,191 a candidate was under federal indict­
ment at the time of the election, 192 a i.vinning black candidate had been a professional 
athlete,193 and a well-financed campaign occurred amidst anti-incumbent sentiment.194 
Further, courts discount elections not involving serious or well-known candidates,195 
and some have approved discounting minority success when the race of the candidate 
was not widely known.196 Courts are often skeptical, however, of "special circumstances" 
that simply illustrate good campaigning on the part of the minority candidate. 197 
Low Turnout: Some courts have been unwilling to find white bloc voting where minori­
ty voters did not turn out to vote in substantial numbers.198 Some courts phrase this 
issue as one of causation: namely, those plaintiffs must establish that white bloc voting 
caused the minority defeat, as opposed to a seemingly independent cause such as low 
turnout. 199 The premise is that if there had been higher minority turnout, the minority­
preferred candidate might have been elected. Other courts warn that indicators of vote 
dilution, such as official discrimination, may contribute to low turnout.200 
THE SENATE FACTORS 
S E NATE FACTOR 1: History of Official Discrimination that Touched the Right to Vote 
The first factor listed in the Senate Report asks courts to assess "the extent of any histo­
ry of official discrimination" in the jurisdiction that "touched the right of the members 
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic 
process."201 Courts assessing Factor 1 have documented scores of instances in which 
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state and local officials engaged in intentional race discrimination.202 These j udicial 
findings record the nature, frequency, and recentness of this conduct. 
One hundred and forty-eight lawsuits considered Factor 1 .203 The lawsuits that 
did not consider this factor generally never reached the Senate Factors at all, finding 
instead that Section 2 did not apply to the plaintiffs' daim,20·1 or that, if it did, the plain­
tiffs had failed to satisfy the threshold Thornburg v. Gingles test.205 
Of the lmvsuits considering this factor, 137 (or 92.5%) found that there was a 
history of official discrimination. Of these, 1 07 lawsuits actually found that Factor l 
was met.206 The remaining thirty cases concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish 
that the identified history "touched" the present-day ability of members of the minority 
group to participate in the political process.207 
Of the 107 lawsuits that found Factor 1 ,  65 also found a violation of Section 2 
or otherwise issued a decision favorable to the plaintiffs.208 Seven lawsuits found a viola­
tion of Section 2 without considering Factor 1 at all.20" Ten others identified a violation 
of Section 2 after considering but not finding Factor i .210 
Lawsuits finding Factor l most often found that three additional Senate Factors 
were satisfied: 66 found racially polarized voting (either in the Gingles threshold test or 
when considering Factor 2) , 70 found ongoing socioeconomic effects (Factor 5 ) ,  and 67 
found lack of candidate success (Factor 7) .21 1 
Many courts assessing Factor 1 discussed instances of discriminatory conduct 
dating from the nineteenth century and continuing through much of the twentieth. 
These accounts addressed literacy tests, grandfather clauses, poll taxes, white primaries, 
racially discriminatory voter registration requirements as well as state laws mandating 
segregation, the separation of names by race on voter registration lists, and other 
official discriminatory practices in education, employment, and housing.2 12 
Seventy lawsuits considering evidence of Factor 1 identified official discrimina­
tion post-dating the enactment of the VRA.213 A number of these focused on instances 
of discriminatory conduct during the period between 1965 and the 1982 Amendments 
to the VRA. These cases cited official resistance to school desegregation orders, employ­
ment discrimination settlements and judgments against local governments,214 and viola­
tions of the VRA itself.215 Courts took note of various states' and counties' failure to hire 
minority poll officials,216 a county registrar's refusal to register black citizens as voters,217 
the "hostility and uncooperation" displayed by public officials in Texas when Mexican­
American candidates ran for office,218 and the race-based retention of a majority-vote 
and post system in Georgia.219 The City of Starke litigation noted the City's failure to 
repeal unenforceable statutes mandating segregation.220 
Official Discrimination Since 1982 
Twenty-four lawsuits identified more than 1 00 instances of intentionally discriminatory 
conduct in voting since 1 982.221 Eleven of these lawsuits originated in covered j urisdic­
tions; 1 3  in non-covered. While several findings identified intentional discrimination in 
the drawing of state reapportionment plans, conduct by local governmental officials 
accounted for the vast number of instances of official discrimination identified, as 
described below. 
Judicial findings documenting official, intentional discrimination on the basis of 
race or language minority status encompass a wide range of conduct by public officials. 
The discussion below first lists the findings since 1982 in jurisdictions covered by 
Section 5, followed by findings in non-covered jurisdictions. 
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Findings of Intentional Discrimination in Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions Since 1982 
I N  C HA RLESTON COUNTY, SOUTH CARO LINA 
- The "consistent and more recent p attern of white persons acting to intimidate and 
harass African-American voters at the polls during the 1980s and 1990s and even as late 
as the 2000 general election;' including "significant evidence of intimidation and 
harassment" that was "undeniably racial" and that "never occurred at predominantly 
white polling places, including those that tended to support Democratic candidates."222 
-The participation of county officials, including at least one member of the 
Charleston County Election Commission and at least one county-employed poll man­
ager,223 in the Ballot Security Group which, in the 1990 election, "sought to prevent 
African-American voters from seeking assistance in casting their ballots:'224 
-The county's assignment of white poll managers, described by some as "bulldogs;' in 
unspecified recent elections since 1982, to majority African-American precincts, where 
they "caused confusion, intimidated African-American voters, . . .  had the tendency to 
be condescending to those voters;' and engaged in "inappropriate behavior."225 
-The "routine" assignment by "the Election Commission . . .  [of] one particularly prob­
lematic poll manager to predominantly African-American polling places in different 
parts of the County during the 1980s and early 1990s. At the polls, this poll manager, 
who is white, routinely approached elderly African-American women seeking to vote." 
He would often "make a scene": approaching them, putting his arm around them and 
speaking loudly, when " [t]hey just wanted to come in and sign up and vote. And it hap­
pened repeatedly just to that class of voter."226 
-The "recurring" official harassment of elderly African-American voters during the 
1980s and 1990s, so severe that that the Charleston County Circuit Court "issue [d]  a 
restraining order against the Election Commission requiring its agents to cease interfer­
ing with the voting process."227 
-The persistence of problematic "treatment of African-American voters by some white 
poll managers, even though the Election Commission has provided training to poll 
managers on this subject."228 
-The refusal of county workers at the polls to provide African-American voters with 
legally required voting assistance, in elections from 1992-2002; including: 
the discriminatory practice employed by white poll managers working at 
black-majority precincts of hassling African-American voters who asked for 
help voting, including "asking questions such as: 'Why do you need assis­
tance? Why can't you read and write? And didn't you just sign in? And you 
know how to spell your name, why can't you just vote by yourself? And do 
you really need voter assistance?"' 229 
the absence of comparable questioning of white voters who were allowed to 
have their voting assistor of choice without being challenged: "no evidence 
exists of any instances of harassment, intimidation, or interference directed 
against white or African-American voters at predominantly white polling 
places."230 
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- The county's retention of a poll manager who had exhibited a "threatening attitude" 
toward black voters at the Joseph Floyd Major Precinct in the 1996 election, after his 
refusal to respond to a county election commissioner's reprimand; and the retention of 
this poll manager as a county employee at majority African-American polls in 
Charleston County in 2004.231 
- The decision of "the Charleston County Council [to reduce] the salary for the 
Charleston County Probate Judge in 199 1 ,  following the election of the first and only 
African-American person elected to that position" from $85,000 to $59,000 annually.m 
-The state legislative delegation's proposal to replace the School Board's non-partisan 
electoral system with a partisan one and to remove control of budgetary matters from 
the Board following African-American candidate success in School Board elections in 
2000; both proposals were made without communicating at all with members of the 
School Board at the time.233 
IN SOUTH DAKOTA 
-The display of discriminatory, "negative reactions" by county voter registrars to 
Native Americans during voter registration drives in the 1980s, ranging from "unhelpful 
to hostile ."234 
-The limitation imposed by county officials on the number of voter registration forms 
given to people intending to register Native American voters despite the absence of a 
legal limit on the provision of such forms. 235 
-The refusal of county officials to accept Internet voter registration forms from Native 
American voters.c36 
-The "erroneous rejections of registration cards" from Native American applicants by 
county officials who, after apparent protest, accepted them without explaining why they 
had first been rejected.237 
-The 1986 refusal of the Dewey County Auditor to provide Native Americans with 
sufficient voter registration cards to conduct a voter registration drive on the Cheyenne 
River Reservation, conduct that prompted a court order instructing the auditor to sup­
ply 750 additional cards and extend the registration deadline.238 
-The 1984 refusal of the Fall River County Auditor "to register Indians who had 
attempted to register as part of a last-minute voter registration drive on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation," a refusal that led to a court order the day before the election requiring 
that voters be allowed to register and cast their ballots. 239 
-The 2002 refusal of Bennett County commissioners to move two polling places to 
Indian housing areas that would "increase convenience for Indian voters:' after Indian 
residents petitioned the County for the stations.240 
-Wholly unsubstantiated public claims made by Bennett County officials just before 
the 2002 election that Indians involved in voter registration were engaged in voter 
fraud, and investigations that followed these claims in Pine Ridge and Rosebud, that 
produced no actual charges but "intimidated Indian voters."241 
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-The state's requirement that voters provide photo identification and other new vot­
ing requirements enacted by the South Dakota legislature following the 2002 election,242 
passed after a legislative debate that included the following: 
Statement by Rep. Van Norman that in passing these provisions, "the legisla­
ture was retaliating because the Indian vote was a big factor in new regis­
trants and a dose senatorial race."243 
Statement by Rep. Ted Klaudt defending driver's license requirements by 
referring to Native American voters: "The way I feel is if you don't have 
enough drive to get up and drive to the county auditor . . .  maybe you 
shouldn't really be voting in the first place."2·14 
Statement by Rep. Stanford Adelstein opposing provisions that would have 
made voting registration easier and, in reference to Native American voters ,  
claiming: "Having m ade m any eftorts to register people . . .  I realize that those 
people we want to vote will be given adequate opportunity. I, in my heart, 
feel that this bill . . .  will encourage those who we don't particularly want to 
have in the system . . . .  I 'm not sure we want that sort of person in the polling 
place. I think the effort of registration . . .  is adequate."245 
-The state legislature's 1 996 decision to combine two single-member house districts, 
including a majority-Native American district where a Native American had won the 
Democratic primary in 1994, in order to create one multi-member, majority-white 
house district.246 
-The discriminatory retention by Buffalo County of " [a] redistricting plan, which had 
been in use for decades, [ and which ] confined virtually all of the county's Indian popu­
lation to a single district containing approximately 1500 people," leaving white voters in 
control of the remaining two districts, "which essentially gave them control over the 
county government;' an arrangement that prompted a lawsuit settled in 2004, in which 
the county "admitt [ed] that the plan was discriminatory."2•7 
-The 1999 refusal by Day County officials to let Native Americans vote in a sanitary 
district election, an action that prompted a lawsuit which ended in a settlement under 
which "the county and the district admitted that the district's boundaries unlawfully 
denied Indian citizens' right to vote."248 
IN BLECKLEY COUNTY, GEORGIA 
-The county's 1984 decision to replace numerous polling places that "provid [ ed] ready 
access to voters in the outlying areas;' with a single precinct for the 2 19 square mile 
county and to locate this single precinct in an "all-white civic club" (the Jaycee Barn in 
Cochran) ;  and the county's decision to use the precinct as the sole polling place for 
county commissioner and county school board elections throughout the 1980s and up 
to the court's 1 992 decision.249 
IN DALLAS, TEXAS 
-The city's attempts to keep a partially at-large election system after minority voters 
petitioned for its change and city officials recognized the existing system "denied both 
blacks and Hispanics access to any of the 3 at-large seats."250 
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IN N O RT H  JOHNS, ALABAMA 
-The town mayor's 1988 refusal to provide registration forms required by state law to 
t\No African-American city council candidates, the first African Americans to run for 
town office after the entry of a consent decree that replaced an at-large regime with a 
districted one, where " [t]he mayor was aware that Jones and Richardson, as black candi­
dates, were seeking to take advantage of the new court-ordered single-member district­
ing plan and that their election would result in the town council being majority black."251 
-The town's prosecution of the two successful black candidates for failing to file the 
forms required by state law that the mayor refused to give them, a failure that a federal 
court later found had happened only because of the mayor's intentionally discrimina­
tory actions. 
-The town's refusal to seat the candidates after they were elected in 1988 until a federal 
court ordered the town to do so.252 
IN BIG HORN COUNTY, MONTANA 
-The use of a voter registration process, and the appointment of deputy registrars and 
election judges in 1986 with "an intent to discriminate" against Native Americans.253 
-The county's failure to include "the names of Indians who had registered to vote . . .  
on voting lists in 1982 and 1984"254 and the county's removal of the names of Indians 
who had voted in primary elections from voting lists such that they were not allowed 
to vote in the subsequent general election.255 
-The county's refusal to provide " [a] n Indian candidate for the state legislature . . .  
voter registration cards in 1984, forcing her to obtain them at the State Capitol."256 
-County officials' refusal to provide a Native American man more than a scant number 
of voter registration cards based on the claim that few cards remained, even though the 
official shortly thereafter provided a white woman with fifty more cards than the man.257 
-The subjection of Native Americans to a more technical and more difficult voter 
registration process than whites, in which county officials "looked for minor errors in 
[Native American] registration applications and used them as an excuse to refuse to 
allow registration."258 
I N  JEFFE RSON COUNTY, ALABAMA 
-The express refusal of Jefferson County officials to appoint black workers in white 
precincts in 1984 on the ground that white voters would not listen to black poll officials, 
a refusal found to amount to "open and intentional discrimination" that "is lawless and 
inexcusable:'259 The court stated that "try[ing] to excuse the practice under cover of the 
purported intolerance of their own constituents is indefensible and repugnant."260 
IN T H E  STATE OF ALABAMA 
-The intentional failure of the Governor and Attorney General of Alabama to remedy 
past discrimination or ongoing racial harassment at the polls.261 
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-The conduct of white poll officials who "continue to harass and intimidate black 
voters" including "numerous instances of where white poll officials refused to help illit­
erate black voters or refused to allow them to vote, where they refused to allow black 
voters to cast challenged ballots, and where they were simply rude and even intimidating 
toward black voters."262 
IN MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 
-The mayor's proposal of a city ordinance in 198 1 ,  following a series of annexations, 
to lower the African-American population in majority-black district 3 to "the lowest 
level he understood to be legally possible in order to reduce the possibility that district 
3 's council member could be reelected."263 Still in place as of 1983, the ordinance was 
found to be "in substantial measure the product of a scheme purposefully designed and 
executed to decrease the voting strength of the black electorate in district 3."264 
IN TERRELL, TEXAS 
- The city's reliance on at-large elections with staggered terms for five member city 
council, adjudicated on the merits to constitute intentional racial discrimination,205 
compounded by the city's settlement of a lawsuit "alleging that poll workers improperly 
refused to let certain black citizens vote,"266 and the city's refusal in 1983 to establish a 
polling place repeate(Uy sought by black residents .267 
Findings of Intentional Discrimination in Non-Covered Jurisdictions Since 1982 
IN THURSTON COUNTY, N EBRASKA 
-The County's refusal to adjust its 1990 redistricting process to address a documented 
increase in the Native American population, and its decision instead to maintain its 
existing districting system, a course of action found to embody discriminatory intent. 268 
IN B E R KS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 
-Hostile public statements by officials at the polls to Hispanic and Spanish-speaking 
voters,269 statements such as " 'This is the U.S.A.- Hispanics should not be allowed to 
have two last names. They should learn to speak the language and we should make 
them take only one last name; "270 and " 'Dumb Spanish-speaking people . . .  I don't 
know why they're given the right to vote.' " 271 
-The subjection of Hispanic voters: "to unequal treatment at the polls, including 
being required to show photo identification where white voters have not been required 
to do so."271 
-The county's refusal to "appoint[ ]  bilingual persons to serve as clerks or machine 
inspectors, and to fill vacant elected poll worker p ositions" showing an "apparent 
unwillingness to ensure that poll workers included p ersons reflective of the community 
. . . .  Berks County did not provide bilingual oral assistance at the polls prior to this 
Court's preliminary injunction" ordering Defendants to translate all written election­
related materials and appoint bilingual interpreters.273 
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-The conduct of poll officials in the City of Reading, who "turned away Hispanic 
voters because they could not tmderstand their names, or refused to 'deal' with Hispanic 
surnarnes."274 
-The County's imposition of more onerous requirements for applicants seeking to 
serve as translators at the polls than those applying to be other types of poll officials, a 
requirement that impeded the court's order requiring the County to hire bilingual poll 
officials. 275 
-Boasts by county officials and poll workers, flaunting their racially discriminatory 
motivations and practices to federal officials observing elections in May 2001 ,  November 
2001 ,  May 2001 and November 2002, including statements from poll officials in the 
City of Reading to Justice Department observers "boast[ ing] of the outright exclusion 
of Hispanic voters . . .  during the May 15 ,  2001 municipal primary election."276 
IN M O NTEZUMA COUNTY, COLORADO 
-The refusal of county officials during the 1980s and early 1 990s to allow residents to 
register to vote at Towaoc on the Ute Reservation, even though the county created satel­
lite registration in the non-Indian communities of Mancus and Dolores.277 
-The county's imposition of significant limitations on the hours it would make avail­
able mobile voter registration on the Ute reservation, after the County decided to allow 
such registration in the 1990s.278 
IN P H I LA D E L P H IA, PENNSYLVANIA 
-The operation by city election commissioners in conjunction with campaign workers 
of a fraudulent "minority absentee ballot program" to manipulate the outcome of a 1993 
city election; efforts that included "specifically target[ing] Latino and African-Americans 
as groups to saturate with the illegal absentee ballot program;"279 and "deceiving Latino 
and African-American voters into believing that the law had changed and that there 
was a 'new way to vote' from the convenience of one's home."280 
ON T H E  EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLA N D  
-The operation of "a kind of unofficial slating organization for white candidates" by 
some all-white, state-funded volunteer fire departments on the Eastern Shore" until at 
least the mid- 1 980s.281 
-The failure of the State of Maryland to stop funding departments engaging in this 
practice, until an amendment to the Code of Fair Practices the Governor made upon 
the recommendation of the Attorney General in 1988.282 
-The discriminatory placement of polling places, that continues " [e]ven today, [ of] 
coru1ties on the lower Shore .. .in white-dominated volunteer fire companies, a hostile 
environment that may depress black electoral participation."283 
IN LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 
-Decisions in the 1980s by county officials to move polling places on short notice.284 
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-The county's appointment, "with isolated exceptions," of deputy voting registrars 
"only as a result of litigation;" other recent, unspecified efforts to "intimidate black 
candidates."285 
-The intimidation in 1986 by an unnamed white county sheriff of a black lm.vyer, Roy 
Lewellen, running for State Senate, including: 
first, warning him "not to run;' and, 
second, when that advice was ignored, an unnamed prosecutor's "institution 
[of] a widely-publicized criminal prosecution against Mr. Lewellen for wit­
ness bribery";286 treatment that "a white lawyer, even one who opposed the 
political powers that be" would not have received ;287 and conduct amounting 
to "racial intimidation" that shows "that official discrimination designed to 
suppress black political activity is not wholly a thing of the past, at least not 
in the Delta:'288 
IN BOSTON ,  MASSAC HUSETTS 
-The enactment of a redistricting plan in 2001 described by the court as "a textbook 
case of packing . . .  concentrating large numbers of minority voters within a relatively small 
number of districts;' devised by the House leadership, which "knew what it was doing."289 
-The manipulation of district lines "to benefit t\vo white incumbents" where the State 
House did not "paus [e]  to investigate the consequences of its actions for minority voting 
opportunities;' thereby using race "as a tool to ensure the protection of incumbents."290 
IN N EW ROCHELLE, N EW YORK 
-The enactment of a city council redistricting plan in 2003 that diluted minority 
voting strength by replacing a majority-minority district with a plurality district, a plan 
reflecting "a course of conduct which can only be characterized as intentional and 
deliberate."291 
IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFO RNIA 
-The County's reliance in 1990 on a districting plan that was found to be discrimina­
tory292 because it "intentionally fragmented the Hispanic population among the various 
districts in order to dilute the effect of the Hispanic vote in future elections and pre­
serve incumbencies of the Anglo members of the Board of Supervisors."293 A concurring 
judge observed that this conduct illustrated the County's "single-minded pursuit of 
incumbency;' which led it to "run roughshod over the rights of protected minorities."294 
IN C H I CAGO, ILLIN O I S  
-The retention and defense in a 1984 lawsuit of a city districting plan that "packed" 
and "fractured" minority voters to ensure the reelection of an incumbent senator, a plan 
that exposed how "the requirements of incumbency are so closely intern-vined with the 
need for racial dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarily white, district for 
Senator Joyce is virtually coterminous with a purpose to practice racial discrimination:'295 
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IN I LL I N O I S  
- The state legislature's retention and defense in a 1983 lawsuit of its districting plan 
for the state legislature, which diluted minority voting strength in order to protect two 
incumbent white senators in Chicago. 
- The state redistricting commission's drawing of district lines with "the immediate 
purpose . . .  to preserve the incumbencies of twu white state Senators."290 " [T]his process 
was so intimately intertwined with, and dependent on, racial discrimination and dilu­
tion of minority voting strength that purposeful dilution has been clearly demonstrated 
in the construction of Commission senate districts 14, 1 7  and l 8."297 
IN WESTERN TEN N ESSEE 
- " [V]  oting rights violations by public officials in rural west Tennessee as late as the 
1980's . . . .  Official discrimination not only prevents blacks from electing representatives 
of their choice, it also leads to disillusionment, mistrust, and disenfranchisement. These 
feelings last beyond the current election , and can cause black voters to drop out of the 
political process and potential black candidates to forgo an election run." 298 
-The city council's amendment of the Bolivar city charter creating a majority-vote 
requirement for mayoral elections "in response to the success of two black candidates 
for mayor;' which was challenged in a 1983 lawsuit against the city of Bolivar. "The dis­
trict court approved a class action settlement setting up a new 'system which will ensure 
the opportunity of black citizens of Bolivar to meaningfully participate in the political 
process'. . . .  [ C ]ases challenging newly adopted election systems indicate to the court that 
official discrimination against blacks in voting is not entirely a thing of the past in west 
Tennessee."299 
In addition, some courts have credited allegations of current official discrimination in 
the course of issuing Section 2 plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, action that reflects 
the view of these courts that plaintiffs were highly likely to prevail on their claims, but 
that did not reach the question of whether Section 2 had been violated on the merits.300 
Examples include: 
IN C I C E RO, ILLI N O IS 
-Town board's adoption in January 2000 of an 1 8-month residency requirement to 
register to vote, and its placement on the March primary ballot-a requirement that 
"was adopted, at least in part, with the racially discriminatory purpose of targeting 
potential Hispanic candidates for disqualification and thereby seeking to prevent 
Hispanic voters from having the opportunity to vote for and/or elect candidates of 
their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."301 
IN C R E N SHAW COUNTY, ALABAMA 
- The consistent and repeated creation of at-large systems for local governments by 
the Alabama legislature, "during periods when there was a substantial threat of black 
participation in the political process." 
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-Barriers "consistently erected" by the state " [f] rom the late 1 800's through the pres­
ent [ 1986] to keep black persons from full and equal participation in the social, eco­
nomic, and political life of the state;' where these systems "are still having their intend­
ed racist impact."302 
- The creation of these "systems .. .in the midst of the state's unrelenting historical 
agenda, spanning from the late 1 800's to the 1980's, to keep its black citizens economi­
cally, socially, and politically downtrodden, from the cradle to the grave."303 
IN HAY\VOO D  COUNTY, TENNESSEE 
- The 1982 decision by the Haywood County Commission to replace 10 district seats 
for the Road Commission with 9 seats elected at-large after the first black road com­
missioner was elected, a decision the court "finds from the evidence in the record . . .  
occurred as a result of the purposeful intention to dilute black voting strength in 
Haywood County, Tennessee."304 
Sources 
Of the 1 07 lawsuits finding Factor 1 ,  32 lawsuits (30%) did so without reference to any 
evidence,305 and another 7 ( 6.5%) did so based upon defendants' stipulation to a history 
of official discrimination.306 Courts addressing lawsuits in Section 5-covered jurisdic­
tions were no more likely than those in non-covered jurisdictions simply to assume or 
take judicial notice of Factor l ,  without any evidentiary discussion. Most courts assess­
ing Factor l examined various types of evidence. Sixty-five ( 60. 7% of those finding 
Factor 1 )  cited statutes or other official policies.307 Thirty-five (32.7%) noted actions 
and statements taken by public officials;308 24 (22.4%) cited expert testimony;309 sixteen 
( 1 4.9%) mentioned history books, newspapers or scholarly artides,310 fifteen ( 14%) 
mentioned other witness testimony.3 1 1  Some listed the jurisdiction's status as a covered 
( or non-covered) jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.312 
Fifty-six lawsuits (52.3% of those finding Factor 1 )  looked to prior judicial deci­
sions identifying official discrimination in a range of conduct. 313 Some of these decisions 
found such discrimination in education, housing, employment. Others specifically 
addressed claims of discrimination in voting, including a jurisdiction's failure to com­
ply with the requirements of Section 5 of the VRA.:' 14 Numerous cases addressing Factor 
1 cited as evidence the Factor l findings from a prior Section 2 case in the same state or 
jurisdiction.315 This earlier decision typically engaged in lengthy analysis of the historical 
record, and the subsequent suit in the state cited back to that decision, sometimes with­
out making further findings.316 
Some lawsuits ( 23 or 2 1 .5% of all lawsuits finding the factor) included within 
their Factor l analysis examples of private or unofficial discrimination, although no 
court relied exclusively on such evidence in finding Factor l .317 For example, in the 
Armour Litigation in Ohio, the court included within Factor 1 the media's use of racial 
labels to describe an African-American candidate in 1985, the failure in the same year 
of party officials to support a minority candidate 318 and the 1970 bombing (allegedly by 
private individuals) of the house of the first African-American member of the 
Youngstown School Board in Youngstown, Ohio.319 
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Discounting History 
Forty-one lawsuits addressed but did not find Factor l .320 Some courts eemed instances 
of discrimination too remote in time to count towards Factor 1 .321 Some lawsuits found 
that plaintiffs presented no evidence of official discrimination, and refused to take 
judicial notice of this factor without such evidence.322 Several courts deemed Section 5 
coverage alone insufficient to satisfy Factor l ,  and instead have demanded evidence of 
official discrimination in the specific locality in question.323 
Courts in covered and non-covered jurisdictions alike have deemed evidence of 
intentional discrimination in a neighboring locality inadequate, even when that discrim­
ination was of recent vintage.32·1 Three lawsuits specifically found evidence insufficient 
because it was not linked to the specific, local jurisdiction. In the Alabama lawsuit 
Chapman v. Nicholson, the court found Factor 1 absent because " [t]here was certainly 
no evidence that black citizens in Jasper have had as much difficulty in voting as has 
been experienced by black citizens in some Southern communities."325 Similarly, in the 
Rodriguez l itigation, the court acknowledged as "troubling" the evidence of discrimina­
tion from recent litigation in the City of Yonkers, but deemed this evidence insufficient 
to establish Factor 1 in a challenge to a proposed state senate district, because only a 
fraction of the challenged district's residents came from Yonkers.12" Most lived in the 
Bronx, where, the court noted, "Hispanics - and the various ethnic groups that fall 
under that label- have very actively participated in local Bronx politics."327 Finally, in 
the Kent County litigation, the district court found that evidence of a city's official dis­
crimination was not relevant to a Section 2 challenge to a county's actions.m 
Thirty of the lawsuits addressing but not finding Factor I parsed the factor into 
two components. These cases all identified a history of official discrimination, but 
deemed insufficient evidence showing that this past history "touched" on the right to 
vote today.329 All read Factor I as requiring a showing that the official discrimination 
h indered present-day minority political participation.330 Under this approach, much 
evidence of historic discrimination in voting is irrelevant absent linkage to contempo­
rary problems. Thus, in the Liberty County Commissioners l itigation the defendants 
conceded an extensive history of official discrimination and the court recounted this 
history in detail.331 The court then assessed "the extent to which that discrimination still 
affects the r ights of blacks to have equal access to the political process;'332 and, on this 
question, the court concluded that it did not. The primary example of more recent 
official discrimination was a school employment lawsuit decided in 1986, which " indi­
cate [d] lingering prejudice on the part of whites even in their official capacity . . .  [ but] 
did not touch the issues involved in a determination of whether the Voting Rights Act is 
being violated."333 
For some courts, affirmative steps taken by a jurisdiction to improve voting 
rights ameliorated evidence of historical discrimination. The Aldasoro l itigation, for 
example, recounted thirty years of California legislation designed to " improve m inority 
voting participation and to liberalize the political process."334 Some deemed the absence 
of contemporary examples of discrimination reason to discount past evidence. The 
court in City of Woodville, for example, acknowledged a past h istory of discrimination 
and the fact that the city "remains a place of almost total racial segregation on a social 
level;' but it nevertheless minimized this finding because "Blacks and Whites are oper­
ating a government which is fair and responsive to Blacks in a community atmosphere 
of cooperation between the races and devoid of intimidation."m So too, the court in a 
1997 case in Massachusetts noted that " [t] he 1995 election witnessed the complete 
absence of election-related problems that plagued elections in the 1980's ."336 
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For other courts, the very prevalence of discrimination meant it should be dis­
counted. Thus, while courts in Southern States assumed or outlined a long local and 
state history of official discrimination,337 some maintained that this discrimination was 
too common and too widespread to weigh heavily within the Section 2 analysis. 338 The 
court in City of Woodville explained that the city "has a past history of racial discrimi­
nation as does every other Mississippi town or city,'' thus minimizing that history.m 
Some courts in Northern States minimized a local history of discriminatory 
practices by contrasting that history with the record of what occurred in the South. In 
the Butts litigation, for example, the appellate court took issue with the district court's 
identification of numerous official practices targeting black and Hispanic voters and its 
suggestion that racial discrimination in voting is hardly confined to the South.340 The 
appellate court stated that " [ u] nlike many of the jurisdictions typically involved in 
Voting Rights Act cases, New York has ensured to black citizens the right to vote on the 
same terms as whites since 1 874 (when the fifteenth amendment was ratified) ."341 In 
another New York lawsuit against the Town of Babylon, the district court noted that 
" [no] thing in the history of New York even remotely approaches the systematic exclu­
sion of blacks from the political process that existed in the South."342 
S E NATE FACTOR 2: Extent of Racially Polarized Voting 
Senate Factor 2 calls for an evaluation of the extent of racially polarized voting. This 
Report discusses this factor in the Gingles section above. 
S E NATE FACTOR 3 :  Use of Enhancing Practices: At-large Elections, 
Majority i-0te Requirements 
Factor 3 inquires about the "extent to which the state or political subdivision has used 
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provi­
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for 
discrimination against the minority group."343 Sel"tion 2 did not categorically outlaw the 
practices identified in Factor 3, even though numerous decisions have invalidated 
specific uses of such practices as violations of the statute. 
Many more courts adjudicated challenges to the practices listed in Factor 3 than 
actually found the factor. In all, 53  lawsuits found that at least one practice existed that 
might enhance the opportunity for discrimination potentially resulting from the prac­
tice directly challenged in those lawsuits.34'1 
Of those finding Factor 3,  35 ( or 66.0%) also identified a violation of Section 2 
(and 1 additional lawsuit ended with a settlement favorable to the plaintiffs ) .  Thirty­
two lawsuits found majority-vote requirements,345 26 found anti-single shot provisions, 
such as staggered terms and/or numbered-place requirements,346 23 found the use of at­
large elections,347 1 1  found unusually large districts,348 and 6 found other enhancing 
practices, including the use of an automatic voter removal or "purge" law ( based upon 
voting frequency) , a short interval between an initial election and the runoff election, 
candidate registration fee, candidate residency requirement, or low financial compensa­
tion for elected officials.3·19 
Thirty-four ( 64.2%) of the lawsuits finding Factor 3 arose in covered jurisdic­
tions.:;so Of these, 23 also found Section 2 was violated. 351 Of the 19 lawsuits ( 35 .8%) 
finding this factor in non-covered jurisdictions, 12 also found a violation of Section 2.35:: 
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Factor 3 differs from the other Senate Factors in that courts addressing it usually 
engaged in virtually no analysis. Unlike, for example, identifying a racial appeal ( Factor 6) 
or an exclusive slating process (Factor 4) ,  identifying Factor 3 devices is almost always 
perfectly obvious. The jurisdiction either uses an at-large system or it does not. Most 
courts have found little to analyze and little to say apart from identifying the practice. 
Even so, some courts that fotmd Factor 3 discounted its import, typically by deem­
ing the identified practice as having a minimally discriminatory effect on the ground.35' 
These courts suggested that while Factor 3 practices may generally foster discriminatory 
results, no evidence establishing that effect was presented in the particular case. 
The Senate Report's inclusion of the practices identified in Factor 3 in the totali­
ty of the circumstances recognizes the history underlying these practices. Legitimate 
reasons may exist for their continued use, but numerous notorious and historic exam­
ples attest to their adoption and use as devices for limiting political participation by 
racial minorities, and, in particular, participation by African Americans in the South.354 
The Senate Rep ort recognizes this by providing that a jurisdiction's decision to use such 
prac"tices is evidence, albeit hardly dispositive standing alone, that Section 2 may have 
been violated. 
SE NAT E  FACTOR 4: Candidate Slating 
Factor 4 asks whether members of the minority group have been denied access to a 
candidate slating process, assuming such a process exists in the jurisdiction. A denial of 
such access was an important component of a Section 2 claim prior to the 1982 amend­
ments,355 but the factor appears to be of diminished importance under the amended 
provision. Sixty-four lawsuits determining Section 2 was violated did not find Factor 4.356 
More than 20 lawsuits specifically addressed evidence relating to Factor 4. Ten 
of these found the existence of a discriminatory slating process. Of these 1 0  lawsuits, 
4 originated in jurisdictions covered by Section 5 .  All but one also found a violation 
of Section 2. Five of the 1 0  involved challenges to at-large districts. Eight also found 
racially polarized voting existed; all courts in these 1 0  lawsuits also found that the 
minority group had difficulty getting elected.357 
While the term "slating" is not defined by the Senate Report, the Fifth Circuit 
has described it as "a process in which some influential non-governmental organization 
selects and endorses a group or 'slate' of candidates, rendering the election little more 
than a stamp of approval for the candidates selected:'35s Courts finding the factor have 
identified slating in four general circumstances. 
Official Slating 
Three courts identified instances where official party conduct constituted discriminato­
ry slating. The Town of Hempstead litigation documented a slating process under which 
the Republican Party Chairman fo r  the County selected candidates to run for office 
subject to approval by the Party's 69-member executive committee.'59 Deeming this 
process racially exclusive within the meaning of Factor 4, the district court noted that 
the executive committee invariably approved the Chairman's selections without debate, 
making the participation of three African Americans on the committee of little conse­
quence. The only African-American candidate ever slated was not initially supported by 
a town-based organization of African-American Republicans, but instead was "a close 
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friend and tennis partner" of the Party Chairman.360 These circumstances led the appel­
late court to observe that, in this predominantly white, predominantly Republican 
town, the lack of access to the Republican slating process meant that "blacks simply are 
unable to have any preferred candidate elected to the Town Board:'361 
Similarly, in the City of New Rochelle litigation the district court found that can­
didate selection by party members placed barriers on non-party affiliated candidates 
and limited the prospects for candidates preferred by the African-American community 
to gain access to the ballot.362 So too, in the Albany County litigation the district court 
found a lack of access based on anecdotal evidence coupled with the major parties' fail­
ure ever to nominate a minority candidate for county-wide office.l0' 
The Marylanders litigation, as described in the Factor 1 section above, docu­
mented a recent instance of official slating, albeit not by party officials. Although the 
court did not expressly address this evidence under Factor 4, the court cited the prac­
tice tluough the mid- 1 980s of allowing state-funded, all-white fire departments on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland to control the candidate slating process. 
Unofficial Party Slating or Backstabbing 
Two courts found unofficial conduct by party officials to constitute slating.364 In  the 
City of Springfield litigation, the court called unofficial party endorsements and support 
in ostensibly nonpartisan elections "a subtle and covert" form of slating, one that con­
tributed to the failure of African-American candidates to be elected.365 In the Bone Shirt 
litigation the court found that informal activities by the party organizations stymied 
Native American candidacies. The court highlighted as evidence the conduct of the 
chairman of the Democratic Central Committee, who campaigned against his own 
party's nominees for county commissioner in the 2002 general election after Indian 
candidates unseated non-Indian incumbents in the primary.366 
Although not characterized as "slating," conduct documented in two other law­
suits may be similarly understood. In the Armour litigation, the court cited the failure 
of party officials to support minority candidates despite rules requiring such support.367 
The City of Philadelphia litigation cited campaign materials distributed by the 
Democratic Party listing all city council candidates running at-large except for one 
African-American and one Latino candidate.368 
Private Slating 
Three courts found that conduct by private organizations denied minority candidates 
access to slating processes.369 In the City of Chicago Heights litigation the court identified 
such conduct in the activities of an organization called the Concerned Citizens Group, 
a group that had no African-American members and chose candidates for city council 
elections. The court noted the absence of evidence showing either that black voters had 
input into this slating process or that they could gain access to the ballot absent access 
to that process.370 In the City of Gretna litigation, the district court found that electoral 
success hinged on the endorsement of a local political faction known as the Miller­
White Ticket, and that the Ticket routinely blocked black candidates.371 In the Pasadena 
Independent School District litigation, the court noted that essential campaign contribu­
tions flowed to candidates endorsed by a group called Communities United for Better 
Schools ( "CUBS") .  Since a CUBS endorsement typically led to candidate success on 
election day, and because CUBS had only once endorsed a Hispanic candidate, the 
court concluded that Factor 4 was satisfied.372 
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Inference of Slating 
One court inferred a denial of access to slating processes given the absence of African­
American candidates running for office.373 
Slating Not Found 
In an additional 13  cases, plaintiffs introduced what they contended was evidence of 
slating but courts did not find that minority candidates had been denied access. Courts 
in 5 cases rejected evidence regarding private slating processes either because the activi­
ties of the group in question did not fit the court's definition of a slating organization374 
or because the slating organizations were defunct by the time litigation was initiated.375 
For example, in the City of Dallas litigation the district court noted that an organization 
known as the Citizen's Charter Association had denied black and Latino candidates 
access to slating through 1977, but because the group no longer existed, the factor was 
not found.376 Anecdotal evidence of slating was condusorily rejected in another two 
lawsuits.377 
Three lawsuits viewed electoral success by minority candidates as evidence of 
access to slating processes. Additionally, in the Alamosa County litigation,378 the court 
assumed without deciding that the D emocratic Central Committee played a functional 
role in the selection of county commission candidates, but concluded that anecdotal 
testimony about ethnically biased comments and "boorish behavior" by some members 
of the committee was insufficient to establish a "policy or practice" that denied non­
white candidates access to slating. Finally, 2 lawsuits attributed the exclusion of minori­
ty candidates from slating processes to partisanship rather than race.379 
S E NATE FACTOR 5 :  Ongoing Effects of Discrimination (Education, Employment, Health) 
The fifth Senate Factor calls for evaluation of "the extent to which members of the 
minority group bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employ­
ment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political 
process:' Of the 1 29 lawsuits addressing this factor, 84 found the factor to be met. 
Forty-five lawsuits finding Factor 5 originated in jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of 
the VRA. In 50 lawsuits finding Factor 5 ,  Section 2 was violated, and an additional 4 
lawsuits ended favorably for the plaintiffs.38° Courts have evaluated Factor 5 in several 
different ways. 
Depressed Socioeconomic Status Alone 
Several courts found Factor 5 based on a finding of historic discrimination and some 
showing that the minority group experiences comparatively low socioeconomic status. 
In 1 2  lawsuits, courts used this approach and found the factor met.381 
Nexus Between Discrimination and Participation 
Most courts require some kind of n exus not only behveen a history of discrimination 
and lowered socioeconomic status, but also between depressed socioeconomic status 
and the ability to participate in the political process. In 3 1  cases, courts asswned or 
deduced, sometimes aided by expert testimony, that lower socioeconomic status hin­
dered the minority group's ability to p articipate effectively in the political process and 
found the factor met.382 These courts pointed out, for example, that depressed socioeco­
nomic status hinders one's ability to raise money and mount a campaign,383 and to 
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campaign in large districts.384 Moreover, lower socioeconomic status often creates geo­
graphic and social isolation from other members of the community, connection with 
whom may be critical to engage in effective political action.385 One district court 
specifically noted that depressed socioeconomic status maizes it difficult for minority 
candidates to run for particularly low paying public positions.386 
Proof of Depressed Participation 
In the majority of lawsuits, however, courts concluded that Factor 5 requires concrete 
evidence of depressed participation as measured through voter registration and turnout 
statistics. Out of the 35 cases quantifying minority political participation according to 
voter registration and turnout statistics, 24 found Factor 5 based on depressed minority 
registration and turnout,387 while 1 1  courts found the factor unsatisfied when presented 
with nearly equal voting participation rates.388 As a measure of political participation, 
several courts view turnout as more probative than registration rates.389 
In 2 cases, the courts made condusory assertions that socioeconomic disadvan­
tage did not hinder political participation by the minority group in question. J9° In  1 0  
cases, the court did not find Factor 5 met because plaintiffs had not presented sufficient 
evidence to show whether or not the minority group actually suffered from lower polit­
ical participation.'91 
Holistic Approach to Participation 
Other courts considered statistical measures of voting participation but did so in com­
bination with significant testimonial evidence. Five courts, for example, examined 
under Factor 5 the effect of various forms of de facto racial segregation on the ability of 
minority groups to participate in the political process.'92 Thus, the district court in the 
Charleston County litigation noted severe societal and housing segregation and found 
that this ongoing racial separation "maizes it especially difficult for African-American 
candidates seeking county-wide office to reach out to and communicate with the pre­
dominately white electorate from whom they must obtain substantial support to win 
an at-large elections [ sic] :'393 The district court in the Neal litigation likewise concluded 
that similar segregation meant "that whites in the County have historically had little 
personal knowledge of or social contact with blacks . . .  .Quite simply, whites do not 
know blacks and are, as a result, highly unlikely to vote for black candidates:'394 
Causation and Voter Apathy 
Five courts refused to find Factor 5 notwithstanding specific evidence of both depressed 
socioeconomic status and low levels of political participation.395 These courts required 
additional evidence showing that discrimination directly caused depressed participation. 
Some defendants have argued that low participation results not from discrimi­
nation, but instead from voter apathy. Courts have disputed the relevance of voter apa­
thy within this inquiry into causation. Four courts concluded that voter apathy, as 
opposed to socioeconomic status, best explained low levels of political p articipation by 
minority voters in the jurisdiction.396 At least 5 other courts , however, attributed voter 
apathy to the sources of discrimination Factor 5 identifies.397 In the City of Gretna litiga­
tion, for example, the district court held that voter apathy was not an independent 
cause of low political participation, but was instead a product of the very discrimina­
tion that depressed black socioeconomic status. The court noted that " [d ]epressed lev­
els of participation in voting and candidacy are inextricably involved in the perception 
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of futility and impotence" engendered by "severe historical disadvantage."398 The court 
concluded that " [t]hese historicaJ disadvantages continue through the present day and 
undoubtedly hinder the ability of the black community to participate effectively in the 
political process within the City of Gretna."399 
Significance of Past Discrimination 
In one case, the district court required plaintiffs to establish that official discrimination 
caused the current socioeconomic disparities.400 In another, the district court concluded 
that plaintiffs had not carried their burden of proof because they could not show that 
socioeconomic disparities were the specific result of discrimination within the chal­
lenged jurisdiction itself.'101 In three cases, district courts discounted evidence of low 
socioeconomic status among Latinos because the evidence did not distinguish recent 
immigrants from longstanding residents. This approach posits that new immigrants 
cannot bear the effects of discrimination in housing, employment or health within the 
meaning of Factor 5 and thus the failure to distinguish them from other members of 
the minority group leaves courts unable to find the factor satisfied.402 
Intransigence of Inequality 
Some courts discounted evidence of low socioeconomic status because they determined 
that the status was too intransigent to receive significant weight.403 In the A1agnolia Bar 
Association litigation, the district court found sufficient evidence to establish the fac­
tor,404 but concluded that Factor 5 described a condition too common to weigh heavily 
in plaintiffs' failure. The court observed that because "the socioeconomic standing of 
blacks vis-a-vis whites has changed little and it is unlikely that standing will improve 
markedly in the foreseeable future," continuing socioeconomic effects of discrimination 
"will be a factor on which the plaintiffs in voting rights cases will always win in the 
foreseeable future. The issue thus becomes one of weight to be afforded this factor." 405 
S E NATE FACTOR 6 :  Racial Appeals in Campaigns 
The sixth factor in the Senate Report instructs courts to assess whether political cam­
paigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals. Of the cases surveyed, 
48 lawsuits considered evidence addressing this factor. Thirty-one of these identified 
such an appeaJ and found the factor met. Seventeen ( or 54.8%) of these 3 1  lawsuits 
were in covered jurisdictions, while 1 4  were in non-covered jurisdictions. Eighteen also 
held that Section 2 was violated and another issued a preliminary injunction. Of the 
successful lawsuits finding this factor, 1 2  (or 63.2%) occurred in covered jurisdictions.406 
Some courts noted that campaigns generally have been marked by racial 
appeals,407 but most decisions finding Factor 6 identified appeals in specific campaign 
years. These courts have identified racial appeals in 59 specific elections occurring in 
1950, 1954, 1960, 1968, 1970, 197 1 ,  1972, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991 ,  1992, 1995, 2000 and 2002.408 Courts finding Factor 6 identified 
42 specific racial appeals or campaigns characterized by racial appeals since 1982.409 Of 
these, 27 occurred in covered jurisdictions.410 
While some courts have stated without elaboration that elections have been 
marked by racial appeals,41 1 others have identified racial appeals in a wide range of 
conduct. Courts have disagreed, however, as to what conduct should be considered a 
racial appeal. 
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Identification of the Candidate's Race 
In 6 lawsuits, courts identified as racial appeals a variety of statements in which a can­
didate's race was identified, including comments by white candidates or their campaign 
workers that their opponent was black,'112 statements by minority candidates in which 
they identified their minority status,413 and newspaper articles that mentioned the race 
of the candidates.414 
Photographs 
Numerous courts have identified the use of photographs in campaign flyers and adver­
tisements as racial appeals. The majority of these cases involved campaign materials 
distributed by a white candidate or the candidate's supporters that featured the photo­
graph of an African-American opponent.415 
No court has deemed the decision by a newspaper to publish candidates' photo­
graphs a racial appeal.410 In the City of Jackson litigation, for example, the district court 
acknowledged that the publication of candidates' photographs might prompt "some 
white voters [to] vote for a white candidate and some black voters [to] vote for a black 
candidate," but, the court concluded, "that is merely a fact of political life in Jackson."417 
Two lawsuits characterized as racial appeals the manipulation of photographs to 
darken the skin of opposing candidates, be they minority or white.418 The Charleston 
County litigation recounted the use of this tactic in three separate campaigns occurring 
in 1988, 1990, and 1992. ln each instance, white candidates and their campaigns distrib­
uted official campaign literature or placed newspaper ads featuring the darkened pho­
tos of African-American opponents.419 The City of Philadelphia litigation discussed the 
use of similar tactics in two different campaigns. In a state senate campaign in the early 
1990s, one white candidate published a brochure containing a darkened photograph of 
his white opponent next to a photograph of Philadelphia's black mayor.420 The other 
involved a televised campaign advertisement in the 1985 district attorney campaign that 
portrayed light-skinned African-iunerican candidates as having much darker skin.421 
The Specter of Minority Governance 
Courts have held Factor 6 satisfied by a variety of allusions or threats of minority con­
trol of government. Conduct of this sort includes references by white candidates or 
their campaigns that minority voters will engage in "bloc voting" and turn out in high 
numbers,422 that a minority will be elected if whites do not turn out,423 and that minori­
ty candidates, when elected, will appoint other minorities to positions of power.42" 
Similarly characterized are statements by white candidates that the minority communi­
ty wants to "take over" the local government, and the country.425 
In the Armour litigation, for example, campaign workers for a white 1985 may­
oral candidate went door to door telling voters that if the black candidate was elected, 
"his cabinet would be black." They also drove a sound truck around You11gstown 
announcing that should the minority candidate be elected "we will have a black police 
chief, we will have a black fire chief;' and adding "we cannot have that." 426 More recent­
ly, in the Bone Shirt litigation, the district court identified racial appeals occurring dur­
ing the 2002 primary elections for county commission, in which three Native American 
candidates confronted accusations that Indians were seeking to "take over the county 
politically . . .  [and] trying to take back land and put it in trust."427 
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In-group and Out-group 
Two courts identified as racial appeals campaign advertisements making reference to a 
candidate's being "one of us"428 or promising to stand against vandalism and crime that 
"drive our people and our businesses out" of the community.429 In the City of Holyoke 
litigation the district court categorized as a racial appeal the "us versus them" sentiment 
featured in one candidate's 1987 campaign materials where "the 'us' was fairly clearly 
the longtime white residential community, the 'them' the more recent Hispanic minori­
ty."430 The district court noted, for example, the campaign's focus on "teach [ing] the 
'Spanish' English . . .  as an answer to increasing crime and vandalism" and featured an 
advertisement with a "large picture of an Hispanic young man, cigarette dangling from 
his lips and the caption 'The people who really should read this, can't."' 431 
Race-baiting 
In the Charleston County litigation ,  the district court identified as a racial appeal the 
efforts to increase turnout among voters p erceived to be "anti-black."m In 1990, the 
campaign of a candidate for Lt. Governor of South Carolina paid Benjamin Hunt, Jr., "a 
nearly illiterate African-American man" to run in a congressional primary.433 The candi­
date took no part in the campaign beyond allowing his picture to be taken while stand­
ing in front of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. A consultant hired by the would­
be Lt. Governor's campaign mailed out thousands of leaflets featuring this picture with 
the caption "Hunt for Congress:'434 
The Portent of Racial Strife 
Also counting as racial appeals are statements suggesting racial strife or even violence 
will ensue if minority candidates or candidates associated with minority interests were 
supported or elected.435 
Guilt By Association 
Efforts to link a candidate with polarizing figures or organizations have been deemed 
racial appeals. Four courts, for example, have identified as racial appeals statements by 
white candidates linking a minority candidate with Jesse Jackson436 or Louis Farrakhan 
and the Nation of Islam.437 Another characterized as a racial appeal statements by an 
African-American candidate that his white opponent was supported by the Ku Klux 
Klan.438 
Courts have also found evidence supporting a finding of Factor 6 in efforts to 
link a white opponent with minority elected officials or issues of minority concern. For 
example, two district courts classified as racial appeals the campaign literature of white 
candidates who featured photographs of their opponents, also white, alongside pictures 
of African-American elected officials.439 Another district court identified as a racial 
appeal a private slating organization's reference to a white candidate's association with a 
black candidate and his support for voter registration in the minority community. 440 
Discussion of Racially Charged Issues 
In 5 lawsuits courts identified as racial appeals candidates' statements on certain racially 
charged issues. These issues included illegal immigration,441 low income housing;142 bus­
ing and school desegregation,443 and crime.444 In the Town of Hempstead litigation, the 
district court found a racial appeal in a campaign brochure distributed by a candidate 
for town council in 1997. The brochure noted the candidate's awareness of "his com-
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munity's proximity to the City of New York;' his opposition to those who would seek to 
"Queensify" the town, and his concern about the danger of "urban crime spilling over 
the county border." The brochure celebrated the candidate's efforts to "sensitize [ ]  local 
patrolmen to the special concerns of the community," a statement the court identified 
as a reference to an "unofficial border patrol policy" under which the police were to 
stop black youth from Queens, "find out their business and ensure that they 'go back 
where they belong."'445 
One district court identified as a racial appeal public debate on a racially 
charged issue, absent any l inkage to any particular candidate or campaign.'146 Another 
viewed such debate as evidence supporting the inference that other campaigns are char­
acterized by racial appeals.417 
Not all courts treat the presence of racially charged issues in campaigns or gen­
eral public debate as racial appeals. Three district courts rejected plaintiffs' contentions 
that candidates' discussion of busing and school desegregation should be classified as 
racial appeals.448 The district court in the City of Norfolk litigation stated that the inclu­
sion of such issues in campaigns was of "legitimate public concern and not an appeal to 
racial prejudices;' and noted that both black and white candidates addressed the issue 
of busing "reluctantly and often only when questioned by the public about their 
stance."449 Similarly, the court in the City of St. Louis litigation stated that while school 
desegregation has "an undeniable racial dimension;' p laintiffs presented no evidence 
that the issue was raised "in an effort to appeal to members of a particular race:'450 In 
the Red Clay School District l itigation, plaintiffs introduced into evidence a candidate's 
flyer that warned of increasing percentages of minority students at local high schools 
and the potential for "major disruption for our children." The flyer stated that "Bill 
Manning is the only candidate who has said over and over again that he favors stability. 
To deal with overcrowding, he supports change within our same feeders, keeping our 
children together." While the court characterized the flyer as "shrill," it declined to char­
acterize it as a racial appeal because it does not identify the race of any candidate nor 
does it "malign one of the candidates or his supporters because of race."451 
One district court refused to characterize debate about at-large and single­
member districts as a racial appeal.152 Another district court refused to "consider every 
discussion of or question about" Indian exemption from certain taxes a racial appeal, 
notwithstanding the district court's recognition that "white voters harbor a resentment 
over this issue, making white support for Indian candidates unlikely."453 
Racial Bias in Press Coverage 
Racial bias exhibited by the press has been deemed a racial appeal in 2 cases. In the 
Bone Shirt l itigation, the court credited as evidence of racial appeals unsubstantiated 
and false news stories circulating throughout 2002 linking Native Americans to voter 
fraud.454 Likewise, in the City of Dallas litigation, a 1989 newspaper column warning 
that a vote for the African-American candidate running against the incumbent white 
mayor "could l ead to racial violence and white flight" was classified as a racial appeal.455 
Candidate Intimidation 
Some courts have characterized as racial appeals conduct directed at minority candi­
dates as opposed to voters. In the Jeffers litigation, for example, the court termed a 
racial appeal a black candidate's receipt of anonymous calls where the caller used 
obscenities and racial slurs as well as a later incident in which the same candidate was 
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run off the road by a group of individuals wearing hoods.456 Jeffers also deemed a racial 
appeal government retaliation against an unsuccessful minority candidate. Prior to his 
political involvement, the candidate had enjoyed a business relationship with the coun­
ty that was terminated after his campaign.457 
In the Garza v. Los Angeles litigation, the district court cited "substantial evi­
dence" of racial appeals including hostility directed at a Latino candidate for city coun­
cil who "had doors slammed in his face" while campaigning in a predominantly white 
neighborhood.'158 It similarly characterized the destruction of the candidate's campaign 
literature. 
Racial Slurs or Stereotypes 
Courts have also deemed a racial appeal the public use of racial epithets and slurs by 
white candidates running against black candidates.459 One district court found a white 
official's admission before the court in 2002 that he casually and regularly uses the 
word "nigger" to be a racial appeal, even though the plaintiffs made no allegation that 
racial appeals existed. 460 
So too, courts have identified stereotypes about minority candidates' lack of 
qualifications as racial appeals. For example, the district court in the City of Dallas liti­
gation so classified a 1970 ad where the white incumbent described his opponent sim­
ply as "A black man ( no qualifications of any kind) ."461 In the same case, the district 
court also noted a boast made by a white female candidate and printed in the League of 
Women Voters 1972 voter guide that "evidence of [her]  proven ability" was the fact that 
no white men opposed her, and that her only opponents were black men.462 The district 
court in the Neal litigation identified a similar type of racial appeal in an editorial run in 
the local newspaper. The editorial announced the race of two black candidates only to go 
on to urge voters "not to vote on account of race, but rather on merit." Still, the editori­
al noted that one of the races involving an African-American candidate was "of great 
concern to many county residents" because the black candidate could win "solid black 
support" and defeat the white incumbent. The editorial weighed in for the re-election 
of the "more e:x.rperienced" incumbents.463 
Sources of Evidence 
In most cases, plaintiffs seeking to prove Factor 6 introduce campaign literature and 
advertisements from previous elections, documentation of media coverage, and witness 
testimony from minority and non-minority candidates, elected officials, and communi­
ty members. In the Wamser litigation, the district court looked beyond these usual 
sources of evidence and appeared to dismiss the defendant's expert testimony on racial 
appeals, based on the judge's own experience -"Dr. Wendel's observation that other 
political campaigns are devoid of racial appeals would be most credible perhaps to per­
sons who were not in St. Louis during the recent campaign for the City school 
board."464 
Discounting Racial Appeals 
Several lawsuits identifying racial appeals discounted their import. Some characterized 
the appeals as merely "isolated" incidents.465 Others called the appeals ineffective because 
the targeted candidate was elected, at times with significant white support.466 In the 
Alamosa County litigation, the court identified "a fundamental electoral truth - that to 
be elected in Alamosa County, a candidate must appeal to both Anglo and Hispanic 
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voters;' such that racial appeals by Hispanic candidates certainly did not weigh in favor 
of a finding of vote dilution.'167 
Eight lawsuits held that racial appeals occurred too long ago to be probative in 
contemporary claims.468 Appeals deemed too remote include ones occurring more than 
thirty years earlier,469 as well as ones occurring a decade past.170 Two courts discounted 
evidence of racial appeals as outdated by noting a new political reality characterized by 
"racial harmony."471 
In the Charleston County litigation, the court identified numerous racial 
appeals, but concluded without explanation that " [ e] vidence of racial appeals has not 
materially assisted the Court in reaching a conclusion" on Section 2 liability.472 Likewise, 
in the lv1agnolia Bar Association litigation, the district court acknowledged the presence 
of both overt and subtle racial appeals in campaigns, while concluding that "the appeal 
for voters by both black and white candidates crosses racial lines, thereby minimizing 
the importance of this factor under the totality of the circumstances."473 
S E N AT E  FACTOR 7: Success of Minority Candidates 
Under Senate Factor 7, courts must evaluate the "extent to which members of the 
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction."474 Of the lawsuits 
analyzed, 137  specifically addressed this factor, and 85 found a lack of minority candi­
date success.475 Of these, 60 ( 71 %) also found a violation of Section 2. Two additional 
lawsuits ended in outcomes favorable to plaintiffs, albeit not with an adjudicated 
Section 2 violation. Twenty-five lawsuits found Factor 7 but did not find a violation of 
the statute. Fifty-two lawsuits addressed but did not find Factor 7, and of these, only 
one found a Section 2 violation. Forty-nine ( 57.6%) of the Factor 7 findings were in 
covered jurisdictions, while 36 ( 42.4%) were in non-covered jurisdictions.476 
Courts evaluating Factor 7 looked primarily at election results and counted the 
number of minority candidates elected. Courts generally examined minority success 
over the course of several elections, typically occurring over decades.477 Several cases 
distinguished election results occurring before the lawsuit was initiated and those after­
ward, and often discounted evidence of post-filing minority success as strategic efforts 
to frustrate the lawsuit.478 
Unsurprisingly, Factor 7 weighed heavily in the plaintiffs' favor in cases where 
electoral results revealed a total failure or near total failure of minority candidates to be 
elected. Courts have repeatedly found a lack of minority success in this situation.479 On 
the other hand, Factor 7 favored defendants where electoral results showed significant 
success of minority candidates. 480 
Electoral results do not constitute the entire inquiry under Factor 7. Numerous 
courts have also considered the record of minority electoral success in conjunction with 
population statistics. Because Section 2 is explicit that the statute provides no right to 
proportional representation,481 some courts have deemed an absence of proportional 
representation irrelevant to the Factor 7 analysis.482 Others, however, have viewed pro­
portional minority representation (or its absence) as informing the Factor 7 inquiry. 
Several courts deemed the absence of such representation to suggest a lack of minority 
electoral success under Factor 7,'183 while others viewed evidence that minoritv ( 
officeholders approached or exceeded the proportion of minorities in the electorate as 
proof of minority electoral success.484 Still, some courts concluded that greater-than­
proportional electoral success did not compel a finding that Factor 7 was unsatisfied:185 
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The nature and prominence of the offices to which minority candidates had 
been elected also informed the Factor 7 inquiry. Some courts deemed the absence of 
minority candidates in top offices evidence of a lack of minority success, notwithstand­
ing minority election to "lesser" positions.486 Other courts viewed minority success in 
these "lesser" elections as sufficient evidence of minority electoral success, even where 
minority candidates did not win top offices.487 For some courts, the success of minority 
candidates in exogenous elections was sufficient evidence of minority electoral success, 
even where minority candidates did not win any office in the challenged jurisdiction.488 
Many courts compared minority electoral success in endogenous elections to other 
elections for city, cotmty or statewide offices. Most, however, emphasized that exogenous 
elections were less probative of electoral difficulty or success.489 Some courts accorded 
almost no weight to exogenous electoral evidence,490 and several appellate courts 
reversed district court decisions finding that plaintiffs failed to meet Factor 7 based on 
exogenous electoral success.491 
Some courts cited the appointment of minority officials to support a finding 
that Factor 7 had,492 or had not been met.493 For instance, in the Town of Hempstead liti­
gation , the appellate court acknowledged that black Republicans had been appointed to 
various offices in the surrounding area and to "a number of positions" in the Town, but 
emphasized that the "one black . . .  elected to Town office since the establishment of the 
Town Board . . .  [was 1 a Republican who was appointed to the Board in 1 993 and elect­
ed the same year." 494 Thus, where minority electoral "success" hinges on the advantages of 
incumbency secured through appointment, some courts have found that such "success" 
has little bearing on the ability of minority candidates to win elections generally. 
Several lawsuits looked beyond electoral results to assess the number of minori­
ty candidates participating in given races. Some courts noted that the failure of minori­
ty citizens to "offer themselves" as candidates weighed against finding a lack of minority 
electoral succesS.495 In the Red Clay School District litigation, for example, the district 
court noted the absence of black candidates running for the school board in several 
elections. Although it acknowledged that "a sustained inability to elect black preferred 
candidates could create an atmosphere" that might discourage African-American candi­
dacies, the court found evidence supporting the existence of such an "atmosphere" 
lacking in the case before it. It noted in particular the success of one black candidate 
and the absence of an onerous slating process. 496 Other courts, however, considered the 
possibility that a dearth of minority candidates might itself stem from "the very barri­
ers to political participation that Congress has sought to remove" and weighed the 
small number of minority candidates in favor of plaintiffs. 497 
A few lawsuits included within the Factor 7 inquiry an examination of the 
qualifications of successful and unsuccessful minority candidates. Evidence suggesting 
that minority candidates were not serious or viable weighed against plaintiffs in the 
Fort Bend Independent School District litigation;193 while the defeat of well-qualified 
minority candidates contributed to findings of a lack of minority electoral success in a 
small number of cases.499 The failure of prominent white Democrats to rally behind a 
minority candidate contributed to finding Factor 7 in at least one case.500 
In 1 2  lawsuits, courts distinguished minority candidates from minority-pre­
ferred candidates. Seven of these courts seemed willing to gauge minority electoral suc­
cess based on the success of minority-preferred candidates, even when those candidates 
themselves were non-minority.501 In 5 lawsuits, courts were more skeptical about 
whether non-minority candidates were minority- preferred.502 In the City of Cincinnati 
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litigation, for example, the appellate court stated that "the Act's guarantee of equal 
opportunity is not met when . . .  'candidates favored by blacks can win, but only if the 
candidates are white.' "503 The court suggested that the inability of black voters to elect 
their p referred candidate unless that candidate is white signals that black voters have 
been denied an "opportunity enjoyed by white voters, namely, the opportunity to elect 
a candidate of their own race.''504 
Under certain circumstances, courts discounted evidence of minority electoral 
success or an apparent lack thereof. Some lawsuits, for example, viewed the defeat of 
minority candidates by relatively small margins as mitigating evidence of limited 
minority electoral success.505 At least one lawsuit discounted the election of a minority 
candidate where that candidate was "emphatically not the candidate of choice of the 
county's African-American voters."506 
Several courts examining Factor 7 tended to discount minority electoral success 
absent evidence that the minority candidate received the support of white voters. 
Apparently agreeing with the Supreme Court's characterization of the majority-minori­
ty district as the "politics of second best,"507 these courts seemed to place more weight 
on minority success in at-large elections than in majority-minority districts.508 So too, a 
few courts discounted as evidence of minority electoral success the experience of an 
African-American official, first appointed to the city board and then re-elected because 
the official not only enjoyed the benefits of incumbency but also never faced a white 
opponent.509 Conversely, another court credited as evidence of minority electoral success 
the election of candidates who had originally been appointed to office where evidence 
established that these candidates subsequently developed "sustained biracial coalitions" 
and retained their positions through more than "sheer power of incumbency."510 
S E NAT E  FACTOR 8: Significant Lack of Responsiveness 
In addition to the seven "typical " factors listed above, the Senate Report adds two addi­
tional factors "that in some cases have had p robative value" in establishing a Section 2 
violation. The first is whether there "is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part 
of elected official.s to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.''51 1 
Of the lawsuits surveyed, 106 lawsuits addressed this factor and 19 ( 1 7  .9%) found 
responsiveness lacking. 512 Of those finding the factor, 13  ( 68.4%) ended favorably for 
the plaintif s.513 Thus, only 6 lawsuits ( 3 1 .6%) that found a significant lack of respon­
siveness found in favor of the defendant. Thirty-four lawsuits that addressed but failed 
to find Factor 8 also held Section 2 to be violated.514 Thirteen cases considered lack of 
responsiveness but did not decide whether or not Factor 8 was met.515 
Nine ( 4 7.4%) of the lawsuits that found a significant lack of responsiveness 
were in jurisdictions covered under Section 5; ten ( 52.6%) were not.516 Of the 19 law­
suits that found a significant lack of responsiveness, all found a history of discrimina­
tion, 14 found Factor 1 was met, 1 5  found the minority candidate had difficulty getting 
elected, and 1 4  found racial bloc voting. 517 
Courts addressing responsiveness took varying approaches to evaluating the 
factor and what it encompasses. The Senate Report did not define the term, and courts 
have rarely attempted a general definition, opting instead to evaluate the factor based 
on specific examples presented in any given case.518 Nevertheless, the cases suggest that 
courts view responsiveness as having two distinct components: substantive and procedural. 
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Substantive Responsiveness 
In the majority of lawsuits addressing Factor 8, courts viewed the responsiveness 
inquiry as requiring examination of the substantive policies enacted or implemented by 
the jurisdiction at issue. Courts applying this approach nevertheless disagreed 
significantly about which substantive policies signal responsiveness and which do not. 
Numerous courts have held that evidence of affirmative discrimination directed 
at the minority group established a lack of responsiveness to that community.519 Courts 
have cited adjudicated court decisions addressing school desegregation, employment 
discrimination and a violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act;020 resistance to 
school desegregation orders;521 evidence of disparate treatment;522 and instances of racial 
hostility.523 In making this determination, courts generally restricted their inquiry to 
conduct within the jurisdiction of the governing body, be it a school board524 or a gen­
eral local government.525 Courts generally did not consider discriminatory conduct out­
side the jurisdictional authority of the challenged governing body.526 
In 24 lawsuits, courts held that elected officials are responsive absent evidence 
they engage in affirmative discrimination against the minority group. 527 In this context, 
courts have cited the absence of evidence establishing such discrimination, including 
the nondiscriminatory provision of city services, 528 and in particular road paving 
policy.529 Courts have also deemed as responsive efforts by local officials to address or 
correct discriminatory practices. For instance, courts have deemed "responsive" govern­
ing bodies that achieve "unitary" status for previously de jure segregated schools,530 that 
enter into consent decrees,531 or that change to randomized selection of jury roles from 
a system where commissioners choose who will serve on grand and petit juries. 532 For 
other courts, the failure of localities to make similar efforts to remedy past discrimina­
tion is evidence of unresponsiveness. 533 Courts have also held that a j urisdiction's failure 
to remedy evident inequalities absent a court order or other compulsion suggests unre­
sponsiveness,5:'4 while a willingness to provide such remedies absent legal compulsion 
favors finding the jurisdiction responsive to minority needs. Thus, the Red Clay School 
District's recalcitrance in implementing a school desegregation plan signaled its unre­
sponsiveness, while Monroe County's initiative in being one of the first Mississippi 
cou11ties to implement randomized jury selection weighed in its favor.535 
In lawsuits challenging judicial elections, courts also equated nondiscrimination 
with responsiveness. None of the 8 lawsuits to address unresponsiveness in this context 
found the factor to be present.536 Four expressly state that the only type of responsiveness 
a judge may properly demonstrate is to be fair and impartial,537 and 3 deemed the absence 
of evidence suggesting judges were unfair or biased proof that Factor 8 was not met.538 
Thirty lawsuits suggested that nondiscrimination alone was insufficient to 
establish responsiveness.539 These courts looked for evidence of affirmative measures 
serving the minority community before finding responsiveness. 540 
A few lawsuits deemed the failure to adopt an affirmative action policy evidence 
of unresponsiveness;541 while others cited such a policy to support finding responsive­
ness. 5·12 Several courts viewed the failure to hire or to appoint minority employees evi­
dence of a lack of responsiveness,543 while in 1 6  lawsuits, courts viewed jurisdictions as 
responsive because they employed or appointed minorities or were making a good faith 
effort to do so.514 Further, the provision of bilingual education supported a finding of 
responsiveness.545 
Numerous courts have focused on funding decisions in assessing responsive­
ness.546 As noted above, several courts have held that failure to provide equal funding 
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for projects in minority neighborhoods shows unresponsiveness,547 while other courts 
cited the absence of discrimination in funding decisions sufficient to establish respon­
siveness.548 Some courts, by contrast, have suggested that equal funding of particular 
projects, road paving in particular, is insufficient to establish responsiveness, where the 
needs of minority communities had long been neglected.549 Six courts found a lack of 
responsiveness where elected officials failed to fund projects in minority neighbor­
hoods,550 (particularly while funding comparable projects in white neighborhoods551 ) ,  or 
failed to participate in federal programs which would fund such projects for the minor­
ity community.552 In 14 lawsuits, courts have found responsiveness where officials pro­
vided minority communities disproportionately large amounts of funding553 and direct­
ed funds to minority neighborhoods for improvements.554 
A few courts viewed the acceptance of federal aid or efforts to secure such aid 
directed to minority interests as evidence of responsiveness. 555 In other lawsuits, however, 
courts viewed the same conduct as bearing little weight on the responsiveness inquiry. 
The Fifth Circuit suggested such evidence was "suspect" in making a responsiveness 
finding because the funding showed no actual commitment on the part of the jurisdic­
tion to minority interests.556 
Finally, some courts have discounted conduct that might otherwise count as 
responsive when the jurisdiction implementing it does so under legal or economic 
compulsion.557 Thus, increased efforts toward hiring minorities do not establish respon­
siveness where the threatened withdrawal of federal funds propelled the action. 558 
Similarly, desegregating long-segregated schools does little to show responsiveness 
where the school board pursues this course only after threats from the state board of 
education. 559 
Procedural Responsiveness 
A number of courts viewed responsiveness more as a question of process than of out­
come. Here, courts focus on communication between elected officials and their minority 
constituents and tl1e extent to which elected representatives advocate for measures that 
serve the particularized needs of the minority commtmity. The effort to secure enactment 
or implementation of such measures matters as much as, if not more than, achieving 
the desired outcome. 
Officials are unresponsive under this model when they actively oppose or other­
wise evince hostility to the desires of the minority community.560 They are also unre­
sponsive when they fail to address policies that the minority community seeks to have 
addressed, or they do not respond to requests from or advocate for the needs of the 
minority community.561 For instance, in the Jeffers litigation, the district court consid­
ered under Factor 8 the reluctance of white legislators to co-sponsor "bills of interest to 
black voters - for example, the bill to create a holiday in honor of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr."562 The district court noted the difficulties faced by both black constituents and 
black members of the Arkansas State Legislature when lobbying for such support. 563 
By contrast, evidence that an official supports causes championed by minorities 
weighs in favor of responsiveness. The focus is less on securing the desired outcome 
than on the official's engagement with the issue.564 In the Cincinnati litigation, the court 
considered that the minority community "vocally protested that the at-large election 
system dilutes their voting strength,  and has demanded change," and found "the City 
Council has debated the issue a number of times and several proposed ordinances have 
been before the Council. Council-members have made statements supporting change 
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and decrying the lack of minority proportional representation on City Council."565 This 
provided evidence of the city's responsiveness. 
A lack of responsiveness is sometimes found when an elected official simply 
ignores minority requests or complaints,566 or refuses or otherwise fails to meet with 
minority constituents.567 The district court in the Jeffers litigation, for example, recounted 
an incident in which at least one white state representative referred black constituents 
to black members of the state legislature, rather than meeting with them.568 Similarly, 
courts have found evidence of unresponsiveness when white elected officials were 
unable to identify any concerns particular to their constituent minority community.569 
Meeting with or generally being available to meet with minority constituents, 
by contrast, favors responsiveness,570 as does seeking out minority groups or purposely 
including them in the decision making process.571 For instance, in the Terrazas litigation 
the court considered the process the county went through to adopt a redistricting plan 
and found "far from evidencing official discrimination, [the plan] convincingly evidences 
full minority access to the redistricting process and a willingness on the part of almost 
all involved in that process to consider and effectuate minority proposals:' 572 
In 1 1  lawsuits, courts found responsiveness when an elected official was depend­
ent on minority votes either for election or to implement a desired policy.573 Many of 
the courts simply asserted that officials dependent on minority voters will be responsive 
to these constituents. Some courts assessing this question considered electoral mecha­
nisms such as a plurality feature,574 or racially polarized voting575 as affecting the chances 
that a candidate will be "dependent" on particular voters. Implicit in some of these 
cases and explicitly stated in others is the observation that dependency on minority 
votes prompts responsiveness largely of a procedural sort. These "dependent" officials 
will meet with their minority constituents, seek out their views, be familiar with their 
concerns, and advocate on their behalf. 
In related reasoning, 4 lawsuits suggested that responsiveness may be shown by 
candidates who actively solicit minority votes, either via "door-knocking;' or seeking 
endorsements from minority organizations.576 Further, 6 lawsuits held that evidence 
that elected officials promoted voter registration, or otherwise encouraged political par­
ticipation by the minority community established responsiveness.577 Thus, efforts to 
facilitate black voter registration through home visits and special assistance available at 
voting precincts demonstrated that jurisdiction's responsiveness. 578 
Finally, courts in 4 lawsuits found a significant lack of responsiveness where 
jurisdictions did not facilitate minority political participation by failing, for instance, to 
establish a polling place in a minority community or to appoint as volunteer registrars 
minority community members offering their services.579 AU of these lawsuits happened 
within the first five years of the passage of the 1982 Amendments to Section 2. 
S E NATE FACTOR 9 :  Tenuous Policy Justification for the Challenged Practice 
The second additional factor the Senate Report lists for consideration, called in this 
report Factor 9, is "whether the justification for the policy behind the practice is tenu­
ous:'580 Governmental policy underlying a practice is "less important under the results 
test" than it was under the intent test. It remains relevant, however, both because a bad 
purpose or policy "is circumstantial evidence that the device has a discriminatory 
result;' and because "the tenuousness of the j ustification for a state policy may indicate 
that the policy is unfair."581 
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Of the lawsuits analyzed, 66 lawsuits considered whether the policy underlying 
the challenged practice or procedure was tenuous. Twenty-twu of these lawsuits held 
the identified justification to be tenuous, twelve coming from Section 5-covered juris­
dictions and 1 0  from non-covered. Of this total, 20 lawsuits also held Section 2 was vio­
lated.582 Of the lawsuits that found this factor, 20 also found Factor l ,  20 found legally 
significant racial bloc voting, 19 found Factor 5 ,  and 2 1  found Factor 7. The vast major­
ity of lawsuits found a Section 2 violation or ended with a successful outcome for the 
plaintiffs without finding Factor 9. Of these, most did not consider tenuousness, and 
the remainder accepted the justification proffered.583 
Twelve lawsuits addressed Factor 9 in cases where defendants offered no 
justification for the challenged policy.084 In this circumstance, 8 courts deemed the 
justification (or lack thereof) tenuous.585 Four did not, either because the plaintiffs pre­
sented no evidence on tenuousness, or because the court itself came up with what it 
deemed to be a legitimate justification for the policy.586 
Defendants offered a number of substantive justifications for plans challenged 
under Section 2. Most courts accepted these justifications as not tenuous. Those that 
did not generally deemed the reason proffered to be ( 1 )  false, (2)  impermissible, or (3)  
outweighed by other considerations. 
In a number of cases, for example, defendants claimed challenged districting 
plans preserved municipal and other political boundaries. Most courts accepted this 
justification as nontenuous,587 although one deemed this goal tenuous where the juris­
diction did not consistently adhere to it.588 So too, when defendants claimed the chal­
lenged policy was based on political will, some courts accepted this justification,589 but 
others did not where they found it was not the true underlying reason for the policy.590 
Several jurisdictions defended their at-large districts on the ground that the 
practice fostered accountability and responsiveness among elected representatives. 
Many courts accepted this policy justification as nontenuous,591 but some did not, 
including a few that rejected the argument because they had already found the jurisdic­
tion was unresponsive under Factor 8.592 Courts, however, have consistently upheld as 
nontenuous the claim that defendant jurisdictions designed at-large judicial election 
systems to prevent judges from being more responsive to particular constituents.593 
Many jurisdictions defended their districting choices or other electoral practices 
on the ground that the plans or practices protected incumbents or other political allies. 
Some courts accepted this justification as nontenuous.594 A number of courts, however, 
deemed this justification tenuous when protecting white incumbents necessarily diluted 
minority voting strength and the defendant was aware of this consequence. 595 Indeed, 
some courts have concluded that these policies amount to intentional racial discrimina­
tion.596 
In several lawsuits, jurisdictions defended challenged practices on grounds of 
efficiency or ease of administration, and many courts accepted these justifications.597 
The court in the Operation Push litigation, however, deemed administrative ease tenu­
ous as a justification for a dual registration system, concluding that " [m]ere inconven­
ience to the state is no justification for burdening citizens in the exercise of their pro­
tected right to register to vote."598 
In several lawsuits, jurisdictions invoked historical practice to justify challenged 
electoral practices. Most courts accepted this justification as nontenuous.599 In 
Milwaukee NAACP litigation, for example, the court noted that v\Tisconsin's historic 
practice of electing judges at-large, a practice dating to 1 848, set the default basis for 
Documenting Discrimination 48 
what was reasonable in the state.600 In the Kirksey v. Allain litigation, however, the court 
deemed historic practice a tenuous justification for using a numbered post system 
because other judicial bodies in the state no longer used it.601 
Some jurisdictions defended challenged practices on the ground that the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act required the adopted policy. Some 
courts have held such claims to be nontenuous.602 In the Bone Shirt litigation, however, 
the district court found this justification to be tenuous, holding that Section 2 did not 
require South Dakota to create a district that was 90% Native American, and rejecting 
the State's claim that low turnout among Native American voters rendered such a dis­
trict necessary in order for Native Americans to elect their preferred candidate. Bone 
Shirt held that not only does Section 2 not compel a district with this concentration of 
minority residents, but that the statute in fact prohibits packing of this sort as a form of 
racial vote dilution. "03 
Proportionality as a Tenth Factor? 
Eleven years ago, Johnson v. De Grandy introduced "proportionality" as a consideration 
in the totality of the circumstances analysis.604 The Court stated that proportionality­
which "links the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members' 
share of the relevant population" - is not a "safe harbor" insulating a jurisdiction from 
liability under Section 2, but that its existence weighs against a finding of vote dilution. 605 
Seventeen lawsuits both considered and made a finding on proportionality or 
the lack thereof, treating it as a distinct factor under the totality of the circumstances 
test.006 The eleven lawsuits that found proportionality identified no violation of Section 
2 .607 Five lawsuits found a lack of proportionality,6°8 and of these 4 identified a Section 2 
violation.609 One lawsuit found neither proportionality nor a violation of section 2 .610 
Most courts considered proportionality one of many factors, though in the City of St. 
Louis litigation, the appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendants solely on the basis of "sustained proportionality."61 1 
De Grandy spoke of proportionality as involving districts with a "clear majority" 
of minority voters.612 One court has consequently refused to consider the presence of 
"opportunity" or "coalition" districts when assessing proportionality.013 Another deemed 
an absence of "mathematical" proportionality inconsequential where the proposed 
additional majority-minority district was one with a bare 50.3% Hispanic majority, and 
consequently not one the court thought would yield "effective" electoral opportunity.614 
De Grandy found proportionality by comparing the number of majority­
Hispanic districts to the proportion of Hispanics of voting age living in the Miami­
Dade area, as opposed to making that comparison statewide.615 The courts in the Rural 
West I and II, Bone Shirt and Austin lawsuits followed this approach and limited the 
proportionality inquiry to subregions of the state, ratl1er than applying the concept 
statewide in challenges to statewide districting plans.616 The Rural West I court acknowl­
edged the difficulty it faced "in using regional statistics . . .  because there are several 
equally valid ways to decide precisely which districts should be included in a regional 
analysis ."617 In Rural West II, a subsequent challenge to a redistricting plan for the 
Tennessee House of Representatives, the Sixth Circuit explained its regional, rather than 
statewide, focus, finding that "neither over-proportionality in one area of the State nor 
substantial proportionality in the State as a whole should ordinarily be used to offset a 
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problem of vote dilution in one discrete area of the State."618 The district court in .Austin 
offered a distinct explanation for its regional focus, pointing out that it limited "the 
geographic scope of [ its] assessment to Wayne and Oakland Counties, because the 
plaintiffs d [ id] not dispute the State's drawing of district lines except in those areas."61" 
Still, not a11 courts addressing statewide districting plans examined proportionality only 
by region. The district court in Perry examined proportionality statewide,620 while the 
appellate court in Old Person found disproportionality under both regional and state­
wide analyses and thus found it unnecessary to choose between the two.621 
Two courts substituted proportional representation for proportionality when 
confronted with challenges to at-large elections for which no majority-minority districts 
existed.622 The district court in the Liberty County litigation made the same substitution,623 
but the appellate court reversed, emphasizing that proportionality and proportional 
representation are distinct concepts, and that "Section 2 explicitly disclaims any 'right 
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in 
the population.' " 624 
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Notes 
1 .  As originally enacted, the Act banned the use of any "'test or device," such as a literacy test for five years, in areas 
of the country where a significant portion of the voting age population either was not registered to vote or failed to 
vote in the 1 964 presidential election. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 973b (2000) as amended Pub. L. 94-73 ,  tit. I, § 1 0 1 ,  tit. II, 
§§ 20 1 -203 ,  206, Aug. 6, 1 975, 89 Stat. 400 -402 (making ban permanent and nationwide). 
2. Section 5 of the Act required that these so-called "covered" jurisdictions obtain federal "preclearance" before they 
changed any aspect of their electoral rules. 42 U.S .C. § 1 973c (2000). Covered jurisdictions may obtain a 
declaratory judgment to this effect from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or, 
alternatively, submit a preclearance request to the United States Department of Justice. Id. § §  1 973b, 1 973c. The 
Act required that these jurisdictions demonstrate that the new practice did "not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote based on race." Id. § l 973c. 
3. See South Carolina v.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 ( 1966) (upholding constitutionality of major portions of the 
VRA) .  
4. These provisions are the preclearance requirements of Section 5, the federal election monitoring and observer 
provisions set forth in Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9, and the language minority ballot coverage provisions of Sections 203 
and 4(f). See 42 U . S. C. § l 973b(a) (8) (setting 2007 as the next required reauthorization date). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. xv. 
6. See generanv QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE Sourn: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT 1 965 - 1 990, at 3 
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1 994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION]. 
7. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1 .  
8. 42 U . S.C.  § 1 973c (2000 ) .  
9. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 3 84, 3 9 1  (S.D. Ala. 1 976). 
10. Id., aff'd 57 1 F .2d 238 (5th Cir. 1 978), rev'd 446 U.S.  55 ( 1 980). 
1 1 .  City of Mobile v.  Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 60-6 1  ( 1 980) ("[I]t is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than 
elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, . . .  [and] that it was intended to have an effect no different from 
that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself."). 
12. Id. On remand, the district court struck down the at-large system based on evidence of such intent. See SAMUEL 
lSSACHAROFF , PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, LAW OF DEMOCRACY 7 1 1  (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 
IssACHAROFF , KARLAN & PILDEs]; Peyton McCrary, The Significance of Mobile v. Bolden, in MINORITY VoTE 
DILUTION 4 7, 48-49 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). 
13. 42 U . S .C.  § 1 973(a) (2000). 
14. Id. §  1 973(b). 
15. S. REP . No. 97-4 1 7  ( 19 82), reprinted in 1 982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT ] .  
16 .  Thornburg v. Gingles, 4 7 8  U . S. 30, 4 3  n.7 ( 1 986). 
17. 4 1 2  U.S.  755 ( 1973). 
18. 485 F.2d 1 297 (5th Cir. 1 973) (en bane), ajf'd sub nom, East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S.  636 
( 1 976) (per curiam). 
19. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 27-30 . 
20. Id. 
21 .  IssACHAROFF , KARLAN & PILDEs, supra note 1 2, at 747. 
22. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-5 1 ( 1 986). 
23. See Emison v. Growe, 507 U.S.  25, 39-40 ( 1993). 
24. Johnson v. De Grandy, 5 12 U.S. 997, 1024 (1 994). 
25. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S .  461 (2003). 
26. See, e.g., Perry Litig. , discussion at 298 F.  Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  481 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 
F. Supp. 2d 346, 3 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
27. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 3 0 1 ,  327-28 ( 1 966). 
28. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 5 1 9-20 ( 1 997). 
29. Id. at 5 1 8 (discussing "Congress' parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment" as co­
extensive with Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
30. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig. ,  300 F. Supp. 2d 29 1 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding the state legislature had 
used race as a proxy to protect incumbents, and in so doing had engaged in an intentional violation of Section 2, 
therefore not reaching the constitutional claim also raifed by the plaintiffs); Harris v. Graddick Litig., 695 F.  Supp. 
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5 1 7  (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding intentional and results-based discrimination under Section 2 in the Governor's 
failure to remedy the lack of African-American poll workers); Harris v. Graddick Litig., discussion at 60 1 F. Supp. 
70 (M.D .Ala. 1984) (enforcing a preliminary injunction against Jefferson County for failing to hire African­
American poll workers). 
31. The resulting list includes decisions also published in the federal reporters, as well as some only published on the 
electronic databases. The list also includes a few lawsuits decided after the 1982 amendment to Section 2 but 
which did not apply the new results test. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of School Comm'rs, 706 F.2d 1 103 (1 1th Cir. 
1983) (finding that the at-large system to elect the Mobile, Ala. School District was enacted with unconstitutional 
intent and consequently not evaluating it under the new results test); Cross v. Baxter, 704 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1 983) 
(remanding case for consideration under newly amended results test, outcome unclear). 
32. The Master Lawsuit List, located at: http://www.votingreport.org or 
http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/files/masterlist.xls, sorts all lawsuits by state, and then by the 
shorthand litigation title given each lawsuit. The litigation title includes the jurisdiction challenged wherever 
possible; if not included as a party name, however, one or sometimes both of the party names is used as the 
litigation title. Note that this Report regularly cites to a lawsuit a whole using these titles and the final word 
citation only. Even if the factor finding did not occur in that final case, the final case provides the best starting 
place for a researcher considering the lawsuit as a whole, and serves as a short hand way of citing to all relevant 
cases within the lawsuit in its entirety. This Report also cites sometimes to the discussion of a factor or issue 
witl1i.n a lawsuit by naming the litigation and then citing to the case that includes that discussion. 
33. Most lawsuits have only one final word case. In the rare situations in which merits issues were severed (e.g. by 
racial group or by practice challenged) and addressed in separate proceedings, a lawsuit may have more than one 
"final word" case, each corresponding to the final decision on one such issue. Many lawsuits may also contain 
decisions subsequent to the final word opinion, that addressed other matters, such as fees, remedies or other related 
claims. This study has included these other cases to give a full view of the lawsuit as a whole. 
34. These miscellaneous types of cases were coded as falling into four main categories :  1) preliminary-deciding 
whether to issue a preliminary irtjunction, whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim or some other pre-merits 
question, 2) settlement-deciding whether to allow a case to settle by consent decree or approve an agreement 
reached by the parties, 3)  remedy-deciding, after a violation found, how to fix it, or 4) fees-deciding whether to 
grant attorney, expert witness fees or both 
35. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 ( 1 986). 
36. See Master Lawsuit List of the Voting Rights Initiative Database (2005) [hereinafter Master Lawsuit List] ; see 
also http://www.votingreport.org (click Search). 
37. See American Civil Liberties Union Voting Rights Project, Post-1982 Litigation Report, 2005 (forthcoming) (on 
file witl1 the Voting Rights Initiative). 
38. See List of Cases Litigated by Rolando L. Rios, Law Office, sometimes in cooperation with the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund or with Texas Rural Legal Aid (on file witl1 the Voting Rights 
Initiative ) .  
39. See Master Lawsuit List (filterable and sortable by Column: Case Type). 
40. Id. (filter Column: Case Type = liability and Column: Jurisdiction = True or False.) 
41. Id. (filter Column: Success = 1 ,  noting that this includes both those lawsuits that ended with a court finding or 
parties stipulating to a violation and, where no such liability was recognized in a published opinion, tl10se lawsuits 
that ended with a published opinion documenting another form of a favorable outcome for the plaintiff, such as a 
preliminary injunction or other remedy ordered, a settlement reached, and/or fees granted) . 
42. The raw numbers are 67,767,900 out of 28 1,42 1,906. See U.S. Census 2000 Data, www.census.gov (last visited 
Nov. 1 ,  2005). In addition, this data shows that 3 9 .3% of African Americans in the United States live in Section 5 -
covered areas, 3 1 . 8% of Hispanics or Latinos live in covered jurisdictions, and 25% of Native Americans live in 
covered jurisdictions. Id. 
43. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: Jurisdiction = True). 
44. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: WasSection2Violated = True and sort, ascending, Column: Year). Of 
these 88 lawsuits, 53 found violations between 1 982 and 1992,27 between 1993 and 2002, and 8 from 2003 
through the date of this report. Id. 
45. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: Practices Challenged contains *large* and filter Column: 
WasSection2Violated = True). 
46. See id. (instead filtering Column: Practices Challenged contains *majority* or *shot* or * number*); see also 
infra, Factor 3 Section 
47. See id. (also filtering Column: WasSection2Violated = True and/or filtering Column: Success = 1) .  
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48. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: Other Info on Minority Group Contains multi while filtering Column: 
Success = 1). 
49. Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 F .3d 34 1 (4th Cir. 2004 ); Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F .3d 897 (9th Cir. 
2004): Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1 999); Pittsburgh Litig. (PA) , 686 F. Supp. 97 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (approving single member district plan settlement agreed to by defendant and class counsel); 
Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1 994) (ordering the state to submit proposal that creates a single­
member district with a m(ljority African-American voting-age citizen population); Autauga County Litig., 859 F. 
Supp. 1 1 18 (M.D. Ala. 1 994) (approving single member district settlement in determining attorney fees); Fort 
Lauderdale Litig. (FL), 985 F.2d 1471 ( 1 1th Cir. 1993); Kershaw County Litig., 838 F. Supp. 237 (D.S.C.  1 993) 
(ordering a combination of at-large and single districts in remedy proceedings following earlier detennination of 
liability); Love Litig. ,  No . CV 679-037, 1992 WL 96307 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 1 992) (approving the settlement plan 
which created single member districts); Clark Litig., 777 F. Supp. 44 (D. La. 1 990) (ordering sub-districts in the 
"guilty districts"); City of Norfolk Litig. (VA), 883 F.2d 1232 ( 4th Cir. 1 989); Bladen County Litig. ,  No. 87-72-
CIV-7, 1 989 WL 253428 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 1 1, 1989) (ordering a combination of at-large and single districts and 
finding that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees); Dillard v. Chilton Litig.,, 699 F. Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala. J 988) 
(approving settlement plan to create single member districts and establish cumulative voting); Granville County 
Litig., 860 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1 988) (approving the county's single district remedial plan in remedy proceeding 
following determination of liability); Dillard v. Baldwin Board ofEducationLitig., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 
1988); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1 3 1 0  (E.D. Ark. 1988) (ordering the parties to submit 
proposals for single election districts): LULAC-Midland Litig., (TX), 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1 987); County of Big 
Horn Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1 986); Washington County Litig., 653 F. Supp. 1 2 1  (N.D. Fla. 1 986) 
(approving defendant's single member district plan in remedial proceeding following determination of liability); 
City of Statesville Litig., 606 F. Supp. 569 (W.D.N.C. 1 985) (ordering a combination of at-large and single 
districts in a consent decree); Marengo County Litig., 623 F.  Supp. 33  (S.D. Ala. 1 985); City of Greenwood I 
Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (ordering the city to submit a proposal for the election of council 
members other than the mayor by single districts or wards); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 ( 5th Cir. 1 984); 
Mobile School Board Litig. (AL), 706 F.2d 1 103 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 983) (affirming trial court remedy of dividing county 
into 5 single member districts, 2 of which were ffi<l:iority African American). 
50. Bone Shirt Litig. (SD), 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S .D. 2004 ); Black Political Task Force Litig. (MA), 300 F. Supp. 
2d 291 (D. Mass 2004); City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1 52 (S.D.N.Y 2003) ;  Rural West II Litig. 
(TN), 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); Bonilla-Barnett Litig., 17  F. Supp. 2d 753 (N.D. Ill. 1 998) (ordering 
legislature to come up with new lines); St. Francisville Litig. (LA), 135  F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1 998) (ordering new 
district lines in determining attorney fees): Lafayette County Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 996 (ND. Miss. 1998); 
Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142-JAD, 1 997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 
1997) (ordering parties to attempt to reach agreement on a plan with a majority African-American district); 
Walthall County Litig. ,  1 57 F.R.D. 388 (S.D. Miss. 1 994) (approving new district lines in settlement plan); 
Texarkana Litig., 86 1 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1 992); Elections Board Litig.,  793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1 992): 
Wesch Litig., 785 F.  Supp. 149 1 (S.D. Ala. 1 992) (approving new districting plan in settlement proceedings 
following determination of liability); Jefferson Parish I Litig. (LA), 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1 99 1); Annour Litig., 
775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1 99 1); Garza Litig. (CA), 9 18 F.2d 763 ( 9th Cir. 1 990); Monroe County Litig., 740 
F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1 990); Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir. 1 987); Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 
588 (E.D. Va. 1988); Neal Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1426 (E.D. Va. 1 988); Reyes v. Stefaniak Litig., No. 93 C 308, 
1995 WL 38958 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1995) (finding that the new single district plan with one majority-minority 
district entitled Plaintiff to attorney fees); Chickasaw County I Litig. ,  705 F.  Supp. 3 15 (N.D. Miss. 1989); Fifth 
Ward Litig., CIV.A. No. 86-2963, 1989 WL 3801 (ED. La. Jan. 1 8, 1 989) (approving single district settlement 
plan following determination of liability); City of Crystal Springs, 626 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (ordering 
new district lines in determining attorney fees); Rybicki Litig., 574 F. Supp. 1 147 (N.D. Ill. 1 983); Buskey v. 
Oliver Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Major Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325 (D. La. 1983); Grenada County 
Litig. ,  No. WC84-1 36-S-O, 1 989 WL 251321  (N.D. Miss. Sept. 13 ,  1980) (approving new district lines in 
settlement plan). 
51 .  Beaufort County Litig. (NC), 9 36 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 2004) (approving consent decree agreed to by parties which 
created staggered elections with limited voting); Common Cause Litig., No. 0 1 -03470 SVW(RZX), 2002 WL 
1766436 (C.D. Cal. Feb.  19 ,  2002) (approving consent decree for punch-card systems to be replaced); Town of 
Cicero Litig., No. Civ .A. OOC 1 530, 2000 WL 34342276 (ND. Ill. Mar. 1 5, 2000) (ordering a preliminary 
injunction preventing the town from enforcing certain requirements on absentee voting and candidacy 
requirements); Dillard v. Chilton Litig., 699 F. Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) (approving settlement plan to create 
single member districts and establish cumulative voting); Madison County Litig.,  6 10 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Miss. 
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1 985) (ordering the Board of Election Commissioners to convene and make a determination as to which absentee 
ballots were properly cast); Dean Litig., 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982) (ordering polling place not to be moved 
from public housing community center by preliminary injunction). 
52. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 13 17 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (ordering special election to remedy effects of the at­
large system); Town of North Johns Litig., 7 1 7  F .  Supp. 147 1  (M.D. Ala. 1989) (ordering that plaintiffs be 
certified as elected members of the city council); Marks-Philadelphia Board of Elections Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-
6157, 1 994 WL 1461 13  (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1 994) (e11joining the certification of one of the candidates and ordering 
the certification of another, ordering changes to the processes used for absentee ballots). 
53. Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (ordering county to allow federal officials to oversee 
election processes, provide election material in Spanish, and provide bilingual poll officers or interpreters); White 
v. Alabama Litig., 867 F. Supp. 1 5 1 9  (M.D. Ala. 1 994) (holding that the settlement reached by the State and 
plaintiffs was reasonable, ordering the following: 1)  each appellate court's size would increase by two seats, 2) a 
new ')udicial nomination commission" would recommend three African-American judicial candidates to the 
Governor, and the Governor would choose to appoint two to each court, and t11ey would serve a six-year term, 
before standing for re-election under state law) (this remedy was later found unconstitutional following Holder v. 
Hall in T17hite v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058, 1 073 -74 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 996)) ;  City of Tampa Litig., 693 F .  Supp. 105 1 
(M.D. Fla. 1 988) (approving settlement by parties which agreed to provide voter instructions, voter education 
programs, and outreach); Harris v. Graddick Litig. ,  695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (ordering state to have 
African-American poll workers and submit proposals to rectify the current effect of discriminatory laws and 
procedures); Campaign for a Progressive Bronx Litig., 63 1 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y 1 986) (ordering bilingual voter 
education, outreach, and election officials in fees proceeding following liability determination); Citizen Action 
Litig., Civ. No. N 84-43 1 ,  1 984 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 24869 (D. Coilll. Sept. 27, 1984) (ordering registrar to authorize 
volunteers to conduct registration drives and provide materials in Spanish in preliminary injunction proceeding). 
54. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897, 904 ( 9th Cir. 2004) (declining to consider whether Section 2 is 
constitutional because of the summary a:ffirmance inA1ississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 
U.S. 1002 ( 1984), and further stating "in the Supreme Court's congruence-and-proportionality opinions, the VRA 
stands out as the prime example of a congruent and proportionate response to well documented violations of the 
Fourteent11 and Fifteenth Amendments. Most tellingly, when the Supreme Court first am1om1ced the congruence­
and-proportionality doctrine in City of Boerne v. Flores , it twice pointed to the VRA as t11e model for appropriate 
prophylactic legislation." (citation omitted)); Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Colo. 2004) 
(declining to reopen the issue, finding that both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court had affirmed its 
constitutionality);  Sanchez-Colorado, 97 F.3d 1 303, 13 14 ( 10th Cir. 1996) ("Just as the Court has affirmed its 
unfailing championship of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in Shaw II and Bush, it has also declared the 
constitutionality of § 2 of the VRA, observi ng, 'it would be irresponsible for a State to disregard t11e § 2 results 
test.' " (citing O'Connor's concurrence in Bush v. Vera at 1 969)); Elections Board Litig., 793 F. Supp. 859, 868-69 
(W.D. Wis. 1 992) ("The Voting Rights Act authorizes and in some instances compels racial gerrymandering in 
favor of blacks and other minorities. Because the Act implements the Fifteenth Amendment, it is constitutional 
despite its discriminatory character."); Wesley Litig., 605 F. Supp. 802, 808 (M.D. Teilll. 1985) (citing Marengo 
County); Lubbock Litig., 727 F.2d 364, 375 ( 5th Cir. 1 984) (considering the record before Congress in 1982 and 
stating "Where Congress, on the basis of a factual investigation, perceives that a facially neutral measure carries 
forward the effects of past discrimination, Congress may even enact blanket prohibitions against such rules. Here, 
Congress has taken the more modest step of shifting to states and municipalities the burden of accommodating 
their political systems when that system seriously prejudices minority groups. even though the result is either 
unintended or, at least, not demonstrably intended." (citation omitted)); Jordan Litig., 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. 
Miss. 1984) (citing Major v. Treen and declining to reopen tre question); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 591 F. Supp. 
802 (W.D. Tex. 1984) (following Lubbock); City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1 984) (citing 
Lubbock andMarengo County); Marengo County Litig. (AL), 73 1 F.2d 1546, 1558 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) (considering 
Congressional enforcement power in Katzenbach v. lv1organ, South Carolina v. Katzenbach , and Oregon v. 
Mitchell and holding, "[t]he 1 982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is clearly within the 
enforcement power. Congress conducted extensive hearings and debate on all facets of the Voting Rights Act and 
concluded that the ''results" test was necessary to secure the right to vote and to eliminate the effects of past 
purposeful discrimination. The Senate Report explains in detail why the results test was necessary and 
appropriate."); Major Litig. ,  574 F. Supp. 325, 345 (E.D. La. 1 983) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan and Fullilove v. 
Klutznick for the proposition that "congressional authority [embodied in § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment] extends 
beyond the prohibition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact 
perpetuating the effects of past discrimination."). 
55. See infra, Factor 1 Section; see also Master Lawsuit List (filter Column If= 1). 
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56. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column RPV = 1 )  and see id. (filter Column RPV= 1 and also filter Column 
Success= True and also filter Column Jurisdiction =  True) . 
57. See id. (filter Column 7f = 1) .  
58. See id. (filter Column Sf = 1 ) .  
59. See id. (for findings on Factor 3 filter Column 3f = 1,  for Factor 6, filter Column 6f 1).  
60. See id. (for findings on Factor 4 filter Column 4f = 1, for Factor 8, filter Column 8f = 1 .  for Factor 9, filter Column 
9f = 1) .  
61 .  See id. (filter Column Gthreshold = l) ;  for infra, filterthe same, with Column Jurisdiction = True and Column 
Success = 1). 
62. See infra, Factor 1 Section 
63. See infra, Factor 4 Section 
64. See infra, Factor 6 Section. 
65. See infra, Factor 9 Section 
66. See infra, Factor 8 Section 
67. LULAC v. Clements Litig. ,  999 F.2d 83 1 ,  854 (5th Cir. 1 993) .  
68. See, e.g., Garza v. Los Angeles Litig. (CA), 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1 995); City of New Rochelle Litig., discussion 
at 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 1 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2003):  Ketchum Litig. (IL), discussion at 740 F.2d 1 398. 1408 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
69. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column Gcon= 1, and Gthresholdmet= l) .  
70. See, e.g .,  Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 1 995) (assuming that plaintiffs can meet their burden 
on the Gingles threshold factors, equating proportionality with the presence of proportional representation. and 
ultimately finding in favor of defendants) ;  Austin Litig., 857 F. Supp. 560, 569-570 (E.D. Mich. 1 994) (assuming 
for purposes of this challenge that the Gingles factor can be met, equating proportionality with the presence and 
continued likelihood of proPJrtional representation, and ultimately finding in favor of defendants); see also City of 
St. Louis Litig. (MO), 54 F.3d 1345 ( 8th Cir. 1 995) (holding that the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants on the basis of substantial proportionality alone); see also infra. Proportionality 
as a Tenth Factor Section 
71. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: Gthresholdmet does not = 1 ). 
72. See, e.g., Town of Babylon Litig., at 9 14 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996); Meza Litig., discussion at 322 F. Supp. 2d 
52, 69 (D. Mass. 2004) (declining to find for the defendant based solely on plaintiffs ' failure to meet the third 
Gingles factor and instead "turn[ing] to the totality of the circumstances.") . 
73. Lucas Litig. (GA), 967 F.2d 549 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 992): Marks-Philadelphia Litig .. No. CIV. A. 93-61 57, 1994 WL 
146 1 13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994): Maxey Litig., No. 9 1  Civ. 7328 (TPG), 1 996 WL 529024 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 
1 996); Montiel v. Davis Litig. ,  2 15  F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2002); Muntaqim Litig. (NY), 366 F.3d 102 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Salt River Project Litig. (AZ), 109 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1 997); Operation Push Litig. (MS), 932 F.2d 400 
(5th Cir. 199 1) ;  Osburn Litig. (GA), 369 F.3d 1283 ( 1 1th Cir. 2004); Prejean Litig. (LA), 83 Fed. App'x 5 ( 5th 
Cir. 2003); Prewitt v. Moore Litig., 840 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Miss. 1993);  Town of North Johns Litig., 717 F. 
Supp. 1471  (M.D. Ala. 1 989); U.S.  v. Jones Litig. (AL), 57 F.3d 1020 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995); Varner v. Smitherman 
Litig. ,  CIV. A. No. 92-0586-BH-M, 1993 WL 663327. 1 993 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 1 772 1 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 1 993) .  
74. Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Arakaki Litig., 3 14 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Marks­
Philadelphia Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-6157, 1 994 WL 146 1 13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1 994); Elections Board Litig. ,  793 
F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1 992); Harris v. Graddick Litig., 695 F. Supp. 5 1 7  (M.D. Ala. 1988): Operation Push 
Litig., 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) ;  Town of North Johns Litig. ,  7 1 7  F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ala. 1 989). 
75. See, e.g ., City of Springfield Litig. (IL), discussion at 85 1 F.2d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1988). 
76. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: Gthresholdmet= 1, and Column: Jurisdiction =  True; see also Column: 
WasSection2Violated = True or False) . 
77. See id. (except, filter Column: Jurisdiction = False). 
78. Other courts have simply asserted in conclusory terms that Gingles I is, or is not, satisfied, or have noted that the 
parties stipulated to its existence. See e.g ., Rural West II Litig. (TN), discussion at 209 F.3d 835, 839 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the parties stipulated that Gingles I and II were met); City of LaGrange Litig., discussion at 
969 F.  Supp. 749, 774 (N.D. Ga. 1 997) ("Plaintiffs have established the first Gingles factor-that the African­
American community in LaGrange is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single member district.") ;  Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 759  F. Supp. 525, 526 (E.D. Ark. 1 991 )  ("The 
black population in the School District is geographically compact."); Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 380, 
390 (E.D. Tenn 1 989) ( 'There is no doubt whatsoever that the black population of Chattanooga is sufficiently 
compact and numerous as to be an effective majority in various combinations of single member districts."). 
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79. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 29L 300 (D. Mass. 2004) (using voting 
age population statistics in the Gingles I analysis); Hamrick Litig. (GA), discussion at 296 F.3d 1065, 1067 ( 1 1th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that ""it is clear that blacks could not constitute a majority of the voting age population in 
Proposed District 3 ,  and, thus, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy prong one of Gingles"); Old Person Litig. (MT), 
discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 13 ,  1 12 1  (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the district court 's finding that Gingles I was met 
where "American Indians would represent 55% of the voting age population" in the proposed district); 
Marylanders Litig. ,  849 F. Supp. 1022, 1051  (D. Md. 1 994) (finding the first Gingles prong met where "African­
Americans comprise well over 50% of both the total population and the voting-age population"); Brewer Litig. 
(TX), discussion at 876 F.2d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 1 989) ("Only voting age persons can vote. It would be a Pyrrhic 
victory for a court to create a single-member district in which a minority population dominant in absolute, but not 
in voting age numbers, continued to be defeated at the polls. Thornburg implicitly recognized this fact . . .  "); 
Springfield Litig. (IL), discussion at 85 1 F .2d 93 7, 945 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The threshold requirement roughly 
measures minority voters ' potential to elect candidates of their choice. Because only minorities of voting age can 
affect this potential, it is logical to assume that the [Gingles] Court intended the majority requirement to mean a 
voting age majority."); cf Dickinson Litig. (IN), 933 F.2d 497 ( 7th Cir. 1991)  (finding that the lower court erred in 
finding the first Gingles factor not met where plaintiffs were 50.27% of the total population and obseIVing that the 
Gingles court required only a simple majority, but indicating that the court should explore the "facts surrounding 
the proposed district.") . 
80. See, e.g, Meza Litig., discussion at 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2004): Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. 
(TX), discussion at 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999); City of Chicago-Bonilla Litig. (IL), discussion at 141 F.3d 699, 
705 (7th Cir. 1 998); Nipper Litig. (FL), discussion at 1 13 F.3d 1563, 1 569 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 994); Pomona Litig. ,  883 
F.2d 1418,  1426 (9th Cir. 1 988); see also Suffolk County Litig., discussion at 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that plaintiffs' two plans both failed to consider citizenship of Latino population, and that even if 
they had they could not show Latino VAP in the proposed districts); Cano Litig., discussion at 2 1 1  F. Supp. 2d 
1208, 1234 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that the Ninth Circuit considers CV AP the proper measure, but holding that, 
where CV AP data had not yet been released by the census bureau, "the ability to construct a district that is so 
substantially Latino both in overall population and in V AP is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the first Gingles pre-condition."). 
81. See, e.g., Albany County Litig. , discussion at No. 03 -CV-502, 2003 WL 2 1524820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2003) 
("[A] majority group is sufficiently large if it comprises more than 5 1  % of the population of the voting district"); 
City of New Rochelle Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 1 52, 159 (S .D.N.Y. 2003) (finding Gingles I "clearly 
established" where 60.5% black district was replaced by a "mere plurality district"); see also Thurston County 
Litig. (NE), 129 F.3d 1 015,  1 025 ( 8th Cir. 1997) (finding Gingles I not met in part because "[u]nder the proposed 
plans, if 4 or 5 Native Americans moved from the proposed majority-minority districts created for the School 
Board and Village Board, respectively, and they were replaced by non-Native Americans, the majority-minority 
composition would be destroyed."); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F. Supp. 339, 372 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (finding 
Gingles I not met because at the time the white bloc voting occurred Hispanics did not constitute a majority). 
82. See, e.g : Campuzano Litig., discussion at 200 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("In the absence of more 
reliable data regarding African-American voting strength, courts employ the general guideline that African­
Americans must comprise 65% of a district's  total population to control the electoral outcome in that 
district. . .  When reliable V AP statistics are available, we may instead evaluate minority voting strength by using a 
60% V AP rule of thumb."); African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund Litig. (MO), discussion at 54 
F.3d 1345, 1 348 n.4 (8th Cir. 1 995) ("We conclude that either 60% of the voting age population or 65% of the 
total population is reasonably sufficient to provide black voters with an effective majority."); Elections Board 
Litig., discussion at 793 F. Supp. 859, 869 (W.D. Wis. 1 992) (adopting 60% voting age population as the size 
required "to give blacks a reasonable assurance of obtaining a majority of votes in a district"); City of Norfolk 
Litig., discussion at 679 F. Supp. 557, 566 (E.D. Va. 1 988) (finding Gingles I met, but holding that the black 
population was sufficiently large and compact to create only two, rather than three, "safe" districts with 65% black 
population); United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 163-64 (1977) (reasoning t11at 65% minority population 
in a district is required to yield a majority of minority voting age population), cf Alamosa County Litig., 
discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 16, 1028 (D. Colo. 2004) ( "Although the current precinct lines cannot be used to 
create a single-member district with a majority of Hispanic registered voters, the Government has proposed tlrree 
hypothetical districts in which Hispanic residents would comprise at least 60% of the voting age population."); 
Kingman Litig., 348 F.3d 1033,  1 042 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (assuming without deciding Gingles I was met while noting 
that a reduction of the black population from 68.7% to 62.3% in D.C. 's Ward Six "might deprive African 
Americans of an 'effective ' or 'safe '  voting majority"). 
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83. See, e.g. , Old Person Litig, discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 1 3, 1 12 1 -23 ( 9th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court finding 
that rejected defendants argument that proposed district would "be insufficient to confer effective voting power" 
because of low turnout): Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 780 F. Supp. 22 1 ,  226 n.3 (D. Del. 1 99 1) 
("Although the Defendants agree that the Plaintiffs' evidence satisfies the first Gingles factor, they question 
whether such a district would allow the black citizens to consistently elect one candidate of their choice. This 
concern, however, does not negate a finding that the Plaintiffs have proven the first Gingles factor.") (citation 
omitted); Mehfoud Litig., discussion at 702 F. Supp. 588. 592 (E.D. Va. 1988) ("Plaintiffs need not demonstrate 
that blacks could comprise a majority of those actually turning out to vote. but rather, must show that blacks would 
comprise a majority of the voting age population.") . 
84. See, e.g ., Albany County Litig., discussion at No. 03 -CV-502, 2003 WL 2 1524820, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003); 
City of Baytown Litig. (TX), discussion at 840 F .2d 1240, 1244 ( 5th Cir. 1 988); Hardee County Litig., discussion 
at 906 F.2d 524, 526 ( 1 1th Cir. 1990); cf Brewer Litig. (TX), discussion at 876 F .2d 448, 45 1 -52 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(finding Gingles I unsatisfied because no district could be created large enough to have clear majority-minority 
voting age population, even if black, Hispanic, and Asian populations were combined). But see Kent County 
Litig .. 76 F.3d 138 1 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (not allowing multiple minority groups to combine for purposes of 
the Gingles I analysis). 
85. See e.g .. Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (acknowledging that the Fifth Circuit 
precedent permits plaintiffs to combine minority groups to satisfy Gingles majority requirement provided the 
groups are politically cohesive, but concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate political cohesiveness); 
Rodriguez Litig.,  discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing coalition claim, but 
concluding that plaintiffs failed to show that blacks and Hispanics were cohesive); Forest County Litig.(WI), 
discussion at 3 36 F.3d 570, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that blacks and Indians had clearly divergent interests); 
San Diego County Litig., discussion at 794 F. Supp. 990, 998 (S.D. Cal. 1 992) (allowing aggregation, but 
concluding that plaintiffs had failed to show that Hispanics, African Americans, and Asian Americans were 
politically cohesive) ;  Stockton Litig. (CA), 956 F.2d 884, 886 ( 9th Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court 's finding 
of lack of Hispanic-black political cohesion); Hardee County Litig. (FL), discussion at 906 F.2d 524, 527 ( 1  l th 
Cir. 1 990) (finding that blacks and Hispanics were not sufficiently cohesive to satisfy Gingles II); Pomona Litig. 
(CA), 883 F.2d 1 4 1 8  (9th Cir. 1 989) (assuming "aggregation theory" is cognizable but finding no cohesion 
between the minority groups). Plaintiffs do sometimes succeed in proving cohesiveness, however, and are thus 
allowed to proceed to the first Gingles precondition. See, e.g, County of Albany Litig., discussion at No. 03 -CV-
502, 2003 WL 2 1524820, at * 1 1  (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003), France Litig., 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999); 
LULAC-N.E. lndep. Sch. Dist. Litig .. discussion at 903 F. Supp. 107 1 .  1092 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Baytown Litig. 
(TX), discussion at 840 F.2d 1240, 1248 (5th Cir. 1 988); cf De Grandy Litig .. discussion at 8 1 5  F. Supp. 1 550, 
1570-7 1  (N.D. Fla. 1 992) (finding that Cubans and non-Cuban Hispanics were cohesive in spite of party 
differences, because Hispanic Democrats will vote for Hispanic Republicans and because both groups have similar 
views on education, housing, medical aid, and civil rights). 
86. Gingles itself expressly left open this question. See Gingles Litig., discussion at 478 U.S.  30, 46 n. 12 (U.S .  1 986) 
(reserving the question of"whether § 2 permits, and if it does. what standards should pertain to, a claim brought by 
a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, 
alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability to influence elections"). The Supreme Court 
again reserved the question in the Quilter litigation. 507 U.S.  146 (1993) (assuming but not deciding that influence 
districts are a cognizable claim under Section 2). 
87. See e.g. , Second Circuit: Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("We agree with the 
nearly universal opinion of federal courts that section 2 of the VRA does not require the creation of influence 
districts where minority voters will not be able to elect candidates of choice ."). Fifth Circuit: Perry Litig., 
discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  485 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ( "Considering that District 24 as a pure influence district 
is unprotected by § 2 ,  we are persuaded that alterations to it raised questions primarily of § 5 ,  which have been 
answered by the Department of Justice."); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 168 F.3d 
848, 853 -54 (5th Cir. 1 999) (rejecting plaintiffs ' claim that they can satisfy Gingles I with less than a 50% 
majority and reaffirming Fifth Circuit precedent requiring plaintiffs to prove that they constitute more than 50% of 
the relevant population in their demonstration district); Concerned Citizens Litig. (TX), discussion at 63 F.3d 4 13 ,  
4 16-17 (5th Cir. 1 995) ("As blacks do not constitute a majority in any of the four extant JP Precincts in Orange 
County, CCE cannot satisfy the first Gingles precondition."); Brewer Litig. (TX), discussion at 876 F.2d 448, 450 
(5th Cir. 1 989) (affirming district court's requirement that plaintiffs present evidence that they can constitute more 
than 50% of voting age population in a proposed district); Kirksey v. Allain Litig., discussion at 658 F. Supp. 
1 183, 1204 (S.D. Miss. 1 987) (declining to "design single- member districts to raise the black voter percentage by 
concentrating blacks in order to 'influence' the outcome of the elections" in districts where "black majority single-
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member sub-districts" could not be drawn); Sixth Circuit: Parker Litig., discussion at 263 F. Supp. 2d 1 100, 1 105 
(E.D. Ohio 2003), summarily affirmed by 540 U.S. 10 13  (2003), ( "Because influence claims are not cognizable in 
our circuit and the plaintiffs have failed to establish the first Gingles precondition . . .  [t]he plaintiffs' claim under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must fail."); O'Lear v.  Miller Litig., discussion at 222 F.  Supp. 2d 850 (E,D. 
Mich. 2002) (following Cousin Litig.) ;  Cousin Litig. (TN), discussion at 145 F.3d 8 1 8, 828 (6th Cir. 1998) ("As 
the following analysis will indicate, we would reverse any decision to allow such a claim to proceed since we do 
not feel that an "influence" claim is permitted under the Voting Rights Act."); Seventh Circuit: LaPaille Litig., 
discussion at 786 F. Supp. 704, 7 15  (N.D. Ill. 1992) (citing McNe il v. Springfield Park District and refusing to 
recognize "influence districts" because of the "lack of an objective limit to such claims."); City of Springfield 
Litig., discussion at 851 F.2d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 1 988) (refusing to "consider claims that multi-member districts 
merely impair plaintiffs ' ability to influence elections. Plaintiffs' ability to win elections must also be impaired."); 
Williams v. State Bd. of Elections Litig., discussion at 7 1 8  F. Supp. 1 324, 1333  (N.D. Ill. 1 989) (rejecting 
influence districts because "even if all eligible black voters supported a single candidate in the proposed single­
member district. that candidate would not be assured of electoral success"); but see Elections Board Litig. ,  
discussion at 793 F.  Supp. 859, 869 (W.D. Wis. 1 992) (distinguishing Springfield Litig. and considering the 
creation of a "stronger influence district . . . .  a modest plus" in favor of a proposed redistricting plan). Eighth 
Circuit: Turner Litig. ,  784 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1991) ;  Ninth Circuit: San Diego County Litig.,  discussion at 
794 F. Supp. 990, 996 (S.D. Cal. 1 992) (following Chula Vista Litig.); Chula Vista Litig., discussion at 723 F. 
Supp. 1 384, 1392 (S.D. Cal. 1 989) ("Accordingly, the Court finds that there exists no legally cognizable 
'influence' claim under § 2 that would require a lesser standard of proof than set forth in Thornburg.") ; Eleventh 
Circuit: Baldwin County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 376 F.3d 1260, 1269 ( 1  lth Cir. 2004) ("If the group is too small to 
elect candidates of its choice in the absence of a challenged structure or practice, then it is the size of the minority 
population that results in the plaintiffs injury, and not the challenged structure or practice.") . 
88. Baldwin County Comm'n Litig. (AL), discussion at 376 F. 3d 1260, 1268-69 ( 1 1th Cir. 2004) (finding that "an 
unrestricted breach of this precondition 'would likely open a Pandora's box of marginal Voting Rights Act claims 
by minority groups of all sizes,' " and seeing no way to award plaintiffs relief "without awarding similar relief to 
even smaller minority groups in future cases."); see also Rodriguez Litig.,  discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 379 
(S .D.N.Y. 2004) ( "Allowing influence claims would open the door for a legal challenge any time a minority 
population could be shifted to increase the minority population in a nearby district. It would open the door for 
cases like this one, where the plaintiffs are arguing that the defendants had an affirmative obligation to create a 
district that has never existed in order to unite all minority communities in a particular region to maximize the 
proportion of a minority in at least one district."); City of Springfield Litig. , discussion at 85 1 F.2d 937, 947 (7th 
Cir. 1988) ("Courts might be flooded by the most marginal section 2 claims if plaintiffs had to show only that an 
electoral practice or procedure weakened their ability to influence elections.").  
89. See e.g. , Metts Litig. (RI), discussion at 363 F.3d 8, 12 ( 1 st Cir. 2004) ( "To the extent that African-American 
voters have to rely on cross-over voting to prove they have the "ability to elect" a candidate of their choosing, their 
argument that the majority votes as a bloc against their preferred candidate is undercut."); Turner Litig., 784 F. 
Supp. 553, 570-7 1 (E.D. Ark. 1 99 1 )  ( "[P]laintiffs argue here, contrary to the position of the plaintiffs in Jeffers, 
that if the percentage of black voters in District Four is increased from 27 percent (as it is under Act 1220 of 199 1 )  
to 38 percent (as it would b e  under plaintiffs ' proposal), it will be easier for black voters to "elect representatives 
of their choice" by forming coalitions with white voters. Their argument not only ignores the need to prove under 
Gingles that polarized voting prevents this from happening, but it directly undercuts their Section 2 claim by 
showing that even absent a majority, they could elect candidates of their choice if they sought alliances and 
coalitions with other voters in the traditional political manner." (citation omitted)); cf Brooks Litig. (GA), 
discussion at 1 58 F.3d 1230, 1237 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (noting, in the context of a challenge to runoffs in democratic 
primaries, the "fine line" between plaintiffs' argument that minority candidates would be able to gamer enough 
support to win the general election if they could succeed in the primary and plaintiffs' claim of white bloc voting); 
City of Chicago Litig. (IL), discussion at 141 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1 998) (stating that the court is not rejecting 
the notion of the influence ward by requiring majority minority districts to have a 65% minority voting age 
population, but finding the concept "inapplicable" to the facts of the case "because of the rigid racial bloc voting 
on all sides"). 
90. See e.g., Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 379 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("If a minority population is 
too small to elect candidates of choice in a reconfigured district even with the assistance of reliable crossover 
voters, then it is the size of the population and not the voting practice or procedure that is preventing the minority 
group from electing representatives of their choice. Dilution of the ability to influence representatives is not an 
injury cognizable under section 2(b) of the VRA."); Hall Litig. (VA), discussion at 385 F.3d 42 1 ,  430 (4th Cir. 
2004) ("[T]o establish a vote dilution claim under Section 2, minorities must prove that they have been unlawfully 
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denied the political opportunity they would have enjoyed as a voting-age majority in a single-member district: 
namely, the opportunity to 'dictate electoral outcomes independently' of other voters in t11e jurisdiction."); see also 
Kent County Litig. (Ml), discussion at 76 F.3d 1 3 8 1 ,  1 386 (6th Cir. 1 9 96) (en bane) ("Nothing in the clear, 
unambiguous language of § 2 allows or even recognizes the application of the Voting Rights Act to coalitions as 
urged by plaintiffs."). 
91. See, e.g., Second Circuit: Albany County Litig., discussion at No. 03 -CV-502, 2003 WL 2 1 524820, at *9 
(N.D .N.Y. July 7, 2003) (considering defendants' stipulation in a 1991  consent decree and joint political and social 
activities of the Latino and African-American communities); Rodriguez Litig. ,  discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 
443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Third Circuit: Page Litig., discussion at 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 364-66 (D.N.J. 200 1);  F�fth 
Circuit: Brewer Litig. (TX), discussion at 876 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 1 989) (citing Baytown for the proposition 
that "the most persuasive evidence of inter-minority political cohesion for Section 2 purposes is to be found in 
voting patterns"); City of Austin Litig. (TX), discussion at 871 F.2d 529, 529 ( 5th Cir. 1 989) (noting that, because 
plaintiffs could not create a district where Mexican-Americans enjoyed a voting age majority, they must 
demonstrate political cohesiveness with the Black population); Jefferson Parish I Litig.,  6 9 1  F.  Supp. 99 1 ,  1006 
(E.D. La. 1988) ("[Pllaintiffs may have the legal ability to seek and obtain some relief if they prove that they are 
politically cohesive, that a majority voting bloc usually defeats its preferred candidates, and that they are 
geographically compact so that a proposed remedy will insure them equal access to the po litical process and 
provide them the ability to influence elections. The court possesses the equity power to fashion the relief to remedy 
the effects of the prior dilution and to give the minority group the opportunity to participate equally in the electoral 
process . . . .  however, such relief does not mandate a safe district with a super m�jority of 60%. "); LULAC-Midland 
Litig., discussion at 648 F. Supp. 596, 606 (W.D. Tex. 1 986) ("Testimony presented showed that Blacks and 
Hispanics worked together and formed coalitions when their goals were compatible. Additionally, the bringing of 
this lawsuit provides evidence that Blacks and Hispanics have common interests that induce the formation of 
coalitions."). Seventh Circuit: Forest County Litig. (WI), discussion at 336 F. 3d 570, 575-76 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(r�jecting an "Indian/black district" that would pair a longstanding Indian community with a transient black 
community at the local Job Corps center, because the idea that their local interests coincided struck the court as 
"ludicrous"); Ninth Circuit Stockton Litig. (CA), 956 F. 2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992) (considering expert and lay 
testimony regarding cohesion between the minority groups); National City Litig., discussion at No. 88-30 1-R(M), 
1991 WL 42 1 1 15 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 1991), aff'd 976 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1 992) ; Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 
F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting minority population statistics); Pomona Litig., discussion at 665 F. Supp. 853 
(C .D. Cal. 1987) (finding that neither black nor Hispanic group was sufficiently large on its own to satisfy Gingles 
I, and that the two groups were not politically cohesive and, thus, failed to meet Gingles II), aff'd 883 F.2d 1418 
(9th Cir. 1988). Eleventh Circuit: Hardee County Litig. (FL), discussion at 906 F.2d 524, 527 ( 1 1th Cir. 1990) 
(considering voting patterns regarding whether blacks and Hispanics "worked together and formed political 
coalitions");  Metro Dade County Litig. (FL), discussion at 908 F .2d 1 540, 1545-46 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 990), aff'd in part, 
rev 'd in part 985 F.2d 1471 (1 1th Cir. 1 993); De Grandy Litig. ,  discussion at 8 1 5  F.  Supp. 1550, 1572-73 (N.D. 
Fla. 1992) . 
92. Armour Litig .. discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1 044, 1059-60 (N.D. Ohio 1 99 1 )  ("In a reconfigured district plaintiffs 
will constitute nearly one-third of the voting age population and about half of the usual Democratic vote. 
Therefore, the Democratic Party and its candidates will be forced to be sensitive to the minority population by 
virtue of that population's size."). 
93. Id. ; see also Metts Litig. (MA), discussion at 363 F.3d 8, 1 1  ( 1st Cir. 2004) (articulating the court's unwillingness "to 
foreclose the possibility that a section 2 claim can ever be made out where the African-American population of a single 
member district is reduced in redistricting legislation from 26 to 2 1  percent.") . 
94. Page Litig., 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 200 1) . 
95. Id. at 362. 
96. Id. 
97. Martinez Litig ..  discussion at 234 F. Supp. 2d. 1 275, 1 3 16 (S.D .  Fla. 2002). 
98. Id. at 1 3 2 1  n.56. 
99. Id. at 1 322. This court considered Gingles I in order to determine that the plaintiffs were protected by Section 2, 
before concluding that the districting plan did not violate Section 2. 
100. Peny Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 484-8 5 (E.D. Tex. 2004) . 
101 . Id at 484. 
102. Id. at 48 1 .  
103. Id.at 484-85. 
104. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.  461,  481 (2003).  
105. Peny Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 480 (E.D. Tex. 2004) . 
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106. Id. at 48 1 .  
107. Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 3 0 8  F .  Supp. 2d 3 46, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 379. 
1 10. Id. at 3 84.  
111 .  Perry Litig. ,  discussion at  298 F. Supp. 2d 451,  481 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 
2d 346, 3 84 (S.D .N.Y. 2004) (stating that, under Ashcroft "states have the flexibility to choose between safe 
majority-minority districts . . .  and 'coalitional ' districts') . 
1 12. Perry Litig. , discussion at 298 F .  Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  481 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez Litig.,  discussion at 308 F. Supp. 
2d 346, 3 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ( "While Ashcroft allows crossover districts under Section 5 ,  its reasoning does not 
broaden the power of federal courts under section 2 of the VRA to require state legislatures to protect or create 
such 'ability to elect' districts.") . 
1 13. Perry Litig. ,  discussion at 298 F .  Supp. 2d 4 5 1 ,  485 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
1 14. See, e.g. , Rural West I Litig., discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1 096, 1 104 (W.D. Tenn. 1995). 
1 15. West Litig., discussion at 786 F .  Supp. 803, 807 (W.D. Ark. 1992) ("If the Act does not always require the 
maximization of minority voting power, how do we distinguish those cases in which an 'influence ' district should 
be created, from those in which it should not? Plaintiffs have suggested no legal standards to differentiate these 
two kinds of cases . . . .  They are not numerous enough to elect a representative without help, and there is no proof 
that they would have enough help to elect a different representative, nor even that the same representative would 
behave differently in some relevant way."). Still other courts faced with influence claims have failed to address 
tl1em. resolving lawsuits on other grounds. See e.g., Meza Litig., discussion at 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64 (D. Mass. 
2004) (declining to decide whether plaintiffs may satisfy Gingles I without a numerical majority because the case 
could be resolved on alternative grounds); City of Minneapolis Litig., No. 02-l 1 39(JRT/FLN), 2004 U. S .  Dist. 
LEXIS 1 9708 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004); Hardee County Litig. (FL), discussion at 906 F.2d 524 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 990). 
1 16. See e.g. , Sensley Litig. (LA), discussion at 3 85 F.3d 591,  596 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[I]t is clear that shape is a 
significant factor that courts can and must consider in a Gingles compactness inquiry"); Mallory-Ohio Litig. (OH), 
discussion at 1 73 F.3d 377, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court 's decision that plaintiffs "had the 
burden of showing that those minority voters live d in a geographically compact pattern such that it would be 
possible to draw a 'maj ority-minority' district with a rational shape" and stating "But the only evidence submitted 
by the class to demonstrate geographical compactness was a set of maps that purported to show the concentration 
of African-American populations within each of Ohio 's largest counties."); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 
discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 167 (D. Colo. 1 998) (considering an existing plan in a case where defendants 
sought to get out of a settlement and return to an at-large system: "A simple visual inspection shows that District D 
is compact, normally shaped, completely rationale [sic] in appearance and similar to all other districts contained in 
the existing plan."); Jefferson Parish I Litig., 691  F. Supp. 96 1 ,  1 007 (E.D. La. 1 988) (criticizing plaintiffs ' 
proposed plan: "[t]he district contains no less than 35 sides . . .  "), Worcester County Litig., discussion at 840 F. 
Supp. 108 1 ,  1086-87 (D. Md. 1 994), rev 'd in part on other grounds 35 F.3d 92 1 (4th Cir. 1994) ( "The plaintiffs' 
proposed Plan 1 is not unreasonably irregular in shape, considering the population dispersal within the 
County . . . .  The districts may not be symmetrical, but they are compact. They do not rely on districts that run 
through several 'tentacle-like corridors ' nor are the district's boundary lines so unreasonably irregular, bizarre or 
uncouth as to approach obvious gerrymandering."). 
1 17. See e.g,, City of Minneapolis Litig., No. 02-l  139(JRT/FLN), 2004 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 19708, at * 1 0  (Minn. Sept. 
3 0  2004) (considering any plan must conform to a 2 : 1  length to width ratio to comport with the city charter); 
Sensley Litig. (LA), discussion at 385 F.3d 5 9 1 ,  597-98 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that there was no clear error 
where the district court held the proposed districts not compact while ignoring traditional districting principles); 
Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989, 992 (D.S.D. 2004) (finding that the proposed plans 
adhered to state 'straditional redistricting principles, including respect for geographical and political boundaries, 
and protection of minority voting rights."), Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 152, 1 167 (D. 
Colo. 1998) (finding the district was drawn in adherence to traditional districting principles); Town of Hempstead 
Litig., discussion at 956 F. Supp. 326, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[P]laintiffs have amply demonstrated that a 
majority-minority district can be fashioned without subordinating traditional districting principles to racial 
considerations .") . 
1 18. See e.g, Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989, 992 (D.S.D. 2004) (stating that there was no 
Shaw v. Reno problem where districts, while irregular in shape, were no more irregular than those in the state's 
plan); Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 492 (2d Cir. 1 999) ('This proposed District 3 
was found to be more compact than the average congressional district."); City of Columbia Litig.,  discussion at 
850 F. Supp. 404, 4 1 3  (D.S .C.  1 993) (finding compactness where ''Plaintiffs ' single-member district plans are 
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reasonably compact and are no more irregular in shape than the districts actually in use under the existing 4 -2-1 
plan"): Nash Litig. ,  797 F. Supp. 1488, 1497 (W.D. Mo. 1 992) ("A visual inspection of the two plans 
demonstrates Dr. Jones'  plan is less compact than the Commission's plan."); Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F. 
Supp. 1 96 (E.D. Ark. 1 989) (noting plaintiffs ' proposed districts "look rather strange" but that they "are not 
materially stranger in shape than at least some of the districts contained in the present apportionment plan."). 
1 19. See e.g., Albritton Litig. (LA), discussion at 385 F.3d 591, 597-98 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that there was no 
clear error in the district court' s  holding that compactness was lacking where proposed districts separated distinct 
communities); City of Chicago-Bonilla Litig. ,  discussion at 17 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1 998) (considering 
and rejecting claims that displacement of part of the community "into another aldermanic ward will result in the 
destruction of the community."); Columbus County Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 105 (E.D.N.C. 1991)  
(finding compactness where the districts were not "so spread out as to prevent the constituents and their 
representative from communicating with each other" and "none of these districts are so convoluted that its 
members and representatives would not be able to tell who actually lived in each district."); Jefferson Parish I 
Litig. ,  69 1 F. Supp. 961,  1007 (E.D. La. 1988) ("A proposed district is sufficiently compact if it retains a natural 
sense of community. To retain that sense of community, a district should not be so convoluted that its 
representative could not easily tell who actually lives within the district."); Baldwin County Bd. of Educ . Litig., 
686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) (applying a functional approach and suggesting tliat a district would not be 
sufficiently compact, the court suggested, if it destroyed all ''sense of community ."). 
120. Bush v. Vera, 5 1 7  U.S. 952 ( 1996); Miller v. Johnson, 5 1 5  U.S. 900 ( 1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 600 ( 1993). 
121. Sensley Litig. (LA), discussion at 385 F.3d 591.  596-98 (5th Cir. 2004); City of New Rochelle Litig. ,  discussion at 
308 F.  Supp. 2d 1 52, 159 (S .D.N.Y. 2003): France Litig., discussion at 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 
1 999); Town of Hempstead Litig., discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 492 (2d Cir. 1999); Lafayette County Litig., 
discussion at 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Miss. 1 998); Davis v. Chiles Litig. ,  discussion at 1 39 F.3d 
1414 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 998) ; City of Rome Litig., discussion at 127 F.3d 1355 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997); Chickasaw County II 
Litig. ,  No. CIV.A. 1 : 92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 3342676 1 ,  at * 1  (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997); Town ofBabylon 
Litig. ,  discussion at 9 14 F. Supp. 843, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Calhoun County Litig., discussion at 881 F. Supp. 
252, 253 -54 ( 5th Cir. 1 996); Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1056 (D. Md. 1994) ;  Hamrick Litig. 
(GA). 296 F.3d 1 065 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002) . 
122. See e.g., City of Minneapolis Litig. ,  discussion at No. 02-1 139(JRT/FLN), 2004 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 1 9708, at *50-
51 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004) ("[E]xamination of the redistricting maps clearly demonstrates tliat the ward shapes 
in tlris case are neither bizarre nor irregular. The Court is not alone in reaching this conclusion. Plaintiffs ' expert 
testified tliat 'it would be hard to conclude tliat either [the previous wards or the redistricting plan wards] are 
bizarre. '  Similarly, defendant' s  expert testified that, based on his review of numerous redistricting plans, he did 
not find any of the districts to be 'bizarre in terms of their shapes.' " (citations omitted)); Thurston County Litig. 
(NE), discussion at 129 F.3d 1 015 ,  1025 (8th Cir. 1 997) (holding no violation of Section 2 for either the school 
board or the village board of elections because of their bizarre shape). 
123. See e.g., Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 168 (D. Colo. 1998) ("A simple 
visual inspection shows tliat District D is compact, normally shaped, completely rationale [sic] in appearance and 
similar to all other districts contained in the existing plan. It is plainly not the kind of district criticized in Shaw v. 
Reno and Miller v. Johnson."); Lafayette County Litig., discussion at 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Miss. 
1 998) ( "[T]he question is not whether the plaintiff residents' proposed district was oddly shaped, but whether the 
proposal demonstrated tliat a geographically compact district could be drawn. " While both of plaintiffs' plans had 
some "ragged edges," and one district "even containredl three thin appendages that reach[ed] awkwardly into 
nrinority communities located in and around the City of Oxford" the court found Gingles I met because "the Fifth 
Circuit has also reviewed the plans and concluded that at least one of them is not nearly as bizarre as those rejected 
in Shaw v. Reno." (internal quotations omitted)); Sanchez-Colorado Litig., discussion at 97 F.3d 1 303, 1 3 1 5  (10th 
Cir. 1996) ( "We would also note by comparison to the districts the Court recently found 'bizarre' in Shaw II and 
Bush plaintiffs' proposed district is nonobjectionable."); Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 9 14 F.  Supp. 843, 
873 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (noting although the districts were oddly shaped, they were not as odd as the ones in Shaw, 
so the district would not fail on this alone; it failed because the expert failed to adequately take traditional 
districting principles into account, including a consideration of similarity to existing districts in the county); Little 
Rock Litig. (AR), discussion at 56 F.3d 904, 912  (8th Cir. 1995) ("[A]lthough the plaintiffs' proposed zone 
boundaries are nowhere nearly so bizarre as the ones held presumptively unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 
Shaw, they are markedly less regular and compact than those in LRSD's adopted plan.). 
124. See e.g ., Sensley Litig. (LA), discussion at 385 F.3d 591, 596-98 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Vera andAbrams v. 
Johnson, the court focused on the district's odd shape and plaintiffs' failure to observe traditional districting 
principles in holding that Gingles I was not met); France Litig., discussion at 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 325-26 
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(S.D .N. Y. 1 999) (finding that plaintiffs' plan was "primarily driven by considerations of race" and that plaintiffs 
"failed to meet their burden of showing that their districting plan takes into account traditional districting criteria 
such as compactness, geography, and the integrity of political subdivisions;" applying strict scrutiny and finding 
that the district was not narrowly tailored because it failed on the Gingles factors) :  Town of Babylon Litig. ,  
discussion at 914 F. Supp. 843,  873 -74 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (declining "to find that plaintiffs have met their burden of 
proof of showing that their districting plan, drawn with a near-exclusive focus on race, by chance adequately takes 
into account districting criteria such as compactness, respect for the Town's geography, contiguity and the 
integrity of political subdivisions and communities of interests.") . But see City of New Rochelle Litig., 308 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 52, 1 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (maintaining that a return to a prior districting plan would not be contrary to 
Shaw and Vera and that it was not "directing such a race conscious gerrymander; instead it is directing the 
restoration of the status quo ante, which was unnecessarily disrupted in violation of Plaintiffs rights under Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act."). 
125. SENATE REPORT supra note 1 5, at 27-30 (including "racially polarized voting" as one of the factors "relevant" to a 
Section 2 inquiry). Unlike the other Senate Factors, which were largely derived from judicial decisions predating 
the 1982 amendments, racial bloc voting emerged as a formal element of the Section 2 inquiry for the first time in 
1982. See, e.g ., Lubbock Litig. (TX), discussion at 727 F.2d 364, 384 (5th Cir. 1 984). Supporters of the 1 982 
Amendments to Section 2 invoked racial bloc voting as the critical restraint that would keep the amended statute 
from devolving into a mandate for proportional representation. See IssAcHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 
12, at 74 1 ("[O]ne factor that emerges as central in the Senate Report is the extent to which voting is 'racially 
polarized.' This factor is nowhere directly mentioned in the White/Zimmer line of cases; it starts to rise in the 
Senate debates when proponents are forced to respond to Senator Hatch' s argument that the amended Section 2 
will guarantee proportional representation along racial lines."). 
126. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: RPV = 1 and filter Column: WasSection2Violated = 1) .  The exceptions 
are cases involving challenges to specific voting procedures that identified Section 2 violations without 
considering racially polarized voting, see Berks County Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (poll official 
conduct); Marks-Philadelphia Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-6 157, 1994 WL 1 46 1 1 3  (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1 994) (absentee 
ballots) :  Operation Push Litig., 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1 991)  (voter registration system); Town of North Johns 
Litig., 7 1 7  F. Supp. 1471  (M.D. Ala. 1989) (withholding of candidacy filing forms): Harris v. Graddick Litig. ,  695 
F. Supp. 5 17 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) (policy of appointing only white poll officials); Madison County Litig., 6 10 F. 
Supp. 240 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (invalidation of absentee ballots), and two cases that found a violation of Section 2 
based on invidious intent without considering racially polarized voting, see Arakaki Litig. (HI), 3 14 F .3d 109 1 
(9th Cir. 2002): Rybicki Litig., 574 F. Supp. 1 147 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
127. See Gingles Litig. (NC), discussion at 478 U.S. 30, 50-5 1 ( 1 986). 
128. See id. at 32; see also infra, Gingles I Section. 
129. See, e.g ., City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 983 ( 1 st Cir. 1995); De Grandy Litig. (FL), 
discussion at 512 U.S. 997, 1 0 1 1 -12 ( 1994): LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1,  850 (5th 
Cir. 1993) .  
130. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 27-30. 
131. Decisions decided between the 1 982 Amendments and the Court's decision in Gingles obviously do not employ 
the Gingles test. Instead, these courts applied varied standards to evaluate racial bloc voting under Senate Factor 
2. See, e.� ., Terrell Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 3 38, 348-49 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Typically, the degree of 
racial polarity in voting is determined by examining election races in which blacks opposed whites, taking the 
percentage of voters who supported a candidate of their own race, and subtracting the percentage of voters who 
voted for a candidate of another race, to obtain a "racial polarization score.") . 
132. See, e.g ., Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 277-78 (D.S.C. 2003) (discussing racially 
polarized voting in totality review vi a a brief recap of experts ' statistics already analyzed under Gingles); 
Westwego Litig. (LA), 946 F.2d 1 109, 1 1 16 (5th Cir. 1991)  (referencing Gingles analysis in totality of the 
circumstances review).  But cf Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 : 92CV142-JAD, 1 997 WL 33426761 ,  at 
*3 (N.D. Miss. Oct 28, 1997) (briefly finding racial bloc voting under Gingles, with more discussion in the 
totality review). Many courts also hold that causation should be considered in the totality of the circumstances 
assessment, see infra, Gingles II and III Section Some courts then import the causation question into a 
consideration of Factor 2, see, e.g., Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029-33  (D. Colo. 2004) 
(finding Gingles met, but no racially polarized voting due to causation), while others simply consider causation as 
a different part of the totality of the circumstances see e.g., Alamance County Litig. (NC), discussion at 99F.3d 
600, 604 (4th Cir. 1 996) ("[T]he best reading of Gingles . .  . is one that treats causation as irrelevant in the inquiry 
into the three Gingles preconditions but relevant in the totality of the circumstances inquiry."); see also infra note 
1 6 1 .  
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133. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: RPV = l ,  and filter Column: Jurisdiction, and filter Success = 0) . 
134. See e.g .,  Baldwin County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 376 F.3d 1260 ( 1 1th Cir. 2004) (defendant conceded that racial 
bloc voting existed); Sensley Litig. (LA), 3 85 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004) (parties stipulated that racial bloc voting 
existed); Baldwin County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 376 F.3d 1260 ( 1  lth Cir. 2004) (defendant conceded that racial 
bloc voting existed); DeSoto County (FL), 204 F.3d 1335  ( 1 1th Cir. 2000) (finding of Gingles I reversed thus 
appellate court never addressed district court 's finding of Gingles II or III); Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. 
(TX), 165 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Although the district court found that plaintiffs failed to meet the first 
Gingles requirement the court exhaustively considered the evidence presented, addressed the remaining two 
Gingles requirements, and considered the 'totality of circumstances' using the Zimmer factors."); Davis v. Chiles 
Litig. (FL), 139 F.3d 1414, 14 16 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 998) (finding Gingles threshold met, but no remedy therefore 
modifying Gingles I to state it unmet); Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), 5 12 U.S.  874 ( 1 994) (reversed on another 
factor and did not address bloc voting). 
135. See infra, The Gingles Threshold Section (discussing cases that found Gingles but no violation due to 
proportionality). 
136. City of Chicago-Bonilla Litig. (IL), 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1 998) (remanding for review of totality of 
circumstances); Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 154 7 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 987) (remanding for a finding on the 
other two Gingles factors). 
137. Old Person Litig. (MT), 3 12 F.3d 1036, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) ('This is one of those not unusual cases where our 
decision is controlled by the proper standard of review. On one side of the scale lies a history of official 
discrimination, the presence of racially polarized elections, the presence of socioeconomic factors limiting Indians ' 
political participation, the use of racial appeals in elections, and disproportionality. On the other side of the scale 
we see the absence of discriminatory voting practices, the viable policy underlying the existing district boundaries, 
the success of Indians in elections, and officials ' responsiveness to Native Americans ' needs. We have fully 
considered the legal issues presented and the detailed factual record with which the district court grappled. We 
cannot say that the district court 's determination that there was no vote dilution, considered in the totality of 
circumstances, was clearly erroneous."); NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361 ,  374 (5th Cir. 200 1) ("In 
summary, the district court found that, although Mississippi has an undeniable history of official discrimination 
from which its African-American citizens still suffer the effects, Wilson failed to demonstrate that this reality 
hindered the ability of Mississippi 's African-American citizens to participate effectively in the state 's political 
process. Moreover, the court determined that the factors of majority vote requirement, the size of the contested 
electoral districts, candidate slating, responsiveness, and tenuousness did not favor Wilson. The record before us 
supports the district court's determinations regarding these factors. As such, we cannot conclude that these 
findings were clearly erroneous."); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 1 2 1 8  ( 1 1th Cir. 2000); Niagara 
Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1 002 (2d Cir. 1 995); Democratic Party of Arkansas Litig. (AR), 902 F .2d 1 5  ( 8th Cir. 
1 990); City ofBoston Litig. (MA), 784 F.2d 409 ( 1 st Cir. 1 986) (finding that "moderate racially polarized voting" 
does not establish a Section 2 violation when no voting practices minimize minority votes, there is an absence of 
racial animus, and no alternative plan would not sacrifice other districting considerations). 
138. Gingles Litig., 478 U.S.  30, 68 ( 1 986). 
139. First Circuit: City of Boston Litig. (MA), discussion at 784 F.2d 409, 4 1 3  ( 1 st Cir. 1 986) (assuming that black 
candidates are the preferred candidates of black voters); cf City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 
973, 988 ( 1st Cir. 1995) (considering only elections in which Hispanic candidates ran for office); Second Circuit: 
Albany County Litig., discussion at No. 03 -CV-502, 2003 WL 2 1 524820, at * 10- 1 1  (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2003) 
(equating minority candidate with minority-preferred candidate by noting the absence of minority candidates for 
county-wide office and concluding that "no evidence exists as to whether white voters County-wide supported a 
minority-preferred candidate"); Green Litig., discussion at No. CV-96-3367 (CPS), 1 996 WL 5243 95, at *10  
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5,  1996) ("[N]o evidence has been presented that plaintiff voters and registered voters have been 
outvoted by a white majority class. According to the defendants, eight of the nine newly elected board members 
are African Americans . . . .  "); cf Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1 002, 1 0 1 8-1 9 (2d. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a white candidate may be minority-preferred and adopting a race-blind bright line rule for the Second 
Circuit); Third Circuit: Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 1 26 (3d Cir. 1 993) (adopting 
presumption that the minority candidate is minority-preferred and noting that "experience does demonstrate that 
minority candidates will tend to be candidates of choice among the minority community," but nevertheless 
insisting that plaintiffs must present some evidence establishing this presumption); Harrison Litig., discussion at 
Civ. A. No. 92-0603, 1992 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 5 3 1 5 ,  at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2 1 ,  1 992) (agreeing with defendant 
expert testimony that African Americans tend to vote for African-American candidates); Fourth Circuit: 
Columbus County Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 100-02 (E.D .N.C. 1 99 1 )  (considering only black-white 
elections). But see City ofHampton Litig. , discussion at 9 1 9  F. Supp. 2 12, 2 14 (E.D. Va. 1 996) ("[T]he focus of 
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the Plaintiffs' presentation was the race of the candidate elected, whereas the focus of the Voting Rights Act is 
upon the opportunity of a minority to elect the candidate of its choice . . . .  "); Fifth Circuit: St. Bernard Parish 
School Board Litig. , discussion at No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589, at *6 (E.D. La., Aug. 26, 2002) ( "In 
assessing whether racial bloc voting occurs, the appropriate focus is on elections in which a minority group 
member is a candidate"); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  864 (5th Cir. 1 993) (citing 
Gretna for proposition that elections without a minority candidate are less probative because they do not provide 
minority voters with the choice of a minority candidate) ;  Gretna Litig. (LA), discussion at 834 F.2d 496. 503 (5th 
Cir. 1 987) ("We consider Jones to be an aldermanic candidate sponsored by Gretna's minority group because he 
received a significant portion of the black vote, and because he is black.") (footnote omitted); Sixth Circuit: 
Anthony Litig., discussion at 3 5  F. Supp. 2d 989, 992 (E.D. Mich. 1 999) (finding all African-American candidates 
but one were the minority-preferred candidate); Rural West I Litig., discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1 096, l l08 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1 995) ("As a practical matter . . .  in most racially polarized districts where white voters prefer white 
candidates (as is effectively required by the third Gingles precondition to find a § 2 violation), black voters will 
choose to vote for black candidates. This is certainly true in Tennessee."); Seventh Circuit: Campuzano Litig., 
discussion at 200 F. Supp. 2d 905, 9 14 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ( "The parties agree that, with few exceptions, African­
Americans overwhelmingly prefer representation by African-American candidates); City of Chicago Litig. (IL), 
discussion at 1 4 1 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1 998) (dismissing arguments that white candidates in some areas with 
substantial minority populations are responsive to minority interests and ex1Jlaining that "[i]t may be highly 
regrettable that a candidate's race should matter to the electorate: but it does: and the cases interpreting the Voting 
Rights Act do not allow the courts to ignore that preference."):  Eighth Circuit: Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR). 
discussion at 7 1  F.3d 1 3 82, 1 387-88 (8th Cir. 1 995) (adopting Jenkinsv. Red Clay School District methodology 
for determining the minority-preferred candidate which includes a presumption in favor of the minority candidate) .  
The Eighth Circuit, however, requires additional evidence t o  establish the minority-preferred candidate.  See infra 
note 1 40.  Ninth Circuit: The Ninth Circuit always requires evidence to establish the minority-preferred candidate. 
See infra note 1 40.  Tenth Circuit: Alamosa County Litig.,  discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 10 16, 1029-33 (D. Colo. 
2004) (permitting presumption that the minority candidate was the minority-preferred candidate to stand without 
independent evidence because both plaintiff and defendant expert agreed): Eleventh Circuit: Brooks Litig. (GA), 
discussion at 1 58 F.3d 1230,  1235, 1 240 (1 1th Cir. 1 998) (assuming without discussion that all black candidates 
are minority-preferred and all white candidates are majority preferred); Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1 2 8 1  ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995) (same): Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 955 F.2d 1 563, 1 57 1 -
7 2  ( 1  l th Cir. 1 992) (same): B aldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) (same): Dillard v. 
Crenshaw Litig. ,  640 F. Supp. 1 347 (M.D. Ala. 1 986) (same). 
140. The following circuits allow for a lesser burden to establish a minority candidate is minority-preferred: Third 
Circuit: Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 129 (3d Cir. 1 993) (adopting a 
presumption that the minority is the minority-preferred candidate but allowing white candidate to be minority­
preferred and adopting different tests for both); Fifth Circuit. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 958 
F. Supp. 1 1 96 (S.D. Tex. 1 997) (discussing several elections in which, despite evidence of consistent Hispanic 
support for the Hispanic candidate at the polls, the plaintiffs' expert witness could not identify the Hispanic 
preferred candidate); LULAC v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig.,  discussion at Civ. A. No. 1 :94-CV- 104-C, 1 996 
WL 453584, *2 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 1 996) (struggling to identify the minority-preferred candidate in an election 
with multiple Hispanic candidates.); City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 1 393, 1395 (N.D. Tex. 
1 990) (suggesting that voting patterns and witness testimony can help identify the minority-preferred candidate); 
Gretna Litig., discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 1 3 ,  1 1 3 3  (D. La. 1 986) ("Unless it can be shown that an election 
occurred in which a white candidate ran on issues strongly affecting the black community and with an open, 
positive and strong identification with the black community-which has not been shown in this matter­
candidacies of black persons are the proper focus of inquiry concerning the extent to which elections are 
polarized."); Seventh Circuit: Rockford Bd. of Educ. Litig., discussion at Civ.A. No. 89 C 20168, 1991 WL 
299 1 04, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12,  1 99 1 )  ("The African Americans in the School District have tended to vote as a 
group and to vote for African American candidates."); Springfield Park District Litig. (IL), 851  F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 
1 988) (citing trend of minorities voting for the minority candidate found in district court); Tenth Circuit: Sanchez­
Colorado Litig. (CO), discussion at 97 F.3d 1 303, 1 320 -2 1  ( 10th Cir. 1 996) (adopting Jenkins v. Red Clay 
methodology); Sanchez-Bond Litig. (CO), discussion at 875 F.2d 1488, 1 495 (10th Cir. 1 989) (holding the 
minority-preferred candidate does not have to be a minority and elections with only white candidates should be 
given "such weight as the circumstances warrant"); Eleventh Circuit: De Grandy Litig. discussion at 8 1 5  F. Supp. 
1550, 1 572 -73 (N.D. Fla. 1 992) (presuming that minority candidates are minority-preferred after reviewing 
evidence that blacks and Hispanics generally prefer candidates of the own race); but see, City of Rome Litig. 
(GA), discussion at 127 F.3d 1 355,  1 377, 1 379 n.9 ( 1  l th Cir. 1 997) (finding that all black candidates were 
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strongly supported by the black community and were black preferred, including one black candidate who did not 
receive a plurality of the black vote, and then finding that white candidates minority where they had ahnost as 
much support as black candidates). 
Othercircuits require the same evidence regardless of the candidate's race: First Circuit: Black Political 
Task Force Litig. ,  300 F. Supp. 2d 29 1 (D. Mass. 2004) (relying on regression analyses of minority voting patterns 
to identify the minority-preferred candidate);  Meza Litig. ,  322 F.  Supp. 2d 52 (D. Mass. 2004) (same); Second 
Circuit: Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the "minority­
preferred candidate is generally the candidate that receives the most votes from the relevant minority group" and 
citing Niagara Falls for the proposition that the courts must consider elections where the white majority defeats a 
minority-preferred white candidate) ;  Fourth Circuit: Alamance County Litig. (NC), discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 615  
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding any candidate who receives the plurality of the minority votes i s  the minority-preferred 
candidate); Sixth Circuit: Quilter Litig., discussion at 794 F. Supp. 695, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (criticizing 
plaintiffs expert for merely stating that "given the opportunity there is a much higher percentage of black vote for 
black candidates than white vote for black candidates" and not finding racial bloc voting); Armour Litig., 
discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1057 (N.D. Ohio 199 1 )  (finding the minority candidate was the preferred 
candidate because of testimony that "the relationship between the candidate's race and the race of the voter was 
consistently near linear');  Eighth Circuit: While the Eighth Circuit expressly follows Jenkins and allows a 
presumption that the minority candidate is the minority-preferred, this presumption is insufficient to establish the 
minority-preferred candidate alone . See City of Minneapolis Litig., discussion at No. 02-1 139(JRT/FLN), 2004 
U. S. Dist. LEXIS 1 9708, at *28-32 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004) (demanding evidence that the minority candidate is 
minority-preferred); Clay County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (MO), discussion at 90 F.3d 1357, 1362 -64 ( 8th Cir. 1 996) 
(refusing to presume minority candidate was minority-preferred absent independent evidence but acknowledging 
the candidate's race should be considered); Nash Litig., discussion at 797 F. Supp. 1488, 1503 (W.D. Mo. 1992) 
("We have, for purposes of this opinion, arbitrarily deemed any candidate receiving more than 65% of the black 
vote 'minority-preferred. '  There was some testimony to the effect that black voters, given a choice, would vote 
only for black candidates, and that a white candidate receiving a majority of the black vote was probably not a 
'true ' preference. There was also testimony indicating that if a white person received a majority of the black vote, 
any black candidates probably were not viable candidates. We refuse to impart these individual witnesses' views 
to black citizens as a whole. Absent some indication that a particular white candidate was truly not preferred 
despite receiving over 65% of the black vote, or that a particular black candidate was not viable, we will not 
assume that the voters in a particular political contest would have voted for someone other than the person they 
voted for, nor will we assume that a white candidate receiving over 65% of the black vote was not preferred by the 
minority voters."); Ninth Circuit: City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), discussion at 160 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 
1998) (rejecting that only minority candidates could be minority-preferred and adopting a "bright-line" test for 
determining the minority-preferred candidate) ;  National City Litig., discussion at No. 88-301 -R(M), 1991 WL 
42 1 1 1 5  (S.D. Cal. May 16, 1 99 1 )  (looking at voting patterns and using regressions to determine the minority­
preferred candidate); Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding courts should not look 
beyond voting patterns to determine the minority-preferred candidate, but not differentiating between the race of 
the candidates). 
141 . Most circuits now hold that the minority-preferred candidate does not have to be a minority: First Circuit: Black 
Political Task Force Litig. ,  discussion at 300 F .  Supp. 2d 29 1 ,  304 (D. Mass. 2004) ("We understand that black 
voters sometimes may consider a white candidate their representative of choice and vice-versa."); Second Circuit: 
Niagara Falls Litig., discussion at 65 F.3d 1 002, 1016 (2d Cir. 1 995) (refusing to "adopt an approach precluding 
the possibility that a white candidate can be the actual and legitimate choice of minority voters."); Third Circuit: 
Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion in 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 126 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing either 
minority candidates or white candidates to be minority-preferred but adopting different tests for each); Fourth 
Circuit: Alamance County Litig.,  discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 608 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that the minority­
preferred candidate may sometimes be a white candidate); Fifth Circuit: LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 
discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  882-83 ( 5th Cir. 1 993) ("The black-preferred candidate in Harris County, regardless of 
race, was always the Democratic candidate."); Sixth Circuit: Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 
8 1 3  (6th Cir. 1 994) (adopting a colorblind approach to determining the minority-preferred candidate); Seventh 
Circuit: Williams v. State Bd. of Elections Litig. (IL), 718  F. Supp. 1324, 1325-26 ( 7th Cir. 1 989) (finding that 
white candidates who earned a majority of the minority vote were minority-preferred candidates in spite of 
evidence of discrimination in the candidate slating process); see also City of Chicago Heights Litig. (IL), 
discussion at 824 F. Supp. 786, 791  (N.D. Ill. 1 993) (finding, in multi-member districts, candidates who receive 
the majority of the vote are not minority-preferred where "other candidates, preferred by a significantly higher 
percentage of the minority community . . . .  were defeated in the same election"); Eighth Circuit: Blytheville Sch. 
Documenting Discrimination 65 
Dist. Litig. (AR), discussion at 7 1 F.3d 1382, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopting the Jenkins v. Red Clay 
methodology); Ninth Circuit: City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), 160 F.3d 543, 549-50 ( 9th  Cir. 1 998) (rejecting that 
only minority candidates could be minority-preferred and adopting a "bright-line" test for determining the 
minority-preferred candidate); Tenth Circuit: Sanchez-Bond Litig. ,  875 F.2d 1488, 1495 ( 10th Cir. 1 989) (holding 
the minority-preferred candidate does not have to be a minority): Eleventh Circuit: City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 
F.3d 1355 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997). 
142. Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 1 29 (3 d Cir. 1 993). 
143. See, e.g., Third Circuit: Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 129 (3 d Cir. 1993) (finding 
that evidence showing non-minority candidate to be minority-preferred include s minority "sponsorship" of the 
candidate, the level of attention the candidate pays to the minority community, the level of minority turnout for 
white-on-white elections compared to elections involving a minority candidate, the disincentives minority 
candidates confront and difficulties they face in qualifying for o ffice, and the extent minority candidates have run 
in the past); Eighth Circuit: Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 997 -1 0 1 7  (D .S.D. 2004) 
(considering anecdotal evidence such as the formation of advocacy organizations, political parties targeting the 
minority group, get out the vote efforts, and politicians ' testimony as well as statistical evidence in determining 
cohesion and bloc voting); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), discussion at 7 1 F.3d 1 3 82, 1 3 86 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(stating circuit will follow Third Circuit's approach in Jenkins v. Red Clay School District); Tenth Circuit: 
Sanchez v. Colorado Litig. (CO), discussion at 97 F.3d 1 303, 1321  ( 10th Cir. 1 996) (adopting approach from 
Jenkins): Eleventh Circuit' Nipper Litig. (FL), discussion at 39 F.3d 1494, 1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 994) (requiring 
evidence of"strong preference" before white candidate will be considered minority-preferred and permitting such 
evidence to include anecdotal evidence, polling and turnout data, and a review of appeals made during the 
campaign). But see supra note 134 (discussion of Ciry ofRome litigation) . 
144. Sanchez-Bond Litig. (CO), discussion at 875 F.2d 1488, 1496 ( 10th Cir. 1 989) (determining that white candidates 
are minority-preferred based on Hispanic influence over the candidate slating process); City of St. Louis Litig. 
(MO), discussion at 90 F.3d 1 357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1 996) (suggesting slating informs inquiry into minority-preferred 
candidates by stating: "Absent a showing that minority-preferred candidates are, for some reason, excluded from 
the ballot, it is a near tautological principle that the minority-preferred candidate 'should generally be one able to 
receive [minority] votes. ' "); see also Williams v. State Bd. of Elections Litig., discussion at 7 1 8  F .  Supp. 1 324, 
1329-30 (N.D. Ill. 1 989) (refusing to consider the slating process in Gingles inquiry as "turn[ing] the Court's 
language on its head and would have it refer to circumstances explaining the defeat of the minority's candidate, 
such as exclusionary slating") . 
145. See, e.g., City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), discussion at 160 F.3d 543 , 549-50 ("[M]any of the extrinsic factors 
relied upon by the courts adopting the totality of the circumstances analysis do not necessarily bear a correlation 
with how all minority voters feel about a candidate, only how activist groups feel. Whether minority voters 
mobilized to support a white candidate, a factor considered relevant by the Third Circuit, only indicates how those 
minorities willing to become politically active feel about a candidate; not all minorities may have the time or 
inclination to take such steps, even though they support that candidate. A bright-line rule, on the other hand, is 
based on the premise 'that the ballot box provides the best and most objective proxy for determining who 
constitutes a representative of choice.' " (citations omitted)); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 
1 002, 1018 (2d Cir. 1 995) ( "We sympathize with these Circuits in their efforts to grapple with the often­
conflicting requirements of the Voting Rights Act, but we believe that evaluating whether a person is, 'as a 
realistic matter,' minority-preferred-based on subjective indicators such as 'anecdotal testimonial evidence'-is a 
dubious judicial task, and one that can degenerate into racial stereotyping of a high order. Questions such as 
whether a candidate, in a campaign, 'addressed predominately minority crowds and interests' suggest the existence 
of a racial political orthodoxy that courts should not legitimate, much less profess or promote."). 
146. See, e.g., Second Circuit: Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002, 1 0 1 8-19 (2d Cir. 1 995) (defining 
the minority-preferred candidate as the candidate who receives more than fifty percent of minority votes in the at­
large, general election, while providing that courts need not consider such a candidate minority-preferred if either 
( 1) another candidate received more than fifty percent of the minority vote in the primary and failed to reach the 
general election; or (2) another candidate received significantly higher support); Sixth Circuit: Cincinnati Litig. 
(OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 8 10 n. l (6th Cir. 1994) (stating "courts generally have understood blacks ' 
preferred candidates simply to be those candidates who receive the greatest support from black voters."); Ninth 
Circuit: City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), discussion at 160 F.3d 543, 552 ( 9th  Cir. 1 998) ( adopting a rule that any 
candidate who receive d the largest plurality of minority votes was the minority-preferred candidate); Watsonville 
Litig. (CA), discussion at 863 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The court should have looked only to actual 
voting patterns rather than speculating as to the reasons why many Hispanics were apathetic. In fact, there is 
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nothing in the record to support the district court's apparent conclusion that lack of enthusiasm for Hispanic 
candidates was responsible for the low rates of voter registration among Hispanics."). 
147. Earlier cases in the Fourth Circuit allowed more room for subjective inquiries. See City ofNorfolk Litig. (VA), 
discussion at 816 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The mere election of a candidate who appears to have received 
votes from more than fifty percent of minority ballots does not count as a minority electoral success, when each 
ballot may contain votes for more than one candidate . . . .  Each such situation must be reviewed individually to 
determine whether the elected candidates can be fairly considered as representatives of the minority community."): 
see also 883 F.2d 1232, 1238 (4th Cir. 1989) (adding that in such a situation, "in addition to the bare statistics, it is 
appropriate to consider testimony revealing how political observers and the candidates themselves viewed the 
city's claim that Howell and Staylor were the minority's preferred candidates and representatives of choice"). 
More recently, however, the Fourth Circuit has moved closer to the Second Circuit 's  approach. See Alamance 
County Litig. (NC), discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 615  ( 4th Cir. 1 996) ("Where the first choice of black voters was 
successful, there is simply no reason to presume that the minority community has been unsuccessful in electing 
representatives of its choice . . . .  we now hold that, in multi-seat elections in which voters are permitted to cast as 
many votes as there are seats, at the very least any candidate who receives a majority of the minority vote and who 
finishes behind a successful candidate who was the first choice among the minority voters is automatically to be 
deemed a black-preferred candidate, just like the successful first choice . . . . Candidates who receive less than 50% 
of the minority vote, but who would have been elected had the election been held only among black voters, are 
presumed also to be minority-preferred candidates, although an individualized assessment should be made in order 
to confirm that such a candidate may appropriately be so considered."); see also Charleston County Litig., 
discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d268, 278 (D.S.C. 2003) (following Alamance County), and discussion at 3 18 F. 
Supp. 302, 3 10 (D.S.  C. 2002) (focusing on the weight of the statistical data, rather than on defendants' "anecdotal, 
deposition testimony of candidates who testify to being minority-preferred candidates"). 
148. While courts in the Fifth and First Circuits do not expressly adhere to the Jenkins v. Red Clay School District 
approach, they consider some similar factors such as voting patterns, testimony from the community, and evidence 
of active minority support for a particular candidate. These courts do not state a presumption in favor of the 
minority being the preferred candidate, but they weigh elections with minority candidates more heavily. See First 
Circuit: Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F .  Supp. 2d 29 1 (D. Mass. 2004) (relying on regression analyses of 
minority voting patterns to identify the minority-preferred candidate): cf City of Holyoke Litig. ,  (MA), discussion 
at 72 F.3d 973, 988 ( 1 st Cir. 1995) (considering only elections in which Hispanic candidates ran for office); Fifth 
Circuit: LULAC v. Roscoe Indep. Sch Dist. Litig. (TX). discussion at 123 F.3d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1 997) (relying 
on testimony from minority residents); LULAC v. Roscoe Indep. Sch Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at Civ. A. No. 1 :94-
CV- 104-C, 1996 WL 453584, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 1 4, 1996) (listing election results and political activism in 
favor of a particular candidate as potential indicators that the candidate was preferred by the minority community);  
City of Dallas Litig. ,  discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 1 393, 1395 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) (suggesting that voting 
patterns and witness testimony can help identify the minority-preferred candidate); Cf LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. Litig., discussion at 903 F. Supp. 1071 ,  1092 (W.D. Tex. 1 995) (explaining decision to discount results of 
Anglo v. Anglo races on the grounds that "such elections fail to provide minority voters with the choice of a 
minority candidate").  
The Seventl1 Circuit typically does not engage in any such inquiry analysis to identify the minority­
preferred candidate. Rather Seventh Circuit courts typically assume that the minority candidate is the minority­
preferred candidate. See, e.g., Campuzano Litig., discussion at 200 F. Supp 2d 905. 9 14 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding 
that districts with between 50 and 60 percent minority voting age population are likely to perform for minorities in 
part because "evidence that African-American candidates enjoy greater support than white candidates within a 
district would suggest that the district provides African-Americans with effective opport1mities to elect the 
candidate of their choice"): City of Chicago Litig. (IL), discussion at 1 4 1 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1 998) 
(dismissing arguments that white candidates in some areas with substantial minority populations are responsive to 
minority interests and explaining that "[i]t may be highly regrettable that a candidate's race should matter to the 
electorate: but it does: and the cases interpreting the Voting Rights Act do not allow the courts to ignore that 
preference"); Bradley v. Work Litig. (IN), discussion at 154 F.3d 704, 7 10-1 1 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that it is not 
clear that the third Gingles factor has been met because two black candidates won retention elections, without any 
discussion of whether those candidates were minority-preferred). Those cases that have considered the question, 
however, have relied on objective indicators of voting, even where there are other indicators of lack of access .  See, 
e.g., Williams v. State Bd. of Elections Litig. (IL), discussion at 7 18  F. Supp. 1324, 1 325-26 (7th Cir. 1 989) 
(finding that white candidates that earned a majority of the minority vote were minority-preferred candidates in 
spite of evidence of discrimination in the candidate slating process); see also , City of Chicago Heights Litig.,  
discussion at 824 F. Supp. 786, 791 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding, in multi-member districts, candidates who receive 
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the majority of the vote are not minority-preferred where "other candidates, preferred by a significantly higher 
percentage of the minority community . . .  were defeated in the same election") . 
149. Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 7 1 F.3d 1382 (8th Cir. 1995) .  
150. Clay County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (MO), discussion at 90 F.3d 1 3 57,  1 362 (8th Cir. 1 996); see also City of 
Minneapolis Litig., discussion at No. 02-1 1 3 9(JRT/FLN), 2004 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 1 9708, at *28-32 (D. Minn. 
Sept. 30, 2004) (noting the plaintiffs "did not otherwise explicitly identify candidates of choice or a methodology 
for making such a determination," and therefore because plaintiffs failed to prove who the minority-preferred 
candidate was on an election-by-election basis, the court relied on the defendant 's statistical analysis which 
showed significant white cross-over votes.) 
151. Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065 ( 1 1th Cir. 2002) (treating as minority-preferred candidate the candidate who 
received tl1e majority of minority votes) ;  Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), discussion at 139 F.3d 1414, 14 17-18 ( 1 1th 
Cir. 1998) (considering white-on-white elections where blacks and whites supported different candidates rather 
than looking to subjective indications of minority support); City of Rome Litig. (GA), discussion at 127 F .3d 1355, 
1377, 1379 n.9 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997) (ln1ding that white candidates can be considered minority-preferred based on 
anecdotal evidence, turnout polling data, and campaign appeals, but then assuming, in the absence of other 
information, that any white candidate receiving nearly as much of the vote as a black candidate is minority­
preferred). 
152. Fourth Circuit: Alamance County Litig. (SC), discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 6 14 (4th Cir. 1996) (presuming 
minorities to be minority-preferred candidates, looking only at election returns and requiring an "individualized 
assessment" of all candidates who "receive less than 50% of the minority vote, but who would have been elected 
had the election been held only among black voters."); Eleventh Circuit: City of Rome Litig. (GA), discussion at 
127 F.3d 1 355, 1 379 n.9 ( 1  lth Cir. 1 997) (requiring typically a subjective assessment of the candidate's support in 
the minority community, and holding that the Circuit will t reat a white candidate as black-preferred if that 
candidate receives nearly as much support from the black community as does a black-preferred black candidate in 
that election, such that, in the absence of other information, support can be measured by the percentage of minority 
vote received). 
153. See First Circuit: City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 988 n. 8 ( 1st Cir. 1995) ("[E]lections in 
which minority candidates run are often especially probative on the issue of racial bloc voting."): Second Circuit: 
The Second Circuit does not explicitly place more weight on elections with minority candidates. See Niagara Falls 
Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1 002, 1018-1 9  (2d. Cir. 1 995) (holding that a white candidate may be minority­
preferred and adopting a race-blind bright line rule for the Second Circuit): Butts v. NYC Litig., discussion at 614 
F. Supp. 1 527, 1 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1 985), rev 'd on other grounds, 779 F.2d 141  (2d Cir. 1985) (considering only 
black-white elections); Third Circuit: Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 128 
(3d Cir. 1 993) (noting that elections involving only white candidates are ''much less probative of racially polarized 
voting" such that plaintiffs need not present evidence on these elections "if they do not believe those elections are 
probative."); Fourth Circuit: In general, the Fourth Circuit does not place more weight on racially contested 
elections. See, e.g., Alamance County Litig. (NC), discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 608, 610  (4th Cir. 1 996) (holding 
that because the minority-preferred candidate may sometimes be a white candidate, district courts in determining 
whether such candidates are "usually" defeated "must consider, at a minimum, a representative cross-section of 
elections, and not merely those in which a minority candidate appeared on the ballot at least where elections in 
which minorities were on the ballot do not constitute a substantial majority of the total number of elections;" not 
deciding if or to what extent white-on-white elections were entitled to less weight: "[i]t seems to us, however, that 
if white-white elections are entitled to less weight, then they are so only on the question of whether racial 
polarization exists, not on the question of whether, because of that polarization, minority-preferred candidates are 
usually defeated."); Fifth Circuit: Gretna Litig. (LA) , discussion at 834 F.2d 496, 503 -04 (5th Cir. 1 987) ("Gingles 
is properly interpreted to hold that the race of the candidate is in general ofless significance than the race of the 
voter-but only within the context of an election that offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority 
candidate . . .  [t]he various Gingles concurring and dissenting opinions do not consider evidence of elections in 
which only whites were candidates. Hence, neither do we."). Although cases immediately following Gretna only 
considered elections in which a viable minority candidate ran, see e.g., Baytown Litig. (TX), discussion at 840 
F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1 988), later Fifth Circuit cases have considered white-on-white elections, though still 
viewing them as less probative. See, e.g . Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig. (MS), discussion at 994 F .2d. 1 143 , 1 149 
(5th Cir. 1 993) (stating that white-white elections will be considered if evidence is presented, but that black-white 
elections are more probative); Sixth Circuit: Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 813  (6th Cir. 1 994) 
(holding the race of the candidate can matter); City of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1515 ,  153 1 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1 988) (giving more weight to elections involving black and white candidates); cf Cousin Litig. (TN), 
discussion at 145 F.3d 8 1 8, 825 (6th Cir. 1 998) (criticizing plaintiffs ' expert analysis because it excluded white-
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on-white elections); Seventh Circuit: City of Indianapolis Litig. (IN), 976 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no 
racial bloc voting where black Republicans are elected because it will not "disregard the race of the victors" but 
acknowledging that the minority community may prefer another candidate); Eighth Circuit: Texarkana Litig.,  861 
F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (finding racially polarized voting without examining elections involving only 
white candidates because neither side presented this evidence); Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F. Supp. 196, 209 
(E.D. Ark. 1989) ("Where two white candidates are running, for example, black voters can hold the balance of 
power. We do not wish to minimize this aspect of political reality, but we do not believe it has sufficient weight to 
negate the clear proof of polarization . . . .  White voters, in short, can elect white candidates against black opposition, 
but black voters cannot elect black candidates against white opposition, with insignificant exceptions."); Smith­
Crittenden County Litig.,  687 F. Supp. 1 3 10  (E.D. Ark. 1 988) (considering that minority candidates lose even if 
white minority-preferred candidates win evidence of racially polarized voting); Ninth Circuit: Old Person Litig. 
(MT), discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 13 ,  1 127 ( 9th Cir. 2000) ("contests between white and Indian ca,ndidates . . .  are 
most probative of white bloc voting."): Santa Maria Litig., discussion at 160 F.3d 543, 553 ( 9th Cir. 1 998) 
(''minority vs. non-minority election is more probative of racially polarized voting than a non-minority vs. non­
minority election"); Tenth Circuit: Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO). discussion at 97 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 ( 10th Cir. 
1 996) (adopting Jenkins v. Red Clay School District methodology); Sanchez-Bond Litig. (CO), discussion at 875 
F.2d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1 989) (holding the minority-preferred candidate does not have to be a minority and 
elections with only white candidates should be given "such weight as the circumstances warrant"); Eleventh 
Circuit: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Litig. (AL), discussion at 56 F.3d 128 1 ,  1293 (1 1th Cir. 1 995) 
(upholding district court decision to consider elections generally, but giving greater weight to white-on-black 
elections, as a "searching and meaningful evaluation of all the relevant evidence"); see also Hamrick Litig. 
(GA), discussion at 296 F.3d 1 065, 1076, 1078 ( 1 1th Cir. 2002) (finding that district courts may, but are not 
required to, give additional weight to elections involving minority candidates and upholding the decision of a 
district court assigning equal weight to elections involving minority candidates where all such elections involved 
two minority candidates running against each other). 
154. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig. ,  discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291,  304 (D. Mass. 2004) ("fTlhe choice 
presented to minority voters in an election contested only by two white candidates is somewhat akin to offering ice 
cream to the public in any flavor, as long as it is pistachio."); City of Chicago Litig. (IL), discussion at 141  F.3d 
699, 703 (7th Cir. 1 998) (recognizing that white aldermen may be responsive to blacks, but asserting that "blacks 
would prefer to elect black aldermen"); Metro Dade County Litig .. discussion at 805 F. Supp. 967, 984 (S.D. Fla. 
1 992) (finding that "when elections do not include minority candidates, some Non-Black candidates will receive 
more of the Black vote than other candidates. but this does not automatically make that candidate the minority­
preferred candidate" and analogizing this "strained choice" to "Henry Ford's statement that 'any customer can 
have a car painted any color he wants so long as it is Black."'); City of Dallas Litig .. discussion at 734 F. Supp. 
1 3 17, 1 388 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) ("fWlhen there are only white candidates to choose from, it is virtually unavoidable 
that certain white candidates would be supported by a large percentage of . . .  black voters" (internal citations 
omitted)): cf Old Person Litig. (MT), discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 13 ,  1 126 (9th Cir. 2000) (in a claim brought by 
Native Americans, excluding evidence of white-on-white elections where the minority-preferred candidate was the 
same as the white preferred candidate because those elections did not "touch[] on issues of heightened concern to 
the [minority] community"). 
155. See LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig.,  discussion at 903 F. Supp. 107 1,  1092 (W.D. Tex. 1 995) (noting that 
races that include a minority candidate "provide the most direct test of the hypothesis that race is a factor in the 
election system under scrutiny"); City of Columbia Litig.,  discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 416 (D.S.C. 1993) ( "If 
the whites who finished first among blacks are. however, considered the blacks ' candidates of choice, then blacks ' 
candidates of choice have not usually been defeated. Indeed, their choices in at-large contests have been elected 
three out of three times for mayor and four of eight times for the at-large seats. Thus, whether blacks ' candidates 
of choice have usually been defeated depends upon whether the white candidates count as 'candidates of 
choice. '"); Jeffers Litig., 730 F .  Supp. 1 96 (E.D. Ark. 1 989) (considering that in all white elections the African­
American vote holds the balance of power, but finding polarization because minority candidates regularly lose); 
Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1 3 10  (E.D. Ark. 1988) (finding racially polarized voting because 
while the minority-preferred candidate sometimes won in all-white elections, s/he never won when the candidate 
was a minority). 
156. See Smith-Crittenden County Litig., discussion at 687 F. Supp. 1 3 10, 13 16,  13 17 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (finding where 
no black candidate had ever been elected, in spite of nine recent candidacies supported by an average of 89% of 
the black vote, that ''there is evidence that white candidates preferred by black voters sometimes win in elections 
involving only w bites. The evidence of polarized voting in State Representative elections involving blacks and 
whites is so strong, however, that it cannot be overcome even when all reasonable inferences are accorded to the 
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evidence of elections involving only white candidates."); City of LaGrange Litig. ,  969 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. 
Ga. 1 997) (only one black has won a contested election when not running as an incumbent, but the candidate 
receiving the majority of the minority vote was elected in 6 of the last 1 0  elections.) ;  Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281 ( 1 1th Cir. 1995) (finding that most blacks vote for the wimung 
candidate in over 75% of elections, but black candidates rarely win); City of Starke Litig.,  discussion at 7 1 2  F. 
Supp. 1 523 , 1 530 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (finding racial bloc voting in black-on-white elections even though the 
candidate receiving the majority of the black vote won 78% of the time); City of Columbia Litig., discussion at 
850 F. Supp. 404, 416 (D.S.C. 1 993) ("If the whites who finished first among blacks are, however, considered the 
blacks ' candidates of choice, then blacks ' candidates of choice have not usually been defeated. Indeed, their 
choices in at-large contests have been elected three out of three times for mayor and four of eight times for the at­
large seats. Thus, whether blacks ' candidates of choice have usually been defeated depends upon whether the 
white candidates count as 'candidates of choice.' "): Nipper Litig., discussion at 795 F. Supp. 1525, 1 534, 1 548 
(M.D. Fla. 1 992) (All six black candidates have lost, but blacks vote for the winner 68% of the time.) ;  Jeffers 
Litig. ,  730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (considering that in all white elections the African-American vote holds 
the balance of power, but finding polarization because nrinority candidates regularly lose) .  
1 57. See, e.g ., Perry Litig, discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 ,  478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (highlighting evidence gleaned from 
primary elections where minority voters "allegiance is free of party affiliation"); Black Political Task Force Litig.,  
discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 ,  305 -06 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that general elections in Boston are not helpful 
to the racially polarized voting analysis because the vast majority of voters vote Democratic); Anthony Litig., 3 5  
F.  Supp. 2 d  989 (E.D. Mich. 1 999); Cousin Litig. (TN), 145 F.3d 8 18 (6th Cir. 1998): LULAC v .  Clements Litig. 
(TX), discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  884 (5th Cir. 1 993) (relying on evidence from the Democratic primary, "where 
party affiliation plays no part," to refute plaintiff's claim that racially motivated voting accounted for black 
Democrats ' failure to achieve the electoral success of their white counterparts); Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 
380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); City of Starke Litig., discussion at 712 F. Supp. 1523, 1 534 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (discrediting 
testimony from defendant 's expert because he failed to consider a number of primary elections in a "heavily 
Democratic community" where "it would be expected that in general elections both white and black voters would 
register as Democrats and would generally vote for the same Democratic candidate") ; County of Big Hom Litig., 
discussion at 647 F.  Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986). 
1 58. See, e.g, City of Starke Litig., 7 12 F. Supp. 1 523 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 
2d 291 ,  305-06 (D. Mass. 2004). 
1 59. See Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002, 1019  (2d Cir. 1 995) ('When a candidate receives 
support from 50% or more of nrinority voters in the general election, a court need not treat the candidate as 
minority-preferred when another candidate receiving greater support in the primary failed to reach the general 
election."); see also Nash Litig., 797 F. Supp. 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1 992). But see Alamance County Litig. (NC), 
discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 6 16 (4th Cir. 1 996) ( "The statute thus requires that nrinorities have an equal opportunity 
to participate not only in primary elections but also in general elections. From this, we believe it follows that the 
results in these two phases of the single election cycle must be separately considered and analyzed, and, in 
recognition of this statutory requirement, that Gingles ' third precondition can be satisfied by proof that, in either 
the primary or the general election, the minority-preferred candidate is usually defeated by white bloc voting. Not 
to separately consider primary and general elections risks masking regular defeat in one of these phases with 
repeated successes in the other, and thereby nrisperceiving a process that is palpably in violation of t:re Voting 
Rights Act, as not violative of the Act at all."). 
160. See, e.� ., Black Political Task Force Litig., discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 305-06 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(discounting evidence of white support for a minority candidate in the general election because the candidate 
represented the dominant political party in the area): Garza v. Los Angeles Litig. (CA), 918  F.2d 763 ( 9th Cir. 
1 990) (excluding Republican Primary results because all Hispanic candidates who had won in the district did so 
running as Democrats). This approach attempts to address the same concerns that the courts address in liniting 
consideration of white-on-white elections in single party districts. See supra note 156 (discussing the impact of 
giving equal weight to white-on-white elections). 
161 . Black Political Task Force Litig.,  300 F. Supp. 2d 291 ,  306 (D. Mass. 2004) . 
162. See supra note 9 1 ;  see also City of Baytown Litig. (TX), discussion at 840 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1 988) 
(concluding that, where two nrinorities make up the minority group, "the proper standard is the same as Gingles: 
whether the minority group together votes in a cohesive manner for the nrinority candidate."); France Litig. ,  
discussion at 71  F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999) (finding political cohesion among black and Latino voters 
despite testimony from plaintiffs' e"-'})ert witness that black and Latino voters were "more likely than not to support 
different candidates in primary elections"); Hardee County Litig. (FL), discussion at 906 F.2d 524, 526-27 (1 1th 
Cir. 1 990) (assuming a coalition claim could have passed Gingles II if the plaintiffs had proven that black and 
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Hispanic voters in Hardee County were politically cohesive, but concluding that " [ o ]ur review of the record shows 
that the class offered little evidence that blacks and hispanics in Hardee County worked together and formed 
political coalitions'); Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d .f51,  478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ( "Here, there is no 
serious dispute but that Blacks and Hispanics do not vote cohesively in primary elections, where their allegiance is 
free of party affiliation."); Pomona Litig. (CA). discussion at 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1 989) (considering 
the Hispanics and blacks voted differently in the primaries and finding no political cohesion) ; but see Kent County 
Litig. (MI), discussion at 76 F.3d 1381 ,  1 3 86 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
163. See Rodriguez Litig. ,  discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 379, 389, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (primaries more probative in 
determining black/Latino cohesiveness since members of both groups generally vote for Democrats) ; County of 
Big Horn Litig.,  647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986) (refusing to consider defendant 's argument that it was party, 
not race because defendant did not evaluate the primary elections where party would not be an issue); see also 
Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  478 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Page Litig., discussion at 144 F. Supp. 2d 
346 (D.N.J. 200 1 )  (considering only Democratic primaries in determining racial bloc voting). 
164. City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), discussion at 160 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 1 998) ("[w]hether minority voters 
mobilized to support a white candidate, a factor considered relevant by the Third Circuit only indicates how those 
minorities willing to become politically active feel about a candidate; not all minorities may have the time or 
inclination to take such steps, even though they support that candidate. A bright-line rule, on the other hand, is 
based on the premise 'that the ballot box provides the best and most objective proxy for determining who 
constitutes a representative of choice. '  " (citations omitted)) ;  Nash Litig., discussion at 797 F. Supp. 1488, 1 503 
n.29 (W.D. Mo. 1 992) (considering primary elections but noting "[t]here was some testimony to the effect that 
black voters, given a choice, would vote only for black candidates, and that a white candidate receiving a majority 
of the black vote was probably not a 'true ' preference. There was also testimony indicating that if a white person 
received a majority of the black vote, any black candidates probably were not viable candidates .  We refuse to 
impart these individual witnesses' views to black citizens as a whole. Absent some indication that a particular 
white candidate was truly not preferred despite receiving over 65% of the black vote, or that a particular black 
candidate was not viable, we will not assume that the voters in a particular political contest would have voted for 
someone other than the pers.on they voted for. nor will we assume that a white candidate receiving over 65% of the 
black vote was not preferred by the minority voters."). 
165. City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1 355, 1 378-79 ( 1 1th Cir. 1997) (following De Grana'.v reasoning that the 
Voting Rights Act does not exempt minority candidates from the requirement to "pull, haul, and trade" because if 
black preferred candidates must represent the needs of the black community "without regard for the white 
community, the white community is quite naturally going to vote against the black preferred candidates almost 
every time"); Alamance County Litig. (NC), discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 615, (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the 
proposition that the success of a minority-preferred candidate in a general election is entitled to less weight when a 
candidate with significantly more minority support was defeated in the primary, the court stated: "Such a view is 
grounded in the belief that minority voters essentially take their marbles and go home whenever the candidate 
whom they prefer most in the primary does not prevail, a belief about minority voters that we do not share. And 
such a view ignores altogether the possibility that primary election winners will become the minority's preferred 
candidate during the general election campaign, or tliat where, as here, the overwhelming majority of blacks vote 
in the Democratic primary, that a Republican could in fact become the black-preferred candidate in the general 
election by addressing himself to issues of interest to the minority community in a way that appeals to them as 
participants in the political process.") . 
166. 478 U.S .  30,  64 ( 1986) . 
167. Id. at 100 ( "Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority group . . .  was rejected by white voters for reasons 
other than those which made the candidate the preferred choice of the minority group wo uld seem clearly relevant 
in answering the question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates.") . 
168. See, e.g., First Circuit: City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 983 ( 1st Cir. 1 995) (stating that 
satisfying the Gingles factors gives rise to inference of racial animus; if defendants present evidence that facts 
other than race caused the polarization, the court must still "determine whether, based on the totality of the 
circumstances (including the original inference and the factual predicate that undergirds it), the plaintiffs have 
proven that the minority group was denied meaningful access to the political system on account of race.");.cf City 
of Holyoke Litig. ,  discussion at 960 F. Supp. 5 15, 52 1-25 (D. Mass. 1997) (Upon remand, the district court 
pursued its causation inquiry under the third prong of Gingles rather than under the totality of the circumstances 
analysis.): Second Circuit: Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 180 F.3d 476, 493 (2d. Cir. 1 999) ('We 
think the best reading of the several opinions in Gingles . . .  is one that treats causation as irrelevant in the inquiry 
into the three Gingles preconditions . . .  but relevant in tlie totality of circumstances inquiry") ;  see also Rodriguez 
Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowledging that Town of Hempstead controls 
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but warning that, in the context of such a rule, relaxing the first Gingles precondition may cause the third 
precondition to be "effectively eviscerated"); Fourth Circuit: Charleston County Litig. (SC), discussion at 365 
F.3d 3 4 1 ,  348-49 ( 4th Cir. 2004) ("Legally significant" white bloc voting thus refers to the frequency with which, 
and not the reason why, whites vote cohesively for candidates who are not backed by minority voters." but "the 
reason for polarized voting is a critical factor in the totality analysis"); Alamance County Litig. (NC), discussion at 
99 F.3d 600, 604 (4th Cir. 1 996) ("[T]he best reading of the several opinions in Gingles . .  . is one that treats 
causation as irrelevant in the inquiry into the three Gingles preconditions . . .  but relevant in the totality of the 
circumstances inquiry."); Fifth Circuit: Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) 
(requiring demonstration of causation in minority political cohesiveness inquiry);  Attala County Litig. (MS), 
discussion at 92 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1 996) (considering causation as part of Gingles, but holding that the 
district court erred in placing the burden of disproving that factors other than race caused the polarization); 
LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1 993) (requiring consideration of causation under the 
third Gingles precondition): Sixth Circuit: The Sixth Circuit has never squarely addressed causation on the circuit 
level, but has affirmed a district court case that found a lack of racial bloc voting in part on causation grounds 
without addressing the causation argument. See Mallory-Hamilton County Litig., 3 8  F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D. Ohio 
1 997) ("In this case, numerous factors, other than race, explain losses at the polls by particular 
minority candidates . . .  Two factors in particular, "partisanship'' and "incumbency," accurately explain electoral 
outcomes in numerous judicial elections involving African-American candidates.") ajf'd at 173 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 
1 999); see also Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 8 1 3  n2. (6th Cir. 1 994) ( "Given [the lack of 
white bloc voting in this case], we need not consider whether a showing that the minority-preferred candidates" 
lack of success is "somehow tied to race," .. .is a prerequisite to a finding of"legally significant white bloc voting." 
(citations omitted to LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  850-63 (5th Cir. 1 993) and Gingles, 478 U.S .  at 56)) ;  
Seventh Circuit: Milwaukee NAACP Litig. (WI), discussion at 1 16 F.3d 1 194, 1 1 99 (7th Cir. 1 997) (holding that 
"a district judge . . .  should not assign to plaintiffs the burden of showing why the candidates preferred by black 
voters lost; it is enough to soow that they lost, if white voters disapproved these candidates en masse" but that it 
was proper for the district court to consider non-racial explanations for election outcomes though "it would be best 
for district judges to postpone this kind of inquiry to their consideration of the totality of the circumstances"); City 
of lndianapolis Litig. (lL), discussion at 976 F.2d 357, 36 1 (7th Cir. 1 992) (stating that the victory of black 
Republicans in "Marion County illustrates Justice White's observation, 478 U . S. at 83, that losses by the 
candidates black voters prefer may have more to do with politics than with race."); Eighth Circuit: While the 
Eighth Circuit has never held that causation should be a part of the analysis and even defined racially polarized 
voting in terms of correlation, see, e.g., Little Rock Litig. (AR), discussion at 56 F.3d 904, 9 10 ( 8th Cir. 1 995) 
(rejecting Section 2 claim based on totality review while noting that "racially polarized voting is without doubt 
present to a degree," that the presence of"a high correlation between the number of voters in a precinct and the 
number of votes cast for African-American candidates" while citing "some decisive cross-over voting of whites 
for African-American candidates"), district courts have considered causation. See, e.g , Bone Shirt Litig. ,  
discussion at  3 36 F.  Supp. 2d 976, 1 008 (D.S .D. 2004) ("While causation may be relevant to the totality-of­
circumstances review, it is not relevant in the inquiry into the three Gingles factors"); Democratic Party of 
Arkansas Litig., discussion at 686 F. Supp. 1 365) (considering whether low voter turnout is why the candidates 
lost); Smith-Crittenden County, 687 F. Supp. 13 10 (E.D. Ark. 1 988) (calling the materiality of evidence regarding 
other reasons voters may have voted as they did, specifically incumbency, "questionable"); cf Texarkana Litig., 
86 1 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (refusing to consider defendant 's causation argument because no evidence was 
presented on point); Tenth Circuit: Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO), discussion at 97 F.3d 1 303, 1 307-08 ( 1 0th Cir. 
1 996) ("[A ]t the threshold, we are simply looking for proof of the correlation between the race of the voter and the 
defeat of the minority's preferred candidate. We do not, therefore, reject multivariate regression analysis but prefer 
to resetVe its use, if at all, to the more global picture plaintiffs must establish."); Sanchez-Bond Litig. (CO), 
discussion at 875 F.2d 1 488, 1493 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 989) ("we agree with appellants that a court may not explain away 
evidence of racial bloc voting by finding that such voting is caused by underlying differences between the minority 
and white population. The reasons why minority voters may vote alike is unimportant in determining whether in 
fact the minority group votes as a bloc. Racially polarized voting, which indicates political cohesion, exists when 
there is a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes or, in other 
words, where minority voters and white voters vote differently"); see also Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 
306 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 16, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 2004) (noting in the totality of the circumstances review of racial 
polarization that "No witness testified as to how he or she voted or why, not a single witness testified that he or 
she did not participate in the electoral process due to a perception of futility based upon ethnic discrimination. To 
the contrary and without exception, Hispanic witnesses demonstrated their extensive knowledge about and active 
participation in the political process in Alamosa County. In discussing election outcomes, they assessed the effect 
72 Documenting Discrimination 
of incumbency, candidate qualifications and election strategy.") :  Eleventh Circuit: Southern Christian Leadership 
Litig. (AL), discussion at 56 F.3d 1281. 1293 -94 ( 1 1th Cir. 1995) (finding ample evidence "that factors other than 
race, such as party politics and availability of qualified candidates, were driving the election results and that 
racially polarized voting did not leave minorities with 'less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."'). But cf City of Rome Litig. 
(GA), 127 F .3d 1355 (1 1th Cir. 1 997) (adopting verbatim district court's finding that ( 1 )  plaintiffs need not "prove 
racism determines the voting choices of the white electorate in order to succeed in a voting right cases" and that 
(2) it was nevertheless "necessary to evaluate the level of racism in the electorate in the instant case" to gauge the 
relevance of appointment and incumbency was to minority electoral success). 
169. Third Circuit: Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 124 n. 1 9  (3d Cir 1 993) (finding no 
need to reach the "difficult question of what evidentiary weight, if any, should be given the election of minority 
candidates who are not the minority voters ' candidate of choice" while noting division on this issue in LULAC v. 
Clements); D. C. Circuit: In the two published cases from the District o f  Columbia, the plaintiffs failed to allege 
racial bloc voting, and thus the court did not confront this issue. Kingman Park Litig., discussion at 348 F.3d 1033, 
1042 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Howard Litig., Civ.A. No. 93-900 SSH, 1994 WL 1 182 1 1  (D.D.C. Mar. 3L 1994). 
170. See Blaine County Litig. (MT), discussion at 363 F.3d 897, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that 
plaintiffs must show racial bias among the white bloc suggesting such a requirement "would be divisive and would 
place an impossible burden on the plaintiffs"); see also City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA). discussion at 160 F.3d 
543, 558 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting that plaintiffs must prove an intent to moot pending litigation when excluding a 
minority candidate victory under the "special circumstances" doctrine because of the pending litigation). But see 
Brief for the United States in Opposition to Cert., Blaine County v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1 824 (2005) No. 01 -
356 1 1 ,  2005 WL 562201 (Feb. 9, 2005) (characterizing Ninth Circuit's decision in  Blaine County as  applying 
well-established rule that Section 2 does not require a showing of racial animus, and arguing that Blaine County 
raises no conflict with either LUL4C v. Clements or Nipper). 
171 . See LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (''Unless the tendency among 
minorities and whites to support different candidates, and the accompanying losses by minority groups at the polls. 
are somehow tied to race . . .  plaintiffs ' attempt to establish legally significant white bloc voting, and thus their vote 
dilution claim under § 2, must fail."). 
172. See, e.g., Nipper Litig. (FL), discussion at 39 F.3d 1494, 1525 ( 1  lth Cir. 1 994); City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), 
discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1 995) (noting that Gingles preconditions "rise to an inference that racial 
bias is operating through the medium of the targeted electoral structure to impair minority political 
opportunities.") . 
173. City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 983 ( 1 st Cir. 1 995). See also Nipper Litig. (FL), 
discussion at 39 F.3d 1494, 15 14- 15  (1 1th Cir. 1994) (noting that "the existence of [the Gingles] factors, and a 
feasible remedy, generally will be sufficient to warrant relief') . 
174. Compare, for example, City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 983 ( 1 st Cir. 1 995) (examining 
causation in the totality of circumstances of review and stating that plaintiffs need not "affirmatively . . .  disprove 
every other possible explanation for racially polarized voting") with Attala County Litig.,  (MS) discussion at 92 
F.3d 283, 290 ( 5th Cir. 1996) (considering causation as part of Gingles, but holding that the district court erred in 
placing the burden of disproving that factors other than race caused the polarization). 
175. See, e.g., Mallory-Ohio Litig., discussion at 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 539, 575-76 (S.D. Ohio 1 997) ( "In this case. 
numerous factors, other than race, explain losses at the polls by particular minority candidates . . . .  Two factors in 
particular, 'partisanship' and 'incumbency, '  accurately explain electoral outcomes in numerous judicial elections 
involving African-American candidates."); City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 983 ( 1 st Cir. 
1 995) ( "[O]nce the defendant proffers enough evidence to raise a legitimate question in regard to whether 
nonracial factors adequately explain racial voting patterns, the ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that the 
voting patters were engendered by race rests with the plaintiffs."). But see Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 
discussion at 687 F. Supp. 13 10, 13 17 (E.D. Ark. 1 988) ( "The defendants have offered evidence ofother reasons. 
such as incumbency, for the choices made by voters in the district. The materiality of this evidence is questionable. 
In any event, we assume for present purposes that this evidence may have some bearing on whether the particular 
election results on which we focus stem from the multimember structure of the district. We find this evidence 
insufficient to compel a different result in this case, given the sharp polarization in races involving black 
candidates for State Representative." (citation omitted) ) .  
176. See e.g., First Circuit: City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F .  Supp. 5 1 5  (D. Mass. 1 997); Second Circuit: Town of 
Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 180 F.3d 476, 493 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that causation was appropriately 
considered in the totality of the circumstances); Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 814  F.  Supp. 843, 88 1-84 
(E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (considering causation as part of the third Gingles precondition and finding that party not race 
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explained the voting polarization). Plaintiffs in the Second Circuit have not clearly lost on causation since the 
Town of Hempstead litigation. 1 80 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1 999). Fourth Circuit: City of Columbia Litig.,  discussion at 
850 F. Supp. 404, 418, 420 (D.S.C. 1 993) (not explicitly mentioning causation but concluding that plaintiffs' 
evidence was "simply not sufficient to overcome the evidence that the blacks who lost owe their losses as much to 
blacks ' failure to vote more cohesively or to tum out at all as to failure to achieve white support"); Fifth Circuit: 
Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  478 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (concluding that minority groups are not 
politically cohesive because they "do not vote cohesively in primary elections, where their allegiance is free of 
party affiliation"): Bexar County Litig.,  385  F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 2004) (requiring more than mere correlation 
between minority electoral success and a minimum threshold of minority voter registration); City of Cleveland 
Litig., discussion at 297 F. Supp. 2d 901 ,  907 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (finding where plaintiffs relied on the defeat of 
three minority candidates that t11ey were defeated "not only due to any white bloc voting that may have taken 
place, but also because they failed to receive sufficient support in the majority-minority wards" and concluding 
that they had failed to satisfy the third Gingles precondition) ; NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), discussion at 252 
F.3d 361 ,  370-7 1  ( 5th Cir. 2001) (where plaintiffs established racial bloc voting and all three Gingles factors but 
lost on minority electoral success, finding that the case came down to whether the election of two African­
American supreme court justices could be explained by special circumstances): Sixth Circuit: Mallory-Ohio 
Litig., discussion at 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 539 (S.D. Ohio 1 997) ( "The 'clear partisan patterns ' reflected in Dr. 
King's Report suggest that party affiliation is a, if not the, predominant factor in Ohio judicial elections."); 
Seventh Circuit: Bandemer Litig.,  discussion at 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1489-90 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (finding that 
minorities in Indiana vote as a bloc for the Democrat candidate and that therefore "the voting efficacy of 
[minorities] was impinged upon because of their politics and not because of their race."); Tenth Circuit: Alamosa 
County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 2004) ("The anecdotal evidence does 
nothing to buttress the statistical conclusions as to polarization. No witness testified as to how he or she voted or 
why, not a single witness testified that he or she did not participate in tl1e electoral process due to a perception of 
futility based upon ethnic discrimination."); Eleventh Circuit: Hanirick Litig. (GA) , discussion at 296 F.3d 1065, 
1078 ( 1 1th Cir. 2002); City of Rome Litig. (GA) , discussion at 127 F.3d 1355, 1083 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Southern 
Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), discussion at 56 F.3d 1281 ,  1293-94 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995); Nipper Litig. (FL), 39  
F.3d 1494 ( 1 1t11 Cir. 1 994); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), discussion at 899 F.2d 1012 (1 1th Cir. 1 990). 
177. But see Charleston County Litig., discussion at 365 F.3d 3 4 1 ,  3 53 ( 4th Cir. 2004) (holding that it was not clearly 
erroneous for the district court to conclude that "even controlling for partisanship in Council elections, race still 
appears to play a role in the voting patterns of white and minority voters in Charleston County."); Town of 
Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 495-96 (2d. Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendants' argument that 
minority-preferred candidates were defeated because of party not race, and finding tliat, even if minorities were 
Republicans , they would not have been able to elect their candidates of choice because of the unique slating 
process oft11e town's Republican Party, which effectively excluded minorities). 
178. See, e.g., Cano Litig., discussion at 2 1 1  F. Supp. 2d 1 208, 1235-42 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Aldasoro v. Kennerson 
Litig., discussion at 922 F. Supp. 339, 343 -63 (S.D. Cal. 1 995). It remains possible to prove minorities can vote as 
part of the white bloc. See e.g. , Garza v. Los Angeles Litig. (CA), 9 1 8  F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990): Watsonville 
Litig. (CA), 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1 988); Gingles Litig. (NC), discussion at 478 U.S. 30, 57, n.26 (1986) 
(recognizing a list of potential special circumstances, "such as the absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the 
utilization of bullet voting . . .  this list of special circumstances is illustrative, not exclusive"). Under the facts of the 
case, Gingles considered "an election that occurred after the instant lawsuit had been filed-and [held the district 
court] could properly consider to what extent 'the pendency of this very litigation [might have] worked a one-time 
advantage for black candidates in the form of unusual organized political support by white leaders concerned to 
forestall single-member districting. ' " Gingles Litig., discussion at 478 U.S. at 76. 
179. See,  e.g., Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (using incumbency to dismiss the loss of the 
minority-preferred candidate); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. (TX), discussion at 89 F .3d 1205, 1217 ( 5th Cir. 1996) 
(discounting a minority loss because the candidate lost to an incumbent). 
180. See,  e.g., Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that it would be 
possible to find anomalies in most elections and refusing to discount three elections because oflow turnout, a little 
known candidate, and controversy) ;  cf Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 8 14 (6th Cir. 2000) 
("incumbency must play an unusually important role in the election at issue; a contrary rule would confuse the 
ordinary with the special, and thus 'make practically every American election a "special circumstance." ' "); 
Alamance County Litig. (NC), discussion at 99 F.3d 6 00, 6 1 7  (4th Cir. 1 996) (finding since incumbency is very 
common in U.S. elections that it alone cannot be a special circumstance, and if it were used to discount the success 
of minority candidates, it would also have to be used to discount the defeat of minority candidates). 
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181 .  See, e.g, Gingles Litig. (NC), discussion at 478 U.S.  30, 76 ( 1996) . See also, First Circuit Black Political Task 
Force Litig . .  discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 29 L 306 (D. Mass. 2004) (citations omitted) ("Incumbency is a special 
circumstance that must be weighed, sometimes heavily,  in assaying the probative value of election results. 
Consequently, we decline the defendants' invitation to treat this election as disproving the plaintiffs ' allegation 
that legally significant white bloc voting exists in Boston."); Second Circuit: Town of Babylon Litig. ,  discussion at 
914 F. Supp. 843, 879, 88 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996); Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 346, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Fourth Circuit: City of Norfolk Litig. (VA), discussion at 883 F.2d 1232, 1342 (4th Cir. 1989); Fifth 
Circuit: Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 89 F.3d 1205, 1217 (5th Cir. 1996) (discounting a 
minority win because the minority ran against an incumbent and there was "anti-incumbent sentiment"); qf Magnolia 
Bar Ass'n Litig. (MA), 994 F.2d 1 143 (5th Cir. 1 993) (rejecting plaintiffs ' argument that two elections in which 
black candidates were elected Supreme Court justices were attributable to special circumstances because both 
were incumbents: "both of the elections were high profile and involved well-known white candidates" and "neither 
of the two black candidates had been incumbents for very long"); Sixth Circuit: Chattanooga Litig., 722 F. Supp. 
3 80 (E.D. Tenn. 1 989); Eighth Circuit: Little Rock Litig. (AR),, discussion at 56 F.3d 904, 9 1 1  (8th Cir. 1 995); 
Texarkana Litig. ,  861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1 992); Jeffers Litig.,730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1 989); Eleventh 
Circuit: Metro Dade County Litig. (FL), discussion at 985 F.2d 1471 ,  1483 -83 (1 1th Cir. 1993) ; City of LaGrange 
Litig., discussion at 969 F.  Supp. 749, 775 -76 (N.D. Ga. 1 997). 
1 82. Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 8 1 3, 8 14 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding no special circumstance where 
minority candidate who was appointed and subsequently won an election as an incumbent, noting "a contrary 
holding would punish the city for its commendable efforts to increase black representation on the city council by 
means of the appointment process"). See also Second Circuit: Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 346, 
422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that it would be possible to find anomalies in most elections; refusing to discount 
three elections because of low turnout, little known candidate, controversy); Fourth Circuit: Alamance County 
Litig. (NC), discussion at 99 F.3d 600, 6 17 ( 4tl1 Cir. 1 996) ; Seventh Circuit: Milwaukee N.A.A.C.P. Litig. (WI), 
discussion at 1 16 F.3d 1 194, 1 198 -99 (7th Cir. 1 997) (rejecting incumbency as a special circumstance in judicial 
elections when minority judges ran unopposed because "these judges '  color did not lead the voters to tum them 
out"); Eleventh Circuit: City of Rome Litig. (GA), discussion at 127 F.3d 1355, 1382, 1384 n. 18  ( 1 lth Cir. 1 997) 
(finding that incumbency after appointment is relevant only where there is racism in the electorate, presumably 
overcome by the endorsement by white community leaders, because otherwise the advantages of incumbency can be 
overcome through "hard work," at least in communities where it is possible to form biracial coalitions); but see 
Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (allowing consideration of incumbency where the court 
"reflected on the substantial length of [the candidate's] service") . 
183. Old Person Litig. (MT), discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 13 ,  1 122 (9th Cir. 2000). 
184. Gingles Litig. (NC), discussion at 478 U.S .  3 0, 76 ( 1 986). See, e.g., City of Santa Maria (CA), discussion at 160 
F.3d 543, 549-50 ( 9th Cir. 1 998) (discounting the election because "Days before the election, Maldonado told a 
local newspaper that his victory would prove 'Santa Maria is not racist.' "); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), discussion 
at 139 F.3d 14 14, 1417 n.2 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 998); City of LaGrange Litig., discussion at 969 F. Supp. 749, 775 -
76 (N.D. Ga. 1 997); City of indianapolis Litig. (IN), 976 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992); City of Norfolk Litig. 
(VA), discussion at 8 16 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1 987) ( discounting an election where the mayor had for the first 
time supported two black candidates for city council and had made a public statement suggesting their election 
could moot the pending litigation). 
185. See, e.g., Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1033 (D. Colo. 2004); NAACP v. Fordice 
Litig. (MS), discussion at 252 F.3d 361 ,  370 ( 5th Cir. 200 1 ). 
186. See, e.g., Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., discussion at 922 F. Supp. 339, 376 (S.D. Cal. 1995); National City Litig. 
(CA), discussion at 976 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1 992) (refusing to discount these elections because plaintiffs 
had not brought forth evidence regarding other elections); City of Norfolk Litig. (VA), discussion at 816 F.2d 932, 
938 (4th Cir. 1 987) ("If voting patterns show unusual white support for the black candidate . . .  the legal significance 
of his success should be diminished.") .  
187. Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), discussion at 7 1  F.3d 1382, 1 387-88 (8th Cir. 1 995) (excluding elections where 
the minority-preferred candidate won on a plurality because the challenge was to the imposition of a majority vote 
requirement); Little Rock Litig. (AR), discussion at 56 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 1 995); Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. 
(DE), discussion at 4 F.3d 1 103, 1 126 (3d Cir. 1 993) (reversing district court conclusion that special circumstances 
were not at work in the Roberts election because this election involved the largest field of candidates to ever win, 
and Roberts was the only candidate to ever win on a plurality); see also City of Jackson Litig. ,  discussion at 683 F. 
Supp. 1 5 1 5, 1522-3 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1 988) (refusing to consider elections where minority-preferred candidate won a 
plurality when the candidate lost the run-off); Neal Litig., discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 143 1 (E.D. Va. 1 988). 
But see National City Litig., discussion at No. 88-3 0 1-R(M), 1 991 WL 42 1 1 15 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 1991) (finding 
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no special circumstances where there was a plurality victory because there were usually more than two candidates 
for city elections). 
1 88. Jordan Litig., discussion at 604 F. Supp. 807, 813  (N.D. Miss. 1984 ) (concluding that the primary was "atypical" 
because of"a variety of factors, including uncertainty about election dates, the recent realignment of the 
district . . .  the lack of an incumbent" and "a court order allowing Republican voters to participate in the democratic 
primary") .  
1 89. Blytheville Sch. D ist. Litig. (AR), discussion at 71 F.3d 1382, 1387-88 (8th Cir. 1995); cf Clark Litig., discussion 
at 777 F. Supp. 445, 40 (M.D. La. 1 990) (observing that a situation in which a black lawyer was appointed as a 
district judge, then elected without opposition and later reelected without opposition "do[ es] not reveal very much 
about the electorate"). But other courts do consider these elections on the grounds that the candidate would not be 
unopposed if not supported by the white voters. See, e.g., Milwaukee NAACP Litig. (WI), discussion at 1 16 F. 3d 
1 194, 1 199 (7th Cir. 1 997) ( "One good measure of white voters' willingness to support black candidates is the 
failure of white candidates to present themselves for election even when a majority of the electorate is white. 
Potential opponents concede the election only when they face certain defeat. That 6 black candidates ran without 
opposition therefore is highly informative."); Al-Hakim Litig., discussion at 892 F. Supp. 1464, 1 4  75 n. 15 (M.D. 
Fla. 1 995) (considering victories by minority-preferred candidates running unopposed, although recognizing that 
this is a special circumstance under Gingles); Southern Christian Leadership Litig. ,  discussion at 785 F. Supp. 
1469, 1475 (MD. Ala. 1 992); Sanchez-Bond Litig. (CO), discussion at 875 F.2d 1488, 1490-91 ( 1 0th Cir. 1989) 
(finding it not clearly erroneous to consider unopposed candidacies). 
190. Old Person Litig. (MT), discussion at 3 12 F.3d 1036, 1048 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2002) (discounting election where 
minority candidate won a bare majority against a third-party candidate). 
191 . Chattanooga Litig.,  722 F. Supp. 3 80 (E.D. Tem1. 1 989). 
192. Kirksey v. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1 183 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
193. Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142-JAD, 1997 Dist. LEXIS 22087, 1997 WL 3342676 1 (ND. 
Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997). 
194. Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 914 F. Supp. 843, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ('In 1 987, Democrats gained a 
majority of the Town Board for the first time since at least 1967. Shaffer and Bachety testified to the causes 
leading to the defeat of the incumbent Republican Town Supervisor and his two incumbent Republican running 
mates competing for the Town Board seats. A private citizen unhappy with a Board decision affecting his business 
launched a well-financed campaign to defeat the incumbents. The personal popularity of the Democratic candidate 
for County Executive, who won a landslide victory in that election, further aided the Democratic Town Board 
candidates."); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Lltig. (TX), 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court 's 
decision to discount evidence of a black candidate 's loss because he was an incumbent mill1ing during a year marked 
by anti-incumbent sentinlent). 
195. Attala County Litig. (MS), 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996) (criticizing the district court for looking at an election in 
which less than 10% of the total voting population voted for the black candidate as evidence ofcrossover); 
Columbus County Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 101 (E.D.N.C. 199 l) ( "The failure of black voters to 
support the black candidate in the seventeenth election, that of Freeman running for the Board of Education for 
seat 5 in 1 988, can be explained by the fact that Freeman was new to the county and not well known."); but see 
Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that anomalies could be found in 
most elections and rejecting "the plaintiffs' suggestion that we should exclude three of these elections either 
because the candidate was little known, or because there was low turnout, or because controversy touched the 
election"). 
196. Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), 829 F.2d 1547 (1 1th Cir. 1 987); but see Alamosa County Litig., 3 06 F. Supp. 2d 
1016  (D. Colo. 2004). 
197. See e.g., Anthony Litig., discussion at 35 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1 999) ("obtaining name recognition 
and professional success prior to a candidacy are not 'special circumstances' ;  they are ordinary and necessary 
components of a successful candidacy"); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding 
plaintiffs ' attempt to characterize a minority candidate's election due to the candidate's outstanding credentials 
and popularity as special circumstances "absurd") . 
198. See, e.g, Meza Litig. ,  discussion at 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 65 (D. Mass. 2004) ('These elections on their face provide 
evidence of ethnic voting polarization by both Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters in Chelsea. We note that the 
force of this evidence is diminished to some extent because the election results reveal low turnout rates for 
Hispanic voters in these elections."). But see Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D .N.Y. 2004). 
199. See, e.g, City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 5 1 5  (D. Mass. 1997); SW Texas Junior College District Litig., 964 
F.2d 1 542 ( 5th Cir. 1 992); City of Columbia Litig., discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 4 1 8, 420 (D.S .C. 1 993) 
(observing that "the ultimate reason voter cohesion is significant is because it directly bears on the issue of 
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causation" and concluding that plaintiffs' evidence was "simply not sufficient to overcome the evidence that the 
blacks who lost owe their losses as much to blacks ' failure to vote more cohesively or to tum out at all as to failure 
to achieve white support"). 
200. See Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897 ( 9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO), 97 F.3d 1303 (10th 
Cir. 1 996) (considering that low tumout may be probative of"disincentives" for minority candidates to run); 
Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 71 F.3d 1382 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting lower tumout may follow from the 
moving of a polling place in a minority area, a sense of defeat, or the absence of ballot issues that may tumout the 
minority vote): City of Holyoke Litig. (MA), discussion at 72 F.3d 973, 986 (1st Cir. 1 995) (noting that "low 
voter turnout in the minority community sometimes may result from the interaction of the electoral system with 
the effects of past discrimination, which together operate to discourage meaningful elector participation"); 
Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 F.2d 1407 ( 9th Cir. 1988). 
201 .  SENATE REPORT supra note 15, at 27-30 .  
202. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: If = 1 ) .  
203. See id. (filter Column: l e = J).  
204. See, e.g., Montero Litig. (CO), 86 1 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1 988) (finding Section 2 inapplicable to challenge to 
collection of signatures on a petition to make English Colorado 's official language because state action was 
lacking); Democratic Party of Virginia, 323 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. Va. 200..t.) (finding that an African-American 
candidate who failed to become party nominee did not have standing, as a candidate, to challenge party 
nomination process under Section 2): Guy Litig . .  No. Civ.A. 00-83 1 -KAJ. 2003 WL 22005853 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 
2003) (dismissing for failure to satisfy Gingles factors a claim by an African-American candidate. Samuel Guy. 
who had won an at-large city council seat in 1996, then lost in 2000, where another African-American candidate 
had won an at-large seat in 2000 and then gotten reelected). 
205. See supra, Gingles Threshold Section. 
206. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: l f  = J ) .  
207. In California: Pomona Litig . .  883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989) and Aldasoro v.  Kennerson Litig., 922 F. Supp. 339 
(S.D. Cal. 1 995); in Colorado: Alamosa County Litig. ,  306 F.  Supp. 2d 1016 (D .  Colo. 2004); in Florida: Liberty 
County Comm'rs Litig., 221 F.3d 1218 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig., 804 F.2d 6 1 1, 1986 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3 7448 ( 1 1th Cir. 1986); Metro Dade County Litig .. 985 F.2d 147 1  ( 1 1th Cir. 1993);  Nipper Litig., 39  
F.3d 1494 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 994); in Georgia: Carrollton NAACP Litig., 829 F.2d 1 547 (1 1th Cir. 1 987); in  Illinois: 
Jones v. Edgar Litig.,  3 F. Supp. 2d 979 (C.D. Ill. 1 998); City of Chicago-Bonilla Litig. ,  1 4 1  F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 
1 998); City of Chicago Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C 5 1 12,  88 C 9800, 1 997 WL 102543 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1997); 
Rybicki Litig., 574 F. Supp. 1 147 (N.D. Ill. 1983), in Massachusetts: Black Political Task Force Litig . .  300 F. 
Supp. 2d 29 1 (D. Mass. 2004); City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1 997); City of Boston Litig., 
784 F.2d 409 ( 1st Cir. 1986); Meza Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Mass. 2004); in Mississippi: Chickasaw County 
I Litig., 705 F. Supp. 3 15 (N.D. Miss. 1 989) (though Chickasaw County II found this factor met in a later 1 997 
case); Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Armstrong v. Allain Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1320 
(S.D. Miss. 1994); Calhoun County Litig., 88 F.3d 139  (5th Cir. 1996); Lafayette County Litig. ,  20 F. Supp. 2d 
996 (N.D. Miss. 1 998); NAACP v. Fordice Litig., 252 F.3d 3 6 1  (5th Cir. 200 1); in New York: France Litig.,  71 F. 
Supp. 2d 3 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Niagara Falls Litig. ,  65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); in Ohio: Cincinnati Litig., 40 
F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1994); in Tennessee: Wesley Litig., 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986); in Texas: McCarty Litig.,  
749 F.2d 1 134 (5th Cir. 1984); Southwest Tex. Jr. College Dist. Litig., 964 F.2d 1 542 (5th Cir. 1 992); LULAC v. 
Clements Litig.,  999 F.2d 83 1 (5th Cir. 1993); LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 903 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. 
Tex. 1995).  
208. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 1f = 1, and also filter Column: Success = J).  
209. Jefferson Parish I Litig. (LA), 926 F.2d 487 ( 5th Cir. 1991) (not considering evidence of Factor 1 for unclear 
reasons, but finding the policy behind the practice was tenuous, that there had been racially polarized voting in 1 5  
of 20 Parish elections from 1980-88, plaintiffs had shown a lack of candidate success and enhancing practices); 
Cornett Litig. ,  202 F. Supp. 2d 972 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding the plan in place violated 1 -person, 1 -vote and the 
VRA due to the significant census changes that had occurred, the opinion mainly dealt with the remedy); Garza v. 
Los Angeles Litig. (CA), 918 F.2d 763 ( 9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the county board of supervisors had 
intentionally drawn district lines to reduce minority voting power and protect white incumbents in violation of 
Section 2 and so not reaching any of the Senate Factors); Madison County Litig., 6 10 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Miss. 
1 985) (not considering Senate Factors after finding that the county's atbitrary invalidation of 200 ballots cast by 
African-American voters sufficed to establish a violation); Marks-Philadelphia Litig., No. CIV. A. 93-6 1 57, 1 994 
WL 1 46 1 13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1 994); Lawrence County Litig. ,  8 14 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D. Miss. 1993);  Elections 
Board Litig. ,  793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
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210. Watsonville Litig. (CA), 863 F.2d 1 407 (9th Cir. 1 988); Metro Dade County Litig. (FL), 985 F.2d 1471 ( 1 1th Cir. 
1 993): Rybicki Litig., 574 F. Supp. 1 147 (N.D .  Ill. 1 983); City of Chicago Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C 5 1 12, 88 C 
9800, 1 997 WL 102543 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1 997); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 
2004); Chickasaw County I Litig., 705 F. Supp. 3 1 5  (N.D. Miss. 1 989); Monroe County Litig. ,  740 F. Supp. 4 1 7  
(N.D. Miss. 1 990): Calhoun County Litig. (MS), 8 8  F . 3d 1 393 (5th Cir. 1 996): Lafayette County Litig., 20 F. 
Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Miss. 1 998); LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. , 903 F.  Supp. 107 1 (W.D. Tex. 1 995). 
2 1 1 .  See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: lf = 1 and also filter other Senate Factor Columns at the same time). 
212. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1 0 1 3 -34 (D.S.D. 2004); Emison Litig., discussion 
at 782 F. Supp. 427, 439 n. 3 5  & 440 n.3 9  (D. Minn. 1 992); City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 
1320-2 1  (W.D. Tex. 1 990); Chattanooga Litig., discussion at 722 F. Supp. 3 80, 385-89 (E.D. Tenn. 1 989); Neal 
Litig., discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1 428 (E.D. Va. 1 988); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 
13 56-60 (M.D. Ala. 1 986); Gretna Litig., discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 1 3 ,  1 1 1 6 -1 8  (E.D. La. 1 986); Edgefield 
County Litig. , discussion at 650 F .  Supp. 1 176, 1 1 80 -87 (D. S.C. 1 986); Butts v. NYC Litig., discussion at 6 14 F. 
Supp. 1 527, 1 544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), overturned 779 F.2d 1 4 1  (2d Cir. 1 98 5) (also criticizing district court's  
Factor 1 fmding); DeSoto County Litig.,  discussion at  995 F.  Supp. 1440, 1 442 -1450; Major v. Treen, 574 F. 
Supp. 325, 3 39-40 (E.D. La. 1 983). 
213. See, e.g., Hamrick Litig., discussion at No. Civ. 2 : 9 1-CV-002-WCO, 1 998 WL 476 1 86 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 1 998) 
("The 1976 Georgia Constitution still required the completion of a literacy test and good character test as 
prerequisites to registering to vote, even though such barriers were nullified by the Voting Rights Act of 1 965 "), 
overturned on other grounds 296 F.3d 1065, 1 224 ( 1 1th Cir. 2002) (overruling the district court due to lack of 
racially polarized voting and minimizing finding of Factor 1 below, since the history of official discrimination 
shown below "does little to distinguish Gainesville or Georgia from any other Southern state or city"); Mehfoud 
Litig., discussion at 702 F. Supp. 588, 594 (E.D. Va. 1 988) ("state constitutional requirement, in effect until 1 974, 
that all persons registering to vote present proof of literacy"); Gretna Litig.,  636 F. Supp. 1 1 1 3,  1 1 16 (E.D. La. 
1986) ("The historical record of discrimination in the State of Louisiana and the Parish of Jefferson is undeniably 
clear, and the record suggests it has not ended even now. The history of black citizens ' attempts, in Louisiana 
since Reconstruction, to participate effectively in the political process and the white majority 's  resistance to those 
efforts is one characterized by both de jure and de facto discrimination Indeed, it would take a multi-volumed 
treatise to properly describe the persistent, and often violent intimidation visited by white citizens upon black 
efforts to participate in Louisiana' s  political process.") Abilene Litig., 725 F.2d 1 01 7, 1022 (5th Cir. 1 984) (Latino 
city council candidate "encountered hostility and uncooperation from the County Clerk's office in Abilene when 
she attempted to file as a candidate for Justice of the Peace in 1 976 and for County Clerk in 1 978"); Gingles Litig., 
590 F. Supp. 345, 359 (D.N.C. 1 984) ("Following the emancipation of blacks from slavery and the period of post­
war Reconstruction, the State of North Carolina had officially and effectively discriminated against black citizens 
in matters touching their exercise of the voting franchise for a period of around seventy years, roughly two 
generations, from ca. 1 900 to ca. 1 970 . The history of black citizens' attempts since the Reconstruction era to 
participate effectively in the political process and the white majority ' s  resistance to those efforts is a bitter one, 
fraught with racial animosities that linger in diminished but still evident form to the present and that remain 
centered upon the voting strength of black citizens as an identified group.") . 
214. See, e.g., City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749, 757 (N.D. Ga. 1 997) ("Vestiges of segregation remained into 
the 1970s. The black schools during the era of segregation were run down, overcrowded, and only went through 
the eleventh grade. Throughout this time period, the African-American schools enjoyed significantly less resources 
tlmn the schools attended by white students."); City of Springfield Litig., discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 
(C.D. Ill. 1 987) (finding city school district entered into a consent decree in 1 974 to end school desegregation); 
Marengo County Litig., discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1 546 (1 1th Cir. 1 984) ("in 1 978, while this case was being tried, 
the district court characterized the Board of Education as 'obdurately obstinate ' in its opposition to 
desegregation."); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig. ,  640 F. Supp. 1 347, 1 3 5 9-60 (M.D. Ala. 1 986). 
215. See, e.g., City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 3 97, 400 -0 1  (N.D. Miss. 1 984) (Department of Justice objected 
to two annexations in 1 984 as violating the Section 5 preclearance requirement); Quilter Litig., discussion at 794 
F. Supp. 695, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1 992) ("evidence of a history of official discrimination in the State of Ohio and local 
political subdivisions . . . .  includes: a) The 1 9 8 1  apportionment plan was held to unlawfully dilute minority voting 
strength in Armour v. State of Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1 090 ( 1 99 1 ) ;  b) In Mallory v .  Eyrich, 922 F .2d 1 273 (6th 
Cir. 1 99 1), the Governor, Secretary of State, and Members of the Hamilton County Board of Elections conceded 
that the at-large election of Hamilton County Municipal Court Judges unlawfully diluted minority voting strength 
under 82 of the Voting Rights Act; The 1 9 9 1  apportionment plan resulted in only four (4) majority-minority 
districts in Ohio, three (3) of which were in Cuyahoga County"). 
78 Documenting Discrimination 
216. See, e.g., Edgefield County, 650 F. Supp. 1 176, 1 182 (D. S.C. 1 986) (first black poll officials not hired until 1970): 
Harris Litig.,  discussion at 60 1 F. Supp. 70, 72 (M.D. Ala. 1 984) ("The basis for the motion [by Jefferson to make 
the PI not apply to its County] is apparent from the evidence: to avoid the appointment of black poll officials with 
supervisory authority at polling places where the majority of the voters are white. The Jefferson County appointing 
authority maintains that white voters at these polling places will not accept a black supervising poll official.") 
217. Columbus County Litig.,  782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 103 (E.D.N.C. 199l ) (also noting that the county did not begin 
appointing African Americans as special registration commissioners until the 1 980s). 
218. City of Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 F.2d 1017, 1023 ( 5th Cir. 1 984). 
219. City of LaGrange Litig. ,  969 F. Supp. 749, 767 (N.D. Ga. 1 997) (also noting school segregation until 1970). 
220. City of Starke Litig., 712  F. Supp. 1523, 1 537 (M.D. Fla. 1989). 
221 . See tex1 infra; see, e.g. ,  Charleston County Litig., 365 F.3d 3 4 1  (4th Cir. 2004); Rural West II Litig. (TN), 209 
F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), 5 12 U.S .  874 ( 1994); Big Hom County Litig., 647 F. Supp. 
1002 (D. Mont. 1986); Marengo County Litig . .  discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1546, 1567-68 (1 1th Cir. 1984) ('The 
historical record of discrimination in Marengo County is undisputed, and it has not ended even now. The county 
school system remains under judicial supervision . . . .  "); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 152 
(D. Colo. 1 998); Marylanders Litig.,  849 F .  Supp. 1 022 (D. Md. 1 994): City of Starke Litig., 712 F. Supp. 1 523 
(M.D. Fla. 1 989). 
222. Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286 n.23 (D.S.C. 2003); see also id. discussion at 365 
F.3d 341,  353 n.4 ( 4th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's fact findings and finding of a violation). 
223. In Charleston County, the court noted: "[t]he Election Commission pays poll managers to setup the books, operate 
the voting machines and count the votes in polling places on election day." In contrast with poll watchers, who are 
provided by the private political party on election day to observe elections, poll managers are paid county 
employees, assigned by the county to work at particular precincts, for whose actions the county itself has legal 
responsibility. Id. discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d at 286 n.23 .  
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231 .  Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1025 (D. S.D. 2004 ). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 1024-25 . 
239. Id. at 1 024. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 1026. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 1028. 
247. Id. at 1024. 
248. Id. at 1023-24 . 
249. Holder v. Hall Litig., discussion at 955 F.2d 1563, 1 566 (1 1th Cir. 1 992) (later overturned by the Supreme Court 
on the question of whether plaintiffs could challenge single commissioner form of government, but the fact­
finding was not affected). 
250. City of Dallas Litig.,  734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 1324 (N.D. Tex. 1990) . 
251 .  Town of North Johns Litig., 7 1 7 F. Supp. 147 1 ,  1477 (M.D. Ala. 1 989). 
252. Id. 
253. Big Hom County Litig.,  647 F. Supp. 1002, 1 007 (D. Mont. 1986) . 
254. Id. at 1008. 
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255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. ('The court was not persuaded by defendants' explanation that these acts were caused by a shortage of 
registration cards and an increased concern about voter fraud."). 
259. Harris Litig .. discussion at 593 F. Supp. 128, 133 (M.D. Ala. 1984). 
260. Id. 
261 . Harris Litig., discussion at 695 F. Supp. 5 17, 527 & n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ("The defendants' argument that they 
have abandoned their past discriminatory policies and that local rather than state government is responsible for any 
discrimination occurring today, misses the point. The critical question is whether the State of Alabama has 
redressed the present-day effects of its own past discrimination, and the answer is that it has not.") 
262. Id. at 524-2 5 .  
263. Buskey v .  Oliver Litig., discussion at 565 F .  Supp. 1473 , 1483 (M.D. Ala. 1 983). 
264. Id. 
265. Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 349 (N.D. Tex. 1 983). 
266. Id. at 3 4 1 . 
267. Id. 
268. County of Thurston Litig., discussion at 129 F.3d 1015,  1022 (8th Cir. 1 997). 
269. Berks County Litig. ,  discussion at 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  
270. Id. 
271 .  Berks County Litig., discussion at 250 F. Supp. 2d 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2003) .  
272. Id. 277 F. Supp. 2d at 580.  
273. Id. at 577. 
274. 250 F.  Supp. 2d at 529. 
275. 277 F. Supp. 2d at 577. 
276. Id. at 575 -76.  
277. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 162 (D.  Colo. 1998). 
278. Id. 
279. Maiks-Philadelphia Litig., No. CN. A. 93-6157, 1 994 WL 146 1 13,  at * 1 1  (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1 994). 
280. Id. at * 12.  
281 .  Marylanders Litig. ,  849 F. Supp. 1022, 1061 (D. Md. 1 994). 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Jeffers Litig. ,  discussion at 730 F. Supp. 196, 2 10 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
285. Jd. 
286. Id. at 2 1 0  n.8 .  
287. Id. at 2 1 1  (finding that "[t]his kind of intimidation no doubt had a powerful chilling effect") .  
288. Id. at 2 10. 
289. Black Political Taskforce Litig., discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 ,  3 14 (D. Mass. 2004). 
290. Id. at 3 15 .  
291 . City of New Rochelle Litig., discussion at 308 F .  Supp. 2d 152, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
292. Garza v. County of Los Angeles Litig. (CA), discussion at 918  F.2d 763, 766, 768, 772 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
the district court 's  finding of an intent-based Section 2 violation: also deciding that where intentional 
discrimination had occurred there was no need to meet the Thornburg v. Gingles test in the current challenge). 
293. Id. at 769. 
294. Id. at 778-779 (Kozinski, J., concurring on liability question). 
295. Ketchum Litig. (IL), discussion at 740 F.2d 1 398, 1408 (7th Cir. 1984). 
2%. Rybicki Litig. ,  discussion at 574 F. Supp. 1 147, 1 15 1  (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
297. Id. (citing pre-amendment district court opinion in 574 F. Supp. l l  10, 1 1 12 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). 
298. Rural West II Litig., discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1 998). 
299. Rural West I Litig.,  discussion at 835 F. Supp. 453, 460-6 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1 993). 
300. See, e.g. , Hudson County Board Litig.,  discussion at 714 F.  Supp. 714, 715 (D.N.J. 1989). The Hudson County 
Board litigation eventually settled, 949 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1991), after tre last published opinion to make Senate 
Factor findings decided that the county defendant 's insurer would have to pay if the plaintiffs succeeded in 
proving their intent-based Section 2 claim. 714 F. Supp. at 715. In this lawsuit, the court took notice of the alleged 
coordinated effort in 1 985 by the chair of the Hudson County Democratic Party, a campaign consultant, and the 
city Director of Housing and Economic Development, "to undercut Cucci 's [the incumbent 's] strength that would 
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impede or prevent voting in the election districts in neighborhoods that were heavily black or Hispanic." Id. As 
part of this "strategy": 1) letters were sent to residents of public housing projects with significant African­
American and Latino populations informing them ''that unless their names appeared on leases, they would be not 
be permitted to vote and would be prosecuted if they attempted to do so": 2) the placement of five to six thousand 
voter names on the county's official "challenge registry" without notification, and despite the fact that some of 
these people had known good addresses and the "color-coding" of the challenge list; 3)  instructions were given to 
all district board members (who were rnnning the poll operations for the county) to prevent any individual whose 
nan1e was on a challenge list from voting unless the voter produced a current lease (if the voter was a resident in 
public housing), or a phone, gas or electric bill in the voter's name; and 4) the county's "failure to provide 
adequate bilingual assistance both at polling places and at the courthouse for those individuals that attempted to 
obtain court orders permitting them to vote." Id. at 7 16. The plaintiff also alleged that the Democratic Party chair 
had appointed off-duty Jersey City police officers to serve as poll challengers in heavily minority districts. Id. 
301 . Town of Cicero Litig .. No. Civ.A. OOC 1 530, 2000 WL 34342276 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2000) (granting preliminary 
injunction to stop the certification of the referendum results on this question, scheduled to take place 6 days after 
this decision, due to likelihood the United States could prove intent). 
302. Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 & 1360-61 (M.D. Ala. 1 986) (emphasis added) (granting 
preliminary injunction) (this finding was later cited in many other Alabama cases, including Baldwin County Bd. 
of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466-67 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding that ''this court demonstrated in Crenshaw 
County that from the late 1880 's to the present the State of Alabama and its political subdivisions have 'openly and 
unabashedly' discriminated against their black citizens by employing at different times such devices as the poll 
tax, racial gerrymandering, and at-large elections, and by enacting such laws as the anti-single-shot voting laws, 
numbered places laws, and the Sayre law")) . 
303. Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., 650 F. Supp. at 1 357. 
304. Haywood County Litig., discussion at 544 F. Supp. 1 122, 1 13 1  & 1 135 (W.D. Tenn. 1 982) (granting a preliminary 
injunction due to plaintiff's likelihood of succeeding on the merits of Section 2) .  
305. City of Minneapolis Litig.,  No. 02-1 139 (JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 2212044 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2004); Perry Litig.,  
298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004); City of New Rochelle Litig. ,  308 F. Supp. 2d 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ;  Albany 
County Litig., No. 03 -CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003); Hamrick Litig. (GA), 296 F.3d 1065 
( 1 1th Cir. 2002); St. Bernard Parish School Board Litig., No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589 (E.D. La. Aug. 
26, 2002); Old PersonLitig. (MT), 3 12 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), 139  F.3d 1414 
( 1 1th Cir. 1 998); City of Chicago-Barnett Litig. , 17 F.  Supp. 2d 753 (N.D. Ill. 1 998); Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., 
1 16 F.3d 685 (D. Del. 1 997); African-American Voting Rights LDF Litig. ,  994 F. Supp. 1 105 (E.D. Mo. 1 997); 
Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 3342676 1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997); Attala 
County Litig. ,  92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), 89 F.3d 1 205 ( 5th Cir. 1 996); 
U.S.  v. Jones Litig. (AL), 57 F.3d 1020 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 7 1 F.3d 1 3 82 ( 8th Cir. 
1 995) ;  Rural West I Litig. , 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); De Grandy Litig. (FL), 512  U.S.  997 (1994); 
Texarkana Litig., 861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1 992); Rockford Bd. of Educ. Litig. ,  Civ.A. No. 89 C 20 168, 1991 
WL 299 1 04 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12,  199 1); Democratic Party of Arkansas Litig. ,  902 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1990); Holbrook 
Unified Sch. Dist. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 56 (D. Ariz. 1989); Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. Litig., 6 86 F. Supp. 1459 
(M.D. Ala. 1 988); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1 3 1 0  (E.D. Atk 1 988); Baytown Litig. (TX), 
840 F .2d 1 240 ( 5th Cir. 1988); Dallas County Comm'n Litig., 636 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ala. 1 986); Marengo 
County Litig. ,  623 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Ala. 1985); Opelika Litig. (AL), 748 F. 2d 1473 (1 1th Cir. 1 984); Abilene 
Litig. (TX), 725 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1984); El Paso lndep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591  F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1984); 
Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1 984); Dean Litig., 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1 982). 
306. 5 of these 7 were in Section 5-coveredjurisdictions : Edgefield County Litig., 650 F. Supp. 1 176 (D.S.C. 1 986); 
Mehfoud Litig., 702 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Va. 1988); City of Woodville Litig. (MS), 881 F.2d 1327 ( 5th Cir. 1 989); 
Chisom Litig. (LA), 50 1 U.S. 380 (1991) ;  Westwego Litig. (LA), 946 F.2d 1 109 (5th Cir. 1 99 1 ). The other 2 were 
these: Rockford Bd. of Educ. Litig., Civ.A. No. 89 C 20168, 1991 WL 299104 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1991);  
Texarkana Litig.,  861 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Ark. 1 992). 
307. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig., discussion at 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-60 (M.D. Ala. 1986). 
308. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1026 (D.S.D. 2004); Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 1 96,  2 1 0  (E.D. 
Ark. 1 989) (criminal prosecution the sheriff instituted against a black lawyer when ran for office). 
309. Courts identified dozens of expert witnesses by name in their Factor 1 discussions, some of whom were repeat 
players on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant. Exanlples include: Chandler Davidson, Richard Engstrom, Morgan 
Kousser, Peyton McCrary, Raphael Cassimere, Jr., David Sansing, Allan Lichtman, Jerrell Shofner, Dr. Mormino, 
Dr. Hofeller, Philip Hauser, William Rogers, Stephan Thernstrom, Abigail Thernstrom, Dr. Mollenkopf, Lilian 
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Williams. Most experts cited by courts in their Factor 1 discussion were traine d historians, university professors 
with degrees in history or sociology. 
310. Some books included: MORGAN J. Ko US SER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY S OUTH, 1880-19 10. (1974) (cited in Harris V. Graddick Litig., at 695 F. 
Supp. 5 17, 525 n.5 (M.D. Ala. 1 988)), Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brie/History, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 25 n.63 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (cited in 
Marylanders Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1062 (D. Md. 1 994)), ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT ? 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS ( 1987) (cited in Town of Babylon Litig., at 914 F. Supp. 
84 3, 885 n.3 6 (E.D. N. Y. 1 996)). Some cases also cited newspaper documentation of discrimination. See, e.g. , 
Berks County Litig., at 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("Numerous articles have appeared in local 
newspapers outlining Hispanic residents' concerns about equal treatment at the polls."). 
311 .  See, e.g ., Charleston County Litig., 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286 n.23 (D.S.C. 2003) ( "Nettles also provided additional 
uncontradicted testimony about intimidating and harassing conduct by other poll managers aimed at African­
American voters seeking voting assistance . . . .  Conversely, Nettles testified that, based on his observations, white 
voters needing voting assistance at predominantly African-American polling sites were permitted their assistor of 
choice without challenge."); Harris Litig., 695 F. Supp. 5 17, 525 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) ("Witnesses detailed numerous 
instances of where white poll officials refused to help illiterate black voters or refused to allow them to vote, 
where they refused to allow black voters to cast challenged ballots, and where they were simply rude and even 
intimidating toward black voters."); Terrazas Litig., 581  F. Supp. 1329, 1 349-50 (N.D. Tex. 1 984) ("Several 
witnesses, both for the MALDEF Intervenors and the State Defendants, testified that discrimination against 
hispanics has not only occurred in the past, but continues at least in parts of Texas . . . .  Still other witnesses testified 
about the feeling among hispanic candidates and voters in Dallas County that political action is futile." (citation 
omitted)). 
312. See, e.g ., City of Greenwood Litig., discussion at 599 F. Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss. 1 984) (mentioning non­
compliance with the preclearance requirement of Section 5); Town of Babylon Litig.,  discussion at 914 F. Supp. 
843, 886 n.38 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (noting tliat the Town of Babylon was not in a county targeted as a Section 5-
covered jurisdiction, and minimizing the Section 5 coverage of the three New York counties (Bronx, New York 
and Kings) that are covered: defendants' expert "testified that she found no indication that the New York counties 
were targets of the 1970 amendments. In fact, Dr. Thernstrom hypothesized that the extension of Section 5 
coverage to these New York counties may have simply resulted from lack of voter interest in the 1968 presidential 
election.") . 
313. See, e.g., Marengo County Litig., discussion at 7 3 1 F.2d 1 546, 1 568 ( 1  l th Cir. 1984) (citing many recent 
lawsuits). 
314. See, e.g., City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss. 1984) ("[T]he City of Greenwood acted 
contrary to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. . .  by implementing two annexations (in 1 967 and 1979) without 
obtaining preclearance ") . 
315. See, e.g., Mallory-Ohio Litig., at 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 541-42 (S.D. Ohio 1 997) (recounting history of Section 2 
lawsuits in the state of Ohio, as evidence of how much weight to give Factor 1 ). 
316. See, e.g., Clark Litig., discussion at 725 F. Supp. 285, 295 (M.D. La. 1 988) ("[A]dopt[ing] by reference" the 
findings made in Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.La. 1 983)); Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F. Supp. 1 96, 
204 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (takingjudicial notice ofa 1 982 Arkansas decision, and stating " [w]e do not believe that this 
history of discrimination, which affects the exercise of the right to vote in all elections under state law, must be 
proved anew in each case under the Voting Rights Act."). But compare Chickasaw County II, No. CIV.A. 
1 :92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 3342676 1 ,  at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997) (finding Factor 1 and "tak[ing] judicial 
notice of Mississippi 's and Chickasaw County's history of discrimination in the area of voting . . . .  through the use 
of poll takes, literacy tests, good moral tests, and other policies and laws," without requiring plaintiffs to establish 
contemporary political effect) with Chickasaw County I, 705 F. Supp. 3 15, 3 20 (N.D. Miss. 1 989) (finding Factor 
1 not met because plaintiffs had not shown current "political detriment") . 
317. See, e.g ., De Grandy Litig., discussion at 815 F. Supp. 1 550, 1573-74 (N.D. Fla. Jul 17, 1992) (citing both 
English-only legal initiatives and "suspension of a supermarket clerk for speaking Spanish in front of customers 
and the refusal of a personnel agency to refer people with foreign accents to job openings at a Miami bank" as 
relevant to showing a history of official discrimination against Hispanics in Florida). 
318. Armour Litig., discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1991) .  
319. Id. 
320. Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 1 6  (D. Colo. 2004); Black Political Task Force Litig.,  
discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2004); Meza Litig., discussion at 322 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Mass. 
2004); Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Suffolk County Litig., discussion at 
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268 F. Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), discussion at 252 F.3d 361  (5th Cir. 200 1); 
Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), discussion at 22 1 F.3d 1 2 1 8  ( 1 1th Cir. 2000); France Litig., discussion at 71 
F. Supp. 2d 3 17 (S.D .N.Y. 1 999); Belle Glade Litig., discussion at 178 F.3d 1 175 (1 1th Cir. 1 999); City of 
Chicago-Bonilla Litig. (IL), discussion at 1 4 1 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1 998); Jones v. Edgar Litig., discussion at 3 F. 
Supp. 2d 979 (C.D. Ill. 1 998); Lafayette County Litig., discussion at 20 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Miss. 1998); City 
of Chicago Heights Litig., discussion at Nos. 87 C 5 1 12, 88 C 9800, 1 997 WL 102543 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1997); 
Milwaukee NAACP Litig. (WI), discussion at 1 16 F. 3d 1 194 (7th Cir. 1997); City of Holyoke Litig.,  discussion at 
960 F. Supp. 5 1 5  (D.  Mass. 1997); Milwaukee NAACP Litig. (WI), discussion at 1 16 F. 3d 1 194 ( 7th Cir. 1997); 
Kent County Litig. (MI), discussion at 76 F.3d 1 3 8 1  (6th Cir. 1 996); City of St. Louis Litig. (MO), discussion at 
90 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1 996); Calhoun County Litig. (MS), discussion at 88 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1 996); Green 
Litig., discussion at 1996 WL 524395 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996); Town of Babylon Litig.,  discussion at 914  F. Supp. 843 
(E.D.N.Y. 1 996); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., discussion at 922 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Cal. 1 995); Niagara Falls 
Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1 995); LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 903 
F. Supp. 107 1  (W.D. Tex. 1995); Nipper Litig. (FL), discussion at 39 F.3d 1494 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 994); Armstrong v. 
Allain Litig. ,  discussion at 893 F. Supp. 1 320 (S.D. Miss. 1994 ); Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F .3d 
807(6th Cir. 1 994); City of Philadelphia Litig. (PA), discussion at 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994); Metro Dade 
County Litig. (FL), discussion at 985 F .2d 14 7 1  ( 1 1th Cir. 1 993 ); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), discussion 
999 F.2d 831  (5th Cir. 1 993); SW Texas Junior College District Litig. (TX), discussion at 964 F.2d 1542 ( 5th Cir. 
1992); Momoe County 740 F. Supp. 417  (N.D. Miss. 1 990); Pomona Litig. (CA), discussion at 883 F.2d 1418  (9th 
Cir. 1 989); Chickasaw County I Litig. (MS), discussion at 705 F. Supp. 3 1 5  (N.D. Miss. 1989); Watsonville Litig. 
(CA), discussion at 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1 988); Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), discussion at 829 F.2d 1 547 
( 1 1th Cir. 1987); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig. (FL), discussion at 804 F.2d 6 1 1  ( 1 1th Cir. 1986); City of Boston 
Litig. (MA), discussion at 784 F.2d 409 ( 1st Cir. 1 986); Wesley Litig. (TN), discussion at 791  F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 
1 986); Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., discussion at 579 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1984); McCarty Litig. (TX), 
discussion at 749 F.2d 1 134 ( 5th Cir. 1984); Rybicki Litig., discussion at 574 F. Supp. 1 147 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
321 .  Cousin Litig. (TN), discussion at 145 F.3d 8 18, 832 (6th Cir. 1 998) (including in Factor 1 only examples occurring 
within the last thirty years); City of Chicago Litig., discussion at 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1446 (N.D. Ill. 1 997) 
(considering evidence of discrimination dating back twenty-five years "too remote in time" for purposes of Factor 
1) .  
322. Suffolk County Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ;  Belle Glade Litig., 178 F.3d 1 175 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 999); 
Salt River District Litig. (AZ), discussion at 109 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir. 1 997) (finding no evidence presented that 
African- American landowners experienced discrimination, but suggesting that the case might have gone 
differently if the plaintiffs had alleged that non-landowners who were disproportionately African American had 
experienced discrimination based upon the landownership voting requirement); St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig. , 90 
F.3d 1357 ( 8th Cir. 1 996); City of Watsonville Litig. (CA), discussion at 863 F.2d 1407, 1419  (9111 Cir. 1988) 
(finding a violation without Factor 1 met; criticizing the district court for refusing to hear evidence outside of 
Watsonville and stating that it would have taken judicial notice of the "peIVasive" discrimination against Hispanics 
in the State of California, if this were needed to find a violation); Chapman v. NicholsonLitig.,  579 F. Supp. 1504 
(N.D. Ala. 1984) (no evidence presented in county where lawsuit brought). Other courts considered evidence of 
official discrimination, but decided that not enough had been presented to show more than mere disparate impact 
on the basis of race- therefore, Factor 1 was not met. For example, in the City of Philadelphia Litigation 
challenging Pennsylvania's voter purge law, the court found that the removal of African-American and Latino 
voters from the voter registration rolls at higher rates than white voters combined with the "correlation between 
older machines being allocated to neighborhoods with significant minority populations" did not, without more, rise 
to the level of official discrimination. City of Philadelphia Litig., 28 F .3d 306, 3 12 (3d Cir. 1 994). 
323. See, e.g ., Chapman v. Nicholson Litig.,  discussion at 579 F. Supp. 1 504, 1 5 10 (N.D. Ala. 1984) ("While the court 
might assume that, at some point in history, black citizens were discouraged by poll taxes and other means from 
registering, several of the black witnesses testified that they voted up to 30 years ago without difficulty. There was 
certainly no evidence that black citizens in Jasper have had as much difficulty in voting as has been experienced 
by black citizens in some Southern communities."). 
324. See, e.g . ,  Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F.Supp.2d 346, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("while we find the history 
reflected in Yonkers troubling and recognize the need for continued vigilance and resolve to ensure equality of 
opportunity, we do not find in the record a 'history of voting-related discrimination in the State' "). 
325. Chapman v. Nicholson Litig.,  579 F. Supp. 1 504, 1 5 1 0  (N.D. Ala. 1 984). 
326. See, e.g ., Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
327. Id. at 434-45.  
328. Kent County Litig. (MI), discussion at 790 F. Supp. 738, 745 (W.D. Mich. 1 992). 
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329. See cases cited supra note 207 . 
330. Id. ; see, e.g. ,  Monroe County Litig., discussion at 740 F. Supp. 4 17, 422 (N.D. Miss. 1990) ("no black person of 
voting age in Monroe County has been refused registration for any reason since 1964. The court finds no evidence 
that black voter registration is presently impeded by any historical official discrimination."). 
331 .  957 F. Supp. 1 522, 1 557-59 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (findings upheld by 221 F.3d 1218 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000), also affirming 
the court's finding of no violation). 
332. Id. at 1 557. 
333. Id. at 1559 n.86. 
334. Aldasoro Litig. , discussion at 922 F.  Supp. 339, 363-64 (S.D. Cal. 1 995) (citing "the numerous laws enacted by 
the California Legislature in the last 30  years to improve minority voting participation and to liberalize the 
political process. These laws included: County clerks could not refuse to deputize registrars because of race 
( 1 96 1) ;  prohibition of election day challenges based on literacy (196 1); requirement that a copy of the election 
ballot in Spanish be posted in each polling place where the language minority population was greater than 3% 
( 197 1);  law allowing the use of languages besides English in polling places (1973); law requiring county clerks to 
recruit bilingual deputy registrars and precinct board members (1973 ); registration allowed by mail ( 1975); and the 
ability of voters in California to vote by absentee ballot for any reason" along with the state law requirement that 
"[w ] here more than 3% of the voting age residents of a California county lack English skills, the County Clerk is 
required to recruit interested citizens and organizations to assist in the registration of individuals lacking such 
English skills") (citations omitted); see also Butts Litig. (NY), discussion at 779 F.2d 141 ,  150 (2d Cir. 1 985) 
("[T]he City has taken affirmative steps since 1 975 to encourage minority voting, including mail registration (N.Y. 
Election Law § 5 -2 10(1)) and a Registration Task Force appointed by Governor Cuomo") . 
335. City of Woodville Litig., discussion at 688 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Miss. 1988). 
336. City of Holyoke Litig.,  discussion at 960 F. Supp. 5 15, 526 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Tensas Parish Litig., 
discussion at 8 1 9  F.2d 609, 6 1 2  (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that '' [t]he historical tensions between the races in Tensas 
Parish, albeit ameliorated, have not disappeared" and that it is "fervently hoped that District Six will provide the 
occasion for the final rejection of regrettable legacies of the past and the nurturing of more worthy legacies for the 
future ."); City of Boston Litig. ,  discussion at 609 F. Supp. 739, 745 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding some individual 
instances of intimidation while noting that "[t]here was, in fact, testimony that tlie theme of racial harmony played 
a major role in the campaigns of some candidates in the 1983 elections."). 
337. For a detailed description of the history of official discrimination in the Southern States, see : Alabama: Dillard v. 
Crenshaw Litig., 640 F. Supp. 1 347 (M.D. Ala. 1 986); Mobile School Board Litig., discussion at 706 F.2d 1 103, 
1 104-07 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 983) (not reaching amended Section 2 question, but finding an intent violation); Florida: 
DeSoto County Board of Comm'rs Litig., 204 F.3d 1 33 5  ( l  l th Cir. 2000) (finding law enacted with discriminatory 
pmpose and remanding for Section 2 results test hearing); Georgia: Brooks Litig., discussion at 158 F.3d 1230, 
1233 -34 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 988); Ben Hill County Litig. ,  discussion at 743 F. Supp. 864, 865-68 (M.D. Ga. 1 990); 
Louisiana: Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F.2d 496 ( 5th Cir. 1 987); Major Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1 983); 
Mississippi: Kirksey v. Allain Litig., discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1 183, 1 192-93 (S.D. Miss. 1 987); Texas : City of 
Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 13 17, 1 320-33, 1401-03 (W.D. Tex. 1990); LULAC-Midland Indep. Sch. 
Dist. Litig., 648 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1 986). 
338. See, e.g ., NAACP v. Fordice Litig., 252 F.3d 361  ( 5th Cir. 2001); Lafayette County Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 996 
(N.D. Miss. 1 998); Callioun County Litig. (MS), 88 F.3d 1 393 (5th Cir. 1 996); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. 
(TX), 89 F.3d 1 205 (5th Cir. 1996); LULAC - N.E. lndep. Sch. Dist. 903 F. Supp. 107 1  (W.D. Tex. 1 995); 
Armstrong v. Allain Litig. ,  893 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Miss. 1994); LULAC v. Clements: Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 83 1 
(5th Cir. 1 993);  Southwest Tex. Jr. College Dist. 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992); Tensas Parish School Board 
Litig. (TX), discussion at 8 1 9  F.2d 609 ( 5th Cir. 1 987) (referring to "historical tensions," and seeming to blame 
both Blacks and Whites equally for these tensions); U.S.  v. Jones Litig. (AL), 57 F.3d 1020 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995) 
(noting that one "cannot ignore" the history but finding that it does not weigh in favor of a violation); Little Rock 
Litig.,  56 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1 995) (any history of discrimination is "remote in time " and so had minimal value in 
the results test). 
339. City of Woodville Litigation, discussion at 688 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Miss. 1988); see also Calhoun County 
Litig., discussion at 88 F.3d 1393 ,  1 399 (5th Cir. 1 996) (finding a violation but not relying on history of official 
discrintination affecting political participation); Johnson v. Hanirick Litig. (GA), discussion at 296 F.3d 1065, 
1224 ( 1 1th Cir. 2002) ("The State of Georgia and Gainesville have a history of official discrimination against 
blacks. Of course, that does little to distinguish Gainesville or Georgia from any other Southern state or city.") . 
340. Butts v. NYC Litig., discussion at 6 14 F. Supp. 1 527, 1544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that "[c]ontrary to the 
popularly held belief that racial discrimination only takes place within the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, plaintiffs' 
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exhibits . . .  support the finding that Black and Hispanic voters in New York City have been subject to various 
procedures . . .  which have had the effect of abridging their voting rights") . 
341 .  Butts v. NYC Litig., discussion at 779 F.2d 141 ,  150 (2d Cir. l 985) (overturning district court's prior finding of a 
Section 2 violation); see also France v. Pataki Litig.,  discussion at 71 F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999) 
(finding no history of official discrimination, and noting that "[i]n fact, New York City has taken steps to 
encourage minority voting including mail registration and a Registration Task Force appointed by Governor 
Cuomo. Furthermore, defendants' expert, Dr. Mollenkopf, acknowledged that the election practices in question 
were not adopted as a part of a racist historical tradition" (citation omitted)). 
342. Town ofBabylon Litig., discussion at 9 14 F. Supp. 843 .  886 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also City of Boston Litig.,  
discussion at 784 F.2d 409, 412  ( 1 st Cir. 1986) (finding "that Boston's history of discrimination in the area of 
voting rights was less egregious than in certain other parts of the country") . 
343. See SENATE REPORT supra note 15,  at 27-30. Single shot voting is a practice by which voters can direct their votes 
to a single candidate rulllling in a multi-member district, and choose not to cast their remaining votes for other 
candidates rulllling at the same time. Doing so increases the relative weight of their votes by reducing the number 
of votes other candidates receive. An anti-single shot provision may prevent voters from doing this, typically by 
disqualifying any ballot where a voter has not used all available votes. See QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 46 
(explaining the numbered place ballot system, a common type of anti-single shot provision: "[s]ingle shot voting is 
impossible if each candidate is required to qualify for a separate place or post (i.e., place no. 1 ,  place no. 2, and so 
forth). Because every seat on the governing body is filled through a head-to-head contest in which only one vote 
can be cast there is no way to increase the mathematical weight of one 's ballot by denying votes to other 
candidates.") See also Marengo County Litig. , discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1546, 1570 n.45 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984) ( "When 
voters can cast more than one vote in the same race, an anti-single-shot provision can force minority voters to vote 
for majority candidates.") 
344. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 3f= 1). Of the 53 lawsuits finding Factor 3, 25 were decided in the 1 980s 
(20 violations), 22 in the 1 990s (12 violations), and 6 since 2000 (3 violations). Id. (sort Column: Year while 
filtering Column: WasSection2Violated=True) .  Note that where a practice enun1erated in the Factor 3 list was 
directly challenged in the lawsuit, a court did not always consider or find Factor 3 independently of the express 
challenge to the practice. 
345. City of Cleveland Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 90 1 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 F.3d 341 (4th 
Cir. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004); NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 3 6 1  
(5th Cir. 2001) ;  Brooks Litig. (GA), 158 F.3d 1230 ( 1 1th Cir. 1998); City of LaGrange Litig. 969 F .  Supp. 749 
(N.D. Ga. 1 997); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1355 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 997): Chickasaw County II Litig., No. 
CIV. A. 1 : 92CV142-JAD, 1 997 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 22087, 1 997 WL 33426761 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997); Calhoun 
County Litig. (MS), 88 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996); Southern Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281  ( 1 1th 
Cir. 1 995): Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), 7 1 F.3d 1382 ( 8th Cir. 1995); Stockton Litig. (CA), 956 F .2d 884 
(9th Cir. 1 992); Jefferson Parish I Litig. (LA), 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1991);  Columbus County Litig., 782 F. 
Supp. 1097 (E.D.N.C. 1991) ;  Momoe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1 990); City of Dallas Litig., 
734 F. Supp. 1 3 17 (W.D. Tex. 1990); City of Starke Litig., 712 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Baldwin Bd. of 
Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988): City of Jackson Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tellll. 1 988); 
Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); Kirksey v. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1 183 (S.D. Miss. 1987); 
Dallas County Comm'n Litig., 636 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ala. 1986): Gingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S.  30 ( 1 986); 
Edgefield County Litig.,  650 F. Supp. 1 176 (D.S.C. 1986); LULAC - Midland Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 648 F. 
Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1 986); Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., 579 F. Supp. 1 504 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Escambia 
County Litig. (FL), 748 F.2d 1037 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984); City of Greenwood Litig.,  599 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 
1 984); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591  F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1984); Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 F.2d 1017  
(5th Cir. 1 984); Major Litig., 574 F .  Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983); Terrell Litig. 565 F .  Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1 983). 
346. Charleston County Litig. (SC), 365 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004): Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S .D.  
2004); Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  1 16 F.3d 685 (D.  Del. 1997); City of LaGrange Litig., 969 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. 
Ga. 1 997); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1 355 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Town of Babylon Litig. ,  9 1 4  F. Supp. 843 
(E.D.N.Y. 1 996): Southern Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995); Blytheville Sch. Dist. 
Litig. (AR), 7 1  F.3d 1 382 ( 8th Cir. 1995); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 65 F.3d 1 002 (2d Cir. 1 995); Stockton Litig. 
(CA), 956 F .2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992); Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.N.C. 1 99 1); City of Dallas 
Litig.,  734 F. Supp. 1 3 17 (W.D. Tex. 1 990); City of Starke Litig., 712 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1 989); Brewer 
Litig. (TX), 876 F.2d 448 ( 5th Cir. 1989); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1 988); City 
of Jackson Litig. ,  683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tenn. 1 988); City of Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015  (C.D. Ill. 
1 987); County of Big HomLitig., 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986); Gingles Litig. (NC), 478 U.S. 30 ( 1986): 
Edgefield County Litig., 650 F. Supp. 1 176 (D.S.C. 1 986); Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), 804 F.2d 469 
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(8th Cir. 1 986); Escambia County Litig. (FL), 748 F.2d 1037 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984); City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. 
Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1 984); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1 984); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig.,  
591  F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1 984); Terrell Litig. 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1 983).  
347. Alamosa County Litig. ,  306 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Colo. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig. (SD). 336 F.  Supp. 2d 976 
(D.S.D. 2004); City of Chicago Heights Litig., Nos. 87 C 5 1 12, 88 C 9800, 1 997 WL 102543 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
1997); Southern Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1281 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995); Blytheville School District (AR) 
Litig., 7 1 F.3d 1382 (8th Cir. 1995); LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 903 F. Supp. 107 1 (W.D. Tex. 1995); 
Worcester County Litig. (MD), 35 F.3d 92 1 (4th Cir. 1 994); Stockton Litig. (CA), 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992); 
SW Texas Junior College Dist. Litig., 964 F.2d 1 542 (5th Cir. 1 992);  Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097 
(E.D.N.C. 1991);  City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1 3 1 7  (W.D. Tex. 1 990); Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. 
Ark. 1 989); City of Starke Litig., 712  F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1 989); Brewer Litig. (TX), 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 
1989); Harris v. Graddick Litig., 695 F. Supp. 5 17 (M.D. Ala. 1 988); Gretna Litig. (LA), 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 
1 987); Dallas County Comm'n Litig. ,  636 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ala. 1 986); LULAC - Midland Indep. Sch. Dist. 
Litig., 648 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1 986); Marengo County Litig., 623 F. Supp. 3 s3 (S.D. Ala. 1 985); Chapman 
v. Nicholson Litig., 579 F. Supp. 1 504 (N.D. Ala. 1 984); Abilene Litig. (TX), 725 F.2d 1 0 1 7  (5th Cir. 1984); 
Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1 984); Mobile School Board Litig. (AL), 706 F.2d 1 103 (1 1th Cir. 
1983). 
348. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004); Charleston County Litig., 365 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004) ; 
Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 1 80 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1 999); Stockton Litig. (CA), 956 F.2d 884 ( 9th Cir. 1992); 
Jefferson Parish I Litig. (LA), 926 F.2d 487 ( 5th Cir. 1 99 1); City of Jackson (TN), 683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tenn. 
1 988); City of Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1015  (C.D. Ill. 1987); LULAC - Midland Litig., 648 F. Supp. 596 
(W.D. Tex. 1986); Chapman v. Nicholson Litig. ,  579 F. Supp. 1 504 (N.D. Ala. 1 984); Escambia County Litig. 
(FL), 748 F.2d 1037 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984); City of Greenwood, 599 F. Supp. 3 97 (N.D. Miss. 1 984). 
349. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (negligible compensation for elected officials); City of 
Jackson Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (short interval between election and runoff existed until 
1979 favoring wealthy candidates); County of Big HornLitig., 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1 986) (staggered 
terms, residential district); Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), 804 F.2d 469 ( 8th Cir. 1 986) (apportionment 
based upon voter registration, not population); Escambia County (FL), 748 F.2d 1037 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) 
(registration fee for candidates); Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984) (no residential requirement for 
candidacy) ;  see also City of Philadelphia Litig. (PA), 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1 994) (where voter purge law, such that 
voters automatically removed from the registration list, and required to re-register if they had not voted in 4 years, 
was both challenged and considered under Factor 3 ). 
350. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 3f= 1 while filtering Column: Jurisdiction = True) .  
351 .  Id. 
352. Id. 
353. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F .3d 361(5th Cir. 200 1 )  (finding that majority-vote requirement was 
not in itself discriminatory); Kirksey v. Allain Litig.,  658 F. Supp. 1 183,  1 194 (S.D. Miss. 1 987) ("Although it is 
obvious that abolition of the majority vote requirements and post system without adoption of anti-single-shot 
voting laws would make it easier in some situations for black candidates to be elected, this Court cannot hold that 
these provisions as they now exist discriminate against blacks per se."); see also Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. 
Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Colo. 2004); City of Cleveland Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Miss. 2004); City of Rome 
Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1 355 (1 1th Cir. 1 997); Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142 -JAD, 1997 U.S.  
Dist. LEXIS 22087, 1 997 WL 3342676 l (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997); Town of Babylon Litig., 914 F. Supp. 843 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Southern Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 1 28 1 ( 1  lth Cir. 1 995); Niagara Falls Litig. 
(NY), 65 F.3d 1002, 1020 (2d Cir. 1 995); SW Texas Junior College Dist. Litig., 964 F.2d 1 542 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 1 96 (E.D. Ark. 1 989) ; Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338  (N.D. Tex. 1 983). 
354. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw County Litig., 650 F. Supp. 1347, 1 3 57 (M.D. Ala. 1 986) (ordering a preliminary 
injunction against the at-large election systems in the 5 counties, finding that "the Alabama legislature . . .  has 
consistently enacted at-large systems for local governments during periods when there was a substantial threat of 
black participation in the political process . . .  enactment[s] . . .  [that were] not adventitious but rather racially 
inspired."); Major Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325, 340 (E.D. La. 1983) ("As a further obstacle to minority access, the 
legislature established a majority-vote requirement for election to party committees in 1 959 ."); Mobile School 
Board Litig. (AL), 706 F.2d 1 103, 1 106-07 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 98 3 ) ('The 1 876 act which reenacted the 1 852 Act ofat­
large voting procedures was a convenient method of making the election of a black board member unlikely . . .  [and 
when] the Alabama legislature reinstated a law which suited the purpose of discrimination, the law may be said to 
have been a product of discriminatory intent."). See generally QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 6. 
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355. See, e.g ., Hendrix v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 63 1 -32 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (describing the slating inquiry as 
ascertaining "the ability of blacks to get on the ballot" and finding that slating existed where no blacks had mn for 
county-wide office): Tumer v. McKeithen Litig. (LA), discussion at 490 F.2d 191 ,  195 ( 5th Cir. 1973) (reasoning 
that slating is a particularly salient factor in situations where "the black vote has been solicited at a stage when the 
actual candidate selection has already occurred and the possibility for meaningful influence is significantly 
diminished"); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) ("[S]ince Reconstruction days, there have 
been only two Negroes in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of Representatives and that these two 
were the only two Negroes ever slated by t11e Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (DCRG), a white­
dominated organization that is in effective contro 1 of Democratic Party candidate slating in Dallas County. That 
organization, the District Court found, did not need the support of the Negro community to win elections in the 
county, and it did not therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the 
Negro community.''). 
356. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: WasSection2Violated = True and filter Column: 4f= O) .  
357. See Master Lawsuit List (filter ColullUl: 4f= 1 while filtering Column: RPV= 1 ,  then Column: 7f=J) .  
358. Westwego Litig (LA), discussion at 946 F.2d 1 109, 1 1 16 n.5 (5th Cir. 1 99 1) .  
359. Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 180 F.3d 476, 483-86 (2d Cir. 1 999) 
360. Id. at 486. 
361 .  Id. at 496. 
362. City of New Rochelle Litig.,  308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
363. Albany County Litig., No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL 2 1524820, at * 44, 46 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003) (concluding that 
t11e evidence "demonstrates tliat minorities have generally been excluded from candidacy for County offices 
except in majority/minority districts.") . 
364. Bone Shirt Litig., (SD), 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1036 (D.S.D. 2004); City of Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1 0 1 5, 
1030 (C.D. Ill. 1987). 
365. City ofSpringfield, 658 F. Supp. at 1030. 
366. Bone Shirt, 3 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. 
367. See Armour Litig.,  discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1 044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 199 1 )  (noting such rules and observing that 
"although each precinct had committeemen who were paid to campaign for the endorsed candidates, Starks 
received zero votes in four precincts, including one precinct where two party officials resided. No sanctions were 
taken by the party against the officials or the committeemen who refused to support Starks."). 
368. City of Philadelphia Litig. ,  discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 537 & n.22 (E.D. Pa. 1 993). 
369. City of Chicago Heights Litig. ,  Nos. 87 C 5 1 12, 88 C 9800, 1 997 WL 102543 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5 ,  1 997); Pasadena 
Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at 958 F. Supp. 1 196 (S.D. Tex. 1 997); Gretna Litig. , discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 13 ,  
1 1 18 (E.D. La. 1 986): see also Abilene Litig. (TX), discussion at 725 F.2d 101 7, 1022 (5th Cir. 1 984) (remanding 
to district court for additional findings on whether private citizen group known as Citizens for Better Government 
denied black candidates access to slating; endorsement of this "white-dominated" organization was essential to 
win and three minority candidates endorsed by organization had not been shown to be "true representatives" of the 
minority population). 
370. City of Chicago Heights Litig. , Nos. 87 C 5 1 12, 88 C 9800, 1 997 WL 102543 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1 997) . 
371 .  Gretna Litig.,  discussion at 636 F. Supp. at 1 1 18 (E.D. La. 1986) (affirming district court and noting that "[a]n 
unofficial slating system excludes black candidates from Gretna city elections'). 
372. Pasadena Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at 958 F. Supp. 1 196 (S.D. Tex. 1 997). 
373. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17 (W.D. Tex. 1990). 
374. City of LaGrange Litig., discussion at 969 F. Supp. 749, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1 997) (describing the virtual absence of 
African-American candidates for city council as "striking" and observing that support received by the few black 
candidates to run suggested "a lack of opportunity, rather than a lack of inclination, to sponsor minority 
candidates."): see also U.S. v. Marengo County Comm'n (AL), 73 1 F.2d 1 546, 1 569 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) (stating that 
broadly understood, "the term 'access to slating' -that is, the ability to mn for office-there does not appear to 
have been any substantial fomial or infomial impediment to black candidacies."); Hendrix v. McKinney Litig.,  
discussion at 460 F. Supp. 626, 63 1 (M.D. Ala. 1978) ("[t]he core of the inquiry as to slating is the ability of 
blacks to get on the ballot.") . 
375. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17 (W.D. Tex. 1 990) (finding the factor not met as the organization that 
denied access to black and Latino candidates through 1977 no longer existed at the time of the opinion); County of 
Big Hom Litig., discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1016 (D. Mont. 1 986) (assigning no weight to a now-defunct 
slating organization that was never successful in having endorsed candidates elected). 
376. City of Rome Litig.,  discussion at 127 F.3d 1355 ( 1  lth Cir. 1997) (holding that informal "tickets" were not a 
slating device given their infrequent use and non-official nature): City of Norfolk Litig., discussion at 605 F. Supp. 
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377, 390-91 (E.D. Va. 1 984) (concluding that the organization alleged to engage in discriminatory slating did not 
qualify for the factor because it did not run candidates for all open seats); Westwego Litig. ,  discussion at 946 F.2d 
1 109, 1 1 1 5 -16 (5th Cir. 1 99 1)  (finding that although there were local organizations which played a central role in 
political life from which African Americans were excluded but not finding slating because there was no official 
endorsing of candidates). 
377. Little Rock Litig., discussion at 83 1 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D. Ark. 1 993) (dismissing plaintiffs ' claim that the 
"white power structure" throws support behind particular candidates as both untrue and not pertaining to slating); 
City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14 ,  5 3 3  (E.D. Pa. 1 993). 
378. Alamosa County Litig., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Col. 2004). 
379. See, e.g , McCord v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 6 1 7  F. Supp. 1 093 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 999) (no denied access to slating 
where citizens ' committee exclusively endorsed Republican candidates and no African American ever ran as a 
Republican); LULAC (CA5 87) (slating not found where no evidence was presented suggesting that African 
Americans could not run as Republicans if tl1ey wanted to). 
380. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Colunm: 5f= 1 ,  and Column: Success= 1 ,  or WasSection2Violated= True) . 
381 . See Blaine County Litig. (MT), discussion at 363 F.3d 897, 9 1 4  (9th Cir. 2004) (finding socioeconomic disparities 
as a result of a history of discrimination); Albany County Litig., discussion at No. 03-CV-502, 2003 WL 
2 1 524820, at * 12 (N.D.N.Y July 7, 2003) (finding that minorities continue to bear the effects of discrimination in 
almost all aspects of life); City of New Rochelle Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 1 52, 1 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(finding the continuing socioeconomic effects of historical discrimination); Montezuma Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 
discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 169-1 1 70 (D. Colo. 1 998) ("There is no doubt that this depressed status was 
caused, at least in part, by the history of mistreatment alluded to in this order."); Emison Litig., discussion at 782 
F. Supp. 427, 438 (D. Minn. 1 992) (finding the factor met based on extensive housing segregation in the city as 
well as educational performance differences arising from historical discrimination); Westwego Litig. (LA), 
discussion at 946 F.2d 1 1 09, 1 1 1 5  (5th Cir. 1 99 1) (noting that Westwego 's black citizens continue to bear the 
effects of a history of discrimination-"[b ]y almost any measure, the black families of Westwego are less we 11 off 
than their white neighbors."); Garza v. Los Angeles Litig., discussion at 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1339- 1341  (C.D. Cal. 
1 990); Houston v. Haley Litig., discussion at 663 F. Supp. 346, 3 52-54 (N.D. Miss. 1 987) (finding past 
discrimination led to continuing socioeconomic disparities); Wamser Litig., discussion at 6 79 F. Supp. 1 5 1 3 .  1 5  3 1  
(E.D. Mo. 1 987) (finding present socioeconomic disparities as a result of past discrimination) ; Baytown Litig .. 
discussion at 696 F. Supp. 1 1 28, 1 1 32, 1 1 36 (S.D. Tex. 1 987) (finding that minorities lag significantly behind 
whites in education, income, occupational status, and employment, ''the Court concludes that the minorities in 
Baytown carry with them the re sults of past discrimination to a substantial extent."); City of H:ilyoke Litig., 
discussion at 880 F. Supp. 9 1 1 , 9 17-19 (D. Mass. 1 995); Halifax County Litig., discussion at 94 F.  Supp. 1 6 1 ,  
166 -7 1 (E.D.N.C. 1 984). 
382. See Metts Litig. (Rl), discussion at 347 F.3d 346, 2003 WL 22434637, at * 2 ( 1 st Cir. 2003) (The state's 
African-American citizens continue to suffer from past official discrimination in housing, education, health care, 
and employment. By common measure of socio-economic status, educational attainment, and access to political 
resources, they continue to lag behind the rest of the state."); Berks County Litig., discussion at 277 F .  Supp. 2d 
570, 575, 581  (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("Hispanics in Reading suffer from significant socioeconomic inequality, which is 
ordinarily linked to lower literacy rates, unequal educational opportunities, and depressed participation in the 
political process."); St. Bernard Parish School Board Litig. ,  discussion at No. CIV.A. 02-2209. 2002 U.S.  Dist. 
LEXIS 16540, at *3 1 -32 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002) (finding socioeconomic discrepancies and then quofo1g 
language from the Senate Report linking socioeconomic depression to lower political participation); Old Person 
Litig. (MT), discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 13 ,  1 1 29 (9th Cir. 2000) ("American Indians have a lower socioeconomic 
status than whites in Montana; these social and economic factors hinder the ability of American Indians in 
Montana to participate fully in the political process."); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), discussion at 1 3 9  F.3d 1 4 1 4, 
1 4 1 9  & n. 1 0  (1 1th Cir. 1 998) ("Florida has had a history cf racially discriminatory voting practices and . . . 
continuing socio-economic disparities are hindering blacks' participation in the political process in these 
districts."); Rural West II Litig., discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1 998) (linking low 
socioeconomic status with inability to fundraise and fully participate in politics); Chickasaw County II Litig., 
discussion at No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142 -JAD, 1 997 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 22087, at * 10 - 1 1 (N.D .  Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997) 
(linking low socioeconomic status with lack of access to telephones and vehicles, which "translates into lower 
voter participation and heightens a finding of vote dilution"); City of LaGrange Litig., discussion at 969 F. Supp. 
749, 757, 776 (N.D. Ga. 1 997) ('These lingering effects of Georgia's history of discrimination continue to 
translate into diminished political influence and opportunity for LaGrange 's African-American citizens."); City of 
Rome Litig. (GA), 127 F.3d 1 3 55,  1 370-7 1 ,  1 38 5-86 (1 1th Cir. 1 997) (linking low socioeconomic status with 
depressed political participation as shown by the positive statistical correlations between status and participation); 
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Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO), discussion at 97 F.3d 1 303,  1 322-24 ( 10th Cir. 1996) (deciding that the lower 
court's finding of roughly equivalent political participation was not enough to refute the massive quantity of 
evidence showing current socioeconomic depression that could not be explained other than by a history of 
discrimination); LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig.,  discussion at 903 F. Supp. 1071,  1085-86 (W.D. Tex. 
1995) ("Blacks and Hispanics still bear the effects of past discrimination in such areas as education, employment 
and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process."); Cousin Litig., discussion 
at 904 F. Supp. 686, 708-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1 995) (linking low socioeconomic status with isolation "from the 
economic and political main stream" and inability to "fund and mount political can1paigns") ; Marylanders Litig., 
discussion at 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1060-61 (D. Md. 1 994) (finding depressed socioeconomic status and quoting the 
Senate Report for the proposition that depressed socioeconomic status tends to depress political participation); 
Rural West I Litig., discussion at 836 F. Supp. 453, 461-62 (W.D. Tenn. 1 993) ("In west Tennessee, black citizens 
are more likely than white citizens to live in poverty, to be unemployed, and to live in substandard housing. Black 
citizens are less likely to have completed high school, to own their own homes, to have access to a car, or to have 
telephones in their homes. As the Senate Report recognizes, educational and economic disadvantages can translate 
into political disadvantage."); Brunswick County Litig. , discussion at 80 1 F. Supp. 1 5 1 3 ,  1 5 1 8, 1524 (E.D. Va. 
1 992) ("[B]lacks in Brunswick County bear the lingering effects of this discrimination by experiencing lower 
education levels, poorer housing and lesser earning power. This Court finds that these conditions dramatically 
hinder the ability of African Americans to participate fully in the political process in Brunswick County.") ; 
Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., discussion at 793 F. Supp. 1 386, 1409 (S.D. Miss. 1992) ('A person with less 
education is less likely to vote than one with more education. A person with less money is less likely to own an 
automobile and therefore less likely to make the effort to go to the polls to vote or to the courthouse to register."); 
De Grandy Litig., discussion at 794 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1 992) (linking low socioeconomic status to 
depressed political participation as shown by voting studies that consistently show a positive correlation between 
socioeconomic factors and voter participation) ; Hall Litig., discussion at 757 F. Supp. 1 560, 1 562-63 (M.D. Ga. 
199 1 )  ("The depressed socio-economic status of black residents, including particularly the lack of public or private 
transportation, telephones and self-employment, hinders the ability of and deters black residents of Bleckley 
County from running for public office, voting and otherwise participating in the political process."); City of Dallas 
Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 13 17, 1403 -05 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) (linking low socioeconomic status with an 
inability to fund an effective campaign as well as the inability to afford to hold office because of the small amount 
of financial compensation council members receive); White Litig.,  discussion at 1989 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 161 17 at 
*9- 1 1, 22-23 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the lingering effects of past discrimination hinder the political process); 
Clark Litig., discussion at 725 F. Supp. 285, 290-9 1 ,  299 (M.D. La. 1 988) (The stipulated facts establish the 
substantial socio-economic disparities which exist in Louisiana today between blacks and whites. These disparities 
are a vesture of past discrimination and they do hinder the ability of blacks to effectively participate in the political 
process."); Smith-Crittenden County Litig.,  discussion at 687 F. Supp. 1 3 10,  1 3 17 (E.D. Ark. 1988) ("T]he history 
of discrimination has adversely affected opportunities for black citizens in health, education, and employment. The 
hangover from this history necessarily inhibits full participation in the political process.'"); Baldwin Board 
Education Litig .. discussion at 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466-67 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ('The evidence . . .  reflects that this 
discrimination has resulted in a lower socio-economic status for Alabama blacks as a group than for whites, and 
tliat this lower status has . . .  depressed levels of black voter participation and has thereby hindered the ability of 
blacks to participate effectively in the political process."); Mehfoud Litig., discussion at 702 F.  Supp. 588, 594-95 
(E.D. Va. 1988) (linking low socioeconomic status to depressed political participation, which credits expert 
testimony that "participation in the political process is positively correlated with socioeconomic status," and also 
linking low socioeconomic status with the ability to raise enough funds to effectively run for political office); City 
of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5, 1 533-1534 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) ("White collar workers can more 
easily register and vote than blue-collar workers since they have a greater ability to take time off from work. Since 
black citizens earn less money than white citizens, it is more difficult for a candidate favored by the black 
community to raise campaign funds. Due to their depressed socioeconomic status, it is more difficult for the black 
community to mobilize and get black voters to the polls than it is for the white community to do so with white 
voters."); Chisom Litig.,  discussion at CIV. A. No. 86-4057, 1 989 WL 106485 at *8-9 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1989) 
(linking low socioeconomic status with the inability to finance effective campaigns.); Kirksey v . ..Allain Litig., 
discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1 183, 1 194-95 (S.D. Miss. 1 987) (linking low socioeconomic status with depressed 
political participation and crediting expert testimony linking lower socioeconomic status with lower rates of 
registration and voting) ; Operation Push Litig., discussion at 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1253 -54, 1264-65 (N.D. Miss. 
1 987) (linking low socioeconomic status with the lower availability of automobiles making it harder for poor 
blacks to register during working hours); Gretna Litig. ,  discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 13, 1 1 16 -20 (E.D. La. 1986) 
("[D]epressed levels of income, education and employment are a consequence of severe historical disadvantage. 
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Depressed levels of participation in voting and candidacy are inextricably involved in the perception of futility and 
impotence such a history engenders. These historical disadvantages continue through the present day and 
undoubtedly hinder the ability of the black community to participate effectively in the political process within the 
City of Gretna."); Lubbock Litig. (TX), discussion at 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th Cir. 1 984) (finding that a history of 
discrimination combired with socioeconomic depression led to a decreased ability of minorities to participate in 
the political process); Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig. (AR), discussion at 7 1 F.3d 1382, 1 390 (8th Cir. 1 995) (holding 
that the district court did not give enough weight to the effect that socioeconomic depression caused by past 
discrimination has on current political participation). 
383. See, e.g., Rural West II Litig. , discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) ("Money has a prominent 
role in American politics. Campaigning is expensive and all candidates are aware of the need to raise money. 
Financed electorate groups can exert influence by sponsoring their own candidate or gaining the ear of another 
through contributions. The economic and educational isolation of African-Americans described by the Rural West 
I court limits their ability to fund and mount political campaigns. In this s:!nse therefore, blacks are not able to 
equally participate in the political process."); Cousin Litig., discussion at 904 F. Supp. 686, 708-10 (E.D. Tenn. 
1 995) (finding less ability to fund a campaign); Mehfoud Litig., discussion at 702 F. Supp. 588, 594-95 (E.D. Va. 
1 988); Chisom Litig., discussion at CIV. A. No. 86-4057, 1 989 WL 106485 at *8-9 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1 989) .  
384. See, e.g., City o f  Rome Litig. (GA), discussion at 127 F.3d 1355, 1370-1371 ,  1385- 1 3 86 (1 1th Cir. 1997) 
("Rome 's at-large electoral systems, moreover, have the effect of increasing the importance of money in the 
electoral process by enlarging the electoral district."); Cousin Litig., discussion at 904 F. Supp. 686, 708-7 10 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1 995) ; Columbus County Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 103- 1 105 (E.D.N.C. 199 1 )  (finding a 
large district, an at-large challenge, and a large area in which to campaign disadvantages minority candidates who 
are likely to have less access to necessary resources for travel and advertising); City of Dallas Litig. ,  discussion at 
734 F. Supp. 1 3 17,  1403-04 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) ("[Socioeconomic]disparities provide a distinct advantage to white 
at-large candidates in terms of financial and other support.") . 
385. See, e.g., Charleston County Litig. ,  3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 291 (D.S.C. 2003) ("The on-going racial separation that 
exists in Charleston County-socially, economically, religiously, in housing and business patterns-makes it 
especially difficult for African-American candidates seeking county-wide office to reach out to and communicate 
with the predominately white electorate from whom they must obtain substantial support to win an at-large 
elections [sic] ."); Cousin Litig., discussion at 904 F. Supp. 686, 708-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1 995) (noting isolation from 
economic and political main stream); Neal litig., discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (E.D. Va. 1988); cf 
Terrell Litig. ,  565 F. Supp. 338, 342 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("It is clear to the Court that a major reason for the white 
majority's lack of familiarity with many black candidates is the severe de facto segregation of housing in 
Terrell.") . 
386. City of Dallas Litig.,  discussion at 734 F. Supp. 13 17, 1403-05 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) ("The ridiculous pay for Council 
Membersc- $50. 00 for each meeting - further exacerbates the discriminatory effect of these disparities by limiting 
the pool of African-Americans and Hispanics who can financially afford to serve on the Council where they 
would, in effect, volunteer their full time service.") . 
387. See Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1037-41  (D.S.D. 2004) (finding Factor 5 met based on 
evidence of depressed socioeconomic status, differentials in voter turnout statistics as well as by expert testimony 
that " 'People living on a day-to-day basis wonder if they can heat their home. Those are not the kinds of people 
who are the most predisposed to go out and engage in a great deal of political campaigning or activity' " (citation 
omitted) ); Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at Civ. A. No. 89-230-LON, 1 996 WL 172327, at * 1 9 -
2 0  (D. Del. Apr. 1 0 ,  1 996) (finding both depressed socioeconomic status and lower levels of political participation 
by African Americans and overturning the lower court's determination that a 2% difference in voter turnout was 
insignificant); Attala County Litig. (MS), discussion at 92 F.3d 283, 293-95 (5th Cir. 1 996) (finding depressed 
socioeconomic status and depressed political participation); Nipper Litig. (FL), discussion at 39 F.3d 1494, 1507-
08 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 994) (overturning the lower court's finding that voter registration and turnout were equivalent and 
finding that while voter registration was roughly equivalent, black voter turnout still lagged); City of Philadelphia 
Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 533-35 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding depressed socioeconomic status and 
depressed voter registration and turnout rates); Little Rock Litig., discussion at 83 1 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D. Ark. 
1 993) (finding lower socioeconomic status as well as depressed levels of voter registration and turnout. Although 
in upholding the district court's finding, the 8th Circuit held that less weight should be given to this factor because 
differences were not as great as in other areas.); Columbus County Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 10 3 -
0 5  (E.D.N.C. 1 99 1 )  (finding depressed socioeconomic status and lower levels of voter turnout despite finding 
roughly equivalent voter registration numbers); Armour Litig., discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991 )  
(finding depressed socioeconomic levels as well as lower rates of political participation); Democratic Party of 
Arkansas Litig. (AK), discussion at 890 F.2d 1423, 143 1-3 3 (8th Cir. 1 989) (finding lower voter turnout and 
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socioeconomic disparities); City of Springfield Litig .. discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1 0 1 5, 1 024-27 (C.D. Ill. 1 987) 
("The lingering effects of segregation and racial isolation are seen in the statistics of black turnout at the polls. The 
voting participation of blacks continues to lag well behind that of whites. Blacks participate at a rate of one-third 
to one -half of white voters."): County of Big Hom Litig .. discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 10 16-17 (D. Mont.  
1 986) (finding that although voter registration between Native Americans and whites was roughly equivalent 
Native American voter turnout still lagged.): Gretna Litig. ,  discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 13 ,  1 1 16-20 (E.D. La. 
1 986) (finding continued socioeconomic disparities, and noting that although blacks and whites register to vote in 
roughly equivalent numbers, black voter turnout still lagged behind that of whites.): Edgefield County Litig., 
discussion at 650 F.  Supp. 1 176, 1 180-89 (D.S.C. 1 986) (finding socioeconomic disparities and lower voter 
turnout for blacks than for whites); Dillard v. Crenshaw Litig.,  discussion at 649 F. Supp. 289, 295 (M.D. Ala. 
1 986) (finding both current and past depressed socioeconomic and political participation); Jordan Litig., discussion 
at 604 F. Supp. 807, 812  (N.D. Miss. 1984) (finding depressed socioeconomic status and decreased voter 
registration rates); Terrazas Litig., discussion at 581  F. Supp. 1329, 1348-5 1 (N.D. Tex. 1 984) (finding depressed 
political participation due to low voter registration and turnout number); Gingles Litig., discussion at 590 F. Supp. 
345, 360, 363 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Marengo County Litig. (AL), discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1 546, 155 1 ,  1 567-70 ( 1 1 th 
Cir. 1984) ('Past discrimination may cause blacks to register or vote in lower numbers than whites. Past 
discrimination may also lead to present socioeconomic disadvantages, which in turn can reduce participation and 
influence in political affairs."); Dallas County Comm'n Litig. (AL), discussion at 739 F.2d 1 529, 1 537-38 (1 1th 
Cir. 1 984) (overturning the lower court 's finding that equivalent voter registration rates showed effective political 
participation despite persisting socioeconomic disparities because blacks continued to turn out at lower rates than 
whites); City of Greenwood Litig., discussion at 599 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (N.D. Miss. 1 984) (finding that 
plaintiffs showed depressed socioeconomic status as well as depressed political participation as demonstrated by 
lower voter turnout rates); Escambia County Litig. (FL), 748 F.2d 1037, 143 -44 (5th Cir. 1984)( finding depressed 
socioeconomic status and political participation and expressly rejecting the proposition that plaintiffs must prove 
causation between the two): Buskey v. Oliver Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1475 -76 (M.D. Ala. 1 983) 
(finding socioeconomic disparities and low voter registration); Major Litig., discussion at 574 F. Supp. 325, 339-
4 1  (E.D. La. 1 983) (finding that a "legacy of historical discrimination" caused lower socioeconomic status of 
blacks, and finding lower registration and turnout in the black community); Mobile School Board Litig., 
discussion at 542 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (finding socioeconomic disparities and depressed 
registration and turnout rates). 
388. See NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), discussion at 252 F.3d 361,  367-368 (_5th Cir. 200 1 )  (refusing to find 
inequality of political access where evidence showed that registration and turnout rates were nearly equal); 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference Litig., discussion at 785 F. Supp. 1469, 1473, 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1 992) 
(finding that despite depressed socioeconomic status, blacks are registered to vote in approximately equal numbers 
to whites and in some areas black voter registration exceeds that of whites); Monroe County Litig., discussion at 
740 F .  Supp. 4 17, 423 -24 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (finding no evidence of a disproportionate level of black voter 
participation in Monroe County, and noting that "the black turnout in the 1 989 alderman election in Aberdeen was 
higher in the 93% black ward than the white turnout in more affluent wards"); City of Starke Litig., discussion at 
7 1 2  F. Supp. 1 523, 1 529 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (finding that black and white voter registration and turnout numbers 
were nearly equivalent); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig. (FL), discussion at 865 F.2d 1566, 1 582 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 988) 
(finding socioeconomic disparities, but that on the whole black voter registration was generally high and often 
even exceeded that of whites); City of Boston Litig., discussion at 609 F. Supp. 739, 744-45 (D. Mass. 1 985) 
(finding that blacks and whites register and vote at "basically similar" rates) ; Qty of Fort Lauderdale Litig. ,  
discussion at 6 17 F. Supp. 1093, 1 104-05 (D. C .  Fla. 1 985) (finding that despite depressed socioeconomic status, 
blacks still turned out to vote in equal or greater numbers than whites and therefore Factor 5 was not met); City of 
Norfolk Litig. ,  discussion at 605 F. Supp. 377, 3 9 1 -92 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("Blacks are registering to vote and turning 
out to vote at rates equal to or greater than the rate for whites, based on a percentage of the voting age 
population."): Rocha Litig., discussion at No. V-79-26, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 5 164 at *2 1-22 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 
23 ,  1 982) ("[T]he past discrimination does not appear to affect the political participation of minorities. They freely 
register to vote and do vote in the same ratio as do the Anglos."); France Litig., discussion at 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 
332 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999) ( "Minorities have not been excluded from participating in the political process as is evident 
by their climbing voter registration rates, turnout at the polls and their success in the electoral process."); Metro 
Dade County Litig. ,  discussion at 805 F. Supp. 967, 98 1, 991 -92 (S.D. Fla. 1 992) ("[D]espite the depressed levels 
in [education, employment and health], Blacks are making great strides in overcoming these obstacles as 
evidenced by their high registered voter turnout levels."). 
389. See, e.g ., Nipper Litig. (FL), discussion at 39 F.3d 1494, 1507-08 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (overturning the lower court's 
finding that voter registration and turnout were equivalent; finding that while >Dter registration was roughly 
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equivalent, black voter turnout still lagged); Columbus County Litig .. discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 103-05 
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (finding depressed socioeconomic status and lower levels of voter turnout, despite roughly 
equivalent voter registration numbers); County of Big Hom Litig., discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1016-17 (D. 
Mont. 1 986) (finding that although voter registration between Native Americans and whites was roughly 
equivalent, Native American voter turnout still lagged); Gretna Litig., discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 13, 1 1 16-20 
(E.D. La. 1986) (finding continued socioeconomic disparities, and noting that although blacks and whites register 
to vote in roughly equivalent numbers, black voter turnout still lagged behind that of whites); Dallas County 
Comm'n Litig. (AL), discussion at 739 F.2d 1 529, 1537-38 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) (overturning the lower court 's finding 
that equivalent voter registration rates showed effective political participation despite persisting socioeconomic 
disparities because blacks continued to tum out at lower rates than whites). 
390. See Town of Hempstead Litig., discussion at 956 F. Supp. 326, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 1 997) (noting that in comparison to 
other parts of the country, socioeconomic differences in Hempstead, while present, were not as severe as in other 
parts of the country and that "differences in the socioeconomic status of blacks do not significantly impair their 
relative ability to participate in the political process"); Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 89 
F.3d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1 996) (finding that socio-economic disparities "do not prevent meaningful participation 
in the political process"). 
391 . See Rodriguez Litig., discussion at 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that minorities in New 
York bear "to some e:\.ient" the effects of past discrimination, while finding no "substantial or adequate showing" 
that the "socioeconomic status of minorities significantly impairs their ability to participate in t11e political process 
in the relevant geographical areas"); Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 1 6, 103 5 -38 (D. 
Colo. 2003) ("[T]he Court concludes tliat notwithstanding historical ethnicity-based discrimination, there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that socioeconomic or educational conditions currently hinder Hispanic residents 
in Alamosa County from participating in the electoral process."); City of Chicago Heights Litig., discussion at 
Nos. 87 C 5 1 12,  88 C 9800, 1997 WL 102543, at * 1 0  (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1 997) ("This factor requires a showing 
that, as a result of past discrimination, African-Americans in Chicago Heights suffer from lower socioeconomic 
conditions than whites and that African-American political participation is depressed."); Mallory-Hamilton County 
Litig.,  discussion at 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 542 (S.D. Ohio 1 997) ("Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence which 
establishes that the effects of past discrimination deny African-Americans equal access to the political process or 
actually hamper the ability of African-Americans to participate in the political process. The Court hereby makes 
these same findings with respect to Summit County in general, and with respect to the Court of Common Pleas for 
Summit County, and the Akron Municipal Court in }llrticular."); Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 914 F. 
Supp. 843, 887-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (noting absence of evidence on depressed socio-economic status and 
insufficient evidence of depressed political participation); Kent County Litig.,  discussion at 7 90 F. Supp 738, 744, 
749 (S.D. Mich. 1992) (finding that notwithstanding socioeconomic disparities, there was no showing of less 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process in Kent County); Turner Litig. ,  discussion at 784 F. Supp. 553, 
576-77 (E.D. Arl<:. 1991) (finding that the factor was not met because there was no evidence that black voters had 
"less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process"); McCarthy Litig. 
(TX), discussion at 749 F.2d 1 134, 1 135-37 (5th Cir. 1 984) (holding that plaintiffs must present evidence to show 
that there are actual obstacles or hindrances to minority political participation) ; see also Suffolk County Litig., 
discussion at 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he plaintiffs have not established, in any manner, 
that Hispanics' lower socioeconomic condition in Suffolk County, if such is the case, has deprived them of their 
right to participate in legislative elections."); cf Chickasaw County I Litig., discussion at 705 F .  Supp. 3 1 5, 320-
21 (N.D. Miss. 1 989) (finding insufficient evidence showing actual depressed political participation and citing 
some testimony suggesting that registration and turnout may be higher among black voters than white.). 
392. See Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 282 -92 (D.S.C. 2003); LULAC v. Clements 
Litig. (TX), discussion at 986 F.2d 728, 782 & n.41 ,  (5th Cir. 1 993); Neal Litig.,  discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 
1428-3 1 (E.D. Va. 1 988); Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 3 4 1 -342 (N.D. Tex. 1 983) (finding that although blacks 
are registered in equal or greater numbers than whites past discrimination lingers in housing segregation, which 
makes winning the white crossover vote nearly impossible because of the white majority's lack of familiarity with 
many black candidates.); Terrazas Litig.,  discussion at 581  F. Supp. 1329, 1348-5 1 (N.D. Tex. 1 984) (crediting lay 
testimony concerning "the feeling among Hispanic candidates and voters in Dallas County that political action is 
futile") . 
393. Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 291  (D. S .C. 2003). 
394. Neal Litig., discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (E.D. Va. 1 988); see also Terrell Litig., 565 F. Supp. 338, 342 
(N .D. Tex. 1 983) (It is clear to the Court that a major reason for the w bite majority's lack of familiarity with 
many black candidates is the severe de facto segregation of housing in Terrell."). 
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395. City of St. Louis Litig .. discussion at 896 F. Supp. 929 (ED.  Mo. 1 995) (finding depressed socioeconomic status 
and voter turnout is not sufficient to satisfy this factor when difference in turnout could be attributable to voter 
apathy); Armstrong v. Allain Litig .• discussion at 893 F.  Supp. 1320, 1332-33 (SD. Miss. 1 994) (finding that 
although significant socioeconomic disparities between whites and blacks exist. that the lack of vote turnout could 
be attributable to voter apathy and noting that when a black candidate is up for election. "the turnout of black 
voters increases dramatically"); City of Columbia Litig . •  discussion at 850 F. Supp 404 (D.S.C. 1993) ("Based on 
these registration and turnout statistics, the court rejects the notion that lower black turnout in city elections is 
attributable, to a significant degree, to the inability of blacks to learn of the election, to obtain transportation to the 
polls, or to mobilize in support of candidates and issues. A far more plausible explanation for low black turnout in 
city elections is the same as that for low turnout generally : voters are either satisfied that the City is working well, 
thus little interest is generated by the campaigns, or they are generally uninspired by some of the candidates."); 
SW Texas Junior College Dist. Litig. , discussion at Civ. A. No. DR-88-CA-1 8, 1 99 1  WL 367969, at *3-7 (W.D. 
Tex. Feb. 25, 1991)  ("[T]his Court is hesita11t to intervene when those same Hispanics could readily solve this 
problem by simply runnillg candidates and turning out to vote."); Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), discussion at 
829 F.2d 1 547, 156 1  (1 1th Cir. 1 987) (upholding the District Court's findillg that the defendant had sufficiently 
carried its burden to disprove "any causal com1ection between economic disparities and reduced political 
participation by minorities'' and finding that there had been significant efforts to ensure that voter registration 
facilities were equally dispersed and available to all without regard to race) .  
3%. See City of St. Louis Litig.,  discussion at 896 F .  Supp. 929 (E.D. Mo. 1 995) (finding evidence of depressed 
socioeconomic status and voter turnout was not sufficient to satisfy Factor 5 when difference in turnout could be 
attributable to voter apathy); Armstrong v. Allain Litig., discussion at 893 F. Supp. 1 320, 1 332-33  (S.D. Miss. 
1 994) (finding that although significant socioeconomic disparities between whites and blacks exist that it could be 
attributable to voter apathy-when a black candidate is up for election, "the turnout of black voters increases 
dramatically."); City of Columbia Litig.,  discussion at 850 F. Supp 404 (D. S.C. 1 993) (finding lower black voter 
turnout attributable to voter apathy as opposed to the "inability of blacks to learn of the election, to obtain 
transportation to the polls, or to mobilize in support of candidates and issues;" and concluding that black voters 
"are either satisfied that the City is working well, thus little interest is generated by the campaigns, or they are 
generally uninspired by some of the candidates"): SW Texas Junior College Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at Civ. A. No. 
DR-88-CA- 18, 1991 WL 367969, at *6-*7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 1991) (blaming low voter turnout on voter apathy 
and suggesting that "those same Hispanics fwho are currently underrepresented] could readily solve this problem 
by simply running candidates and turning out to vote") .  
397. See, e.g. , Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1040 (D.S.D. 2004) ( "People living on a day-to-day 
basis wonder if they can heat their home. Those are not the kinds of people who are the most predisposed to go out 
and engage in a great deal of political campaigning or activity."); Attala County Litig. (MS), discussion at 92 F.3d 
283, 293 -9 5  (5th Cir. 1 996) (overturning lower court 's attribution of lower black voter participation to voter 
apathy, which affected both blacks and whites because to "conclude that black voter apathy is the reason for the 
failure of blacks to elect the candidates of their choice when apathy affects all voters is counterintuitive . . . .  The fact 
that blacks and whites in Attala County are going to the polls in decreasing proportions does not explain why 
blacks alone are essentially shut out of the political processes of the county."): Gretna Litig., discussion at 636 F .  
Supp. 1 1 13 ,  1 120 (E.D. La. 1 986) ('Depressed levels of participation in voting and candidacy are ineJ.1ricably 
involved in the perception of futility and impotence" engendered by "severe historical disadvantage."); Terrazas 
Litig., discussion at 581  F. Supp. 1329, 1348-5 1 (N.D. Tex. 1 984) (finding Factor 5 based on depressed political 
participation as shown by low voter registration and turnout number, and "the feeling among Hispanic candidates 
and voters in Dallas County that political action is futile.") ; Major Litig.,  discussion at 574 F. Supp. 325, 339-41 
(E.D. La. 1983) (finding both lower socioeconomic status of blacks and lower registration and turnout in the black 
community, and concluding that "[a] sense of futility engendered by the pervasiveness of prior discrimination, 
both public and private, is perceived as discouraging blacks from entering into the governmental process"). 
398. Gretna Litig., discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 13 ,  1 120 (E.D. La. 1 986). 
399. Id. 
400. Cincinnati Litig., discussion at No. C-1-92-278, 1993 WL 76 1489, at * 1 1  (S.D .  Ohio July 8, 1993) ("While the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and housing do hinder the ability of some 
African Americans personally to finance political campaigns, the defendants have neither created these conditions 
nor do they intentionally maintain them.") . 
401 . Milwaukee NAACP Litig.,  discussion at 935 F. Supp. 1 4 1 9, 1427, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1 996) (finding no evidence 
had traced the continuing socioeconomic disparities to discrimination in the challenged county or state of 
Wisconsin). 
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402. See Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at 958 F. Supp. 1 196, 1225 (S.D. Tex. 1 997) ("The 
socioeconomic data does not distinguish between Hispanics who are recent immigrants and those who have been 
in this country for longer periods, particularly those who are citizens. This infom1ation is important to this 
analysis, but was not presented."); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig . .  discussion at 922 F. Supp. 339, 365 (S.D. Cal. 
1 995) ( "Hispanics are characterized by lower socioeconomic status than Anglos, but many Hispanics in El Centro 
have immigrated recently from Mexico, a third world country, and naturally are characterized by lower 
socioeconomic status . . .  Therefore, it is critical to distinguish between foreign born and native born Hispanics in 
addressing this Senate Factor. Plaintiffs' evidence failed to make this distinction."): El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. 
Litig., discussion at 5 9 1  F. Supp. 802, 807, 809-10 (W.D. Tex. 1 984) (finding discrepancies in socioeconomic 
status between Hispanics and whites, but holding that the "record fails to show how many of those affected by 
m1employment are recent immigrants or resident aliens as opposed to citizens" as well as that " [t]he evidence . . .  
fails to show how many residents of South El Paso were educated (or not educated) in Mexico rather than in the 
United States") . 
403. &e, e.g .,  Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., discussion at 793 F. Supp. 1 386, 1409 (S.D. Miss. 1992) ('[B]lacks in 
Mississippi continue to bear the effects of discrimination in critical areas of socioeconomic attainment and this 
continues in some ways to affect their opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives 
of their choice."). see also Calhoun County Litig.,  discussion at 813  F. Supp. 1 189 (N.D. Miss. 1 993) (finding that 
repercussions of discrimination against African-Americans continue to affect political participation). 
404. See Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., discussion at 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1409 (S.D. Miss. 1992) ("[B]lacks in Mississippi 
continue to bear the effects of discrimination in critical areas of socioeconomic attainment and this continues in 
some ways to affect their opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.") . 
405. ld. 
406. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 6f= 1 ,  and filter Colmnns Jurisdiction, Success, accordingly). 
407. See, e.g. ,  Columbus County Litig. ,  discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, l l05 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (noting the long history 
and continuing practice of using racial appeals in campaigns in Columbus County and North Carolina generally). 
408. Racial appeals found in 1 950 (Gingles Litig.), 1954 (Gingles Litig.), 1960 (Gingles Litig.), 1 968 (Gingles Litig.), 
1 970 (City of Dallas Litig.), 1 97 1  (Garza v. Los Angeles Litig. and City of Philadelphia Litig.), 1972 (City of 
Dallas Litig. and Gingles Litig.), 1 973 (Charleston County Litig. and Butts v. NYC Litig.), 1 975 (Jeffers Litig. and 
City of Dallas Litig.), 1 976 (Jeffers Litig. and City of Dallas Litig.), 1 977 (City of Greenwood Litig.), 1979 (Town 
of Babylon Litig.), 1 982 (Southern Christian Leadership Litig. and Jordan Litig.), 1 983 (Garza v. Los Angeles 
Litig., Clark Litig., Neal Litig.,  Mehfoud Litig., and City of Philadelphia Litig.), 1984 (County of Big Hom Litig. ,  
Gingles Litig., Town of Babylon Litig.), 1 985 (Armour Litig.), 1986 (Annstrong v .  Allain Litig.), 1987 (Clark 
Litig., Mehfoud Litig., City of Philadelphia Litig., Town of Hempstead Litig .. Town of Holyoke Litig., and 
Wamser Litig.), 1 988 (City of Dallas Litig. and Charleston County Litig.), 1989 (Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig. and 
City Dallas Litig.), 1 990 (Southern Christian Leadership Litig., Metro Dade County Litig., Magnolia Bar Ass'n 
Litig., and Charleston County Litig.), 1991  (Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig. and City of Philadelphia Litig.), 1 992 
(Charleston County Litig. and Alamosa County Litig.) 1 995 (City of LaGrange Litig.), 2000 (Charleston County 
Litig.), 2002 (Bone Shirt Litig. and St. Bernard Parish School Board Litig.). 
409. See id. ; see also Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 6f= 1 for the lawsuits finding racial appeals, to see the lists of 
campaigns within those). 
410. See Southern Christian Leadership Litig., Jordan Litig., County of Big Hom Litig. ,  Gingles Litig. , Armstrong v. 
Allain Litig., Clark Litig.,  Mehfoud Litig., Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., City of LaGrange Litig., Bone Shirt Litig., 
St. Bernard Parish School Board Litig. 
41 1 .  See, e.g . ,  Crenshaw County Litig. ,  discussion at 649 F. Supp. 289, 295 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (finding that "white 
candidates have encouraged voting along racial lines in Calhoun, Lawrence, and Pickens county by appealing to 
racial pr�judice."); Clark Litig., discussion at 777 F. Supp. 471, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14322, at *80 (M.D. 
La. 1 99 1) ("She [an African American judicial candidate] also testified about the overt and covert racial appeals in 
both elections by candidates and the public rin 1 983 and 1 987 campaignsl."); Magnolia Bar Ass'n., 793 F. Supp. 
1386, 1409-10 (S.D. Miss. 1 992) ("Supreme court and other judicial campaigns in Mississippi have been 
characterized by overt and subtle racial appeals. For example, in the 1 986 Supreme Court Central District, Place 
No. 2 election, avowed segregationist B arrett relied on overt racial appeals in his unsuccessful attempt to defeat 
black former Justice Anderson."); Martin v.  Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1 183, 1 195 (S.D. Miss. 1 9 87) ('Plaintiffs, 
however, presented proof of racial appeals . . .  by Richard Barrett in his 1986 challenge of Mississippi Supreme 
Court Justice Reuben Anderson."). 
412. See LULAC v. Clements Litig.,  discussion at 999 F.2d 8 3 1 ,  879 (5th Cir. 1993 ) (finding that a judicial candidate 
had been labeled a "Black Muslim" by his opponent); City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 
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1339 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) (finding in the 1972 Precinct 7 Constable's race, the incumbent used ads describing his 
African-American opponent in this manner: ''fl black man (no qualifications of any kind)"). 
413. See Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 10 16, 1025-26 (D. Colo. 2004) (identifying as a "subtle 
ethnic appeal" Marguerite Salazar's 1992 campaign for co1mty cmlllllission in which "she ran as a designated 
Hispanic role model immediately after joining the Hispanic Leadership Institute") . 
414. See Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976. 1041 (D.S.D. 2004) (characterizing as a racial appeal the 
headline in the state's largest newspaper, trumpeting "HUNHOFF PICKS INDIAN WOMAN AS RUNNING 
MATE"); Armour Litig. ,  discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991)  ("[T]hroughout the [ 1985] 
primary race, the media focused on Starks ' race, consistently describing him as the black candidate for Mayor."); 
Neal Litig.,  discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 143 1 -32 (E.D. Va. 1 988) (identifying a racial appeal in an editorial 
that identified two candidates as black and "urged voters not to vote on account of race, but rather on merit. 
However, the editorial also said that the race from District 3, involving Jack Green, 'is of great concern to many 
county residents' because Green could earn 'solid black support ' to defeat the veteran incumbent. The editorial 
clearly favored the re-election of the 'more experienced' incumbents."). But see City of Norfolk Litig., discussion 
at 605 F. Supp. 377, 3 92 (E.D. Va. 1 984) (deciding that news accounts discussing the race of candidates and the 
issue of black representation in the 1 982 campaign were not racial appeals where court found that black candidates 
had raised the issue and there was no evidence the issue was used to appeal to voters' prejudice) .  
415. See Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F .  Supp. 2d 268, 294-97 (D.S.C. 2003); Southern Christian 
Leadership Litig.,  discussion at 56 F.3d 128 1 ,  1 290 (1 1th Cir. 1 995) ('One . . .  subtle racial appeal was in the 
Democratic Party primary in 1 982 which involved a newspaper ad run by a white candidate contrasting the 
pictures of the white candidate and Justice Adams [who is African American] ."); LULAC v. Clements Litig., 
discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  879 (5th Cir. 1993); Mehfoud Litig. ,  discussion at 702 F. Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 
1 988) (citing selective use by white candidate of flyer with black opponent 's photograph, and failure to use similar 
photograph in campaign against a white candidate); Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., discussion at 793 F. Supp. 1 386, 
1410  (S.D. Miss. 1 992) (citing the white candidate's campaign flyers with pictures of African-American 
candidates used in judicial elections in 1 989, 1990, 1991) .  But see Charleston County Litig.,  discussion at 3 16 F. 
Supp. 2d 268, 295 (D.S.C. 2003) (classif)'ing as a racial appeal a campaign flyer from a race involving two white 
candidates that featured the photograph of an African-American elected official unassociated with either of the 
white candidates). 
416. See, e.g. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 780 F. Supp. 22 1,  237 (D. Del. 1991) (concluding that a 
newspaper article with accompanying photographs of black and white candidates was not a racial appeal because 
the "candidates [were] not referred to in any disparaging manner"); City of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F .  
Supp. 1 5 1 5, 1 534-35 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (rejecting the argument that a newspaper's publishing of candidate 
photographs was a racial appeal). 
417. City of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. Supp. 15 15,  1534-35 (W.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Red Clay Sch. Dist. 
Litig., discussion at 780 F. Supp. 22 1 ,  237 (D. Del. 1 991) (finding no racial appeal where newspaper published 
pictures o f  the candidates, stating tl1at race may be an issue in the 1 985 election, and noting concerns expressed by 
sole black board member that the black vote might be split). 
418. Charleston County Litig .. discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 294-97 (D.S.C. 2003) (finding that darkened 
photographs of African-American opponents were run by white candidates in their campaign materials in 1 988, 
1 990, 1992); City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1 993) (finding that a white 
candidate's photograph had been darkened by her opponent and used in the opponent's campaign literature). 
419. Charleston County Litig. ,  discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 294-97 (D.S.C. 2003). 
420. City of Philadelphia Litig. ,  discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1 993). 
421 .  ld. 
422. See, e.g ., City of Dallas Litig. ,  734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 1348 (N.D. Tex. 1 990) (noting that a white slating group 
warned of the "Mass Block Voting Tactics" in the black areas of South Dallas in 1970 and noting that "Folsom 
also distributed a leaflet charging that Weber was attempting to win the election with a 'massive black turnout,' 
and threatening that 'Garry Weber's South Dallas Machine is going to elect the next mayor' thanks to the efforts 
of 'professional black campaigners who will tum out unprecedented numbers of blacks voting for Weber."'); Neal 
Litig. ,  discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 143 1-32 (E.D. Va. 1 988) (identifying a racial appeal in an editorial stating 
that the race from District 3,  involving Jack Green, 'is of great concern to many county residents' because Green 
could earn 'solid black support' to defeat the veteran incumbent."). 
423. See, e.g ., Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F. Supp. 1 96, 212 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("In the Mayor's race in Pine Bluff in 
1975, for example, a supporter of a white candidate publicly warned that if white voters didn't tum out, there 
would be a black mayor.") 
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424. See, e.g. ,  Armour Litig., discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991)  (finding that a black mayoral 
candidate's opponents emphasized that if the black candidate was elected, he would have a black cabinet and that 
the police chief and fire chief would also be black). 
425 . See, e.g . ,  Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 104 1  (D.S.D .  2004) ("During the 2002 primary 
election for Bemett County offices, Indians were accused of 'trying to take over the county politically, . . .  [and] 
trying to take land back and put it in trust."'); City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 
n. 19  (E.D. Pa. 1 993) ('In the 1983 mayoral election, Mayor Goode testified that his opponent, former Mayor 
Frank Rizzo, attempted to associate Mayor Goode with Jesse Jackson and Harold Washington, implying that 
Mayor Goode's candidacy was part of 'a movement by blacks to take over all across the country. "'). 
426. Annour Litig., discussion at 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991) .  
427. Bone Shirt Litig.,  discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 104 1  (D. S.D. 2004). 
428. Jordan Litig.,  discussion at 604 F. Supp. 807, 814  (N.D. Miss. 1 984) ('One campaign television commercial 
sponsored by the white candidate whose slogan was 'He 's one of us ' opened and closed with a view of 
Confederate monuments accompanied by this audio message: You know, there 's something about Mississippi that 
outsiders will never, ever understand. The way we feel about our family and God, and the traditions that we have. 
There is a new Mississippi, a Mississippi of new jobs and new opportunity for all our citizens. [video pan of black 
factory workers] We welcome the new, but we must never, ever forget what has gone before. [video pan of 
Confederate monuments] We cannot forget a heritage that has been sacred through our generations."). 
429. City of Holyoke Litig. , discussion at 880 F. Supp. 9 1 1 , 922 (D. Mass. 1 995). 
430. Id. 
431 .  Id. 
432. Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 296 (D.S.C. 2003) .  
433. Id. 
434. Id. 
435. See, e.g . ,  City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 17, 1368 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (counting as a racial 
appeal a 1989 newspaper column indicating that "a 'protest vote' for lawyer and 'civic gadfly, '  Peter Lesser . . .  
could lead to racial violence and white flight;" citing leaflet that accused opponent 's campaign o f  "planting lies 
and rekindling old fires that could set Black/White relations back 20 years." and told black voters "No one, Black 
or White, will benefit from the hostilities between the Races [that] Gany Weber's hate-campaign is trying to 
force."). 
436. See, e.g., Metro Dade County Litig.,  discussion at 805 F. Supp. 967, 981-82 (S.D. Fla. 1 992) ("Recent elections 
demonstrate how successfully candidates and their supporters have engaged in a tactic of 'guilt by association' to 
defeat Black opponents. This tactic is utilized at the end of the campaign period, immediately prior to election day. 
For example, voters have been told that Black candidates share common goals with Jesse Jackson or Nelson 
Mandela, two political figures strongly supported in the Black community, but opposed in some Cuban and Jewish 
communities."). 
437. See, e.g . ,  City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 537 n. 1 9  (E.D. Pa. 1 993) ('Mayor Goode 
testified that in the 1 987 mayoral primary election, Ed Rendell, Goode 's opponent, attempted to associate Mayor 
Goode with Louis Farrakhan, a controversial Muslim leader."); City of Dallas Litig. ,  734 F. Supp. 13 1 7, 
1365 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (''On March 4, 1988, a Dallas Morning News article reported that a candidate for Criminal 
District Court No. 2, who was running against the African-American incumbent, mailed 77 ,000 fliers criticizing 
her opponent because he had changed his name to 'Baraka' after converting to Islam and becoming 'a follower of 
Malcolm X, the slain Islamic leader and black nationalist."'). 
438. Wamser Litig., discussion at 679 F. Supp. 15 13 ,  1 527 (E.D. Mo. 1 987) ("In his 1 987 primary campaign, Roberts 
[an African American] made overt racial appeals to black voters. Roberts accused a white opponent-Osborn-of 
being backed by 'the Klan. ' ") . 
439. See Charleston County Litig.,  discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 295 (D. S.C. 2003) (noting a campaign flyer from 
a 2000 race involving two white candidates that featured the darkened photograph of an African-American school 
board member from a separate district whose pennission to use the picture had neither been sought nor granted); 
City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 537 n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting campaign material 
distributed in an early 1 990s state senate race between two white candidates where one candidate published a 
darkened picture of his white opponent side -by-side with the picture of P hiladelphia's black mayor). 
440. City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 1 7, 1339 n.34 (W.D. Tex. 1 990) (''During the run-off election 
for two State Representative districts in June of 1970, the 'Democratic Committee for Responsible Government' 
attacked a white candidate . . .  because he was 'running in South Dallas . . .  as a team' with a black candidate-and 
because he had raised money for voter registration activities, mostly in predominately Black or Latin-American 
neighborhoods." ); see also Gingles Litig., discussion at 590 F. Supp. 345, 364 (E.D.N.C. 1 984) (noting crude 
96 Documenting Discrimination 
cartoons and pamphlets of the campaigns marked by outright white supremacy in the 1 890's which featured white 
political opponents in the company of black political leaders and later appeals with the same theme ) .  
441 .  Garza v .  Los Angeles Litig., 756 F .  Supp. 1298, 1 3 4 1  (C.D. Cal. 1 990) ("In the 1 97 1  runoff for the 4 9th Assembly 
District. Richard Alatorre ran against William Brophy. Mr. Brophy distributed mailers which included Mr. 
Alatorre's photograph and alluded that Alatorre was sympathetic to undocumented aliens."). 
442. City of Holyoke Litig., discussion at 880 F. Supp. 9 1 1 ,  922 (D. Mass. 1 995) ("Proulx, for his part, attacked Dunn 
for not calling for a moratorium on all subsidized housing programs in Holyoke. Proulx explained that he 
supported such a moratorium with one important exception-subsidized elderly housing. The vast majority of 
govenunent subsidized elderly housing in Holyoke was occupied by white non-Hispanic senior citizens."): Butts 
v. NYC Litig., 614 F. Supp. 1527, 1 5 3 1 (SD.N.Y. 1 985) ("Badillo's opponents distributed literature 
misrepresenting or emphasizing Badillo 's position on issues said to have racial connotations, such as scatter site 
subsidized housing."). 
443. Town of Hempstead Litig.,  discussion at 956 F. Supp. 326, 342-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1 997) ("In a late 1 970s campaign 
for a State Senate seat from an Assembly District within the Town, the incumbent Republican appealed to the fears 
of Town residents that black students from Queens would be bused to schools in the Town. The campaign 
literature used pictures of black children in school buses to convey the message that voting for the Democratic 
opponent would result in such busing."); City of Dallas Litig.,  discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 1 7 ,  1 3 17 n.64 (W.D. 
Tex. 1 990) ("In Place 9 [city council elections in 1976), Jesse Price campaigned against Bill Blackburn on a 
platform that included opposition to busing for school desegregation-and opposition to any court order requiring 
busing-saying he intended to 'hang Blackburn's stand on busing around his neck. '''). 
444. Town of Hempstead Litig., discussion at 956 F. Supp. 326, 342-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1 997); City of Holyoke Litig. ,  
discussion at 880 F. Supp. 9 1 1 , 922 (D. Mass. 1995) ("Dunn's campaign literature featured the slogan 'It takes 
guts,' coupled with a teach the 'Spanish' English theme as an answer to increasing crime and vandalism"). 
445. Town of Hempstead Litig., discussion at 956 F.  Supp. 326, 342-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1 997). 
446. City of LaGrange Litig., discussion at 969 F .  Supp. 749, 777 (ND. Ga. 1 997) ('[P]ublic debate about the 
consolidation of the local schools was marked by racial appeals and arguments."). 
447. City of Greenwood Litig., discussion at 599 F. Supp. 397, 403 (N.D. Miss. 1 984). 
448. City of Norfolk Litig., discussion at 605 F. Supp. 377, 392 (ED. Va. 1 984); City of St. Louis Litig., discussion 
at 896 F. Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mo. 1 995): Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 780 F .  Supp. 221 ,  237-38 (D. 
Del. 1 99 1). 
449. City of Norfolk Litig., discussion at 605 F. Supp. 377, 392 (ED. Va. 1 984) . 
450. City of St. Louis Litig., discussion at 896 F. Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mo. 1 995). 
451 .  Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 780 F. Supp. 221 ,  237-3 8  (D. Del. 1 9 9 1 ). 
452. City of Austin Litig., discussion at 87 1 F .2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1 989) (noting the lower court 's dismissal of 
"appellants' contention that subliminal racial appeals accompanied the voters' rejection in 1 985 of an amendment 
proposing single-member districts.") . 
453. County of Big Hom Litig., discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1017- 18 (D. Mont. 1 986) ('Unlike plaintiffs, this 
court does not consider every discussion of or question about the taxation issue to be a racial campaign appeal.") . 
454. Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 3 36 F. Supp. 2d 976, 104 1 (D.S.D. 2004) ("Media outlets across the state ran 
numerous articles about alleged voter fraud prior to the general election. None of the allegations were actually 
proved to be true. Bennett County's local newspaper ran a large, front page headline a111 ouncing, 'LOCAL 
V01ER FRAUD LOOKED AT BY FBI,' despite the fact that no fraudulent activity was alleged to have occurred 
in Bennett County. Similar voter fraud allegations made the headlines in 1 978." (internal citations omitted)) . 
455. City of Dallas Litig., 734 F. Supp. 13 17, 1 368 (W.D. Tex. 1990) 
456. Jeffers Litig.,  discussion at 730 F. Supp. 1 96, 212-13 (E.D. Ark. 1 989). 
457. Id. 
458. Garza v. Los Angeles Litig., discussion at 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1341  (C.D. Ca. 1 990). 
459. Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F. Supp. 196, 212  (E.D. Ark. 1 989) ("[A]t a public rally [a white candidate fU1111ing 
against a black candidate] used profanity and a racial epithet-not in his actual speech, to be sure, but in open 
conversation''). 
460. St. Bernard Parish School Board Litig.,  discussion at No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 16540, *33 -34 
(E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002). 
461 . City ofDallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 13 17, 1339 (W.D. Tex. 1 990). 
462. Id. 
463. Neal Litig., discussion at 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1432-3 3 (E.D. Va. 1 988). 
464. Wamser Litig. ,  discussion at 679 F. Supp. 1 5 13 ,  1 527 (E.D. Mo. 1 987). 
Documenting Discrimination 97 
465. LULAC v. Clements Litig., discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  879 (5th Cir. 1 993 ) (en bane) ("Nothing in the district 
court 's opinion indicates that these racial appeals were anything more than isolated incidents."); City of 
Springfield Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1 0 1 5 ,  1 032 (C.D. Ill. 1 987) (noting racial slur directed at black candidate at 
luncheon meeting in 1 982 and stating that this "single occurrence cannot support a claim that political campaigns 
in Springfield are carried out through subtle or overt racial appeals."); Milwaukee NAACP Litig., discussion 
at 935 F. Supp. 1 4 1 9, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1 996) ("While the plaintiffs insist that this factor supports the inference of 
vote dilution, they are able to point to only one judicial election which appears to have involved racial appeals: the 
1 996 general election between Judge Stamper and Robert Crawford. Assuming that the Stamper/Crawford election 
did, in fact, involve hostile racial conduct, one election in the past 25 years is hardly enough to prove a pattern.") . 
466. Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 1 6, 1 025-26 (D. Colo. 2004) (noting ethnic appeals only 
by minority candidates who subsequently lost their elections); Southern Christian Leadership Litig., discussion at 
56 F.3d 1 28 1 ,  1 290 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995) (finding that appeals were "ineffective " as targeted black candidates won 
their races); LULAC v. Clements Litig., discussion at 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  879 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane) ("In the only 
judicial election affected by a racial appeal, Judge B araka, the black candidate, won bot11 the Republican primary 
and the general election, winning a majority of the white vote in both elections.") . 
467. Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 16,  1 025-26 (D. Colo. 2004). 
468. Liberty County Litig., discussion at 957 F. Supp. 1 522, 1 565 (N.D. Fla 1 997); City of Chicago Litig., discussion 
at 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1 449 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Town of B abylon Litig., 9 14 F. Supp. 843, 889 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996); 
Sanchez-Colorado Litig.,  discussion at 861 F. Supp. 1 5 16, 1 529 (D. Colo. 1 994); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 
discussion at 591  F. Supp. 802, 8 10 (W.D. Tex. 1 9 84); City of Columbia Litig. ,  850 F. Supp. 404, 
424 (D. S. C. 1 993); Chattanooga Litig., discussion at 722 F. Supp. 3 80, 396 (E.D. Tenn. 1 989); Gty of Boston 
Litig., discussion at 609 F. Supp. 739, 744 -4 5  (D .  Mass. 1 985). 
469. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 5 9 1  F. Supp. 802, 8 10 (W.D. Tex. 1 984) ("The next factor to be considered is whether 
political campaigns for the office of trustee have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals. Mrs. Maxine 
Silva, a candidate for trustee in the 1 948 school board election, testified that during her campaign she received 
telephone calls in which she was accused of being a 'wet-back, ' and subjected to other ethnic slurs. The Court 
accepts the testimony of Mrs. Silva, and finds it to be quite credible. It was her further testimony, however, tllat 
times have changed, and that the same atmosphere does not exist today. In fact, Mrs. Silva is again a candidate for 
trustee in the 1 984 school board election.") . 
470. Town of Babylon Litig. ,  discussion at 9 14 F. Supp. 843, 889 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) ("The African-American candidates 
that were tlle targets of tllese racial appeals lost. While deplorable, these racial appeals occurred ten years ago, and 
plaintiffs presented no evidence as to more recent racial appeals."). 
471. City of Columbia Litig. ,  discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 424 (D.S.C. 1 993) ("the court finds that tlle racial 
harmony exhibited in the more recent campaigns is more indicative of the present-day political climate within tlle 
City. Accordingly, these two instances in which racial appeals were made are, by modem standards, rather isolated 
incidents and are not indicative of current attitudes."); see also City of Boston Litig., discussion at 609 F .  Supp. 
739, 745 (D. Mass. 1 985) ("Other than an incident of verbal intimidation directed at a campaign worker in 1 983, 
the record in this case contains no indication that the use of racial tactics has been a part of the City's elections 
since 1 977. There was, in fact testimony tllat the theme of racial harmony played a major role in the campaigns of 
some candidates in the 1 983 elections.") . 
472. Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 304 (D.S.C. 2004). 
473. Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig.,  discussion at 793 F. Supp. 1 3 86, 1410 (S.D. Miss. 1 992) .  
474. SENATE REPORT supra note 1 5, at 27-3 0 .  
475. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column 7 f  = 1 ) .  
476. See id. (filter Column 7 f  = 1 while filtering Column Jurisdiction = True o r  False). 
477. See, e.g. , Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO), discussion at 97 F.3d 1 303, 1 3 1 9  ( 10th Cir. 1 996) (noting that no 
Hispanic candidate had won election to state legislature from the district since 1 940); Jefferson Parish I Litig. 
(LA), 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1 99 1 )  (discussing expert 's analysis of tlle 20 elections in which blacks have sought 
office in Jefferson Parish since 1 980). 
478. See, e.g., City of Santa Maria Litig. (CA), discussion at 1 60 F.3d 543 , 548 ( 9th Cir. 1 998) (noting that "[i]t was 
well-known throughout Santa Maria that the district court was awaiting the results of that election. Days before the 
election, Maldonado told a local newspaper that his victory would prove ' Santa Maria is not racist,' " and 
concluding that "[p]laintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact in whetller the 1 994 city council election was 
representative of typical voting behavior in Santa Maria"); Chickasaw County II Litig., discussion at No. CIV.A. 
1 :92CV142-JAD, 1 997 WL 3 342676 1 ,  at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997) (finding the election ofblack candidate to 
constable an anomaly where he "won the election by only 8 votes and his prestige was heightened by tlle fact that 
he is an ex-pro atltlete. Moreover, this election occurred during the pendency of this lawsuit");  Clark Litig., 
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discussion at 725 F. Supp. 285, 299 (M.D. La. 1988) (discussing Judge Pitcher, who "was elected in East Baton 
Rouge where this litigation is pending and after this litigation commenced. While the term 'aberration,' used by 
one witness to describe Judge Pitcher's victory, is too strong, it is clear that the election must be considered as one 
under unusual circumstances"); City of Springfield Litig., discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1015. 103 1 (C.D. Ill. 1 987) 
(noting that "[s]ince this suit was filed, Candice Trees. a black woman, was elected Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Sangamon County in a county-wide general election in November of 1986," and "find[ing] that the majority 
citizens in power sought to evade Section 2 'by manipulating the election of a "safe" minority candidate' to an 
office that has no policymaking power" because the "result is sudden and aberrant and logically can be attributed 
primarily to the concern generated by this litigation within the power centers of the City of Springfield") (citation 
omitted). 
479. See, e.g., Albany County Litig.,  discussion at No. 03 -CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820, at * 1 1  (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003) 
(noting that "[ s ] ince the County was incorporated in 1788. no minority has ever been elected to a County-wide 
office"); Mehfoud Litig.,  discussion at 702 F. Supp. 588, 590 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting that "'[n]o black has ever 
been elected to the Henrico Board of Supervisors. Prior to 1 979 no black had ever run for the position, and since 
that date there have been three black candidates . . .  All three were defeated. In addition, as of the date of the trial 
in this case, no black had ever been appointed to the Henrico County School Board"): Seastrunk Litig., discussion 
at 772 F.2d 143, 1 5 3  (5th Cir. 1985) (observing that "no black had ever held office of any sort in the Parish"); City 
of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1 5 15, 1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1 988) (stating that of the Senate Factors, 
"perhaps the most significant in Jackson is the fact that no black candidate has ever been elected to, or served on, 
the City Commission" and pointing out that "[a] politically cohesive, geographically compact minority which 
exceeds 30% of the population of the City has been unable for over seventy years to have a member of the 
minority serve upon the governing authority of Jackson") . 
480. See, e.g., African-American Voting Rights LDF Litig., discussion at 994 F. Supp. 1 105, 1 125 (E.D. Mo. 1 997) 
(finding that "[ t]he seventh factor also weighs in defendants' favor because African-Americans have been 
generally successful in reaching the bench in the jurisdictions in question; and, to whatever e.xtent it is relevant, 
African-Americans have also been successful in reaching nonjudicial public office in Missouri of late"); Little 
Rock Litig.,  discussion at 83 1 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (noting that "[b]lack candidates won ten of 
the twenty-five races in which one or more blacks participated'  for "the position of Little Rock City Board of 
Directors from 1 962 to 1 992"); Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., discussion at 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1410 (S.D. Miss. 
1 992) (finding that "blacks have enjoyed considerable electoral success in Mississippi" from facts that "two 
blacks . . .  have been elected to the Mississippi Supreme Court," that "United States Congressman Mike Espy . . .  is 
black [and that] numerous blacks have been elected to judicial offices and non-judicial offices throughout" the 
state) . 
481 .  See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2005) (providing that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population'') . 
482. See, e.g., Old Person Litig. (MT), discussion at 3 12 F.3d 103 6, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the Voting 
Rights Act does not "require any precise mathematical calculation of percentages of success in election," 
suggesting that " [s]uch calculations may be misleading or give undue weight to what is only one of many factors" 
and that "[ w ]hat is important is that the district court consider the success in elections of the protected class," and 
concluding that "neither the statute, nor the Senate report pertinent to its interpretation. nor the Supreme Court's 
teachings in Gingles or De Grandy require any particular form for the district court's assessment of election 
success"); Cincinnati Litig., discussion at No. C-1-92-278, 1 993 WL 761489. at *24 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1 993) 
(noting minority successes fall short of proportional representation and finding "there is no constitutional or 
statutory right to proportional representation"); Terrazas Litig., discussion at 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1355-56 (N.D. 
Tex. 1984) (observing that " [ o ]ne would expect greater hispanic representation for a population group of its size," 
but concluding that there are "limits . . .  to the probative value of this inference. A lack of proportional 
representation has no independent constitutional or statutory significance.") . 
483. See, e.g. , Bridgeport Litig., discussion at Civ. No. 3 :93CV1476(PCD), 1993 WL 742750, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 
1 993) (noting discrepancy between percentages of voting-age populations of blacks and Hispanics, roughly 22% 
for each, and election to 13 and 1 6o/o, respectively, of city-wide offices, lowered if ceremonial and uncontested 
offices are removed) ; Operation Push Litig.,  discussion at 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1 987) (observing 
that "Mississippi has some 52 1 black elected officials, including one State Supreme Court Justice, one U. S. 
Congressman, and two State Senators. On the whole, these 52 1 black officials as of January 1 986 represented 
approximately 9. 9 percent of the total number of elected officials-approximately 5 ,278 in all. The black 
population of Mississippi is approximately 35  percent of the total population. Most of these black officials were 
elected from black majority districts"); Jordan Litig., discussion at 604 F. Supp. 807, 8 12 (N.D .  Miss. 1 984) 
(noting that "[b]lacks hold less than ten percent of all elective offices in Mississippi, though they constitute 3 5% of 
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the state 's population and a majority of the population of22 counties); Major Litig., discussion at 574 F. Supp. 
325, 351 ,  3 4 1  (E.D. La. 1 983) (describing a fifteen percent success rate for black candidates at the polls as 
"substantially lower than might be anticipated" given the parish's fifty-five percent black population, and also 
noting that "[n]otwithstanding a black population of 29.4%, only 7% of Louisiana's elected officials are black") 
(citations omitted). 
484. See, e.g., Suffolk County Litig. ,  discussion at 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that Factor 7 
"favors the defendants" where "there is one Hispanic legislator in Suffolk County which is 6% of the legislators" 
and "the percentage of Hispanic voting age citizens in Suffolk County is 6 .67o/o''); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 
discussion at 127 F.3d 1355, 1381  ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997) (noting that "[b]lack preferred candidates . . .  filled 45% 
(22/49) of the positions available in the races in which they ran [which] is a higher percentage of positions filled 
than the percentage of Rome 's population which is black") . 
485. See Southern Christian Leadership Litig. , discussion at 785 F. Supp. 1469, 1477 (M.D. Ala. 1 992) (stating that 
"strict proportionality between blacks and whites eligible for election does not preclude a finding that blacks have 
not been able substantially to influence elections," noting that Justice Brennan's direction in Gingles to "look 
beyond the single question of the degree of success of black candidates is particularly required where the minority 
candidate pool is so small") . 
486. See, e.g., City of Bridgeport Litig., Civ. No. 3 :93CV1476(PCD), 1 993 WL 742750, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 1993) 
(stating that "[u]nderticket offices are often filled on the coattails of the mayoral candidate and election of 
minorities so such offices do not clearly reflect the ability of minorities to elect the ir choices") . 
487. See, e.g. , Butts v. NYC Litig. (NY), 779 F.2d 141 ,  150 (2d Cir. 1 985) (disapproving district court's "decision to 
disvalue the electoral success that minorities have had in New York City simply because these victories did not 
involve the City's three top offices") . 
488. See, e.g., Meza Litig., discussion at 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 72 (D. Mass. 2004) (acknowledging "a number of 
unsuccessful campaigns by Latino candidates in [the] Chelsea" portion of the 2d Suffolk District in a lawsuit 
challenging the redistricting of State House districts, but finding that "the success of the Barrios 2002 senate 
campaign in the relevant portions of the 2d Suffolk District suggests that attractive Hispanic candidates with well­
run campaigns are currently quite competitive within the Enacted Plan's configuration of the 2d Suffolk District") 
(emphasis added). 
489. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361 ,  370 (5th Cir. 2001 )  (noting that "exogenous elections are 
less probative than elections for the particular office at issue," but also asserting a "critical evidentiary reality that 
the exogenous character of . . .  elections does not render them nonprobative ") (citation omitted); Lafayette County 
Litig. ,  20 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Miss. 1 998) (finding that " [w]hile blacks have enjoyed somewhat better success 
running for other county offices such as constable and board of education members, those exogenous elections are 
not as probative as the supervisocy elections at issue here") . 
490. See, e.g., Smith-Crittenden County Litig., discussion at 687 F. Supp. 13 10, 1 3 17 (E.D. Ark. 1 988) (finding non­
persuasive "evidence of some success by black candidates in school-board elections or other local races, because 
the electoral structure at issue here has no effect on these candidates"); City of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. 
Supp. 15 15, 1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1 988) (declining "to consider the election of a black candidate to the Madison 
County Commission as being relevant to an inquity of whether black candidates have been elected to the Jackson 
City Commission, the only political subdivision which is the subject of this litigation'' and noting that county 
commission "a different governing body, with many more commissioners than the City, elected from a different 
group of voters, and having different duties and responsibilities."). 
491 .  See, e.g., Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO), discussion at 97 F.3d 1303, 1 324 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that "the 
record does not justify the district court's credit of the extent to which minorities have been elected to public office 
in HD 60" and stating that "exogenous elections-- those not involving the particular office at issue--are less 
probative than elections involving the specific office that is the subject of the litigation'') (quotation omitted); City 
of Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), discussion at 829 F.2d 1 547, 1560 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 987) (holding that "[t]he district 
court 's reliance on municipal elections in Carroll County as proof of minority electoral success of a county 
electoral scheme is obviously misplaced. The political jurisdiction in question here is the county, not the cities of 
Villa Rica, Whitesburg, or Carrollton. The record plainly demonstrates the clear lack of minority electoral success 
in Carroll County."). 
492. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F.  Supp. 2d 976, 1042-43 (D.S.D.  2004) (finding that "electing fewer 
than thirty Indians in nearly 100 years in a majority-Indian county does not demonstrate a long histocy of Indians 
being elected to office. Several positions listed, moreover, were appointed, which detracts from their probative 
value"); Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 495 (2d Cir. 1 999) (noting that "[a]lthough 
black Republicans have been appointed or elected to other offices in the surrounding area, and blacks have been 
appointed to a number of positions in the Town, the fact remains that until the election of Curtis Fisher in 1 993, no 
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African-American was ever elected to the legislative body at issue in this case.") (quotation omitted): Texarkana 
Litig., discussion at 861 F. Supp. 756, 764 (W.D. Ark. 1 992) (discounting as evidence of minority electoral 
success experience of plaintiff Londell Williams, who was appointed to the city board of directors in 1978, has 
never had a white opponent and when he was opposed by a black candidate, was an incumbent.") ; Metro Dade 
County Litig.,  discussion at 805 F. Supp. 967, 982 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (commenting that since 1 968 "no Black 
candidate preferred by Black voters has ever been elected to the County Commission without first being appointed 
to the Commission. Therefore, although Blacks have been elected to the County Commission, this seeming 
electoral success does not demonstrate that Blacks are able to elect their preferred representatives in the absence of 
special circumstances"). 
493. See Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F .3d 1 002, 102 1 (2d Cir. 1 995) (finding Factor 7 unsatisfied, citing 
evidence that "blacks have held several elected positions on the Board of Education, they have been appointed to 
other local boards and commissions, and they have held positions on the Niagara Falls Democratic Committee"); 
City of Rome Litig. (GA). discussion at 127 F.3d 1355, 1384 n. 1 8  (1 1th Cir. 1 997) (finding subsequent electoral 
success of minority candidates first appointed to office probative of minority electoral success where evidence 
indicated that the appointed candidates had been able to develop sustained biracial coalitions" and have not simply 
maintained "their elected positions because of the sheer power of incumbency"). 
494. Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476, 495 (2d Cir. 1999). 
495. See, e.g., Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 780 F. Supp. 22 1 ,  226 (D. Del. 1991) (noting that 
"[s]pecifically, in 1 986, 1987 and 1989, no black candidates ran for a seat on the Red Clay Board and, as indicated 
supra, there are virtually no procedural restrictions in the system which would chill or frustrate black 
candidacy . . .  The Court finds, therefore, that on the whole this Senate Factor does not weigh heavily in favor of the 
Plaintiffs."): McCarty Litig. (TX), discussion at 749 F.2d 1 134, 1 135 (5th Cir. 1 984) (noting that "[o]nly two black 
candidates sought election to the Board of Trustees" and that ''Black voters register and vote in Lamar County 
without hindrance, as each plaintiff testified, and there is no hindrance or obstacle to the candidacy of black 
persons for the Board"). 
4%. See Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 780 F.  Supp. 22 1,  226 & n.2 (D. Del. 1991).  
497. See, e.g., Calhoun County Litig. (MS), discussion at 88 F.3d 1393, 1397-98 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting "[t]hat few or 
no black citizens have sought public office in the challenged electoral system does not preclude a claim of vote 
dilution . . .  To hold otherwise would allow voting rights cases to be defeated at the outset by the very barriers to 
political participation that Congress has sought to remove.") (quoting Westwego Citizens For Better Government 
v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1208 n. 9 ( 5th Cir. 1 989)); see also City of LaGrange Litig. ,  discussion at 
969 F. Supp. 749, 776 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (noting testimony from African-American candidates that they "would not 
even run for at-large City-Council seats because of the perception that such campaigns would not succeed" and 
finding that this "testimony comports with the strikingly low number of African-American candidates for the 
LaGrange City Council over the last one hundred years."); LULAC - Midland Litig., discussion at 648 F. Supp. 
596, 604 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (noting that "only three minority candidates have been elected" since formation of the 
school board, that "[flew minority members have dared to try to be elected," and that ''no minority member has 
been elected" since the adoption of majority vote requirement); cf Cousin Litig. (TN), discussion at 1 45 F.3d 8 1 8, 
833 (6th Cir. 1 998) ( acknowledging that "no black has ever run for a county judgeship, a phenomenon surely 
attributable at least in part to the perception that it is very difficult for a black candidate to win a countywide 
election," but ultimately concluding that Factor 7 did not clearly weigh in plaintiffs' favor; finding the fact that 
"political success is difficult . . .  does not mean it is unmanageable" and observing that three of the 27 black 
lawyers in the county already held "lawyer-qualified" offices). 
498. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 89 F.3d 1205, 12 1 5  (5th Cir. 1 996) (crediting defendants' 
expert testimony that "a serious candidate must raise and expend considerable sums of money for his campaign" 
and that "the failure to do so renders the candidate non-serious and non-viable" and noting that plaintiffs' 
concession that "several minority candidates who lost were not 'serious ' candidates either because they spent little 
money or were not supported by the minority community"). 
499. Blaine County Litig. (MT), discussion at 363 F.3d 897, 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "no American Indian 
was ever elected to the Blaine County Commission under the at-large voting system" and also noting evidence 
"demonstrat[ing] that there is a pool of qualified American Indian candidates [who] also testified that they were 
currently unwilling to run for County Commissioner because white bloc voting made it impossible for an 
American Indian to succeed in an at-large election"); Gretna Litig., discussion at 636 F. Supp. 1 1 13 ,  1 122 (E.D. 
La. 1986) (commenting that "despite the strong candidacies of two qualified blacks on three separate occasions, no 
black has ever won an aldermanic election" and concluding that "[t]his evidence can be interpreted only as strong 
evidence of dilution"). 
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500. See Bridgeport Litig., Civ. No. 3 : 93CV1476(PCD), 1 993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 974 1 ,  1993 WL 742750 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 27, 1 993) and discussion at 26 F .3d 271 (2d Cir. 1 994) (noting that a black candidate won the mayoral 
primary, that an "influential" group called the Democratic Town Committee failed to endorse him, and that the 
candidate lost the general election in an overwhelmingly Democratic city). 
501 . Bone Shirt Litig. ,  336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004), Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004); National 
City Litig. (CA), 976 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1 992); Romero Litig. (CA), 883 F.2d 1418  (9th Cir. 1989), Sanchez 
Bond Litig. (CO), 875 F.2d 1488 ( 10th Cir. 1 989), Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 1 16 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1 997), 
County ofBig Hom Litig., 647 F. Supp. 1 002 (D. Mont. 1 986). 
502. Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1 999); Cincinnati Litig. ,  40 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1994); City 
of Norfolk Litig. (VA), 883 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989); Baytown Litig. (TX), 840 F.2d 1 540 ( 5th Cir. 1988); Rocha 
Litig., No. V-79-26, 1 982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 5 1 64 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1982). 
503. Cincinnati Litig. (OH), discussion at 40 F.3d 807, 8 12  (6th Cir. 1 994) (quoting Smith v. Clinton) .  
504. Id. 
505. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1 002, 1022 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing Kimble, a 
candidate who ''failed by only six votes to win one of the available nominations in the 1987 Democratic Party 
primary for the City Council. To be sure, Kimble only placed sixth in a contest of nine, and she received the least 
white-voter support of all the candidates. Nevertheless, she received more white-voter support than any other black 
candidate had before, and the crossover vote was nearly enough to secure a seat."); Bond Litig. (CO), discussion at 
875 F.2d 1488, 1492 -9 3 (10th Cir. 1 989) (basing the conclusion that "Hispanics have the ability to elect 
commissioners under the at-large system currently in use in the county" in part on finding that "in two recent 
elections in which Hispanics had run for the county commission, the Hispanic candidate had lost by only 53 votes 
in one race and by 22 votes in the other."): City of Pomona Litig., discussion at 665 F. Supp. 853, 861 (C.D. Cal. 
1 987) (noting that although "no black has been elected to the Pomona City Council, in 1 983 black candidate Willie 
White, despite the small size and dispersion of the black community in Pomona, lost by only 71  votes. His near 
miss, which could not have been achieved without substantial white cross-over support, demonstrates the potential 
electability of black candidates"). 
506. Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 16 F. Supp. 2d 268, 278-79 & n 14 (noting that in the 1997 and 2000 
elections, the minority candidates at issue received only 7% and 2.8% of the non-white vote). 
507. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 5 12 U.S. 997, 1020 ( 1994) (internal citation omitted). 
508. See, e.g., City of Cleveland Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 901 ,  908 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (finding no violation of Section 2 
where, "while the three minority candidates in the above -denoted races lost, the record demonstrates that African­
American candidates in many other City and county wide elections have prevailed. Three of the City's current 
aldermen, two of the at-large members on the City School Board, the Superintendent of the School Board, the 
Circuit Clerk, a Circuit Court Judge, a County Court Judge, and a majority of the County Election Commission are 
African-American, thus demonstrating that minority candidates are fully capable of winning City and county-wide 
elections, and that the City's minority citizens can fully participate in the political process"); NAACP v. Fordice 
Litig. (MS), discussion at 252 F.3d 361 ,  371  ( 5th Cir. 2001 )  (noting that minority candidate "Antwinette McCrary 
( 'Mccrary') won an at-large council position in the City of Quitman. a town with a 26.88% black voting age 
population'' and concluding that "absent any other countervailing evidence in the record, we cannot say that [the 
court below] erred by relying on these elections to ultimately conclude that the electoral success of African­
Americans in Mississippi militates against a finding of vote dilution''); Niagara Falls Litig.,  discussion at 913 F. 
Supp. 722, 748-49 (W.D.N.Y 1 994) (noting, in lawsuit finding neither Factor 7 met nor a violation of Section 2, 
that "African Americans have been elected to the Niagara Falls Board of Education in significant numbers . . .  
Elections to the Board are at-large and are non-partisan") ; Stockton Litig. (CA), discussion at 956 F.2d 884. 89 1 
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[t]he statistical data before the district court reflected that while in past elections 
minorities had been elected, those elected were for the most part not elected by minorities. Of the three black 
representatives in office at the time Measure C was adopted, two were elected from districts that were 
overwhelmingly (more than 70 percent) white. Prior to 1 97 1 ,  when an at-large system was in effect, [H]ispanics 
had been elected by white majorities, further indicating that the minority representation before Measure C existed 
because whites voted for minorities"); City of Boston Litig. (MA), discussion at 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(finding that "the success of minority candidates and the influence of minority voters were not confined to tre two 
districts having Black majorities," noting that " [t]wo Blacks were chosen by the City as a whole to be at-large 
members of the School Committee"). 
509. See, e.g., Texarkana Litig., discussion at 86 1 F. Supp. 756, 764 (W.D. Ark. 1 992) (concluding that the successful 
black candidate's "experiences do not support the notion that minority voters have the ability to elect 
representatives of their choice in at-large elections in Texarkana" where "[h]e has had the advantages of 
appointment and incumbency and the lack of a white opponent"); Columbus County Litig., 782 F. Supp. 1097, 
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1 102 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (noting that in "three of the four elections in which the black candidate won, he was an 
incumbent, and in two of the four elections the black candidate had no white opponent" and that " [o]nly once, in 
1980, has a non-incumbent black beaten a white opponent"): Clark Litig., discussion at 725 F. Supp. 285, 299 
(M.D. La. 1988) (finding factor met and noting that "[i]n the case of Judge Collins, there were special 
circumstances because he was first appointed to a vacancy and then elected as an incumbent in 1 978 in an election 
in which he had no opposition''); Terrell Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338,  347-48 (N.D. Tex. 1 983) (finding 
that "a disproportionately low number of blacks have been elected as Terrell officials,'' that a black official first 
appointed to the city council "now runs from an essentially all black residency district, and has never had a white 
opponent" and that "[t]here has never been more than one black representative on the five member city council") . 
510. See, e.g . ,  City of Rome Litig. (GA), discussion at 127 F.3d 1 3 55, 1384 n. 18 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997). 
51 1 .  SENATE REPORT, supra note 1 5, at 29. 
512. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 8c= J, then filter Column: 8f= J) .  
513 .  See id. (filter Column: 8f= 1 while filtering Column: Success= J) .  
514. See id. (filter Column 8c=J , while filtering Column 8.f=O, while filtering Column: WasSection2Violated= J) .  
515.  Charleston County Litig., discussion at 3 1 6  F. Supp. 2d 268, 297 (D .S.C.  200 3) ("Although the Court received 
evidence on both factors, the United States has not put them at issue . . . .  The Court has considered all of the 
evidence related to the factors of tenuousness and responsiveness and finds that they do not materially contribute 
to the Court's conclusion.); Suffolk County Litig., discussion at 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
("The plaintiffs' only evidence is that the Committee of Reapportio111 1ent for the Suffolk County Legislature and 
the Legislature did not respond to the PRLDEF's letters and proposed Latino redistricting plan. This alone, does 
not show a significant lack of responsiveness. As such, this factor is neutral at best."); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. 
Dist. Litig.,  discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 170 (D. Colo. 1 998) (discussing evidence including the use of 
federal funds to implement programs that will be responsive to Indian student needs, though noting these programs 
have not been wholly successful, and considering the school board's negative response to an Indian community 
attempt to get bilingual and Native American education programs but not concluding whether the body was 
responsive): City of Holyoke Litig. ,  discussion at 960 F.  Supp. 5 1 5, 526 (D. Mass. 1 997) ('The significant lack of 
responsiveness of Holyoke o fficials to the needs of the Hispanic community, the eighth factor, was evidenced in 
the 1980 's and is significantly diminishing in the 1 990's, if not disappearing."); Rural West I Litig., discussion at 
836 F. Supp. 453, 463 (W.D. Tenn. 1 993) (characterizing evidence as "equivocal. We do not, therefore, place 
much weight upon this factor."); Kent County Litig., discussion at 790 F. Supp. 738, 749 (W.D . Mich. 1 992) 
(noting evidence "raises serious concerns" about responsiveness but making no finding); City of Springfield, 
discussion at 658 F. Supp. 10 15, 1032 (C.D. Ill. 1987) ( considering testimony of county board member that he has 
difficulty getting city officials to listen to him regarding minority needs but making no finding because 
responsiveness is a "peripheral issue "); Chickasaw County I Litig., discussion at 705 F. Supp. 3 1 5 ,  3 2 1  (N.D. 
Miss. 1989) ("The only area in which plaintiffs have demonstrated a lack of responsiveness is in the employment 
of blacks in non-elected official positions in county and municipal government. The parties could point to only one 
black person employed in the government in Chickasaw County, outside of an elected or appointed public office: 
one black person was hired in 1988 in the tax assessor's office . . . .  Of those factors which plaintiffs have failed to 
prove, none weighs strongly against the plaintiffs' case . . . .  A general history of responsiveness, if established, 
would fail to rebut the evidence of a Section 2 violation . . . .  A benevolent monarchy would be nonetheless non-
democratic."); Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), discussion at 829 F.2d 1 547 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 987) (remanding to the 
district court noting that "the lack of black teachers in the Carroll County school system was a factor bearing on 
unresponsiveness, and that this had caused the court deep concern, but, the court nonetheless ruled tliat the 
plaintiffs did not prove what steps defendants should have undertaken to increase the number of qualified black 
teachers. We do not understand that the plaintiffs must carry as part of their burden, establishing what measures 
the county should have taken to correct alleged unresponsiveness by school administrators."); County of Big Hom 
Litig., discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1020 (D. Mont. 1986) (finding officials were "without a doubt" more 
responsive to the Indian community than before the institution of the lawsuit, but noting that courts were often 
skeptical of steps taken during litigation); City of Boston Litig.,  discussion at 609 F.  Supp. 73 9,  7 48 (D. Mass. 
1 985) (noting "the parties offered conflicting evidence concerning the extent to which Boston's government has 
attempted to alleviate minority problems " but also noting t11e factor only has "marginal significance"); Escambia 
County Litig. (FL), discussion at 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1 984) (Circuit noted that responsiwness was less 
important under Section 2 and stated "Although the court found that the commissioners had generally been 
responsive to the interests ofblack citizens, it noted two areas in which they had not: appointments of blacks to 
committees or boards and housing policy."); Haywood County Litig., discussion at 544 F. Supp. 1 122 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1982) (crediting expert testimony which noted that racial bloc voting may create a less responsive governing 
body without making a finding). 
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516. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column: 8f= 1 ,  then filter Column: Jurisdiction= True or False) .  
517 .  See id. (filter Column 8f=l wlrile filtering l f=l , RPV= 1 ,  7f= 1,  noting as discussed supra in Factor 1 Section that 
not all lawsuits finding a history of discrinrination also found Factor 1 was met). 
518. But see Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 1 1 7 F .3d 1 222, 1227 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997) ("An official is responsive 
if he/she ensures that minorities are not excluded from municipal posts, evenhandedly allocates municipal 
services, and addresses minority complaints."); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002. 1023 (2d 
Cir. 1 995) ("The ''responsiveness" inquiry here involves review of tangible efforts of elected officials and the 
impact of these efforts on particular members of the community."). 
519. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 1 16 F.3d 685, 698 (3d Cir. 1997); Town of Hempstead Litig. (AL), 
discussion at 956 F. Supp. 326, 3 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1 997); City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 
538 (E.D. Pe1111. 1 993); Bridgeport Litig., discussion at Civ. No. 3 :93CV1476(PCD), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1974 1 (D. Co1111. Oct. 27, 1 993); City of Jackson Litig.,  discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1515,  1535 (W.D. Te1111. 1988); 
Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., discussion at 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Marengo County Litig. 
(AL), discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1 546, 1 572 ( 1  lth Cir. 1 984): Terrell Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N.D. 
Tex. 1 983); Mobile School Board Litig.,  discussion at 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982): Cf City of Holyoke 
Litig. ,  discussion at 960 F. Supp. 5 1 5, 523 -24 (D. Mass. 1 997); Kent County Litig., discussion at 790 F. Supp. 
738 ,  749 (W.D. Mich. 1 992) (noting that "serious concerns about responsiveness" were raised by districting plan 
that heavily concentrated minority population into a single district and left them with little voice in others but 
making no express finding on Factor 8); Carrollton NAACP Litig. (GA), discussion at 829 F.2d 1 547, 1561 ( 1 1th 
Cir. 1987) ("[T]he lack of black teachers in the Carroll County school system was a factor bearing on 
unresponsiveness."); but see Fort Bend Indep. Sch. D ist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1 996) 
(achieving unitary status weighs in favor of responsiveness); LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 
903 F. Supp. 107 1,  1087 (W.D. Tex. 1 995) (flying a confederate flag and nanring a school after an alleged racist 
does not prove lack of responsiveness); Monroe County Litig., discussion at 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1 990) 
(switching voluntarily to randonrizedjury roles evidences responsiveness); Dallas County Comm'n Litig. ,  
discussion at 548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.  Ala. 1 982) (considering improvements made after judgment against the town 
in segregation lawsuit to be evidence of responsiveness); see also infra note 53 1 (consent decrees do not establish 
a significant lack of responsiveness). 
520. See, e.g, Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999) (considering 
employment discrimination judgment entered against the town); Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 1 16 
F.3d 685, 698 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that it took seven years to comply with desegregation order); Bridgeport 
Litig.,  discussion at Civ. No. 3 :93CV 1476(PCD), 1 993 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 1 974 1 ,  at * 16- 17 (D. Conn Oct. 27, 
1 993) (citing judgments in school desegregation and fire department employment lawsuits as showing a 
"disservice to minority interests"); City of Philadelphia L itig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 538 (E.D. Pa 1993) 
(taking judicial notice of a judgment for Latino plaintiffs in an unlawful arrest lawsuit); Baldwin Bd. of Educ. 
Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) (finding "[T]he Baldwin County Board of Education has been 
particularly unresponsive to the black citizens ' concern about race relations in the county's schools, in particular 
concerns arising out of school desegregation and the apparent resulting displacement of black adnrinistrators."): 
Mobile School Board Litig., discussion at 542 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (readopting earlier findings 
that "as recently as 1970, another judge of this court was forced to threaten members of the Board of School 
Comnrissioners of Mobile County with $ 1 ,000 per day contempt fines for their refusal to comply with orders to 
desegregate the public schools."). But cf Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (AL), discussion at 739 F.2d 1529, 
1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) (holding evidence of both a desegregation and a faculty hiring lawsuit not sufficient on 
record before appellate court to render district court's finding of responsiveness clearly erroneous); City of 
Greenwood Litig., discussion at 5 99 F.  S upp. 3 97,  403 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (considering a violation of Section 5 of 
t11e VRA to weigh against finding responsiveness, but did not suffice to establish Factor 8 ). 
521 .  See, e.g ., Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), discussion at 1 16 F.3d 685, 698 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that despite a 
school desegregation plan one year after an adverse judgment, the town board took seven years to desegregate its 
schools, and then desegregated in the same year the state board of education insisted that the racial composition to 
be corrected); Mobile School Board Litig., discussion at 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1 982) (considering that the 
school board had only acted in response to numerous restraining and injunctive orders throughout more than a 
decade). 
522. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 538 (E.D. Penn. 1 993) (considering testimony 
of a former mayor and a city councilman that the police and fire department discrinrinated against minorities); City 
of Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1 5 15, 1535  (W.D. Tenn. 1 988) ("The fact that ninety-one of 1 03 
inadequate streets in 1 978 were located in black neighborhoods, the fact that in 1 955 and prior thereto the City of 
Jackson employed no black supervisors, black policemen, or black firemen, and the fact that no black has ever 
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been appointed as head of any department make it painfully obvious that the City Commission has not always 
been responsive to the needs of black citizens."): Terrell Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N. D. Tex. 
1983) (finding a law that disproportionately affected African-American neighborhoods in street paving decisions 
established a significant lack of responsiveness); cf Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), discussion at 804 F.2d 
469, 4 77 (8th Cir. 1 986) (remanding to district court for particularized findings on evidence of disproportionately 
low employment of minority teachers, and the failure to appoint minority voting registrars or establish polling 
places despite minority requests). But see Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 89 F.3d 1205, 
1209 (5th Cir. 1 996) (citing anecdotal testimony of disparate treatment insufficient to show unresponsiveness). 
523. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting placement of Ku 
Khu;: Klan insignia in town 's fire department); but see LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 903 F. 
Supp. 107 1 ,  1087 (W.D. Te x. 1 995) (discounting plaintiff's assertions that a school athletic center had been named 
after a racist and that the Confederate flag was flown at the high school until 1993 because the minority 
community did not bring these complaints to the attention of the board). 
524. See, e.g., Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 152, 1 170 (D. Colo. 1 998) (discussing 
evidence only in terms of the School Board and efforts made by it in evaluating whether there was a significant 
lack of responsiveness); Aldasoro v. Kem1erson Litig., discussion at 922 F. Supp. 339, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1995) 
(considering evidence regarding school policies in evaluating the responsiveness of defendant school district); 
Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), discussion at 804 F.2d 469, 477 (8th Cir. 1 986) (considering only evidence 
about the school system and school board in responsiveness inquiry); Dallas County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 
discussion at 739 F.2d 1529 ( 5th Cir. 1 984) (noting the responsiveness inquiry rests on different evidence for the 
County Commission and for the School Board); see also Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., discussion at 957 F. 
Supp. 1 522, 1 566 (N.D. Fla. 1 997) (considering evidence of school board and county commission separately). 
525. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1043 (D. S.D. 2004) (looking at a wide range of 
issues in considering whether the state legislature was responsive including legislation about gaming, racial 
profiling, and legislation regarding negotiations between the state and the reservations); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), 
discussion at 65 F.3d 1002, 1023 (2d Cir. 1 995) (discussing a wide range of evidence in determining 
responsive ness including hiring practices by the city, a school integration program, seeking grants for increased 
community policing in the city, and the adoption of a fair housing law in determining whether the city was 
responsive.) ;  City of Austin Litig. (TX), discussion at 871 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing evidence 
regarding the number of parks in minority areas, mortgage loans to low-income families, shelter operations, job 
training, and medical services in making a responsiveness determination.); Baytown Litig., discussion at 696 F. 
Supp. 1 128 (S.D. Tex. 1 987) (considering evidence in the areas of employment, appointments to boards and 
commissions, housing rehabilitation, streets and drainage improvements). 
526. See e.g., Hamrick Litig. ,  discussion at 1 5 5  F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1 378 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("Significantly, the city 
manager also testified that Gainesville ' s  attorneys had advised the city that it lacked the power to issue a 
moratorium on new industry which may contribute to the environmental concerns of Ward 3 residents, and that 
certain of these areas were both geographically and legally beyond the scope of city control."); Jeffers Litig. ,  
discussion at 730 F. Supp. 1 96, 213 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (discounting evidence regarding poor quality roads in 
minority areas because the state legislature did not have jurisdiction over this issue). 
527. Alamosa County Litig., discussion at 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Colo. 2004); NAACP v. Fordice Litig. (MS), 
discussion at 252 F.3d 361  (5th Cir. 200 1) ;  Hamrick Litig., discussion at 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 
2001) ;  City of LaGrange Litig., discussion at 969 F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Holderv. Hall Litig. (GA), 
discussion at 1 17 F.3d 1 222, 1 227 ( 1 1th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Houston Litig. , discussion at 10 F. Supp . 2d 72 1 ,  726 
(S.D. Tex. 1997); Texarkana Litig. ,  discussion at 86 1 F. Supp. 756, 765 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Westwego Litig., 
discussion at 1 989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7298, at * 14 (E.D. La. 1 989); City of Woodville Litig. (MS), discussion at 
881 F.2d 1 327, 1335  (5th Cir. 1 989); Chickasaw County I Litig., discussion at 705 F. Supp. 3 15, 321  (N.D. Miss. 
1 989); City of Starke Litig., discussion at 7 12 F. Supp. 1523, 1538 (M.D.  Fla. 1 989); Jeffers Litig., discussion at 
730 F. Supp. 1 96,  2 1 3  (E.D. Ark. 1 989); City ofNotfolk Litig., discussion at 679 F. Supp. 557, 585 (E.D. Va. 
1 988); City of Woodville Litig., discussion at 688 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Houston v. Haley Litig. 
(MS), discussion at 859 F.2d 34 1 ,  347 (5th Cir. 1 988); Baytown Litig. (TX), discussion at 840 F.2d 1240, 1250-5 1 
(5th Cir. 1988); Pomona Litig. ,  discussion at 665 F. Supp. 853, 862 (C.D. Cal. 1987); City of Fort Lauderdale 
Litig., discussion at 6 17 F. Supp. 1093, 1 107 (S.D. Fla 1985); City of Austin Litig., discussion at CIV. No. A-84-
CA- 1 89, 1 985 WL 1 9986, at * 1 2  (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1 2, 1 985); Escambia County Litig. (FL), discussion at 748 F.2d 
1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1 984); Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (AL), 739 F.2d 1529, 1540 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984); 
Opelika Litig. (AL), discussion at 748 F.2d 1473, 1476 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984); Terrell Litig.,  discussion at 565 F. Supp. 
338, 343 (N. D.  Tex. 1 983); City of Greenwood Litig., discussion at 534 F. Supp. 1351  (N.D. Miss. 1 982); see 
also Calhoun County Litig. ,  discussion at 8 1 3  F. Supp. 1 189, 1201 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (criticizing district court on 
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this point but letting finding stand as not clearly erroneous); infra note 537 (nondiscrimination in the context of 
judicial elections); cf Chapman v. Nicholson Litig .. discussion at 579 F. Supp. 1 504, 1 5 12 (N.D. Al a. 1 984) 
("Evidence shows that the city had spent an appropriate amount of resources on the African American 
neighborhoods in Jasper.") . 
528. See, e.g. , Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 1 17 F.3d 1222, 1227 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997) (stating "municipal 
services are not allocated in a race based fashion"); Houston v. Haley Litig. (MS), discussion at 859 F.2d 341 ,  347 
(5th Cir. 1 988) (noting city services are available to everyone regardless of race); City of Woodville Litig., 
discussion at 688 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D. Miss. 1 988) (considering services "are provided equally"); Pomona 
Litig., discussion at 665 F. Supp. 853, 862, 868 (C.D. Cal. 1 987) (citing testimony that city "makes every effort to 
provide services equally to all citizens, regardless of race, color or creed") . 
529. See, e.g., Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., discussion at 579 F. Supp. 1504, 1 5 1 2  (N.D. Ala. 1 984) ( "Evidence shows 
that the city had spent an appropriate amount of resources on the African American neighborhoods in Jasper"); 
Chickasaw County II Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 : 92CV142 -JAD, 1 997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 
1 997) (finding responsiveness in part based on testimony of Supervisor John Moore that at least half of the roads 
paved in the last five years have been in predominantly black areas); Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (AL), 
discussion at 739 F.2d 1 529, 1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984) (finding responsiveness in part because the "roads have been 
maintained on a non-discriminatory basis"); Hamrick Litig.,  discussion at 155 F. Supp. 2d 1 3 55, 1 378 (N.D. GA. 
200 1 )  (finding responsiveness based on city manager's testimony that numerous programs which the city had 
adopted directly benefited the black community, including a road repaving project); see also Calhoun County 
Litig. (MS ), discussion at 88 F.3d 1 393, 1400 (5th Cir. 1 996) (discussing equality in road paving but noting that 
current equality may not be afforded much weight under totality of the circumstances when there is a history of 
discrimination in road paving). 
530. See, e.g. , Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (TX), discussion at 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1 996) (finding that evidence 
defendant had achieved unitary status showed responsiveness); cf Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (AL). 
discussion at 739 F.2d 1 529, 1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) (declining to review district court 's finding of responsiveness 
based on improvements made in a lawsuit involving school desegregation and faculty hiring because record not 
included on appeal); see also cases considering consent decree, inji-a note 53 1 .  
531 .  See, e.g . ,  Cincinnati Litig., discussion at No. C- 1-92-278, 1 993 U.S.  Dist LEXIS 2 1 009, at *36 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 
1 993) (taking notice of four consent decrees the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing, Police Division and Fire 
Department had entered into, but not faulting the city "for resorting to the Courts to settle disputes. This pattern of 
behavior on the part of the City to settle these lawsuits constitutes significant responsiveness to the issues of 
concern to the African American community."); Houston v. Haley Litig., discussion at 663 F. Supp. 346, 355 
(N.D. Miss. 1 987) (finding responsiveness in part on the provision of city services even where the city was under a 
consent decree to pave certain roads, provide parks in black areas, and construct a swimming pool after noting that 
the city manager had testified the projects "were not entirely the result of the lawsuit"); City of Fort Lauderdale 
Litig.,  discussion at 6 1 7  F. Supp. 1093, 1 107 (S.D. Fla. 1 985) (considering the city responsive in part due to 
recruitment efforts for minority police and fire departments, despite the fact that its efforts resulted in part from a 
consent decree mandating the city try to hire 1 1 .25% minorities); City of Norfolk Litig.,  discussion at 605 F. Supp. 
377, 394 (E.D. Va. 1 984) (altlough city's hiring of police and firefighters was controlled by a consent decree, the 
city's hiring efforts weighed in favor of responsiveness); Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig.,  discussion at 548 F .  
Supp. 794, 8 2 1  (S .D .  Ala. 1 982) (finding that, where t he  county entered into a school desegregation consent decree 
and then a second decree, after the Department of Justice sought to have the first decree judicially enforced, that 
the evidence "affirmatively shows, and the Court therefore finds, that the School Board's operation of the 
transportation system has been fair, without discrimination, and responsive to the needs of all students, both black 
and white.") . 
532. Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 4 1 7  (N.D. Miss. 1 990). 
533. Operation Push Litig., discussion at 674 F. Supp. 1 245, 1 265 (N.D. Miss. 1 987) (finding unresponsiveness where 
officials did not conduct precinct registration, or appoint deputy registrars because it demonstrated a failure by the 
state to act to overcome past discrimination); Citizen Action Litig.,  discussion at Civ. No. N 84-43 1 ,  1 984 U.S.  
Dist. LEXIS 24869 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 1 984) (finding unresponsiveness because officials "have failed to utilize 
any of the available tools to increase registration."); Terrell Litig. , discussion at 565 F. Supp . 3 3 8  (N. D. Tex. 
1 983) (finding unresponsiveness based partially on evidence of a history of unequal funding of white and black 
cemeteries, despite current equality of funding); see also Calhoun County Litig. (MS), 88 F.3d 1 3 93 ,  1400 (5th 
Cir. 1 996) (criticizing district court finding that current non-discrimination in road pavement shows 
responsiveness when there is a past history of discrimination, but still affirming as not clearly erroneous). 
534. See e.g. , Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  Civ. A. No. 89-230 -LON, 1 996 U. S .  Dist. LEXIS 4747 (D . Del. Apr. 1 0, 
1 996) (finding that a school board taking more than seven years to desegregate showed unresponsiveness); 
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Bridgeport Litig., Civ. No. 3 : 93CV1476(PCD), 1993 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 1974 1 (D . Conn. Oct. 27, 1 993) (finding 
evidence of lawsuits against the town established lack of responsiveness); Mobile School B oard Litig., 542 F.  
Supp. 1078, 1 106 (S.D . Ala. 1982) (readopting earlier findings that school board only reacted to numerous 
restraining and injunctive orders by the court in a desegregation lawsuit): Cf Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig. ,  
discussion at 686 F .  Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) ("The Baldwin County Board o f  Education has been 
particularly unresponsive to the black citizens' concern about race relations in the county's schools, in particular 
concerns arising out of school desegregation and the apparent resulting displacement of black administrators."); 
see also supra note 5 3 1  (discussing evidence of consent decrees). Courts also generally discount evidence of 
responsiveness that occurs under either the threat of withdrawal of funds or legal compulsion. See infi·a note 5 56. 
535. Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  Civ. A. No. 89-230-LON. 1 996 U . S. Dist. LEXIS 4747 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 1 996); 
Monroe County Litig., discussion at 740 F. Supp. 4 1 7  (N.D. Miss. 1 990). 
536. See infra notes 537-538 and accompanying te)...1 and Chisom Litig. ,  discussion at CIV. A. No. 86-4057, 1 989 WL 
106485, at * 1 1  (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1989), which did not find Factor 8 met where no evidence was presented. Note 
also that some jurisdictions claimed to have crafted their systems for electing judges e)...'])ressly to prevent judicial 
bias, and they cited this goal as a non-tenuous underlying policy to defend these systems from challenge under 
Section 2 .  See infra note 593 and accompanying text. 
537. Cousin Litig., discussion at 145 F.3d 818, 833 (6th Cir. 1998); Mallory-Ohio Litig., discussion at 3 8  F. Supp. 2d 
525, 543 (S. Ohio 1997); Bradley v. Work Litig., discussion at 916 F. Supp 1446, 1467 (S.D. Ind. 1 996); 
Milwaukee NAACP Litig.,  discussion at 935 F. Supp. 1 4 1 9, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1 996); see also Nipper Litig. (FL), 
discussion at 39 F.3d 1494 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (holding that responsiveness is less important in the context 
of judicial elections but not resolving "'hether Factor 8 was met). 
538. Mallory-Ohio Litig., discussion at 38 F. Supp. 2d 525, 543-44 (S.D. Ohio 1 997); Milwaukee NAACP Litig., 
discussion at 935 F. Supp. 1419, 1433 (E.D. Wis. 1 996); Southern Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), discussion at 
56 F.3d 128 1 ,  1295 (11th Cir. 1995) (en bane); see also Kirksey v. Allain Litig.,  discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1 183, 
1 1 95 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (discounting idea that more minority judges would improve the minority community's 
perception of the judicial system). 
539. Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1043 (D.S.D. 2004); France Litig. ,  discussion at 7 1  F. Supp. 
2d 3 1 7, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 170 (D. 
Colo. 1 998); Rural West II Litig., discussion at 29 F.  Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D . Tenn. 1 998) ;  Chickasaw County 
II Litig.,  discussion at No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142-JAD, 1 997 U . S. Dist. LEXIS 22087 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997): 
Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 914 F.  Supp. 843, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996); Sanchez-Colorado Litig. (CO), 
discussion at 97 F.3d 1303, 1325 ( 10th Cir. 1996); Calhoun County Litig. (MS), discussion at 88 F.3d 1393,  1400 
(5th Cir. 1996); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002, 1023 (2d Cir. 1995);  Aldasoro v. Kennerson 
Litig.,  discussion at 922 F. Supp. 339, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1 995); Rural West I Litig., discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1096 
(W.D. Tenn. 1 995); City of Columbia Litig.,  discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 425 (D .S .C. 1993);  Cincinnati Litig., 
discussion at No. C-1-92-278, 1993 U. S. Dist LEXIS 2 1 009, at *36 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1 993); Columbus County 
Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 105 (E.D .N.C. 1 99 1);  City of Dallas Litig. , discussion at 734 F. Supp. 
1 3 17, 1406 (N.D. Tex 1 990); City of Austin Litig. (NY), discussion at 871 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1 989); Monroe 
County Litig., discussion at 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1 990); City of Starke Litig. ,  discussion at 7 12 F. Supp. 
1 523, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Operation Push Litig.,  discussion at 674 F. Supp. 1 245, 1 265 (N.D. Miss. 1 987); 
Baytown Litig.,  discussion at 696 F. Supp. 1 128 (S.D. Tex. 1 987); Edgefield County Litig. ,  discussion at 650 F. 
Supp. 1 1 76, 1 204 (D.S.C. 1986) ; County of Big Hom Litig. ,  discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1020 (D. Mont. 
1986); Lubbock Litig. (TX), discussion at 727 F.2d 364, 3 8 1  (5th Cir. 1 984); McCarty Litig. (FL), discussion at 
749 F.2d 1 1 34, 1 1 37 (5th Cir. 1984 ); Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (AL), 739 F.2d 1 529, 1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 
1 984); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 5 9 1  F. Supp. 802, 8 1 1  (W.D . Tex. 1 984); Citizen Action 
Litig. ,  discussion at Civ. No. N 84-431,  1984 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 24869 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 1 984); Terrell Litig., 
discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N. D. Tex. 1 983); Rocha Litig., discussion at No. V-79-26, 1 982 U . S .  Dist. 
LEXIS 1 5 164, at * 1 8  (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1 982); see also City of Norfolk Litig., discussion at 679 F. Supp. 557, 
585 (E.D. Va. 1988) (finding on remand that a housing policy that displaced a disproportionate number of African­
American families was "aimed at ensuring that public services were adequately provided" and "encouraging a 
higher quality of life, re-integrating the inner city area and providing more job opportunities"; that the new 
development was racially inclusive, and thus that the policy was responsive ). 
540. See, e.g., Calhoun County Litig. (MS), discussion at 88 F.3d 1 393, 1400 ( 5th Cir. 1 996) ("[W]e offer no bright line 
here. We are content to note that paving roads left unpaved by years of discrimination and appointing a biracial 
redistricting commission do not reflect the comprehensive and systematic responsiveness to minority needs that is 
entitled to substantial weight in the totality of the circumstances"); City of Norfolk Litig. (VA), discussion at 8 1 6  
F.2d 932, 9 3 9  ( 4th Cir. 1987) (remanding district court finding the East Ghent Housing policy was 
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nondiscriminatory asking whether the policy was not responsive). Courts have also credited as responsive efforts 
to increase minority political participation. See infra note 577. 
541. See, e.g. , Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 180 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999); Bridgeport Litig. ,  
discussion at Civ. No.  3 :93 CV1476(PCD), 1 993 U . S .  Dist. LEXIS 1 974 1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27,  1993).  
542. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002, 1023 (2 d Cir. 1 995): El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. 
Litig.,  discussion at 591  F. Supp. 802, 8 1 1  (W.D. Tex. 1 9 84); Cf Lubbock Litig. (TX), discussion at 727 F.2d 364, 
3 8 1  (5th Cir. 1 984) (criticizing the district court 's finding of responsiveness and noting the affirmative action 
policy has "increased the number of minorities in public employment but not necessarily in the best positions.") . 
543. Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1999); City of Philadelphia Litig., 
discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 1 4, 538 (E.D. Penn. 1 993); Columbus County Litig., discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, 
1 105 (E.D.N.C. 199 1 ); City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 1 3 1 7, 1406 (N.D. Tex 1990); City of 
Starke Litig. ,  discussion at 7 1 2  F. Supp. 1523,  1538 (M.D. Fla. 1 989); Chickasaw County I Litig., discussion at 
705 F. Supp. 3 1 5, 3 2 1  (N.D. Miss. 1 989) (considering only one black person employed in govemment, outside of 
an elected or appointed public office); City of Jackson Litig. ,  discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5, 1535 (W.D. Tenn. 
1988); Operation Push Litig., discussion at 674 F. Supp. 1 245, 1 265 (N.D. Miss. 1 987); Carrollton NAACP Litig. 
(GA), discussion at 829 F.2d 1 547 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 987): Terrell Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N. D. Tex. 
1983); Mobile School Board Litig., discussion at 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Cf Escambia County Litig. 
(FL), discussion at 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984) (noting that "[A]lthough the court found that the 
commissioners had generally been responsive to the interests of black citizens, it noted two areas in which they 
had not: appointments of blacks to committees or boards and housing policy" but not resolving the question of 
responsiveness); but see LULAC-N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at 903 F. Supp. 107 1 ,  1087 (W.D. Tex. 
1 995) (considering failure to recruit minority teachers insufficient to show non-responsiveness); NAACP v. 
Fordice Litig. (MS), discussion at 252 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 200 1) (finding minorities making up less than 1 5% of 
entire Department of Transportation does not show unresponsiveness); City of Greenwood Litig. ,  discussion at 
599 F. Supp. 3 97 (N.D. Miss.  1 984) (stating low percentage of minorities appointed to boards does not establish 
unresponsiveness). 
544. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 1 17 F.3d 1 222, 1227 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (minorities hired): City of 
Chicago -Bamett Litig. ,  discussion at 969 F. Supp. 1 3 59, 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (minorities "hold important and 
influential positions of power within the City's govemment," including appointive positions): Niagara Falls Litig., 
discussion at 9 1 3  F. Supp. 722, 749 (W.D .N.Y. 1 994) (established affirmative action task force); City of Columbia 
Litig., discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 425 (D. S .C. 1 993) (minorities "well represented" on boards): Calhoun 
County Litig.,  discussion at 8 1 3  F. Supp. 1 1 89, 120 1 (N.D. Miss. 1 993) (minorities appointed); City of Austin 
Litig. (TX), discussion at 87 1 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1 989) (minorities hired and appointed); Houston v. Haley 
Litig. (MS), discussion at 859 F.2d 3 4  L 34 7 ( 5th Cir. 1 988) (minorities appointed); McCarty Litig. (TX), 
discussion at 749 F.2d 1 1 34, 1 1 37 (5th Cir. 1 984) (recruitment attempts, minority appointments); City of 
Woodville Litig., discussion at 688 F. Supp. 255, 257 (S.D. Miss. 1 988) (minorities appointed to commissions and 
hired as police officers); Houston v. Haley Litig., discussion at 663 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (minority 
leadership on appointive boards); Baytown Litig., discussion at 696 F. Supp. 1 128 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (minorities 
participate on boards and hired as city workers); Edgefield County Litig., discussion at 650 F. Supp. 1 1 76, 1204 
(D.S.C. 1986) (minority teachers hired) ; County of Big Hom Litig., discussion at 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1020 (D. 
Mont. 1986) (minorities appointed); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig., discussion at 6 1 7  F. Supp. 1093, 1 107 (S.D. 
Fla. 1985) ("intensive efforts" to hire minority police officers, even though under a consent decree); City of 
Norfolk Litig., discussion at 605 F. Supp. 3 77, 3 94 (E.D. Va. 1 984) (minorities hired and appointed); City of 
Greenwood Litig. ,  discussion at 534 F. Supp. 1 3 5 1  (N.D. Miss. 1 982) (minority appointments). 
545. Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig.,  discussion at 922 F. Supp. 3 39, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1 995) ("Despite some deficiencies in 
the District 's bilingual program in 1 990-9 1 ,  it is responsive today because it recruits teachers and while it has no . 
bilingual stipend, it pays more than adjacent school districts that have a bilingual stipend); El Paso Indep. Sch. 
Dist. Litig., discussion at 5 9 1  F. Supp. 802, 8 1 1  (W.D. Tex. 1 984) (considering that El Paso County was a pioneer 
in bilingual education); Rybicki Litig. ,  discussion at 574 F .  Supp. 1082, 1 122 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (noting the 
democratic party in Illinois "supported bilingual education, an issue of particular importance to Hispanics.") Cf 
Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 152, 1 1 70 (D. Colo. 1998) (considering the 
absence of a bilingual education program as evidence of unresponsiveness but making no finding). 
546. See e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig.,  discussion at 3 00 F. Supp. 2d 29L 3 1 3  (D. Mass. 2004); Hamrick 
Litig., discussion at 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. GA 200 1) ;  Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 
180 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1 999); Montezuma-Cortez Sch. D ist. Litig. ,  discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 52, 1 170 (D. 
Colo. 1 998); Rural West II Litig., discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Chickasaw County 
II Litig. ,  discussion at No. CIV.A. 1 : 92CV142-JAD, 1 997 U . S. Dist. LEXIS 22087 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); 
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City of LaGrange Litig. ,  discussion at 969 F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. GA 1997); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., 
discussion at 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1 566 (N.D. Fla. 1 997); Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 1 17 F.3d 1222. 
1227 ( 1 1th Cir. 1997); Calhoun County Litig. (MS). discussion at 88 F.3d 1393, 1400 (5th Cir. 1996); Town of 
Babylon Litig., discussion at 9 14 F. Supp. 843, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig. ,  discussion at 
922 F. Supp. 339. 366 (S.D. Cal. 1 995); Niagara Falls Litig. (NY), discussion at 65 F.3d 1002, 1023 (2d Cir. 
1 995); City of Columbia Litig., discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 425 (D.S .C. 1993); City of Philadelphia Litig. ,  
discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 538 (E.D. Penn. 1 993); Texarkana Litig., discussion at 861 F. Supp. 756, 765 
(W.D. Ark. 1992); Momoe County Litig. ,  discussion at 740 F. Supp. 417  (N.D. Miss. 1990); City of Dallas Litig .. 
discussion at 734 F. Supp. 13 17, 1406 (N.D. Tex 1 990); City of Starke Litig., discussion at 712 F. Supp. 1 523, 
1 538 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F.  Supp. 196, 213 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Westwego Litig . .  
discussion at CIV. A. NO. 84-5599, 1 989 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 7298, at * 14 (E.D. La. June 28, 1989); City of Austin 
Litig. (TX), discussion at 87 1 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1 989); City of Woodville Litig.(MS), discussion at 881  F.2d 
1 327, 1335 (5th Cir. 1 989); City of Norfolk Litig., discussion at 679 F. Supp. 557, 585 (E.D. Va. 1 988); City of 
Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F .  Supp. 1 5 15, 1 53 5  (W.D. Tenn. 1 988); Springfield Park District Litig., 
discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1015,  1032 (C.D. Ill. 1 987); Baytown Litig., discussion at 696 F. Supp. 1 128 (S.D. Tex. 
1987); Pomona Litig., discussion at 665 F. Supp. 853, 862 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Houston v. Haley Litig. (MS), 
discussion at 859 F.2d 341 ,  347 (5th Cir. 1 988); City of Fort Lauderdale Litig. (FL), discussion at 787 F.2d 1 528, 
1 533 (1 lth Cir. 1986); Dallas County Bd. of Educ. Litig. (AL), discussion at 739 F.2d 1529, 1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 
1 984); Lubbock Litig. (TX), discussion at 727 F.2d 364, 3 8 1  (5th Cir. 1 984); McCarty Litig. (TX), discussion at 
749 F .2d 1 134, 1 137 (5th Cir. 1 984); Escambia County Litig. (FL), discussion at 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 l lth Cir. 
1 984); Opelika Litig. (AL), discussion at 748 F.2d 1473, 1476 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984); Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., 
discussion at 579 F. Supp. 1504, 1 5 12 (N.D. Ala. 1 984); City of Greenwood Litig., discussion at 599 F. Supp. 3 97 
(N.D. Miss. 1984); El Paso Indep. Sch Dist. Litig. , discussion at 591 F. Supp. 802, 8 1 1  (W.D. Tex. 1984); Terrell 
Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338, 343 (N. D. Tex. 1 983); Rocha Litig., discussion at No. V-79-26, 1 982 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1 5 164, at * 18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1 982). 
547. See supra note 522. 
548. See supra note 528. 
549. See, e.g., Calhoun County Litig. (MS), discussion at 88 F.3d 1393, 1400 ( 5th Cir. 1 996) ("We offer no bright line 
here. We are content to note that paving roads left unpaved by years of discrimination and appointing a biracial 
redistricting commission do not reflect the comprehensive and systematic responsiveness to minority needs that is 
entitled to substantial weight in the totality-of-circumstances inquiry."); City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. 
Supp. 13 17, 1406 (N.D. Tex 1 990) (finding while city's spending of equal resources "may be enough to defeat a 
claim of current racial discrimination in the allocation of resources, it certainly does not show responsiveness to 
the particularized needs of the minority community-which would often require unequal and higher expenditures 
of City resources in minority areas to remedy the effects of past discrimination.);  see also supra note 529 
(discussing road paving policies). 
550. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig., discussion at 956 F. Supp. 326, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Columbus County 
Litig.,  discussion at 782 F. Supp. 1097, l l05 (E.D.N.C. 1 99 1); but see City of LaGrange Litig.,  discussion at 969 
F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. Ga. 1 997) ("Several of Plaintiff's witnesses testified that the council had failed to address 
certain problems within the African-American community. However, these examples seemed to reflect the typical 
shortcomings of government entities rather than an institutional umesponsiveness to the minority community."); 
Texarkana Litig., discussion at 86 1 F. Supp. 756, 765 (W.D. Ark. 1 992) ("In all of these issues . . .  the Court 
believes the essential culprit is the same encountered by most cities in this country-lack of sufficient money to 
address all of the city's problems."); Chapman v. Nicholson Litig., discussion at 579 F. Supp. 1 504, 1 5 12 (N.D. 
Ala. 1 984) ("While there may be evidence of isolated incidents of specific requests not receiving immediate 
attention, said inattention appears more typical of a municipality being financially unable to immediately react to 
all its citizens ' perceived needs, rather than being based on race.") . 
551 .  See, e.g., City of Philadelphia Litig., discussion at 824 F. Supp. 5 14, 538 (E.D. Penn. 1993); see also City of 
Jackson Litig., discussion at 683 F. Supp. 1 5 15,  1535 (W.D. Tenn. 1 988) (historical evidence). 
552. See, e.g., Terrell Litig. , discussion at 565 F. Supp. 3 38, 343 (N. D. Tex. 1983); Rocha Litig., discussion at No. V-
79-26, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15 1 64, at * 18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1 982). 
553. See, e.g., Rural West II Litig., discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D. Tenn. 1 998) (considering 
representatives seeking appropriations for black constituents to illustrate, in part, their responsiveness); Chickasaw 
County II Litig., discussion at No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142-JAD, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 
1 997) (asserting responsiveness to be shown when at least half of the roads paved in the past five years were in 
predominately minority areas) ;  Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 9 14 F. Supp. 843, 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(considering responsiveness shown in part by the fact that development funds are directed toward the minority 
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community); Sanchez-Colorado Litig., discussion at 861 F. Supp. 1 5 1 6  (D. Colo. 1 994) (noting Representative 
Entz working in the state legislature to obtain funding for minority constituents) ;  City of Columbia Litig., 
discussion at 850 F. Supp. 404, 425 (D.S.C. 1993) (stating a disproportionate amount of city budget spent in 
minority communities demonstrates responsiveness): Monroe County Litig., discussion at 740 F. Supp. 4 1 7, 424 
(N.D. Miss. 1990) ( obsetving a disproportionate amount of funds directed toward paving minority roads 
demonstrated responsiveness); City of Austin Litig. (TX), discussion at 87 1 F.2d 529, 534-35 ( 5th Cir. 1 989) 
(considering as evidence of responsiveness that, "Sixty percent of the city's $ 273,000,000.00 in community 
development bloc grant funds between 1979 and 1 984 was related to housing. The city also funds a corporation to 
make mortgage loans to low-income persons, provides essential medical setvices for the poor, operates a shelter 
for transients and constructed a job training center. Forty-two percent of the city's parks and recreation facilities 
and forty-five percent of all city facilities are located in the three of Austin's eight fiscal districts having the 
highest minority populations."). 
554. See, e.g., Hamrick Litig., discussion at 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2001 )  (surface pavement 
improvement, community policing and the development of a community setvice center); Liberty County Comm 'rs 
Litig., discussion at 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1566 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (bulk of grant money for water project and housing 
upgrades in African-American areas); Houston v. Haley Litig. ,  discussion at 663 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Miss. 1 987) 
(city provided a swimming pool, baseball fields, a gym, tennis courts, and a recreation center in an area that is 
predominately black); Baytown Litig.,  discussion at 696 F. Supp. 1 128 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (street and housing 
improvements, though this was criticized in the circuit opinion, it was affirmed as not clearly erroneous); City of 
Springfield L itig., discussion at 658 F. Supp. 10 15, 1032 (C.D. Ill. 1 987) (Fair Housing Board work and 
neighborhood renewal attempts through the Pioneer Park Project); Opelika Litig. (AL), discussion at 748 F.2d 
1473, 1476 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984) (development funds, such as matching city water board funds directed at minority 
community); McCarty Litig. (TX), discussion at 749 F.2d 1 134, 1 137 (5th Cir. 1984) ("participation in funding 
programs for disadvantage students"). 
555. See e.g., Hamrick Litig., discussion at 155 F. Supp. 2d 1 355, 1378 (N.D. GA. 2001) (finding that efforts in 
applying federal, state and local funds to improve housing conditions for certain lower income residents weighed 
in favor of responsiveness); Houston v. Haley Litig. (MS), discussion at 859 F.2d 341 ,  347 ( 5th Cir. 1988) (City 
has used federal grants to upgrade housing in minority neighborhoods); Dallas County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 
discussion at 739 F.2d 1529, 1 540 ( 1 1th Cir. 1984) ('The Commission has funded or sought federal funding for a 
variety of projects that have benefited the black community, including drainage projects, water setvice, site 
preparation for industiy, a regional comprehensive mental health center, the county health department and 
recreational facilities."); El Paso lndep. Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 591  F. Supp. 802, 810  (W.D. Tex, 1 984) 
(federally funded programs illustrate responsiveness because the school "must administer them for the benefit of 
the students."). 
556. City of Dallas Litig., discussion at 734 F. Supp. 13 1 7, 1406 (N.D. Tex 1 990) (discounting evidence of capital 
expenditure project because there was no showing of how much money came from the federal government); 
Lubbock Litig. (TX), discussion at 727 F.2d 364, 382 (5th Cir. 1984) ( 'The City cannot take credit entirely for the 
equal provision of City setvices; the funds for these derived largely from federal programs aimed at economically 
depressed areas."); see also Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 152, 1 170 (D. Colo. 
1 998) (noting some of the attempts to implement changes to help meet the needs of minority community were 
federally funded but making no finding). 
557. See, e.g., Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), discussion at 804 F.2d 469, 477 (8th Cir. 1 986) (considering the 
low number of Indians on boards or commissions was due to federal mandates). 
558. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 1 17 F.3d 1222, 1 227 (1 1th Cir. 1 997). 
559. See Red Clay Sch. Dist. Litig. (DE), 1 16 F.3d 685, 698 (3 d Cir. 1997). 
560. Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1044 (D.S.D. 2004) (discussing numerous legislative bills 
that affect the Indian community and the consistent opposition of certain members of the legislature to any 
legislation that the Indian community lobbied for including voting against bills with overwhelming support and no 
organized opposition and keeping bills that affect only the minority community from reaching a floor vote). 
561 . See e.g., Town of Hempstead Litig. (NY), discussion at 1 80 F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1 999) (considering whether the 
denial or disregard of requests to fund minority community centers shows lack of responsiveness); Holderv. Hall 
Litig. (GA), 1 17 FJd 1222, 1227 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997) (finding that nondiscrimination in road work where official 
campaigned on that issue established responsiveness); Ward v. Columbus County, 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1 105 
(E.D .N. C.  1991)  (considering that minorities "particular requests have gone unmet."); Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. 
Litig. (SD), discussion at 804 F.2d 469, 4 77 (8th Cir. 1 986) (considering refusal to establish polling places despite 
Indian requests); see also Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1 152, 1 170 (D. Colo. 1 998) (noting 
"Parent Advisoiy Committee request for development of a mission statement for bilingual education and Native 
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American education programs," and school board's response that its "District mission statements must be 
'ethnically clean,'" but making no finding on responsiveness either way). Other courts not following this model 
have simply considered services in terms of what was provided to the minority community. See e.g., City of 
Austin Litig. (TX), 87 1 F.2d 529, 534 ( 5th Cir. 1989) (considering the fact that the city had constructed a job 
training center but not discussing minority input); Dallas County Comm'n Litig. (AL), 739 F.2d 1 529, 1540 ( 1 1th 
Cir. 1984) (finding that roads had been maintained on a non-discriminatory basis). 
562. Jeffers Litig.,  730 F. Supp. 196, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
563. Id.; see also Sanchez-Colorado Litig., 86 1 F. Supp. 1 5 16, 1530 (D. Colo. 1994) (after plaintiffs argued 
Representative Entz did not "speak out in favor of bilingual education for non-English speaking children" but 
noting that "Representative Entz has worked on education issues, housing issues, and economic development 
issues. He worked against the English Only Amendment, has worked to obtain funding through grants for local 
govermnents within H.D. 60, has worked on a 1994 school financing act to obtain equality in school financing, 
and has helped constituents obtain jobs."). 
564. See e.g.. Black Political Task Force Litig., discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 ,  3 13 (D. Mass. 2004) ( finding 
evidence that officials sought out minority groups and implemented policies to address their concerns): Rural West 
II Litig., discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D. Tenn. 1 998) (considering representatives seeking 
appropriations for black constituents to illustrate, in part, their responsiveness); Rural West I Litig, discussion at 
877 F .  Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1 995) (finding that legislators' support of Martin Luther King holiday showed 
responsiveness): Cincinnati Litig. , discussion at No. C-1 -92-278, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2 1 009, at *37 (S.D. Ohio 
July 8, 1993) (debating changing to a district-by district plan evidenced responsiveness); Monroe County Litig., 
discussion at 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1 990) (plaintiff testified board of supervisors has "always been 
responsive to his requests."); Jeffers Litig., discussion at 730 F. Supp. 196, 2 13  (E.D. Ark. 1 989) (noting that while 
the minority voters feelings of umesponsive were "not without basis . . .  Members of the House like Representatives 
Cunningham, McGinnis, Flanagin, and Dawson are anything but umesponsive. They are well aware that a large 
proportion of their constituency is black, and they make assiduous and sincere efforts to represent these voters."). 
565. Cincinnati Litig., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21009, at *37-3 8 .  
566. See e.g., Bridgeport Litig. ,  discussion at Civ. No. 3 :93CV1476(PCD). 1993 U .S .  Dist. LEXIS 1 9741 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 27, 1993) (no action taken on repeated minority community requests for a community center); Sisseton Indep. 
Sch. Dist. Litig. (SD), discussion at 804 F.2d 469, 477 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Appellants offered substantial evidence 
that the District was umesponsive to the Indian community . . .  the District failed to establish additional polling 
places despite the request of appellants. The district court may not ignore this evidence."); see also LULAC - N.E. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig .. discussion at 903 F. Supp. 1071 ,  1087 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that a school district 
flying a confederate flag did not show a lack of responsiveness where the minority community had failed to 
request the flag to come down); Little Rock Litig. ,  discussion at 83 1 F. Supp. 1453, 1461 (E.D. Ark. 1 993) (noting 
the President of Local NAACP brought up issues to the School District in a letter but received no response). 
567. See e.g., Jeffers Litig. ,  discussion at 730 F. Supp. 1 96, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("Some white members, on being 
approached by black citizens in their own districts for help, referred these constituents to black legislators 
representing other areas."); City of Springfield Litig., discussion at 658 F. Supp. 1015 ,  1032 (C.D. Ill. 1987) 
("County Board member testified that he has had no success having city officials listen to him when he brings 
complaints from Springfield's black citizens about housing, employment and other govermnent matters."); see 
also Suffolk County Litig., discussion at 268 F. Supp. 2d 243, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering a failure to 
respond to plaintiffs letter regarding redistricting plan "neutral at best"). 
568. Jeffers Litig., 730 F. Supp. 1 96, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1 989). 
569. See e.g., Mehfoud Litig., discussion at 702 F. Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 1988) ("[N]one of the five sitting members 
of the Henrico Board of Supervisors could identify a single issue of unique concern to the black community­
despite notable publicity of, among other things, black efforts to have a black appointed to the school board. In 
fact, two of the five Supervisors had no idea what percentage of their constituencies are black."); see also Black 
Political Task Force Litig., discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 29 1 ,  3 13 (D. Mass. 2004) (plaintiffs provided testimony 
that officials were unaware of their concerns); Cf LULAC - N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  903 F. Supp. 107 1 ,  1087 
(W.D. Tex. 1 995) (finding no lack of responsiveness because the minority community had not brought their 
concerns to the attention of the school board). 
570. See e.g., Holder v. Hall Litig. (GA), discussion at 1 17 F.3d 1222, 1227 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 997) (county board advertises 
monthly public meetings); Liberty County Comm'rs Litig.,  discussion at 957 F. Supp. 1 522, 1 567 (N.D. Fla. 1 997) 
("Blacks have no problem approaching county commissioners. and even those commissioners elected from other 
residential districts (outside of residential district 1 ,  where most blacks are concentrated) listen to their complaints 
and are responsive to their needs."); City of Holyoke Litig., discussion at 960 F. Supp. 5 1 5, 524 (D. Mass. 1997) 
("The administration of the new Mayor has witnessed a greatly increased effort to recruit Hispanic officials, 
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include Hispanic viewpoints, and address the interests of all the citizens of Holyoke, Hispanic and non­
Hispanic."); Niagara Falls Litig.,  discussion at 9 1 3  F. Supp. 722, 749 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (city officials have an 
"open door" policy). 
571 . See e.g., Black Political Task Force Litig., discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 29 1 ,  3 13 (D. Mass. 2004) (considering 
"evidence of instances in which legislators sought out minority groups and instituted programs designed to address 
the groups ' requests."); Calhoun County Litig., discussion at 8 1 3  F. Supp. 1 189, 1201 (N.D. Miss. 1 993) (noting 
county made efforts to include black participation in the redistricting process through its biracial collllllission); 
Terrazas Litig., discussion at 581  F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1 984) (considering the inclusion of minorities 
process of redistricting). 
572. Terrazas Litig., discussion at 581 F. Supp. 1 329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1 984) 
573. City of Rome Litig. (GA), discussion at 127 F.3d 1 355, 1 386 -87 (1 l th Cir. 1 997) ("Both voting statistics and 
testimonial evidence conclusively reveal that Rome 's black community has political influence. This political 
influence naturally translates into political responsiveness.") (footnote omitted): Hamrick Litig., discussion at 155 
F. Supp. 2d 1 355, 1 378 (N.D. Ga. 200 1 )  (finding "there is evidence of record that the city council members are 
responsive to the black community and that many of them have been supported by the black community."); City of 
Chicago -Bonilla Litig., discussion at 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1 997) (noting African Americans and 
Latinos were holding many positions within Cook County government, and that Latino and African-American 
aldermen testified that they found other white officials to be responsive.); Town of Babylon Litig., discussion at 
914 F. Supp. 843 , 890 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996) (finding town board "very responsive " to minority concerns, partially 
because the two Democratic members of the board "owe their election to the African-American vote."); Attala 
County Litig., discussion atNo. 1 :9 1 CV209-D-D, 1995 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 2 1569, at * 1 9  (N.D. Miss. Mar. 20, 
1995) (weighing the testimony of "political veterans" about the importance of the need for to get black support in 
favor of responsiveness); Rural West I Litig. ,  discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1 106 (W.D. Tenn. 1 995) ("A 
serious political candidate cannot ignore such a sizeable portion of the electorate."); Cincinnati Litig., discussion at 
No. C-1-92-278, 1 993 U.S.  Dist LEXIS 2 1009, at *36 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1 993) (considering evidence that officials 
need support of black collllllunity on a variety of issues, including any time they want to pass a tax levy, and many 
need it to get elected); Armour Litig. ,  775 F. Supp. 1044, 1058 (N.D. Ohio 1 991)  (considering that black voters 
always vote for the Democrat and the white voters swing between the two parties, so no candidate needs to be 
responsive to their concerns); Calhoun County Litig.,  discussion at 8 1 3  F. Supp. 1 189, 120 1 (N.D. Miss. 1993) 
(officials need minority vote to win elections); Ketchum Litig. (IL), discussion at 740 F.2d 1 398, 1405 (7th Cir. 
1984) (finding elected officials and the Democratic Party responsive to black and Hispanic concerns because of 
the number of minority candidates elected); Rybicki Litig. ,  discussion at 574 F. Supp. 1 147, 1 15 1 (N.D. Ill. 1983) 
(considering many officials in the Chicago area are minorities, and the Democratic Party needs their votes to get 
elected); City of Greenwood Litig. ,  534 F. Supp. 1 3 5 1  (N.D. Miss. 1982) (finding candidates must actively seek 
and gain the support of blacks to be elected); cf Kent County Litig.,  discussion at 790 F. Supp. 738, 749 (W.D. 
Mich. 1992) (evidence of racial appeals in campaigns "raises serious concerns about responsiveness."). 
574. See, e.g., Brewer Litig. (TX), discussion at 876 F.2d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 1 989) ("A plurality feature is of course 
more responsive to minority voter groups."). 
575. City of Chicago-Barnett Litig. (IL). discussion at 141 F.3d 699, 703 ( 7th Cir. 1998) (remanding and criticizing the 
responsiveness finding as "flawed methodology of relying on its own estimation of the responsiveness of 
particular incumbents to particular groups" because of the extent of racial bloc voting); Metro Dade County Litig. ,  
discussion at 805 F. Supp. 967, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1 992) (finding lack of responsiveness on remand because "there is 
severe racially polarized voting in Dade County Commission elections."); Haywood County Litig. ,  discussion at 
544 F. Supp. 1 122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (not making a finding on responsiveness but crediting ex1Jert testimony that 
officials would not have to be responsive because of the polarization in voting). 
576. Rural West II, discussion at 29 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459-60 (W.D. Tenn. 1 998); Rural West L discussion at 836 F. 
Supp. 453, 463 (W.D. Tenn. 1 993): City ofJackson Litig. ,  discussion at 683 F.  Supp. 15 15, 1 535 (W.D. Tenn. 
1 988); Houston v. Haley Litig .. discussion at 663 F. Supp. 346, 3 54 (N.D. Miss. 1 987). 
577. See France Litig., discussion at 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 3 17, 333 (S .D.N.Y. 1 999) (substantial responsiveness demonstrated 
by congressman's testimony about voter registration drives, efforts to establish local political clubs, and initiatives 
to add minorities to the Democratic party's county executive committees); Chickasaw County II Litig., discussion 
at No. CIV.A. 1 :92CV142-JAD, 1 997 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 22087 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997) (lack of responsiveness 
not found because of efforts to facilitate black voter registration through home visits and special assistants 
available at voting precincts); City of LaGrange Litig. , discussion at 969 F. Supp. 749, 770 (N.D. GA 1 997) 
(formation of biracial collllllittee to study redistricting process weighs in favor of responsiveness); Calhoun 
County Litig., discussion at 8 1 3  F. Supp. 1 189, 1201 (N.D.  Miss. 1 993) (finding that the appointment of biracial 
redistricting committee was partial evidence of responsiveness); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig. ,  discussion at 591  
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F. Supp. 802, 8 1 1  (W.D. Tex. 1 984) (deputizing high school principals as voting registrars so that they could 
register students upon turning 18  was evidence of responsiveness); Terrazas Litig., discussion at 581 F. Supp. 
1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984) ("The process by which, following the 1 980 census, the State of Texas drafted and 
adopted redistricting plans, culminating in the 1 983 House plan, far from evidencing official discrimination, 
convincingly evidences full minority access to the redistricting process and a willingness on the part of almost all 
involved in that process to consider and effectuate minority proposals."). 
578. Chickasaw County II Litig., discussion at No. CIV.A. 1 : 92CV142-JAD, 1997 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 22087. at *8 
(N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1 997). 
579. Operation Push Litig., discussion at 674 F. Supp. 1 245, 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (unresponsiveness found based 
upon failure to appoint deputy registrar/white officials hinder black registration): Marengo County Litig., 
discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1546, 1 572 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (failure to appoint minority registrars weighs in favor of 
finding lack of responsiveness); Citizen Action Litig., discussion at Civ. No. N 84-43 1 ,  1 984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24869 at * 12 -13  (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 1 984) (responsiveness lacking based on jurisdiction's failure to use available 
resources to increase voter registration, the absence of door-to-door canvassing, the scarcity of outreach, the 
decision to ban volunteer registrars, and the registrar's failure to provide bilingual ballots available at no cost from 
the state); Terrell Litig., discussion at 565 F. Supp. 338,  343 (N. D.  Tex. 1983) (refusal to open second more 
accessible polling station supports finding of lack of responsiveness); see also Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 
discussion at 804 F.2d 469, 477 (8th Cir. 1 986) (remanding for more findings on failure to hire Native American 
teachers or appoint a Native American deputy registrar). But cf Suffolk County Litig., discussion at 268 F. Supp. 
2d 243, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (failure to respond to plaintiff's letters regarding redistricting made Factor 8 "neutral 
at best") . 
580. SENATE REPORT supra note 1 5, at 27-3 0 .  
581. Marengo County Litig. (AL), 73 1 F.2d 1 546, 1 5 7 1  ( 1 1th Cir. 1 984). 
582. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column 9f=l , and Success, Jurisdiction). The lawsuits that held otherwise were: 
Southern Christian Leadership Litig. (AL), 56 F. 3d 1281  ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995) (finding the policy tenuous but no 
Section 2 violation where racial bloc voting was not established and no viable alternative to challenged plan was 
presented); Wamser Litig. (MO), 883 F.2d 6 17 (8th Cir. 1 989) (lower court found policy tenuous, but plaintiff 
involved lacked standing to bring challenge); 
583. See Master Lawsuit List (filter Column 9f=O, and Success, WasSection2Violated). 
584. Armour Litig. , 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991) :  Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1990); 
Wamser Litig. (MO), 883 F.2d 6 17 (8th Cir. 1989); Smith-Crittenden County Litig. , 687 F. Supp. 1310  (E.D. Ark. 
1988): Baldwin Bd. of Educ. Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1 988); City of Jackson Litig., 683 F. Supp. 
1515  (W.D. Tenn. 1 988); Marengo County Litig., 623 F. Supp. 3 3  (S.D. Ala. 1985); City of Greenwood Litig., 
599 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1 984); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig., 591  F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1984); 
Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984); McCarty Litig. (TX), 749 F.2d 1 134 (5th Cir. 1984); Major 
Litig. , 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1 983). 
585. See, e.g., Armour Litig., 775 F. Supp. 1 044 (N.D. Ohio 1 99 l ) (finding "simply no defensible basis" for the current 
boundaries because they are in clear violation of the state constitutional requirement "that the integrity of political 
subdivisions be respected whenever possible."); Monroe County Litig., 740 F. Supp. 4 17 (N.D. Miss. 1990) 
(holding the policy was tenuous where county gave no justification for districting plan, the population was 30% 
African American, no district was majority African American, and "[t]here is no state or county policy requiring 
majority white voting age populations in all supervisory and justice court judge districts"); Baldwin County Bd. of 
Education Litig., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1 988) (finding the policy tenuous where board of education gave 
no justification for at-large election system, the policy was tenuous because the board had a "pattern or practice" 
of shifting between at-large and single-member voting systems, which was motivated by a desire to prevent 
African-American candidates from winning school board seats); Wamser Litig., 679 F. Supp. 1513  (E.D. Mo. 
1 987) (finding tenuous city election lx>ard's lack of a justification for not reviewing ballots uncounted by ballot 
machine on the ground that some justification was necessary), overruled and dismissed for lack of standing, 883 
F.2d 6 1 7  (8th Cir. 1989); City of Greenwood Litig., 599 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (finding the policy 
tenuous where city gave no justification for at-large election system because there was no state policy favoring at­
large elections, and there was a tendency in Mississippi cities with a population of 10,000 or more to elect their 
city councils by multiple districts.); Marengo County Litig. (AL), discussion at 73 1 F.2d 1546 (1 1th Cir. 1984) 
(finding policy tenuous where county gave no justification for at-large commissioner and school board elections, 
because there was no strong state policy for or against at-large elections, and because this system was adopted in 
1 955 that the goal of the plan was to prevent an increase in African-American political participation); El Paso Ind. 
Sch. Dist., 591  F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Tex. 1 984) (finding the policy behind an at-large system was tenuous when the 
school district gave no justification and where the combination of a 1977 referendum and subsequent legislative 
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approval of single-member districts led the court to infer the only real reason for the system could be to 
discriminate);  Major v. Treen Litig., 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (finding policy tenuous where the 
reapportionment plan was passed without the input of African-American groups after Governor's veto threat). 
586. Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1 3 10 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (no evidence presented) ; City of Jackson 
Litig. ,  683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (finding at-large elections "for all practical purposes, a requirement 
for the commission form of government") ;  Lubbock Litig. (TX), 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th Cir. 1 984) ("the record 
does not elucidate the precise policies underlying the Lubbock at-large system") ;  McCarty Litig. (TX), 749 F.2d 
1 134 (5th Cir. 1 984) (no evidence presented) . 
587. See, e.g., Rural West I Litig., 836 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (finding justification of respect for traditional 
political boundaries not tenuous); Forest County Litig.,  194 F. Supp. 2d 867 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (finding policy of 
respecting traditional political boundaries nontenuous): Chattanooga Board of Comm'rs Litig., 722 F. Supp. 3 80 
(E.D. Tenn. 1 989) ( considering at-large policy was necessary to keep the commission fom1 of government): City 
of Jackson Litig., 683 F. Supp. 1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tenn. 1 988) (finding at-large policy was a "logical feature" of 
commission form of government). 
588. Rural West II Litig.,  209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting as tenuous state's claim that it sought to maintain 
political boundaries and thus not fracture the City of Jackson where challenged districting plan fractured cities in 
other parts of the state) .  
589. Liberty County Comm' rs Litig. (FL), 22 1 F.3d 1 2 1 8  ( 1 1th Cir. 2000); Niagara Falls Litig. ,  9 1 3  F. Supp. 722 
(W.D.N.Y. 1 994); Town of Babylon Litig., 9 1 4  F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1 996): City of Austin Litig .. discussion at 
CIV. No. A-84-CA- 1 89 ,  1985 WL 19986 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1985). 
590. See, e.g., Bone Shirt Litig. ,  336 F. Supp. 2d 976. 1048 (D. S.D. 2004) (finding that the policy was not supported by 
the idea that the people were happy with their districts because the only input the legislature had sought from the 
people was far away from the Indian Reservation, and the legislature did not make the plans accessible to the 
public); Terrell Litig . ,  565 F. Supp. 338,  341  (N.D. Tex. 1983) (finding the policy not supported because the 
people of Terrell had voted to change to single member districts in a referendum). 
591 . City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 5 1 5  (D. Mass. 1997); Red Clay School Dist. Litig. (DE), 1 16 F.3d 685 (3 d 
Cir. 1 997); City of Rome Litig. (GA), 1 27 F.3d 1355 ( 1 1th Cir. 1997): Hall v. Holder Litig. ,  757 F. Supp. 1 560 
(M.D. Ga. 1 99 1) (finding a single-member commission may be more responsive in a small county); City of Dallas 
Litig., 734 F. Supp. 1 3 1 7  (W.D . Tex. 1 990): City of Norfolk Litig., 679 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Va. 1988): Pasadena 
Indep. Sch. Dist. Litig.,  958 F. Supp. 1 1 96 (S .D.  Tex. 1 997). 
592. Blaine County Litig. (MT), 363 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2004); Town of Hempstead Litig., 956 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 
1 997) (discounting the responsiveness argument after finding Senate Factor 8 (a significant lack of 
responsiveness) met); Escambia County Litig., 748 F.2d 1037 ( 5th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court finding that 
the responsiveness explanation was inconsistent with the current operation of the Commission): City of 
Springfield Litig., 658 F.  Supp. 1015 ,  1033 (C.D. Ill. 1987) ( "The claim of responsiveness of the officials to the 
electorate is tenuous in a community where racially polarized voting exists. The responsiveness of the elected 
official is, of course, to the white majority that elected him and not to the black minority which is without the 
ability to elect candidates of their choice to seats of power."); see also City of Columbia Litig. ,  850 F. Supp. 404, 
425 (D.S.C. 1 993) ( "Mixed systems provide neighborhood, and therefore often minority, representatives, but 
nevertheless avoid the factionalism and 'turfism' often associated with all single-member districts. Mixed systems 
provide the advantage of a city-wide perspective, but nevertheless avoid the problems often associated with at­
large systems of lack of diversity on the council and neglect of neighborhoods . . .  The overwhelming weight of the 
evidence offered in this case suggests that Columbia's mixed system functions exactly as designed, in terms of 
attention to neighborhood concerns, but without resulting in factionalism or turfism.") 
593. See, e.g., Cousin Litig. (TN), 145 F.3d 8 1 8  (6th Cir. 1998); Prejean Litig. (LA), 227 F.3d 504, 5 16 ( 5th Cir. 2000); 
France v. Pataki, 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 3 1 7  (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Davis v. Chiles Litig. (FL), 1 3 9  F.3d 14 14, 142 1 (1 lth Cir. 
1 998): Southern Christian Leadership Conference Litig. (AL), 56 F.3d 128 1 ,  1295 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 995) (en bane); 
Nipper Litig. (FL), 3 9  F.3d 1494, 1534 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 994) (en bane); LULAC v. Clements Litig. (TX), 999 F.2d 83 1 ,  
857-58 (5th Cir. 1993);  Magnolia Bar Ass'n Litig., 7 9 3  F .  Supp. 1386 (S.D. Miss. 1992). 
594. See, e.g., Pn�jean Litig. (LA) , 83 Fed. App 'x 5,  1 1  (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that drawing district lines to protect 
incumbent judges who happened to be white was not tenuous and did not violate Section 2 or the Constitution, as 
politics not race was the primary motivation); Fund for Accurate & Informed Representation Litig., 796 F. Supp. 
662, 672 (N.D.N.Y. 1 992) ("plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any linkage between the alleged fragmentation of 
minority communities in Monroe, Nassau, Erie or Westchester Counties, and an alleged intent to preserve the 
incumbency of 'certain white incumbents,' " so not only could no intentional discrimination be shown, but also: 
"Plaintiffs have not convinced us that the state legislature 's decision to heighten the minority population in certain 
Assembly districts is a pretext for an unworthy goal. Moreover, under some circumstances, the use of a lower 
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population threshold for minority districts may lead to ineffective minority control districts. This choice is a matter 
of judgment, and we cannot say on this record that the legislature exercised its judgment unlawfully."). 
595. See, e.g., Gingles Litig., 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (protecting incumbents was "obviously" not enough to 
justify racial vote dilution). 
596. See, e.g ,  Black Political Taskforce Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 29 1 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding that "race [was] used as a 
tool to achieve incumbency protection" in the drawing of Massachusetts state legislative district lines after the 
2000 census) ; Ketchum Litig. (IL), 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 (7th Cir. 1 984) ("We think there is little point for present 
purposes in distinguishing discrimination based on an ultimate objective of keeping certain incumbent whites in 
office from discrimination borne of pure racial animus."); Buskey v. Oliver Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 
1 983) (drawing district to ensure defeat of political rival is tenuous where jurisdiction knew effect would be to 
dilute black voting power). But see Escambia County Litig. (FL), 638 F.2d 1239, 1245 (5th Cir.) ("the desire to 
retain one 's incumbency unaccompanied by other evidence ought not to be equated with an intent to discriminate 
against blacks qua blacks") . 
597. Westwego Litig., discussion at CIV. A. NO. 84-5599, 1989 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 7298, at * 16, 1 989 WL 73332, at *7 
(E.D. La. June 28, 1 989) ("The undisputed evidence at trial revealed that Westwego's five aldermen head the 
city' s  five departments. Thus, the board of aldermen is functionally better suited to at-large election than election 
by single-member district.") ;  Armstrong v. AllainLitig. , 893 F. Supp. 1 320 (S.D. Miss. 1 994) (finding a 60% 
requirement for school bond referenda was justified by the fact that school districts had a number of alternative 
sources of reve nue for capital expenditures.); Calhoun County Litig., 8 1 3  F. Supp. 1 189 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (policy 
of keeping districts with equal road mileage nontenuous); Aldasoro v. Kennerson Litig., 922 F .  Supp. 339  (S.D. 
Cal. 1 995) (noting the reasons for keeping an at-large system were El Centro was too small for single districts and 
finding the at-large system allowed minorities to elect); Lafayette County Litig., 84 1 F.  Supp. 75 1 (N.D. Miss. 
1 993) (equal road mileage); Chattanooga Board of Comm'rs Litig.,  722 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1 989) (finding it 
was necessary to keep the commission form of government); Buchanan v. City of Jackson Litig., 683 F. Supp. 
1 5 1 5  (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (logical feature of commission form of government); Operation PushLitig., 674 F. Supp. 
1245 , 1268 (N.D. Miss. 1987) ('The clerks are responsible for registering all voters and must have some discretion 
in selecting those agents and employees who will assist the circuit cletks in accomplishing their objective. The 
court concludes that some measure of discretion and flexibility is needed for the registration process to work 
smoothly and efficiently." (citation omitted)); Smith-Crittenden County Litig., 687 F. Supp. 1 3 10 (E.D. Ark. 1 988) 
(finding a state policy supporting multi-member districts is neither tenuous nor particularly strong): NAACP v. 
Fordice Litig. (MS), 252 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding requested reorganization would cost the state millions 
of dollars and finding cost efficiency reasons not tenuous); Cincinnati Litig. (OH), 40 F.3d 807, 814  (6th Cir. 
1 994) ( "Moreover, given the difficulties experienced in the administration of PR, we cannot say that the policy 
underlying 9X is 'tenuous. ' "); City of Philadelphia Litig. (PA) , 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994) (accepting a voter 
purge law as not tenuous because the policy was deemed to prevent voter fraud). 
598. Operation PushLitig., 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1266 (N.D. Miss. 1 987). 
599. Holder v. Hall Litig. ,  757 F. Supp. 1560 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (finding use of single person commissioner historically 
fostered responsiveness); Dallas County Comm'n Litig .. 636 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ala. 1 986) (considering a long­
standing statewide policy in favor of at-large elections without regard to race. dating back to the first Alabama 
school board in 1 854): City of FortLauderdale Litig., 617 F. Supp. 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1 985) (noting the at-large 
system had been in place since 1 9 1 1  and there was no evidence of invidious intent); Houston v. Haley Litig., 663 
F.  Supp. 346 (N.D. Miss. 1987) ("Oxford held aldermen elections through single-member districts for as long as 
anyone could remember, except after the 1970 census when because of state statute and growth in population the 
city was required to hold at-large elections for a brief period."); Milwankee NAACP Litig., 935 F .  Supp. 1 4 1 9  
(E.D. Wis. 1 996) (noting Wisconsin had history of using at-large elections for judges dating back to its 1 848 
constitution.) .  
600. Milwaukee NAACP Litig. (WI), 1 16 F .  3d  1 194 (7th Cir. 1 997). 
601 .  Kirksey v. Allain Litig., 658 F. Supp. 1 1 83 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
602. Terrazas Litig., 581  F. Supp. 1 329 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (Even though incumbency was a factor in the 
reapportiomnent, the other factors were present as well such as the need to comply with one person one vote and 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and plaintiff failed to show that the policy behind it was tenuous.); Sanchez­
Colorado Litig.,  97 F.3d 1 303, 1325 (10th Cir. 1 996) (criticizing but not finding clearly erroneous the district 
courts finding that the underlying policy was VRA compliance, noting "[t]he record casts doubt on the court 's 
finding that the Commission from beginning to end observed the tenets of § 2."). 
603. Bone Shirt Litig. ,  discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1048 (D.S .D. 2004). 
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604. As explained by the Court, proportionality is distinct from proportional representation, which links the proportion 
of minority officeholders to the minority group's share of the relevant population. See De Grandy Litig .. 
discussion at 5 12 U.S. 997, 1014 n. 1 1  ( 1994) . 
605. Id. at 1020-2 1 .  
606. Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F .  Supp. 2d 2 9 1  (D . Mass. 2004): Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 
(D.S.D. 2004); Old Person Litig. (CA) , 3 12 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002); Campuzano Litig., 200 F. Supp. 2d 905 
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Rural West II Litig., 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); Liberty County Comm' rs Litig. (FL), 221 F.3d 
1218 (1 1th Cir. 2000); City of Chicago-Bonilla Litig. (IL), 141 F.3d 699 ( 7th Cir. 1998); County of Thurston 
Litig. (NE), 129 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 1 997); African American Voting Rights LDF Litig.,  994 F. Supp. 1 105 (E.D. 
Mo. 1997); City of Holyoke Litig., 960 F. Supp. 5 1 5  (D. Mass. 1 997); Rural West I Litig.,  877 F. Supp. 1096 
(W.D. Tenn. 1 995); St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig., 90 F.3d 1 357 (8th Cir. 1 996); Little Rock Litig. (AR), 56 F.3d 
904 (8th Cir. 1995); City of Columbia Litig. (SC), 33 F.3d 52 (4th Cir. 1 994): Austin Litig., 857 F. Supp. 560 
(E.D. Mich. 1 994); see also Rural West l Litig .. discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1096. 1 109-1 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) 
(addressing proportionality but not ultimately making a definitive finding on it); City of Chicago Litig. (IL), 
discussion at 141 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding proportionality absent and remanding for additional 
findings to determine whether the deviation from proportionality can be justified by reference to other appropriate 
districting factors because "[ d]eviations from proportionality, especially small ones, can be justified by reference 
to other factors, such as the compactness of districts and t11e desirability of preserving continuity and recognizing 
topographical, cultural, and economic factors that may make one ward mapping preserve communities of political 
interest better than another.") . 
607. Rodriguez Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Perry Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 4 5 1  (E.D. Tex. 2004); 
Campuzano Litig., 200 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Liberty County Comm' rs Litig., 221 F.3d 1 2 1 8  (1 1th Cir. 
2000); African American Voting Rights LDF Litig., 994 F. Supp. 1 105 (E.D. Mo. 1 997): City of Holyoke Litig., 
960 F. Supp. 5 15 (D. Mass. 1 997); St. Louis Bd. of Educ. Litig.,  90 F.3d 1 357 ( 8th Cir. 1996); City of St. Louis 
Litig., 54 F.3d 1 345 (8th Cir. 1 995); Little Rock Litig., 56 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 1 995); City of Columbia Litig., 33 
F.3d 52 (4th Cir. 1994); AustinLitig., 857 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1 994). 
608. Bone Shirt Litig., 3 36 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004): Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. 
Mass. 2004): Rural West II Litig.,. 209 F.3d 835 (6tl1 Cir. 2000); Old Person Litig., 3 12 F.3d 1036 ( 9th Cir. 
2002); County ofThurston Litig., 129 F.3d 1015  (8th Cir. 1 997) . 
609. Bone Shirt Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004); Black Political Task Force Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. 
Mass. 2004); Rural West II Litig. (TN), 209 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 2000); County of Thurston Litig. (NE), 129 F.3d 
1015 (8th Cir. 1997). 
610. Old Person Litig. (MT), discussion at 3 12 F.3d 1036, 1050 ( 9th Cir. 2002). In ultimately affirming the judgment of 
the district court finding a lack of vote dilution, though, the Ninth Circuit panel made clear that its decision to 
affirm the ultimate conclusions of the lower court had more to do with the standard of review than the weight 
which the panel would have accorded to some pieces of evidence. See id. 
61 1 .  City of St. Louis Litig., 54 F.3d 1 345, 1357 (8th Cir. 1 995) ("We also hold that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment where the record before it demonstrated that sustained and substantial proportionality existed 
between the percentage of blacks in the citywide voting age population and the number of safe black wards."). 
612. De Grandy, 5 12 U.S. 997, 1023 ( 1994). 
613. Black Political Task Force Litig.,  discussion at 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 ,  3 12 (D. Mass. 2004 ). 
614. Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  494-95 & n. 1 34 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("Plaintiffs ' own experts and 
argument reminded this court that because of the lower turnout of Latino voters, a low majority of the Hispanic 
citizen voting age population does not produce an effective Latino opportunity district.") . 
615. The Court explained that it examined allegations of dilution in the geographic terms stated by plaintiffs themselves 
who had specifically alleged dilution only in particular regions of the state rather than the plan as a whole. As such 
the Court "had no occasion to decide which frame of reference should have been used" had the matter not already 
been agreed upon by the parties in the district court. See De Grandy, 5 1 2  U.S. at 1 022. 
616. Rural West I Litig., discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1 109-10 (W.D. Tenn. 1 995); Rural West II Litig. (TN), 
discussion at 209 F.3d 835, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2000); Austin Litig. ,  discussion at 857 F. Supp. 560, 569 (E.D. Mich. 
1994); Bone Shirt Litig., discussion at 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1 048-49 (D .S.D. 2004). 
617. Rural West I Litig., discussion at 877 F. Supp. 1 096, 1 109 (W.D. Tenn. 1 995). 
618. Rural West II Litig. (TN), discussion at 209 F.3d 835, 843 (6th Cir. 2000). 
619. Austin Litig., discussion at 857 F. Supp. 560, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1 994). 
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620. Perry Litig., discussion at 298 F. Supp. 2d 45 1 ,  494 ("Because the Supreme Court has not yet provided precise 
guidance on the proper standard for assessing proportionality, however, we also examine proportionality on a 
statewide basis.") 
621 .  Old Person Litig. (MT), discussion at 230 F.3d 1 1 13 ,  1 129-30 (9th Cir. 2000). 
622. Blytheville Sch. Dist. Litig., discussion at 7 1 F.3d 1382,  1382 n.6 (8th Cir. 1 995) ("De Grandy resolved a claim 
involving 'proportionality,'  which 'links the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members' 
share of the relevant population. ' Here, because we address a claim involving a single at-large district the analyses 
between proportionality and proportional representation are essentially the same."); City of St. Louis Litig., 896 F. 
Supp. 929, 943 (E.D. Mo. 1 995) ( "In Johnson v. De Grandy, the Supreme Court indicated that even if a plaintiff 
succeeds in establishing the Gingles preconditions, a defendant may be able to defeat a § 2 claim by showing that 
the minority group in question has achieved, or will achieve, substantially proportional representation under the 
challenged districting plan.") 
623. Liberty County Comm' rs Litig. ,  discussion at 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1 570 (N.D. Fla. 1997) ("Proportionality, while 
not dispositive of a section 2 claim, is a relevant factor which should be examined under the totality of the 
circumstances. The proportionality inquiry is very straight forward in this case. Blacks have not achieved 
proportional representation on the Liberty County School Board. Not only is there no black currently serving on 
the school board, no black has ever served on the school board. The opposite is true with the Liberty County 
Commission. Since 1990, Earl Jennings, a black, has served as one of the five county commissioners. As stated 
earlier, blacks make up 17.63 percent of the total population and 25.03 of the voting age population of Liberty 
County. Thus, with blacks comprising twenty percent of the county commission's membership, blacks have 
clearly achieved proportional representation on the county commission. Such proportional representation does not 
automatically preclude a finding of section 2 liability, although it is obviously some evidence that blacks have 
equal access to the political process in Liberty County.") (internal citations omitted). 
624. Liberty County Comm'rs Litig., discussion at 22 1 F.3d 12 1 8, 1225 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1 973(b)). 
Documenting Discrimination 1 17 
